

PHILOSOPHICAL REFLECTIONS

Dr. B. L. Atreya Souvenir Volume : PART II

(ii)

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Philosophical Reflections

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That means, then, that our nice concept of the unity of psychology is a thoroughly false one. Two sciences on the same subject—*Hunt* continues—contradictory in their basic assumptions and inferences cannot be both true at the same time. Sooner or later, one of them will have to give up. And *Hunt* supposes that it will be psychology rather than pedagogics.

His assumption is supported by two experiments (among others) published almost at the same time: *Schenk-Danzinger's* experiment with a human child and *Harlow's* experiment with the child of the rhesus monkey. According to them it appears, first, that the question of whether or not those beings will accept the social behaviour desired in their group is decided at a stage of their development, where they cannot have any experience with pleasant or unpleasant consequences of certain behaviour in the group—which, according to the S-R-model of the classical learning theory, is the necessary condition for the appropriation of suitable patterns of social behaviour—because they are still hanging on the breast of their mothers. Second, there has not been, as yet, a successful attempt to return an uncared-for to the path of virtue, i.e., back to the desired social behaviour, by punishing his undesired behaviour and rewarding the desired one. To this end, quite different measures are needed, as we may read—to name only the sources on hand—in the classical studies of *Aichhorn*, and also in the works of *Alfons Simon* and *H. Fulliger*.

However, is it really so bad with psychology? Is the S-R-scheme, including the modifications introduced by passive and active conditioning, really all that psychology has to offer for the solution of educational problems? This question is parallel with that of the unity of psychology, i.e., with whether there are really no more differing conceptions and schools in psychology. Should the answer be affirmative, it would be necessary—to cope with the knowledge and needs of the pedagogues—to invent immediately a new psychology which would correspond better to the reality of man.

Moreover, an affirmative answer would mean that psychology is no longer a young, vital, progressive science, as such sciences are characterized by continuous emerging of new problems bringing about the most contradictory assumptions or hypotheses. And it is an age-old experience that one of the most significant driving powers of progress is the effort to find among these contradictory assumptions the correct one. The notion "assumption" or "hypothesis" should not be understood here in the diluted sense of statistical lingo where it means only one of several possible outcomes of a situation, which—if it does not come true—is "rejected". This notion means something more to us: a not yet or not yet sufficiently proved assumption concerning a more or less broad scope of functional relations, in about the sense in which the notion "model" is understood today, but without the presently much advocated meaning that only a mathematical formulation makes a full-fledged model out of a hazy idea. (See also *Droessler*, Congress in Vienna, Symposium on Perception.) Thus, we understand the notion "hypothesis" in the old sense, as a statement, which could be promoted to the status of a theory by sufficient experimental proof.

Of course, there will always be hypotheses of very different ranges. And only in those cases where the hypotheses had a sufficient range, a sufficiently broad area of validity, a basic significance, was it customary to speak about a "school", especially

it advocated several different, logically independent but "matching" hypotheses at the same time.

Thus, the question appears to be as follows: are there still some differences in opinions concerning the *basic* questions in psychology?

II. The Principles of Contemporary Psychology

Let us take, as our first example, orthodox behaviourism, as it was represented, for example, by Skinner, because it is widely considered *the* psychology of the present time (also by Hunt). Analysis shows that it is built up of about a dozen principles conceived by the prominent representatives of the school as axioms or articles of faith. However, they *might* be nothing more than unproved hypotheses.

1. The Principle of Objectivity

Only data which can be observed and recorded from *outside* may be used in psychology if it is supposed to be scientific psychology. Psychology can cope with its ambition to be an empirical science only as a science of behaviour.

This is not a hypothesis concerning the facts of psychology; rather, it is a methodic rule, or, more clearly, a *prohibition* to evaluate certain data because of their lack of reliability.

2. The Principle of Passivity or of Primary Reactivity

The psycho-physical organism starts to function only because of external influence. Thus, the objective of the science of behaviour is to assess the relations between the influences *from* outside (stimuli or situations, "S") and the reactions *towards* the outside world (responses, "R"), i.e., the "S-R-relation". The reactions R, bring about a mostly new situation resp. a new kind of influence S_2 ; thus, the elementary relation as a whole may be symbolized as S_1 -R- S_2 .

3. The Principle of Genetic Identity of Psycho-physical Systems

The hereditary or innate psychic outfit is the *same* for all men, if not for all vertebrata. Therefore, for experimental research of human behaviour, doves or rats may be used.

4. The Principle of Minimum Genetic Outfit (of Tabula Rasa)

Without taking into account some elementary reflexes, there are no hereditary relations between the influences S and the reactions R. All differences in reactions R are the result of previous differences in the surroundings S (i.e., S from birth till the respective moment): *milieu theory* or environmentalism. What a person knows, he has *learned* during his individual existence. The capability of learning is the basic property of the psychic. Theoretical psychology is basically a theory of learning.

Principles (3) and (4) form together the doctrine called *empiricism* since the 18th century.

5. The Principles of Elementarism and Connectionism

Learning is a process of formation of connections between elementary facts, of

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as the process may affect itself at least at one single spot, though by means of special conductive connections.

According to the tension-reduction model the psycho-physical system seeks under all circumstances a quiet state. This model may therefore be understood as an expression of the *principle of quietism*: all activity is the result of disturbances and "sweet leisure" is the normal state of man.

9. The Principles of Chance and Effect

In order to understand the formation of new connections and the extinction of existing ones, as in passive ("classical" Pavlovian) conditioning, no new principle is needed, as conditioning is but another name for association introduced for the special case in which one of the elements to be connected is an activity of the subject.

If new types of performance are needed as in trial and error learning resp. operant or instrumental conditioning, these can—as a consequence of principle 7—only be found by chance and recognized as suitable and retained by their effect.

10. The Principle of Additivity of Personality Structure

The S-R-connections reinforced by success-failure learning are also called habits. Personality or character is the sum of habits. Any of these habits may be induced or eliminated individually without changing anything in all other habits (vegetable bed model). From these ideas of formation and elimination of habits results immediately the old, traditional, but, by modern pedagogics, rejected practice of "candy and whip". As the desirability or undesirability is determined by the educating society, the result of such an education is the maximum obtainable degree of adaptation (adjustment) or the conformity, in other words, *opportunism*.

11. The Principle of Reductionism

There are no autochthonous psychic dynamics. All dynamics, e.g., that of learning, of thinking, of exploring, serves the purpose of decreasing organismic tensions. He, who is not hungry, does not think.

12. In the area of social psychology, reductionism results in The Principle of Primary Social Atomism

There are no primary social needs and desires. They are only secondarily formed by conditioning, i.e., by the realization that certain persons are exceptionally suitable tools or means for the gratification of certain organismic needs and/or for the reduction of certain organismic tensions. In this respect, there is an unanimity between behaviourism and psychoanalysis.

III. Axioms or Hypotheses ?

A question arises here: are the above principles axioms, i.e., necessary presumptions of any psychology, or are they hypotheses, which—in the present state of the science—would have to permit the existence of other hypotheses and eventually—perhaps even now—give way to them; in other words, are there still opposite schools in psychology? Thus, our question is: are the above principles necessary? And, in addition, are they sufficient?

1. *On the Principle of Objectivity*

The principle of subjectivity cannot be considered an alternative to the objectivity principle. It characterizes a historical phase of psychology which continued until the introduction of behaviourism. As the objectivity principle is a prohibition, the alternative would be a psychology *without this prohibition*. This alternative is realized in phenomenological psychology, in "Gestalt theory" and in a number of other approaches of present psychology, and—as we shall see—it is successful.

Incidentally, behaviourism itself—even at its extremes—disregarded its own prohibition from the moment it started to speak about the "concealed", "internal", "preceding", "behaviour", meaning processes which cannot be registered by physiological means, but which are rather unequivocally identical with the acts and contents of subjective psychology. The confession of having given up a principle which played a fundamental role in the establishment declaration of behaviourism is, of course, embarrassing. However, it is even more embarrassing that this abandonment of a basic principle not only was *not* confessed but rather veiled by semantic manipulations, by adding to the names of these subjective facts the suffix "behaviour".

Thus, a psychology without the principle of objectivity is not only possible but rather inevitable. That is why we have a new variant of behaviourism calling itself "subjective behaviourism" (G.A. Miller, E. Galanter, K.H. Pribram, 1960). The adjective, of course, inevitably annuls the only clear denotation of the word "Behaviourism" as a *non-subjective* psychology.

2. *On the Principle of Primary Reactivity*

Here, also, the alternative is not a concept of a psycho-physical organism characterized by exclusively spontaneous activity; the true alternative is an organism capable as well of spontaneous activity as of re-action, and, in which, in many cases the reactive behaviour patterns are only superposed on the primary spontaneous ones.

As it was proven by Coghill, the first movements of the amblystomic larva are spontaneous because they occur at a stage of development when the receptor nerves do not yet have connections with the motor centers. The same was shown by von Holst, e.g., that the rhythmic-locomotor fin movements of the fish are not triggered and maintained by external stimuli and that these stimuli only modify them. Behaviour in play and in exploration goes also beyond the limits of the S-R-scheme, as the opportunity for it is *looked for* even by animals and as it immediately starts anew after each conclusion, i.e., after each reduction of tension.

In this case as well, the unavoidable necessity to accept these facts is veiled by behaviourists by a notorious renaming manoeuvre: in the place of the objectively observable—that means originally unequivocally external triggering situation S (with respect to the organism)—simply a non-observable inner-organismic environment of the *motor centers* is introduced; and it appears as if the meaning of the term reaction had not been changed.

Anyway, a psychology rejecting the principle of primary reactivity is not only possible, but rather required by the facts.

3. On the Principle of Genetic Identity

The principle of genetic identity of psycho-physical systems is identical with the denial of specific inborn traits. Here also, the alternative would not be a psychology which would try to reduce all differences in the behaviour of different individuals to the differences of the predispositions, but rather a psychology that would avoid dogmatic presuppositions with regard to the contribution of genetic and environmental factors to individual differences.

As to the validity of this principle for all vertebrata, this was clearly refuted by an abundance of results of recent comparative behavioural research, obtained under pure conditions, e.g., in the Kasper-Hauser experiment.

As to the differences in human psycho-physical genetic outfit, no basic doubts exist any more. The existing controversy pertains only to the *relative effects* of innate outfit and of environment.

In spite of all this, behaviourism is still stuck with the principle of genetic identity. This is a result of an attitude that is even less scientific than the method of renaming, namely simply ignoring all facts not corresponding to one's principles (See K. Lorenz 1961).

Altogether, it appears that a psychology without the principle of genetic identity is not only possible, but—in the face of the existing facts—necessary.

4. On the Principle of Genetic Minimum Outfit

In the discussion of this principle it is necessary to take into account the fact that the principle of objectivity was already rejected by behaviourism itself (see above). The most significant arguments against the minimum outfit principle are derived from the subjective sphere.

In contrast to the *tabula rasa* approach, all sensual data enter.

- (a) an *already existing* and *unchangeable* system of dimensions—not more and not less than three space—and one time-dimension. Moreover, sensual data are limited to a system of elementary qualities *already existing*. Interestingly, this system may differ between individuals in a clearly definable way according to their basic outfit (Daltonism).
- (b) the bulk of the sensual data is divided and grouped spontaneously in accordance with a *given* system of categories.
- (c) the grouping is distributed all over the three given space dimensions according to the minimum and/or optimum principles (Pragnaoz-tendencies) which are inherent to the system and not modifiable by individual experience, thus only partially according to experience, but partially defying experience. (See among others, E. Mach, W. Metzger, G. Kanizsa).

The facts (a), (b) and (c) are not consequences of experiences, but rather *conditions* which make it possible to acquire any experience; they are "pre-empirical".

The principle of reaction patterns inherent to the system is not to be confused with the principle of nativism. Nativism maintains only—in contrast to empiricism—that adjustment to reality is in certain aspects reached phylogenetically rather than ontogenetically. It does not mention system-specific reaction patterns at all. Moreover,

there are in the case of animals, many and, in the case of men, at least several structures originating from the above laws, without any previous experience resp. success and error learning with biologically specific releasing functions. These cannot be understood without admitting some analogon of the much abused "idea innata". (The English expression IRM—innate releasing mechanism, as well as the German AAM—angeborener auslösender Mechanismus, adequately reflect these facts only in their first two words, but the word "mechanism" is misleading and should be replaced by the word "cue", in German "Merkmal").

All this means that the principle of genetic minimum outfit is not consistent with the facts. Thus, a psychology without this principle is not only possible but rather necessary.

5. On the Principles of Elementarism and Connectionism

Under the assumption that the principle of objectivity is rejected, it becomes necessary to discuss the above two principles with a view to the three following problems :

- (1) The problem of autonomous motions (motorics)
- (2) The problem of the surrounding world (situations)
- (3) The problem of the relation between the situation and motorics, which is the basis of behaviour.

The alternative to the statement that all larger complexes in the psychological sphere result from the connection of elementary facts is not the statement that, in the psychic life, "everything is interconnected" at the beginning and that, only in time, by means of maturation and learning processes, this universal interconnection is gradually split up and resolved (William James, Hans Cornelius, Felix Krueger, Helms Werner).

The alternative is rather an assumption that the development and learning processes :

- (a) split up and resolve existing larger complexes,
- (b) combine existing small complexes, which, in extreme cases, may have the character of elements, into larger complexes, and
- (c) that existing structures may change into others by simultaneous resolving and recombining.

In such a psychology, too the question arises as to whether one of these processes is primary and, if this is the case, which one. Here only the following is certain :

- (1) in the sphere of motorics, the primary process of development is the process (a), the splitting or differentiation of the originally total motion patterns which employ all available muscles, (Coghill).
- (2) similarly, in establishing the structure of the surrounding world, the primary one is not the problem of combining "units" but rather that of establishing boundaries, that means, again, the problem of differentiation.
- (3) on the other hand—at least in the case of man—the secondary connection between situation and activities in the sense of behaviourism seems to be the more frequent or perhaps the main means of change even when, as the possibility of extinction of existing connections proves, not the only one.

6. On the Principle of Contiguity or Contact

Contact or time-space vicinity is an important but neither a sufficient nor necessary condition for the formation of connections.

It is not sufficient. The perception field is a continuum without gaps. Thus, the problem arising here may be verbalized in the following way : how it is possible that two processes A, B, taking place in an immediate contact with each other, form a unity whereas two processes B, C, taking place in an immediate contact with each other as well differentiate from each other. Apparently, other principles must be involved.

The same as has been said about the primary field differentiation may be repeated in the case of association experiments. Under completely identical time-space conditions, very different numbers of repetitions are needed in order to establish a connection independent of the materials which are to be connected. In addition, the durability of such connections is very different. Even in this case it is not possible to speak of an exclusive effectiveness of the space-time factor.

On the other hand, the space-time vicinity is not necessary. In problem solving processes, the facts which are "required" in order to fill in a specific gap are often brought from a considerable distance. This does not always happen through an active search but frequently results immediately from the dynamics of the process.

7. On the Principle of Contingency or of Arbitrariness

What is missing in the principle of time-space vicinity for the explanation of the primary field differentiation is provided for by the principle of non-arbitrariness of the connections. The connections and differentiations occur unequivocally according to optimum and/or minimum conditions. (Metzger, 1966).

On the other hand, the animal and human nervous systems, beyond the primary field differentiation, have a very remarkable capacity to form and preserve completely arbitrary (accidental or deliberately chosen) connections, for instance, that of a person and a name or of a name and a telephone number, apparently on the grounds of a mere "togetherness".

Ceteris paribus, however, between the meaningless and meaningful connections, there exists a remarkable difference in the case of their establishment, and in the stability of their preservation. Here, the expression "meaningful" has two denotations :

- one of the facts may be an image of the other one (e.g., series of numbers and series of digits on a dial) or it has similar or corresponding "general properties".
- one of the facts is "missing" in the other one—it is "required" by the other one. By its introduction, a "complete" whole of a uniform lawful structure is formed. (Wertheimer, 1945.)

The furthering effects of consistency holds according to everyday experience for the S-R-relation as well. This, naturally, is to be assessed by further systematic research.

As it appears in a more precise analysis, the multiplicity of the behavioural patterns produced during the first phase of the trial and error process is in no way, as

maintained, arbitrary with regard to the sought goal. Rather, from the infinite multitude of possible behavioural patterns, a choice is made in the sense of an—at least seeming—goal relevance, i.e., in the sense of preferring those actions which promise, because of their character, the possibility of attaining the goal.

All in all, a psychology in which the principles of contiguity and contingency would be banished to a more modest place which is proper for them is possible as well as required by the facts.

8. *On the Question of the Machine Character of the Relations between Situations and Reactions*

As shown above, behaviourism has three different models of this relation—two strictly mechanistic, and one with dynamic properties. The mechanistic models are :

- (a) The conduction and switching model (telephone network type)
- (b) The release mechanism model (trigger type)

The quasi-dynamic one is the homeostatic model.

According to the first two models, the organism is an aggregate of mechanisms, according to the third one, an aggregate of (normally) idle subsystems with feedback connections, remaining in a state of rest unless their equilibrium is disturbed. The aggregate structure is characteristic of all three models. Further, all three models maintain that a psycho-physical organism, if not stimulated, is in a quiet state which is changed by stimulation into activity only for a limited time. In the first and second case, this reflects the fact that the psychic subsystems are considered mechanisms ready for eventual use, in the third case, that the equilibrium state of the subsystems is understood as a static equilibrium.

However, there is a fourth possibility, the most probable one (taking into account the fact that the psycho-physical processes take place in a living organism). It has two complementary assumptions :

- (a) Not only within the subsystems of the psycho-physical system there exists a dynamic relation between their elements. Such a relation also exists between the different subsystems themselves and between the total psycho-physical system and the rest of the organism as well. Thus there exists a highly complicated system of highly sensitive equilibria with a hierarchy of smaller and larger areas.
- (b) As to these equilibria, they are not static. Rather, in each point of the system, there constantly exists a characteristic static disequilibrium which preserves certain active processes. In physics these processes are called stationary or quasi-stationary processes. Ludwig von Bertalanffy introduced the simple expression "steady states".

That means, however, that the organismic subsystems are constantly active. Thus, the "stimulus" *S* does not cause the activity of the organism; as a change in the conditions surrounding the organismic system, it only modifies an already existing activity. This was already supposed by E. Hering (in his *Chronology*). Wolfgang Koehler, proceeding from an idea of Max Wertheimer (1922), proved in the year 1920-22 that this supposition is in accordance with the current ideas of physics and

used it in his theory of perception. Ludwig von Bertalanffy, proceeding from biological facts and ideas, showed the basic significance of the steady state. E. von Holst, in his theory of position reflexes, strictly proved the fact of continuous activity of the nervous system *modified* only by external conditions.

Static equilibriums and steady states have one characteristic in common. Both tend towards structurally defined, time-independent, final state, determined solely by the parameters of the system, and thus independent of the initial conditions. These final states are established or re-established (in case of disturbances) in different ways according to the initial conditions. Thus, the entire process achieves a character of *finality* without defying natural laws.

Moreover, systems preserving a steady state have some properties which are missing in the systems tending towards a static equilibrium only. The processes which enable a system in a steady state to stay in it take materials from the surroundings of the system, and, with them, "negative entropy". There is another fact which is connected with this which was shown by W. Koehler and Ludwig von Bertalanffy in independent works. They have a capability of transition into states of higher complexity and regularity, into states of higher order, and, that means of lower entropy. Thus, they behave *seemingly* in defiance of the second law of thermodynamics.

This holds true not only for the development of more and more highly organized beings in the course of phylogenesis and for the development of a mature organism from the fertilized ovum (morphogenesis), but also for the productive psychic processes. Apparently, they do not take their energy from the external surroundings, like the whole organism, but rather from the psychic surrounding field, from the psychic neighboring systems, so that, in the limit case of a (sound) obsession by a (scientific, artistic technological, organizational) problem, these neighboring systems may become deprived of energy and the respective man, as it were, "consumes himself" (W. Koehler). In other words, during these processes, the dynamics of the gratification of elementary needs may become more or less and, at least for a certain time, the less significant one.

This dynamic approach to the relation between the situation and reaction allows clarification not only of the facts which were already explained in another way by behaviourism, but also of two basic psychological facts which were not explained by behaviourism : finality and productivity.

The fact that this not so simple idea was founded on the basis of both objective (von Bertalanffy, von Holst) and subjective data (Koehler, Wertheimer) indicates that the denial of scientific usefulness of subjective data (the first principle of behaviourism) was apparently based on insufficient facts. By the way, both "subjective data" (Gestalt) and finality is admitted in the "purposive behaviourism" (Tolman, 1932).

9. On the Theory of Learning by Success

According to the behaviouristic theory of learning, it may be ascertained only on the basis of a *success arrived at already* whether some behaviour approaches the goal or not (if there are no previously acquired mechanisms or behaviour patterns).

But, there are certain problem situations, natural or deliberately introduced, which are so accidental or so unclear that there is no other possibility in coping with

them but for the classical active conditioning. However, here the question arises as to whether the conditioning may serve as a *model for all possible problem solving processes*. If this should be correct, then the basic principle would be as follows: There is no *primary finality* in the behaviour of living beings. This thesis cannot be valid, as was demonstrated in the preceding paragraph. Wolfgang Koehler in his intelligence tests of anthropoids was successful in 1917 in proving the primarily goal-centered behaviour in new situations without any ready behavioural patterns available. As to the primary finality of the productive mental processes of man, see, first of all, Max Wertheimer, 1945.

The constantly reappearing assertion that the insightful solving of problems occurs "in reality through trial and error, and that it is only transferred from exterior to interior (to imagination, or, in the behaviouristic nomenclature, on the "hidden level") has never been proven as yet and, preserving the principle of objectivity, cannot be proven at all.

Replacing over trials by the assumption of "internal" attempts, "preceding" the external behaviour, misses the essential. First if a person decides to go to the right around a big round table to reach his goal and not to the left, he does not need to try both possibilities in his imagination in order to find out that it takes a couple of steps less if he goes to the right. Rather, he can observe in his *surrounding world* that the way to the right is shorter. Second, even intelligent problem solving is often not possible without (external) attempts. However (and this is the decisive point), whereas according to learning theory, one of the attempted activities *must have already succeeded* in order to be recognized, accepted, and memorized as useful, in reality for an intelligent, primarily goal-centered activity it is characteristic that it displays choice of attempts limited *a priori* by a view to the goal itself. But moreover, in a typical case of an external attempt, as it can possibly occur even in the course of intelligent problem solving, long before success or failure are arrived at, it is possible to recognize whether or not it serves the desired use. Blind trials of any activities in the sense of the behaviouristic theory of learning are thus possible and sometimes unavoidable. But in no way are blind trials the only or even only preferred way of problem solving.

10. On the Principle of Additivity in the Development of Personality

W. Koehler and L. von Bertalanffy proved half a century ago that, besides the vegetable bed model of personality as presented by the behaviouristic theory of learning, another model is possible, i.e., the model of a very complex open system with a hierarchy of interrelated subsystems, in full accordance with known natural laws. In the light of our present knowledge of the processes in living organisms, this model is even more probable. It is an important characteristic of such a system that it shows reactions which cannot be understood on the basis of a local disturbance (failure of a certain apparatus) but rather on the basis of a disturbance of the general system equilibrium, and which are therefore to be handled accordingly. The psychoanalytic concept of neuroses, with all that it has in common with S-R psychology, is, in this respect, clearly in accord with the system theory from the very beginning.

In the framework of the new theories and models, it was possible to establish

approaches to the process of education which surpass the dubious reward-punishment model. To this, we shall return later.

11. *On the Principle of Reductionism*

It is a common observation that a living being sometimes stresses its psychic capabilities just to get some food under unfavourable conditions, i.e., just to gratify an elementary (organismic) tension. However, the assertion that *all* psychic activity serves only to gratify elementary tensions and, in the psychoanalytic version, to subjectively gratify the achievement of local pleasant feelings, contradicts the facts observed not only in the case of great thinkers, scientists, inventors and organizers, but even in the case of an animal exploring new surroundings or a playing child. The tension of an unsolved problem and the restless activity which it induces in a scientist or in an artist, as well as in an interested student and in a rat transferred to unknown surroundings, on the grounds of immediate observations is to be considered as just as elementary as the tension of hunger or of the sex drive. Moreover, this may be conceived theoretically as well on the basis of the facts given in paragraph.

The question as to whether the tension resulting in a mental effort is an autochthonous one or whether it is induced by elementary needs, or whether both occur simultaneously, is thus not a question of the principle but rather a factual one and it can be answered only for this or that actual case. In paragraph 8, it was shown that the energy for elementary needs may be consumed by mental interests. What happens here sometimes is in a way similar to the Freudian "sublimation". However, the dynamic relation differs. Whereas in Freud's concept the block of normal gratification of the accumulated drive energy results in a mental activity, in the model of the open system the opposite appears. An intensive mental activity absorbs the energy available in the neighboring systems like fire absorbs the air with which it grows and preserves itself.

12. *On the Principle of Primary Social Atomism*

Primary social atomism is, as has been shown already, a subspecies of reductionism. Behaviourism and psychoanalysis agree here again. In the latter, it is expressed even more clearly in the description of the "Erogenous zones" which are supposed to be the main gratification areas in early infancy, in labeling the other man as an "object" of the drive, i.e., as the tool of the primary body-centered gratification, and in that it considers the organism as the main source of gratification so that other people are not indispensable even as tools.

Again, the question arises : is there an alternative ? This question can be divided in the following six sub-questions :

- (1) Are there some primary and, at the same time, vital social needs ?
- (2) Have other people and beings who form groups together with the Ego really the psychological character of tools serving the Ego, or are they possibly, for a normal human being, of the same psychological relevance and of the same significance as the Ego, and, under some conditions, possibly even of greater importance ?
- (3) Are the social structures in the framework of which the individual exists

and lives realities of the same relevance as his own Ego ?

- (4) Is the way in which the individual participates in his group relevant to his manner of general behaviour, first of all for his capability of *normal* behaviour ?
- (5) Does there possibly exist a basic relation between the social needs or tendencies of the individual group members and those of the group as a whole ?
- (6) Do these structures have system properties ? For instance, have they autochthonous tendencies towards transition into extreme or optimum states and towards stabilization in these states.

There is no doubt about the answer. The sensitivity of small children towards separation from the second year of their life, discovered by Rene Spitz, tells all that is necessary as to question (1). Concerning the second question, from the abundance of facts pertaining to it, let us mention only the phenomenon of conformity pressure. Questions (3) and (4) were affirmatively answered long ago in the individual psychology of Alfred Adler, and recently in certain forms of neo-psychoanalysis. See also Schulte (1924). It should be stressed here that the proneness to a socially desirable behaviour, which, as was shown at the beginning, cannot be practically influenced by rewards and punishments, is based essentially on the consciousness of one's pertinence to a group as a member, accepted without reserve and enjoying full rights. Only those educational efforts which take account of this fact can be successful. Clearly affirmative for question (5) are the facts found by Lewin and Lippitt (1938-39) and from here, it is possible to find illustrative and provable insights even for question (6).

There is no doubt any longer that it is possible in this way to derive immediate suggestions of modern education for which classical behaviourism had no explanation.

IV. An Answer

Now, we are able to answer the question of whether there are still different schools in contemporary psychology and the answer is a clear "Yes",

Reincarnation and Christianity

It is a common belief that reincarnation is purely a Hindu concept and that it is accepted by Hinduism, Jainism, Buddhism and Sikhism as the basic tenet. But recent trend in Christianity in the West seems to have turned the tables. Not only does Christianity accept reincarnation and Karma, but these two theories appear to be the pillars on which the edifice of Christian philosophy of love and the concepts of 'kingdom of God' and 'the kingdom of Heaven' are built. Many contemporary Christian denominations have openly declared the acceptance of reincarnation. Scores of books have been published pointing out the fact that reincarnation had been accepted by Jesus Christ, the founder of Christianity and that his apostles knew everything about it.

However, it is very important to note that by reincarnation we do not mean transmigration in the present context. Actually, in the Vedic literature as well, reincarnation has been accepted without confusing it with transmigration. It is stated that the original version of the Holy Bible had distinct references to the theory of reincarnation. These passages were later on expunged from the text especially by the connivance of the queen Theodora, the wife of the King Constantine for personal reasons. Even if this historical controversy is not accepted, Christianity as depicted in the New Testament and particularly as stated by Jesus Christ in the Sermon on the Mount, cannot be held consistent and intelligible without the theory of reincarnation and the doctrine of Karma. Before explaining how these two theories are unavoidable for a Christian way of life, I would like to mention how reincarnation has been stated in some passages of the New Testament.

At two places in the New Testament there is a direct reference to reincarnation. When Jews doubt, Jesus as the Messiah the latter points out that Abraham, the acknowledged ancestor of the Jews honoured Jesus in his own day. The Jews questioned how could Jesus know Abraham who existed much earlier than his birth. Jesus replies, "verily, verily, I say unto you, before Abraham was I am". Many modern commentators have accepted this statement as a reference to the previous births of Jesus. Edgar Cayce, who was an acknowledged psychic of U.S.A., and

attainment of spiritual perfection. It appears necessary to quote this incident as narrated in the book of John 18-10. Then Simon Peter having a sword, drew it and struck the high priest's, slave and cut off his right ear. The slave's name was Malchus, Jesus said to Peter, "Put your sword into its sheath: shall I not drink the cup which the Father has given me."

In order to understand this philosophical basis of Christianity, it is essential to state briefly the doctrine of *Karma* summed up in the statement "as you sow, so shall you reap". It is the law of the Conservation of Ethical Energy, comparable to the law of the Conservation of Physical Energy in the context of Physics. The law of the Conservation of Ethical Energy presupposes that all activities generated by a subject, an agent or a self through body, speech and mind are conserved in the form of the energy or radiation which returns to the agent sooner or later. Whatever action we perform through body, speech or mind, brings us the reaction of good or bad effect. If a person hits another person, he would be paid in the same coin. Similarly if a person thinks ill or well of another person, he will get the same reaction. Thought is a material activity. Samkhya's view of thought and intelligence as subtle matter is most scientific. "As you sow, so shall you reap" and "As you think so shall you be." Thought as a creative force has been accepted also because of the recent researches in depth psychology. That is why Jesus Christ also emphasized that mental commission of adultery is equivalent to its physical commission.

Since every action whether physical, verbal or mental must bring its effect and reaction and since the ethical energy like the physical energy is not lost, the doctrine of *Karma* is the only explanation for the temporary disappearance of the effects of thousands of physical, verbal and mental actions performed by an individual during one life time.

If one were to take account of one's physical, verbal and mental actions performed during twenty four hours, one would realise that if he or she were to reap the fruit of all such good or bad actions, one shall have to live for several months for this purpose. Now the quantity of good or bad actions performed by an individual during one life time is so large that the reward or punishment involved in all these actions would need several life times to be fulfilled. Hence, according to the theory of the Conservation of Ethical Energy commonly called the law of *Karma*, one has to undergo the cycle of reincarnation. The purpose of reincarnation is the attainment of perfection or the kingdom of God by paying off the past *Karmas*. Unless and until one has paid the debt of the past *Karmas*, one cannot attain salvation. Jesus Christ has stated this theory in parables. In the Sermon on the Mount he gives two such instances. While addressing his disciples in this connection he says, "So if you are offering your gift at the altar, and there remember that your brother has something against you, leave your gift there before the altar and go; first be reconciled to your brother, and then come and offer your gift. Make friends quickly with your accuser, while you are going with him to court, lest your accuser hand you over to the judge, and the judge to the guard, and you be put in prison, truly, I say unto you, you will never get out till you paid the last penny."

In these two parables Jesus plainly talks about the law of *Karma*. In the first instance he points out that a man is not fit to worship God in the temple if he has not

paid off his *Karma*. The second example refers to the attainment of life eternal or *Videh Mukti* only after exhausting all *Karmas* or debts. The word 'Prison' here means the cycle of births and deaths and the payment of the 'last penny' refers to the *Karmic* debt. This parable points out that being quits so far as the past *Karmas* are concerned, is necessary condition for salvation.

According to the doctrine of *Karma*, there are three categories of '*Karma* viz :

1. *Sanchit Karmas* or accumulated actions, which would fructify not in the present life, but in some future life or lives.
2. *Prārabdha Karmas* or the pattern of actions, which are earmarked for the present life, and
3. *Kriyamāṇa Karmas* or the voluntary actions chosen in the present life.

According to the same doctrine, a person who on account of his choice of the path of love and devotion has attained perfection or *Jivan Mukti* becomes free from the accumulated actions and is also not bound by the present voluntary choices. But so far as *Prārabdha Karmas* are concerned, he must undergo their effect. Even the perfect masters pay off their *Prārabdha Karmas* through suffering disease or even death by torture, as did Jesus Christ by being crucified long ago and Swami Rama Krishna Param Hanra who died of cancer, did in our own times.

The ethos of non-resistance preached by Jesus Christ becomes meaningless without the acceptance of the doctrine of *Karma* and reincarnation as pointed out above. Jesus says that he has not come to violate the law, but he emphasizes the law of love by saying, "You have heard that it was said, 'You shall love your neighbour and hate your enemy, but I say to you, love your enemies and pray for those who persecute you, so that you may be sons of your Father who is in heaven; for He makes His sun rise on the evil and on the good, and sends rain on the just and on the unjust. For if you love those who love you, what reward have you? Do not even collectors do the same? And if you salute only your brethren, what more are you doing than others? Do not even the Gentiles do the same? You therefore, must be perfect as your Father is perfect.'"

At the very face of it, the advice to love the enemies might look like a pure ethical pacifism. But according to Jesus the law of love is the sole remedy for attaining perfection or freedom from the bondage of *Karmas*. That is why he points out that in order to attain spiritual perfection one has to be nonviolent and free from jealousy and anger. While elaborating the practice of love, he states that if someone slaps a person on the right cheek, one should turn the other cheek towards him. This teaching is the clear indication of the acceptance of the law of *Karma* and reincarnation. If some one causes violence to a person without any provocation on the part of the latter, it is quite likely that the aggressor is simply repaying the past *Karmas* to that person. The only reason why we should not retaliate in the case of unprovoked aggression is that due to our ignorance of the law of *Karma*, we might be creating a new *Karma* towards a person who is paying us back our own past deed. If this is the case, we shall have to be reincarnated for paying this new *Karmic* debt. This is why even the perfect masters do not resist evil including disease and suffering.

It is quite evident that the theory of the Conservation of Ethical Energy and its corollary, the theory of Reincarnation are the rock and foundation of the ethics of unqualified love propounded by Jesus Christ in the Sermon on the Mount, which is the quitesence of Christian way of life.

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The One and the All

I

The world is undivided. Every thing in the world, every detail in it, even the smallest detail, speaks of the wholeness of the world. If a being, before it begins to exist, were in the position to describe our world on the basis of one single detail at its disposal, it would, if it could only think strictly logically, build up an adequate picture of our world as a whole.

This thesis has nothing in common with the well-known Laplace thesis of absolute determinism, according to which we could, on the basis of given parameters, determine every state of our world in the past and in the future. The Laplace thesis belongs to the natural sciences, whereas it could be said of the theory that I have in mind that it belongs to the social sciences. By that I am thinking of the following : the special ethnographic problematics of costumes worn by different peoples at different times could lead a subtle investigator to an interpretation of the material and spiritual style of life of men and peoples, of their views about the world and finally to an explanation of the world as a whole. From the narrow psychological frame of the theme about temperaments we can easily step onto the broad road of the spiritual typology of men and of their *Weltanschauung* and thereby to the explanation of the world as a whole. Taking the phenomenon of slips, dreams and neuroses as his starting point, Freud has attempted to interpret not only the whole sexual life of man, but also all areas of human cultural creation and has reached the level of a general view of the world.

One thing speaks of all : (*hen kai pan*). Every possible fragment of reality can lead us to the broadest ontological alternatives.

always to be found a metaphysics as the expression of the speculative spirit, which is looked on as the foremost. This spirit recasts the basic intentions of its time in its own way. Thus the philosophers of antiquity speculated about Nature as something absolute, the scholars of the Middle Ages meditated, in their philosophical theology, about God as the absolute being, the philosophers of modern times placed human reason in the centre of their speculations as the highest judge in all questions, and today our age sets up the general concept of society as the essence of all (human) essences.

III

Whereas some attempt to separate the pure object of cognition outside the conditions of cognition or the activity of change of the object (Kant with his thing in itself), others lead man back to the pure subject of cognition outside the conditionality of space and time (Schopenhauer). But the objective cannot be changed into the subjective, or the subjective into the objective, without the active participation of the subject in the object.

IV

Aestheticians praise the uncompletedness in art. It is not necessary, they think, to say everything, to express everything, but one allows the reader, the listener, the spectator, the consumer of art generally the possibility of taking part himself in the understanding and thereby in the creation of the work of art. If one says and expresses everything, the consumer remains passive, and one should not do that, while one silently recognizes it.

This uncompletedness and incompleteness, which is the essential characteristic of present day art, is the result of the process which has been called "the acceleration of the history" of our age. As the pace of history gets quicker and quicker, there is demanded of man a greater and greater activity or at least adaptability to new things, there is demanded an activity that is fast and suitable. In his practical life man is offered everything as open, as something that he should continue and complete. For that reason art too inclines towards this need of time and demands active collaboration from its consumers.

What we had said about this aesthetic uncompletedness can also be applied to that in philosophy. In the case of philosophic uncompletedness other moments also play a part, which perhaps also have their place in art, but which are very important in philosophy. It happens that a philosopher remains uncompleted and those who follow after him, the commentators, the philosophical successors and the historians of philosophy strive to decipher the true sense of what was said. Each interpretation finds a justification for itself in the uncompletedness. However the philosopher remains uncompleted not because of the subjection to the demands of aesthetic representation, but because he was not able to say everything that he thought. The philosopher usually comes before his time and what he thinks is dangerous in the eyes of those people who persevere in what has already become anachronistic. For this reason the philosopher cannot always say all that he thinks. Besides that, in the nature of the

An Introduction to Comparative Philosophy

Thought it is claimed is universal. The processes of knowing which includes perceiving, remembering, comparing, reasoning and even imagining, is also claimed to be uniform. It is clear also that the processes aforementioned are dependent on the ideas or concepts which are expressed in words both ideas and words refer to concrete things at first and later they refer to the group or a group which has members having the same function or form or both. These group-words or ideas which are universal then are freely used for the purposes of reasoning or imagining and communication with other human beings. Sometimes, though not universally, the words and ideas are conventionalised symbols frequently necessary for inter-communication. So much today some scholars consider that logic is best practised with mere symbols even without any reference immediate or remote to things or particular forms. Even like numbers symbols are very helpful for arriving at the pure art of reasoning. The different racial and linguistic groups have developed different words or sound-forms and patterns and when these later-mingle the words develop synonyms, and similar sounds tend to fuse their meanings and give rise to multi-meaningful words and ideas. The needs for a real and helpful linguistic discipline seems to be called for when dealing with such recondite topics as truth, which is usually defined as the correspondence of thought or our idea of a thing with the thing itself.

When ideas do not mean merely things but functions or refer to work or activity then correspondence would mean that an idea of an thing is true if the function referred to as belonging to the thing is seen to be there or is shown to work. Thus ideas are not just percepts or concepts of percepts but include also functions or working possibility. A spade is a spade when it helps cut the ground. Similarly a light is a light because it illumines or shines and reveals objects hidden. All names or words are thus said to be connoting functions. But later this connotation may be lost and like relics in a museum have only a denotative or pointing static value.

After all the most important equipment for a philosopher seems to be as in other disciplines the wide awareness about the meaning of the words, ideas and things, which

usually signify use. The grammar of language is important but more important is the awareness of the use which is fused with words, and infact reveal the meaning or is the meaning (*artha*). The study of comparative philosophy involves thus as a first condition awareness of the words in each language which we wish to compare for philosophical fixation of meanings and if we lack it we have to discover the appropriate word which connotes or denotes the function similar to that which we are considering. A comparative multi-lingual vocabulary will not suffice for it is mainly denotative and further it is of no use.

Philologists consider the phonic semantics rather than the functional or dynamic semantics which has reference to use or utility. Language is essentially practical and all words are practical—when we mention words it refers to ideas as well. The concept of a language which has scientifically developed on the basis of discovering original roots (*dhātus*) which give rise to forms of verbs and nouns by prefixes and affixes (even as recently tried by the discoverers of Basic English) is unfortunately not quite universal for language is not wholly a scientific manner of expression (a *sanskriti*), rather it is a *prakrit* (the original) from which the technical words have been connotatively fixed. In any case it has been well-known that any serious work of inter-communication must define the terms or words used and these have to be used uniformly. The language of philosophy has in each climate been more or less fixed and it is here that one has to make a cautious approach in any study of philosophy not only of one's own but also of others. When this danger is present even within one geographical group and the same word means different things to different schools it becomes a very serious matter when one compares one school with another school and still more when one sees identities because of somatic similarity alooe.

So far about the major linguistic difficulty which has to be cleared in any study of comparative philosophy or comparative study of philosophies.

There is another difficulty pointed out by some serious professors of this subject. They consider that a proper appraisal of other philosophies requires a complete understanding of the climate and ethnology and motivations or goals and this is scretly possible. Therefore a mere objective statement of the tenets of the other schools of thought would be advisable without involving ourselves in comparative estimates. So one esteemed author has merely placed the three major world philosophies, Indian, Western and Chinese, in a volume. Similarly the India Government Venture on History of Philosophy Eastern and Western, has been written by Indian writers without any attempt at comparative estimates. The attempt to steer clear of criticisms of other or our own philosophical poses might be considered to prudent in the present climate of misunderstandings and complexes. However it is evident this may be quite safe philosophizing but will not lead to the realisation of One Philosophy, which is the ideal of a universal philosophy or of thought itself.

Many truths must move towards an all-embracing One truth. Divergent trends must be seen to fuse into one view of Reality. This does not and may not mean that Monism is the ideal of thought itself. The organon of knowledge may be one universal reason innate in each individual philosopher or seeker but what it understands and knows may not be One at all.

This leads us to the problem of determining what kind of objects is being known

by any instrument of knowledge or experience and seeing whether what is presented to each *pramāṇa* of instrument of right knowledge is universal or uniform. The levels of reason have thus to be fully cognized. This might help us to determine that knowledge of a particular scope and level is on the whole when uncontaminated or uninfluenced by other sources or means of knowledge universal all over humanity. Thus sensory knowledge for all humans will be verifiable and common. So also those of reasoning would be universal and common. The principles of analogy and comparison would be common and universal. Similarly even the intuitive revelations given in heightened consciousness would be seen to be common, and universal. We have now come to see that even the dream consciousness or sub-conscious and unconscious have a universality and commonness all over mankind. Therefore it seems inevitable that we have to face the problems of Comparative philosophy as of religion in the same way as science has done to evolve a universal philosophy. But here it is necessary to study the basic problems of philosophy in the light of experiences which have tended to fuse together in human experience, all over the globe.

The problems are not only those a group of philosophers have seen and sought to solve but also those of other groups and an objective and sympathetic consideration of both may not only reveal startling similarities but solutions to each other's problems. This would be an undoubted gain. Above all it is necessary to be humble and practice humility in approaching alien philosophies for truth might be found at very unexpected places and by unexpected means. This has been the reason why the first indologists had pointed out the basic similarities between the Greek and Indian philosophical systems. One of the off-shoots of a comparative study of philosophies had been the probabilities of (1) philosophic colonisation, (2) philosophic adaptation, (3) independent development of similar philosophies widely separated from each other geographically and culturally, where there is hardly any possibility of contact.

Efforts have been made to affirm cultural and philosophic colonisation or mutual intercourse following the age-old trade-routes and so on. That may be a cause but it may not be conclusive unless these are historically determined. It is likely that scholars moving from place to place or migrating may have learned philosophies of other nations and taught them to their mother country or fatherland. Alien schools could flourish and gain strength and indirectly modify the beliefs and rites and philosophic attitudes also. The last alternative also is not quite as improbable as it appears based as it is on the uniformity of the reason in all humanity. Provided we reckon the phenomenon of levels of aspiration, and ability and needs for social and spiritual life, it may conceivably be possible to have similar patterns of philosophy whose genesis are different. This phenomenon draws its analogy from biology. Similarity of form does not mean similarity of function—homology does not entail analogy say the logicians.

Bearing all these in mind it is possible to study the philosophy or philosophies of other countries and philosophers in a comparative way so that we can be able to understand better the emergence of a universal philosophy.

Philosophy comprises a methodology of knowledge and a theory of knowledge. It was once stated that every philosophy should be helpful to conduct : In other words it must be practical-oriented. Life or how to live in the world is life's problem

—it is a human problem. Knowledge is required to live in it, to adapt ourselves to it, intelligently so as to avoid avoidable risks and suffering. This is the first objective of any attempt to know about our external world, or Nature or the physical universe. It involves knowing about ourselves and how far we can adapt ourselves to the external world and how far that world could be adapted to our needs, and what are the limits of our knowledge, and the limits of our activity. The practical bias of all education arises out of this need to know in order to act. The practical utility of knowledge is something assumed in all efforts to know about the external world or science. Science is an attempt to know the external world of Nature in its physical and chemical and biological aspects. It may include all the levels of matter and kinds of energy. It may study the original constitution of matter and how everything has evolved out of certain primal elements or energy. All this once constituted Natural philosophy.

The modern studies of the nature of our body and its psychological functions or behaviour also comes under psychological or empiricistic philosophy.

The basic studies on human behaviour and goals to which it moves are undoubtedly a larger section of human ideals and herein arises the social context of human behaviour leading to the ethical problems of right behaviour or conduct and evolution of character and culture. The problems of philosophy in the context of human relations becomes extremely practical, and the instrument of knowledge in this sphere of philosophy or the ethical is to be discovered to lie beyond the range of the scientific physical area. Indeed in the West Immanuel Kant it was he who clearly discerned the need for a different type of organon of knowledge called the Practical, and following his footsteps Benedetto Croce developed the Philosophy of the Practical, which stands for the intuition of the ethical and the practical (utility). All knowledge is for the practical or utility but the ethical practical is something different and in India this organon was known as *dharma-jñāna* and *vyavahāra-jñāna*.

It is the practical bias of all knowledge or verify its first incentive that has stamped all knowledge as practically directed towards human goals or ends—*purushārthas* of *artha-kāma*. *Dharma* is the right manner of use or the ethical aspect of the *vyavahāra-jñāna*.

The test of truth has been held by philosophers and scientists to be the practical verification through utility or use. Some philosophers have held that it is not enough that truth involves verifiability or utility, but also the notion of its 'workability'. Not only is a thing what it does but also what it claims to do or solve. An hypothesis is a solution of a problem or rather it is proposed to solve a problem: this would be true of all hypothesis whether it involves a hypothesis regarding the whole reality or a particular bit or sphere of it or about any particular mode of behaviour. The hypothesis then has to be tested by drawing consequences from it and testing whether the consequences do follow or not. Scientific testing is based on experimental verification and all this would constitute elements for the determination of truth about Reality or the particular. Thus truth involves several tests, (1) the test of correspondence, (2) the test of coherence or non-self-contradictoriness between the several propositions about the same phenomenon, (3) the test of *vyavahāra* or utility and lastly (4) the test of being able to solve the problems of practical conduct. And a

still further test may be proposed regarding the constant changeability of environmental conditions and individual growths and adaptations entailing different appropriate propositions or truths. Truth is shown to be not that permanent static description of the nature of anything or the system as a whole, but constantly modified by the changing patterns of culture and widening knowledge. Previous knowledges modify succeeding knowledges, the Knowledge is not static but dynamically accumulating through experience. Not only this, even Reality is undergoing this change, and is constantly being modified or modifies itself even as in the biological and psychological Memory—biological and psychological is additive and integrative and this indeed is a fact of Reality and not of one part of it, alone.

The philosophy that does not include the practical cannot be the love of wisdom (sophia). Wisdom includes the ability to act in such wise as to be capable of being considered intelligent—perfect adaptation to a perfect world as Herbert Spencer would put it. The values of human nature as spirit are as much important as the values by which one strives to keep one's physical body, vital ability and mental capacity. Such values only emerge as civilization progresses or the individual discovers himself not merely a creature of Nature but a creator of Nature's possibilities and deliverer of its potentialities. Such awareness of the spiritual values comes as a test of truth and truth becomes enriched with this new dimension.

Such value as Freedom from bondage or possibilities of it (or liberty), an innate equanimity and capacity to feel detached from all lower strivings and the ever luminous happiness that comes from a sense of abiding harmony with Nature and Society are normally even beyond the sphere of social and personal ethics. The supreme of a Transcendent Reality, and its intrinsic worthiness that is the challenge to the individual philosopher are undoubtedly needing a different approach for knowing or realising them. Their truth is a different order and kind. Nevertheless they are held to be profoundly more real and necessary for man to be. Religion demands a different kind of valuations and even urge that the lower planat truths are of no worth and moment. It may even condemn the whole sphere of the biological as hedonistic and illusory. Similarly the mystical experiences condemn even the religious attitudes. All these seem to form a pretty difficult amalgam for the ordinary man who gets his bits of knowledge from several layers of experience and life.

Though Wisdom would be recognized as the attainment of that ultimate knowledge which secures the highest truth or that truth which grants one the practice and fulfilment of the transcendent values that make one be at harmony with the whole of Reality, yet the word Wisdom has been used promiscuously, at first and finally wrongly to the knowledge of the sciences and ethics and politics and psychology, and religion too. If however, we can get back to that original concept of Wisdom, the first wisemen of the world may be expected to throw light on our terrestrial and social history as well. It is in this sense that all ancient cultures or civilizations claimed wisemen to be the founders of their philosophies. The word *Veda* or *Gnosts* or *Para-Jñāna*, may help the lower knowledge also called *aparā-vidyā* or *avidyā*, referring to human *karma* or actions or *kriyā*. But it is also be remembered that the ultimate wisdom demands not a spectator like immobility or mere contemplative life, but also the supreme participation in the lower levels to see that the World Harmony is sustained

maintained. Further that wisdom too requires its vigilant exercise and therefore is dynamic and self-supporting and self-verifying in the lives of one and all who aspire for that Ultimate Realisation of Reality.

Therefore, philosophy or love of wisdom is a life of the utmost spiritual being, which transcends the little philosophies of the logical or the rational, or the empirical and the pragmatic or the utilitarian which confines its knowledge to the upkeep and maintenance of the physical body and its appetites. Nor is it to be confined to the life of the body in terms of the world which caters to the upkeep of it or the society of similarly materialistic souls however socialised in this sense of trying to live in community in terms of the basic economic wants or hedonistic wants so nicely idealised by eudomonism by Aristotle and even the stoics and the epicureans in the Greek world and Roman world, and in India by the gracious *brahaspatyas* or *Carvakas* or *lokayatikas* of all levels of school philosophies, in India and elsewhere. The concept of moderation or the golden mean or the *sophrosyne* is a way of revealing the basic oneness of the Real which exhibits itself in Matter and the Spirit, in the temporal and the eternal, in the mortal and the immortal. Philosophical wisdom ultimately in terms of this world lies in moderation or what was perhaps really meant by the middle path (*mādhymika*) avoiding the extremes or as it was also expressed *samatva* or equilibrium of the qualities in Nature.

All these fertile concepts have to be studied in the history of thought and ethics, religion and spirituality (mysticism).

The tendency to separate these areas of thinking and isolated study of these has led to extraordinary paradoxes in philosophy. Metaphysics has been made separate from logic, the logic of science has been isolated from the logic of deduction, and these have been isolated from the fields of economics and ethics and politics or social sciences, and the religious and mystical have been isolated if not insulated from the former and thus multi-furcation of an integral wisdom has taken place. No wonder the special training in one area bars him from other disciplines. In fact discipline has also lost its meaning. Symbolic treatment no better than mythological treatment is bound to be confusing if not self-defeating and barren. Fertile ideas unfortunately become barren in the hands of modern philosophers whose only discipline consists in cleverness and ingenuity which lacks the quality of genius.

All this might well be difficult to surmount in any exposition of comparative philosophy, but they have to be faced with dedication to arrive at that integral philosophy of man by which he can live and move and have his being in the Reality that has lifted itself beyond the clouds of understanding and illusion.

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William James' "Radical Empiricism"

"Jede wahrhaft Umfassende Philosophie muss Philosophie des uns alle umfassenden Lebens sein."

—Hermann Rickert

Preface

In order to understand someone, one must first listen to him; then one must appropriate what one has learned to one's own thinking; then one must respond—enriched by what one has received. In short: Every philosophical understanding is a dialectical process.

My present partner is William James. The brevity of my report is disproportionate with the length of my conversation with him; and my dry account does not reflect the intensity of delight I had in meeting him. There is no more humane and charming philosopher than William James; a master of style, rich, original, infinitely suggestive. But what I present here is mainly a list of perplexities, inconsistencies and contradictions. I am aware of the discrepancy between the whole philosophical personality of James and my logical difficulties with some of his thoughts.

I

Kant's first question of philosophy is: What can I know? And by knowledge he means scientific, intellectual, conceptual knowledge whose possibility is to be founded in its logical principles or categories. Kant's logic is the philosophy of "experience" (*Erfahrung*). James goes beneath this question by focussing attention on an immediate experience which precedes in time the rational-scientific *ERFAHRUNG* by an immediate experience (*Erfahrung*). Before we know we must live. This living, immediate experience is the world-view of babies which they share with animals. Although they

are biologically awake, they are spiritually as if they were asleep; as Hegel puts it: "the experience of the waking natural soul is the sleep of the spirit." Hegel also calls this, like James¹: a magic life, which maintains itself by appropriating other forms of life to sustain its own; physically this appears as eating, drinking and sleeping, in which the natural soul (Hegel's term) is tired of being engaged in the life of others and egotistically refuses contact. Both for Hegel and James trances, hypnosis and telepathy are vestiges of magic life in maturity. In immediate experience there is no world yet, but only an immediate environment. Particular events stand in the center of attention, surrounded by vague fringes. They interact. To be active is to be alive. All things interact among themselves and in reference to the one who is immediately involved and aware of them. They sometimes coalesce, unite, confuse," sometimes they separate, divide, get out of sight. Both conjunctive and disjunctive relations are equally experienced; discontinuity is just as real as continuity. My immediate consciousness is not yours, but on the other hand one state of consciousness may continuously pass into another; as when I think of a place to be reached and then arrive there.

Things or events as immediately experienced (*erlebt*) are both relative among themselves as well as subjective with reference to the capacities and organs of the experient: as there are no colours or tones without seeing and hearing them.

As subjective immediate experience is no less real than are the events that are immediately experienced. This physical room in which I find myself is at the same time my present field of awareness.

This action and reaction, this relative and subjective life of *Erlebnis* is at the same time filled with affectionate values. We live in an affective continuum; and in an affective discontinuum when we are frustrated, disappointed and expectations leave us in the lurch. The raw unverbilized life of the natural soul is a flux of unexpected "set of eases", which are entirely beyond any scientific-rational prediction or control.

Physical, mental, moral accidents break equilibriums. The cruelty of the universe is shocking to morality and upsets religious attitudes. "Of no special system of good attained does the universe recognize the value as sacred. This dogging of everything by its negative, this perpetual undoing and moving on to something future, which shall supercede the present, this is the Hegelian vision of the essential provisionality and unreality of everything empirical and finite. This is accurate."²

Reason and its "absolute through and through is too clean for the vast, slow-breathing, unconscious cosmos, with its dread abysses and its unknown tides."³

Perhaps the most famous expression of James' feeling of immediate experience is the following:

If you should liken the universe of absolute idealism to an aquarium, a crystal globe in which goldfish are swimming, you would have to compare the universe to something more like one of those dried human heads with which the Dyaks of Borneo deck their lodges. The skull forms a solid nucleus; but innumerable

1. James, *A Pluralistic Universe*, (Longmans, Green & Co., New York, New Impression, 1928), p. 31.

2. *Ibid.*, p. 89.

3. James, *Essays in Radical Empiricism*, (Longmans, Green & Co., New York, Second Edition, 1922), p. 277.

feathers, leaves, strings, beads, and loose appendices of every description float and dangle from it, and, save that they terminate in it, seem to have nothing to do with one another. Even so my experiences and yours float and dangle, terminating, it is true, in a nucleus of common perception, but for them most part out of sight and irrelevant and unimaginable to one another."¹

In the middle of the book the title "Radical Empiricism" shifts to "Humanism". But both titles cover the same meaning. "Humanism" entails a variety of value-pursuits, which are finite, making a difference to their environments with which they interact. Those value-pursuits are risks with no guaranteed outcome; and they are pluralistic, such that the success of one may also be the loss of another, as for example the success of industrialization may at the same time be the loss of a beautiful or festive life. Humanism, to James, means the rejection of transempirical and super-human standards. This is particularly important with reference to the "Varieties of Religious Experience", where any "God" is the aspect of the Holy or Sacred in the Universe, one of its parts or "Eaches".

Having listened I now turn to some critical questions: Is "immediate experience" not also mediated? It is that in two ways: first it is not only immediate, but it is abstracted from the mediated rational, moral and aesthetic "forms of rationality".² Secondly it is mediated in that it has evolved out of the subconscious life of Nature.³ James shows most explicitly in his essay on the "Earth-Soul" in Fechner. In James himself, his radical empiricism is mediated through his rejection of a rationalistic block-universe, whose name is F. Bradley. In the second place, James opposes his immediate experience with the rational scientific experience, where particular experiences are thought as members of their conceptual classes and in accordance of the law of their classes. He admits that scientific experience, which breaks through the narrowness of environment into an objective world, is just as real as is immediate experience. The principle of all scientific knowledge: "Nothing is admitted as a fact, except what can be experienced at some definite time by some experient in a definite place"⁴ is in itself not an immediate experience (*Erlebnis*) but a universal and formal principle, which defines and limits scientific knowledge.

When he speaks about the "physical world" with its external relations, in contrast to the "spiritual world" with its internal relations, he uses categories of philosophical and dialectical reflection, which are neither immediate experiences nor scientific judgments. He erroneously identifies reason with the reason of scientific object-thinking, and is therefore unaware that his own philosophical reflections are dialectical in distinguishing and relating essential and universal opposites.

When he says: "We are in the end absolutely dependent on the Universe"⁵, then that absolute feeling can hardly refer to the empirical "string of eches" which is constantly changed by its interacting agents.

And speaking about religion, there is, in James, also a religious mediation, a conversion which has led him to his radical empiricism. It is similar to the conversion

4. *Ibid.*, p. 46.

6. James, *A Pluralistic Universe*, p. 131 f.

7. James, *Varieties of Religious Experience*, (Longmans, Green & Co., New York, p. 51.

5. *Ibid.*, p. 312.

7. James, *Essays in Radical Empiricism*, p. 160.

of Augustine, who asks in his *Confessions* (book VIII, ch. 55) why he should be ashamed to follow the example of the uncultured in accepting piety. Similar also is the conversion of Tolstoy, described by James in the *Varieties of Religious Experience*: Tolstoy threw away his intellectual and artistic life to become a simple farmer. James speaks in a similar vein of the "bankruptcy of the intellect to let life in", and compares this to Luther's "religion of the cross."⁹

Sometimes James seems to be aware of the non-immediacy of immediate experience, as when he says: "Concepts are as real in the realm which they inhabit as the changing things of sense are in the realm of space."¹⁰ Or; "Direct acquaintance and conceptual knowledge are complementary."¹¹ Here he thinks dialectically according to the logic of philosophical reflection. Universal opposites define each other by each not being what its complementary other is. But how does that jibe with the following statement: "For my own part I have finally compelled myself to give up the logic, fairly, squarely, irrevocably,"¹² ? I ask: which "logic"? The logic of scientific intellect (*Verstand*), or the logic of dialectical self-knowledge of philosophy? I would like to quote another sentence of his against himself: "The empiricists use logic against the absolute, but refuse to use it against finite experiences."¹³

Anyone who disregards logic should quit writing philosophical books which intend to be true and not false—and take to football instead.

II

So far I have followed James' text and have noticed several inconsistencies and self-contradictions; what Hegel calls "immanent criticism." I now turn to the more difficult task of evaluating James as philosopher. I shall not preface this with the pseudo-modest and redundant remark that such an evaluation must be in terms of what I understand by philosophy. That is self-evident and unavoidable. A physician is not expected to say: According to my subjective opinion this is a case of shingles. It is a case of shingles; and James is a case of empiricism.

As empiricist is perfectly justified in saying: According to my point of view, a philosophy is nothing but an expression of moods and feelings, of healthy or sick, of tenderminded and toughminded souls. The strength of James is his scientific description of states and phases of consciousness; his psychological strength is at the same time his philosophical weakness: psychology is not philosophy.

I don't recall a single passage which would show an understanding of what is meant by the "concept" in classical philosophy and logic. Concepts are objective contents (*Sachverhalte*), thought in their universal validity (*Geltung*) for all their instances. They are known in philosophical reflection on them. It is through concepts and not only percepts that reality becomes articulate. The world of perception is itself a concept of philosophy.

I shall confine my critical remarks to two objections. The first is: his radical

9. James, *A Pluralistic Universe*, p. 317.

11. James, *A Pluralistic Universe*, p. 57.

12. *Ibid.*, p. 212.

10. James, *Varieties of Religious Experience*, p. 57.

13. *Ibid.*, p. 243.

empiricism is not radical enough; and the second: his pluralistic universe is not pluralistic enough.

James reiterates time and again that empiricism wants to get hold of the whole of reality from finite and particular experiences, and then never fails to add that this whole is not an experience and its unity nowhere on display. Of course not! Reality is not a jig-saw puzzle! The whole cannot be pieced together of the finite abstractions of immediate experiences. Its spatial span is myopic, its time durations brief and fleeting. And the past is no longer an immediate experience because it is not living anymore, and the future real immediacies are not experienced. In short the empiricist way of approaching the whole is logically impossible. Radical empiricism as philosophy is absurd. The world of perceptions is not reality, but only an appearing section of it.

His empiricism would cease to be absurd, if James would more clearly draw the line between immediate experience as *Erlebnis*, and inferred and logically sound object-thinking. If immediate experience would dialectically reflect on its limitations, it would be more radical and would perform a most valuable service to philosophy in making articulate its own irrationality. This irrationality would then be that ineradicable part of the whole, which contains its own finitude within itself. It would make us forever immune against any rationalism, which is equally one-sided, and against any monism, which would claim to deduce the concept of the whole from one principle. As Hegel puts it: Systematic philosophy is the systematic destruction of falsely absolutized systems. Dialectic is their negation.

A second consideration, which would make radical empiricism more radical, is contained in the proposition of Heraclitus, that "the senses are bad witnesses." This is valid for all perceptions and all percepts. Let me illustrate with the Epicurean example, that in immediate experience the sun has the size of a thumb. This is logically absurd, but in immediate experience it is obtrusively real. We live in this absurd world and get along with it and in it, because we are used to it. It is one of the most profound observations of David Hume that immediate experience is governed by habit.

James shuns away from the illusionism of his beloved perception; in order to protect them, he rather falls back on a naive realism for which objects are given as they are in themselves, regardless of the many perspectives in which they are thought. This contradicts his pragmatic account of knowledge, according to which objects are fulfillments of practical desires and expectations; and concepts are merely economic shortcuts and substitutions for handling experiences, phases of action. And again he accepts without a murmur Bergson's devaluation of this pragmatism of logic as merely falsifying the stream of life.

I now turn to my other point, that James' pluralistic universe is not pluralistic enough. His term "multiverse" was a stroke of genius. But he does not carry it out. And he cannot carry it out, because he lacks principles by which reality particularizes itself in contrasted spheres or realms of life, each of which is what it is by not being its own complementary other. Actuality and comprehensiveness belong together, as Hegel says. And each of those articulate spheres of reality is represented by individuals who dedicate themselves to them: as the mathematician represents a mathematical

14. Cf. Gustav Emil Mueller, *Plato—The Founder of Philosophy as Dialectic*, (Philosophical Library, New York, 1948).

order of reality; as an empirical scientist represents an aspect of given experiences which he has isolated; as a statesman represents a legal order; as an artist dedicates himself to beauty which he actualizes in various arts; as religious faith orients itself in the holy—a being which cannot be but good—which in turn is the founding principle of his religious life. "God" is the mythical personification of the absoluteness of Being. We need an ontological anthropology: in man reality becomes systematically articulate and aware of itself.

Conclusion

The Greeks are and remain the founders of *Philosophia Perennis*, because they did not only think in order to live more comfortably or draw property lines more properly, but they also lived in order to think—to serve truth in all manifestations of cultural life.

Plato's "Idea" of the unconditional whole (anhypotheton) is the absolute standard, in the light of which all levels of knowledge and of insight in all realms of values are justly given their due in their limitations. They are relative approximations and involve contradictions in that lower levels rebel against higher levels of insight. The realms of values are dialectically contrary as well as complimentary. His focus of all values is the soul. It is a political one. It incarnates itself in the individual. It builds the organs, enabling communication with others. That is the soul's external politics. Internally it preserves its unity and integrity in the flux of vitality (Government). Because Plato's identity is not "naked", but is the identity of that which is not identical or different. Thus it is "clothed". The same soul also embodies itself in the state, the *Polis*, where the same functions of values which are in the individual become visible on a greater scale in the economic, legal and moral institutions of the whole. Every individual is the *Polis* in miniature, and the *Polis* is the individual soul writ large and therefore more easily discernible. This correlation is the basis for intersubjective communication, which cannot be understood if one starts from the isolated individual, as James is trying to do. The soul is the dialectical unity of I/me, I/we.

Aristotle's One Being in all its kinds and in all individual beings is logically necessary and ontologically the ground of everything whatsoever. (I disregard here his dualistic and extramundane "God", the darling of scholasticism.)

To think reality as a whole world itself, is the universal and unique task of philosophy, which no other discipline can replace—least of all logistics. It is always logical reflection or dialectical self-knowledge, regardless of whether the content of this self-knowledge be scientific or rational in the sense of formal logic, or non-rational or irrational and negative. "Nonbeing is no less real than being" to mention Plato again. The concrete whole of reality is a whole of opposites: it is not an object, scientific object-thinking is only one of those opposites within it. Reality is dialectical because it posits, cancels and contains all approaches to it within itself.

Revelation: Its Meaning, Modes and Polarity

Revelation constitutes the foundation of religion. It embodies the essential truths of religion. It removes the veil that separates man from the Divine. A religious man's faith in God, soul, immortality and the other supernatural truths and values of life is ultimately centred in revelation and is derived from it. This phenomenon is witnessed in every great religion and religious tradition.

Meaning and Modes of Revelation

Now the question is, what is revelation? It may be conceived as that which imparts to man the knowledge of the Divine or the supreme Reality and also the knowledge about his own real existence, his relationship with the Divine, the supreme goal of his life and the way to attain it. This knowledge is essentially supernatural and it cannot be attained by man by any other means available to him. It is supposed to be embodied in the scriptures of different religions. Thus scriptures are books of revelation. One significant fact that is found in the different religions is that they do not regard their scriptures as having been composed by man. They are supposed to be revealed by God (*Išvara*). The Vedas are supposed to have been revealed by *Išvara*. The ṛṣis have received the eternal truths of *Śruti* from *Išvara*. They have not created them or discovered them by their own efforts. *Ācārya Sankara* says in his introduction to the *Bhagavad-gītā* that *Bhagavān* after creating the world and desirous of its well-being taught two kinds of *Dharma* as propounded in the Vedas, namely, *pravṛtti-lakṣaṇa* and *nivṛtti-lakṣaṇa* to ancient seers. The *pravṛtti-lakṣaṇa-dharma* (*karma-yoga*) was revealed to *Prajāpatis* like *Marichi*, etc., and the *nivṛtti-lakṣaṇa-dharma* (*jñāna-yoga*) to the ṛṣis like *Sanaka*, *Sananda* and others. Zoroastrianism and the Semitic religions also believe that their scriptures have been revealed by God. The eternal truths propounded in these scriptures were communicated by God to prophets like *Zarathustra*, *Moses*, *Muhammad* and others. They simply received them. They were not their authors or creators. It is due to this very fact that the scriptures command

unquestionable authority in different religions and religious traditions. They constitute the supreme source of religious knowledge.

But there are other modes of revelation as well. I propose to discuss here only one other important form of revelation which is known as intuition. It is a direct and immediate experience of *Īśvara*, the Supreme Being or the Supreme Reality. It may also be characterized as the direct experience of self, *Ātman*, *puruṣa* or of *nirvāṇa*. From this point of view, revelation may be understood as the direct manifestation or experience of the transcendent reality. This experience is attained by a yogi in the state of *samādhi*. But *samādhi* is possible only if the individual attains complete freedom from the distractions of mind. It is a widespread belief in the Indian religious or yogic traditions that mind can be completely silenced. Different methods are prescribed for the attainment of this supreme state. But one important fact that has to be noted in this connection is that each yoga prescribed a rigorous moral and spiritual discipline for one who aspires to attain *samādhi* and to have a direct experience of the Divine. It has always been conceived as a rare achievement. Though theoretically speaking, it is open to all, yet it is actually attained only by the very few. The state of *samādhi*, as it has been conceived in the Indian religious tradition, cannot be attained by the use of narcotics, or any other artificial means. It is also not the result of any mental abnormality or disorder. Thus *samādhi* has to be clearly distinguished from that kind of trance which is brought about by any artificial means or occurs due to disorders in the nervous system. The state of *samādhi* can be attained by man by his own sustained efforts or by a single-minded devotion to God and by His grace. But the perfect control of senses and mind, cultivation of detachment are its prerequisites. Thus in the state of meditation or *samādhi*, man has an immediate experience or intuition of the Divine. In the other great religions also we have the traditions of mystics. They are supposed to have direct experience or revelation of God. While the ordinary man enjoys a living experience of God by believing in Him and having an unshakable faith in Him, the mystic or the yogi has a direct vision of Him and enjoys union with Him. A mystic is one who is detached from the world and is united with God. A true mystic who enjoys direct vision of God in the state of deep meditation or *samādhi* can be clearly distinguished from a pseudo-mystic who only pretends to have the vision of God. A pseudo-mystic necessarily lacks the quality of detachment. The world inevitably sticks to him. But a true mystic even while he lives in the world remains above it. He knows that he simply is in the world but he is not of the world.

Intuition or mystic experience has been taken in the different religious traditions as an extremely important form of revelation. The *śruti* (scripture) and Intuition are both revelation. The *Śruti* imparts to man the knowledge of the Divine; intuition enables him to have a direct vision of Him. Through *Śruti*, man hears about God; through intuition, he sees Him, has direct and immediate experience of Him. It is only after *śravaṇa* (hearing) that *manana* (reflection) and *nididhyāsana* (contemplation) can take place. Unless one receives the divine word of the *Śruti* from an enlightened teacher and ascertain its real meaning in respect of Brahman one cannot embark on the path of reflection and meditation. But for *Śruti*, man would never have been aware of the Divine Being and of his higher destiny. And in the absence of this saving know-

ledge, he cannot attain *Brahman-jñāna* or *Brahman-sākṣātkāra*. Thus Śruti precedes intuition and constitutes its ground. In this respect, Śruti can be conceived as the original revelation of God. It is the revelation of Brahman in and through the World. Intuition can be characterized only as a dependent revelation. To say that intuition is ultimately dependent on Śruti or scriptural knowledge does not in any way detract from its importance or value. It simply means that man cannot attain Brahman-jñāna by himself and in an unaided way. It is only in rare cases that Brahman-knowledge is attained without the aid of *śāstra* and *guru*. But there also the prior touch of the Divine cannot be denied. The main purpose of Śruti is to make man aware of the supreme Reality, the Divine Being, the Eternal and the Infinite that is seated within him and that pervades the whole universe and to awaken in him the desire and aspiration to realize It. This direct realization is attained through intuition. So Śruti and Intuition both serve as aids to man's realisation of the Infinite and Eternal within him. Intuition does not give us any new knowledge. It simply removes the veil that hides the Eternal seated within our hearts. It is the unfolding of the Infinite in the heart of the finite creature (*Jīva*). In the real sense the Infinite is eternally revealed. The eternal knowledge is always there within man. Shri Aurobindo calls it the eternal Veda. But it remains unknown to man under the conditions of existence or finitude. So he stands in need of revelation to proceed on the divine path and realize his union with Brahman. "The supreme Śāstra of the integral Yoga is the eternal Veda secret in the heart of every thinking and living being. The lotus of the eternal knowledge and the eternal perfection is a bud closed and folded up within us. It opens swiftly or gradually, petal by petal, through successive realizations, once the mind of man begins to turn towards the eternal, once his heart, no longer compressed and confined by attachment to finite appearances, becomes enamoured in whatever degree of the Infinite."¹

Polarity in Revelation

Every revelation is conditioned by some sort of subjectivity. It cannot be taken as altogether objective and unconditional. It is a revelation only for those who have a desire and the capacity to receive it and who entertain faith in it. A scripture is a book of revelation only for those who have faith in it. The message of liberation embodied in a scripture has a meaning only for one who is desirous of it. Only such persons are supposed to possess the necessary qualifications to receive the message of the Śruti, and to proceed on the path of *mokṣa*.² A fact or event may be conceived as revelatory by some, while it may have no revelatory significance for others. The prophets of Israel interpreted certain historical and other events as symbolizing the intervention of God in history. In the same way we find numerous instances in *Rāmāyaṇa*, *Mahābhārata* and *Purāṇas* where different events have been conceived as symbolizing the victory of God over demonic and evil forces. These events may be interpreted differently by non-believers or by those belonging to other religious traditions. Hindus and Christians believe in *Avatāra* or Incarnation. It is according to them, the revelation of God in history. But there are some other great world-religions

who do not admit the possibility of the descent of God in history and even consider this belief as blasphemous. Hinduism and Christianity also differ in some fundamental respects in their conception of the nature and role of *Avatāra* and Incarnation. The crucifixion and resurrection of Christ constitutes the very foundation of Christianity as it symbolizes his complete conquest of evil and death. It is supposed to give perennial hope to man that if he follows the way of Christ, he is destined to conquer evil and death. But the phenomenon of resurrection of Christ may be explained quite differently, say by the specialists in psychical research. The belief in resurrection which occupies a place of great importance in some world-religions is not shared by Indian religions. Thus the world-religions have serious and fundamental differences in respect of their beliefs in revelation and the revelatory phenomena. Each great religion is based on its own revelation. It explains the various phenomena of revelation in its own way. There is no doctrine, fact or event which is or which can be universally regarded as revelatory. It cannot be taken as absolutely objective and unconditional.

Thus every revelation or revelatory phenomenon is fraught with subjectivity. It is always a revelation for a certain class or category of believers. It necessarily involves a polarity, the polarity between the content of revelation and the subject who receives it or experiences it. The subject not only receives revelation but he also interprets it and makes his own contribution to it. Man receives revelation under the conditions of his own existence. Everyone, whether he happens to be a seer, a prophet or a mystic, is conditioned in some way or the other by finitude. He is also conditioned by his tradition, culture, language, environment, education and so on. So every revelation is received by man under these conditions and it necessarily undergoes modification and even distortion. It is interpreted by man in accordance with the conditions of his own existence. It applies to every revelation whether it is given through the word or event or mystic experience. Thus every revelation becomes a conditioned revelation. It is always conditioned by man's existential situation. This fact introduces an element of subjectivity and relativity in every revelation.

Revelations differ from each other not only in respect of their form but also in respect of their content. They are expressed through different languages, idioms, symbols, etc., and different myths and stories are associated with them. These constitute the form of revelation. But every revelation possesses a content which expresses itself through these forms or is clothed in them. The content is not always the same for every revelation. The content of revelation is constituted of the truths that it embodies or reveals. These truths are not necessarily common to all revelations. There are some truths e.g., some moral values, the idea of holiness, the idea of liberation, etc., which form the content of every revelation. But there are other important and fundamental truths of a revelation which are not shared by other revelations. We find some radical difference between the contents of the *Veda* and the Bible. This is equally true of other scriptures as well.

But it does not mean that all revelations remain always in a state of conflict and tension with each other and there is no meeting ground between them. In spite of their divergences, they also converge on some point and that is the transcendent reality itself. It constitutes the ultimate content of every revelation. Every revelation ultimately serves as a pointer to it. The moment it tries to apprehend it or embody

it in words, it gets conditioned. The supreme or the transcendent Reality is absolute and unconditioned. But its revelation is necessarily conditioned. The revelation of the unconditioned is not an unconditioned revelation. This constitutes the supreme truth of every revelation and every religion. Its proper appreciation and realization alone can provide the necessary atmosphere for a meaningful and fruitful dialogue between religions.

Aristotle's Unity of Sensation As A Response To Plato

Aristotle must always be interpreted as clarifying, reforming, systematizing, and extending the insights of his great master. This is particularly true in his analysis of sensation. Whereas for Plato the sense world is a cave from which we must escape in order to get to the light of knowledge, for Aristotle sensation is the solid base upon which memory, experience, art, and science are erected. Therefore it is not surprising that Aristotle devotes far more attention to problems of sensation than does Plato. Indeed Plato does not even indicate that he has a theory of sensation. In the *Theaetetus*, after referring to the unsophisticated who believe that nothing is real save that which they are able to grasp with their hands, Plato has Socrates say that he will now introduce young Theaetetus to a "much more refined and subtle"¹ theory of sensation. The hypothesis that this theory is Plato's is adequately supported by his reference to aspects of it in other dialogues. In typical western manner Plato uses sight as his example of sensation, assuming that what is true about sight is *mutatis mutandis* applicable to the other senses. The key statement is this: "...as the vision from the eyes and the whiteness from the thing that joins in giving birth to the color pass in the space between, the eye becomes filled with vision, and now sees, and becomes, not vision, but a seeing eye; while the other parent of the color is saturated with whiteness and becomes, on its side, not whiteness, but a white thing."² Plato, recalling his training under Cratylus, locates sensation in a world in which nothing is but is always becoming, nothing is good but is always becoming good, and nothing is beautiful but is always becoming beautiful.³ Color comes to be from two parents: (1) the becoming eye⁴ which is also called both the "patient"⁵ and that which has "the power of being acted upon"⁶ and (2) the becoming object⁷ which is also called both the "agent"⁸ and

1. 156 A.

2. 156 B.

3. 157 D.

4. 157 B.

5. 157 A.

6. 156 A.

7. 157 B.

8. 157 A.

the entity which has "the power of acting."⁹ A stream of vision (visual light) from the eye meets the stream of whiteness (fiery particles) from the object, and in "the space between"¹⁰ eye and object an action and a reaction take place such that the eye becomes "not vision, but a seeing eye"¹¹ and the object becomes "not whiteness, but a white thing."¹² In a later passage Plato says that "the patient becomes perceptive, not a perception, while the agent comes to have a quality, rather than to be quality."¹³ Support for claiming this to be Plato's own view is found in the *Timaeus* where Plato says that a color is "a flame streaming off any and every body, having its particles so adjusted to those of the visual current as to excite sensation."¹⁴ An important addition is offered in the myth of the sun in Book VI of the *Republic* where Plato says that the sun is that which gives the power of sight to the eye and also makes the visible object a sensed color: "If sight is in the eyes, and the possessor tries to use it, and if color is in the things, you know, I suppose that it will see nothing and the colors will be unseen unless a third thing is there specifically created for this very purpose."¹⁵ That thing, Glaucon correctly surmises, is the light of the sun. The unity of sensation for Plato arises from the unified transcendent source of light and fiery particles and also from the mingling of the light from the eye and the particles from the object in the space external to both eye and object.

No aspect of Plato's philosophy irritates Aristotle more than the appeal to transcendent principles. His chief charge against the Forms is that they are separate from sensed objects. Therefore, we are not surprised to find Aristotle developing carefully a theory of sensation which remedies the dual transcendence in Plato's theory of sensation, i.e., the transcendent source of light which operates through eye and object and the birth of color outside eye and object.

In *De Anima*, Book II Aristotle analyzes the five senses individually, yet he is not unmindful of the fact, as he states in the first chapter of Book III, that they "all form a unity."¹⁶ It is the same animal that sees, hears, smells, tastes, and touches. In keeping with his Platonic training Aristotle prefers that argument for the unity of sensation be made by appeal to the unity in sensed objects rather than by appeal to the unity of the sensing subject.

There are three kinds of objects of sense says Aristotle: the special, the incidental, and the common.¹⁷ The special are those objects of sense which can be perceived by one and only one sense organ, e.g., color, sound, flavor, etc. Unfortunately, Aristotle does not leave the matter at this point; instead he adds, "Each sense has one kind of object which it discerns."¹⁸ This is true of color for seeing, of sound for hearing, of taste for tasting, and of odour for smelling, but there is no one kind of object for touching. He says as much in the previous sentence: "Touch, indeed, discriminates more than one set of different qualities." Moreover, in his analysis of touch he admits,

9. 156 A.

10. 156 E.

11. 156 E.

12. 156 E.

13. *De Anima*, Book II, chap. 6. All references to Aristotle, unless otherwise designated, are from*De Anima*.

14. 41E & 15.

15. 402 A.

16. 67 C.

17. 507 E.

18. 425 & 31.

"It is a problem whether touch is a single sense or a group of senses."¹⁹

Aristotle in his conception of incidental objects of sense is distinguishing the object of sense qua sensed and the object of sense qua interpreted, but his four illustrations cloud the distinction. One illustration²⁰ is that of seeing a white object which is the son of Diars. Aristotle here seems to be saying that we see a white object, yet we indicate that what we are seeing is the son of Diars. This we do because we were expecting to see him at this time and place. At first we see the object directly as white and incidentally as the son of Diars, but presumably as we approach the object we see it directly as the son of Diars. The second illustration in Aristotle's own words is "the perception of Cleon's son, where we perceive him not as Cleon's son but as white, and the white thing which we really perceive happens to be Cleon's son."²¹ In this case we see a white object, and we do not while seeing it identify it as Cleon's son. Later we are informed that the white object we saw was Cleon's son. It may be that we have never met Cleon's son, or we may not even have known that Cleon had a son. In this illustration the incidental object of sense may never be perceived as an object of sense, i.e., we did not know this was Cleon's son when we saw the white object and we never happen to see Cleon's son after we are told Cleon has a son and that the white object we once saw was indeed Cleon's son. His third illustration is a passing remark that we might perceive what is sweet by vision.²² This he says is due to the fact that, although we sense sweetness by taste and whiteness by color, when sweet and white commonly meet in one sensed object "we are aware of both contemporaneously." This is a confusing statement, perhaps because of the word contemporaneously. There surely must be a time lag between seeing the white object and inferring that it is a sweet object. The fourth illustration²³ is a variation of the third. We have because of past experiences come to associate the bitterness of bile with a certain shade of yellow. Thus whenever we see this shade of yellow we tend to suppose that the object so colored is also bitter. This identifying of bitterness and yellowness is not the act of the sense of sight nor of the sense of taste. It is, says Aristotle, a "belief" — "the belief that if a thing is yellow it is bile." But beliefs are not sensed! This "illusion of sense" is based upon sensation, memory, and experience. This belief ought to be linked with what Aristotle has to say about the man of experience in the opening sentences of the *Metaphysics*. This illustration is ideally suited to lead into discussion of the third kind of sense objects.

In special sensation there is a one-to-one relationship of sense organ and sense of object, and in incidental sensation there is a one-to-two relationship. The third form of sensation is one in which there is a two-to-one relationship of sense organs and sense object, i.e., it is a form of sensation in which two or more sense organs may sense the same sense object. In other words, whereas incidental sensations do not depend upon any one sense object, common sensations do not depend upon any one sense organ. In several places in his works Aristotle lists the sense objects common to the senses. The lists are not always the same, e.g., "movement, rest, figure, magnitude,"²⁴ "movement,

19. 422 b 19,
20. 418 a 20-22.
21. 425 a 26.

22. 425 a 22.
23. 425 a 32 b 2.
24. 418 a 18.

rest, figure, magnitude, number, unity,"²⁵ "figure, magnitude, motion, number,"²⁶ "figure, magnitude, motion."²⁷ In *De Memoria et Reminiscentia* 451 a 18 he adds time, and in *De Sensu* 442 b 6 he adds roughness, smoothness, sharpness, and bluntness. Although Aristotle says that the objects of common sensation "are not peculiar to any one sense, but are common to all,"²⁸ he immediately qualifies the statement by noting that the objects of common sensation are related to those kinds of movements which can be perceived by both touch and sight. He does not seem to realize when he makes qualifications like this that movement (and rest), number, magnitude, etc., can sometimes be sensed by hearing, tasting, and smelling as well as by seeing and touching. The common objects of sense may be perceived incidentally, but they are not incidental objects of sense.²⁹ Past association or future information, for example, are not needed or relevant in the case of common sensation.

The discussion of the common objects of sense *koina aisthēta* leads Aristotle to the creation of the related term *koinē aisthēsis*. It appears in this form in *De Anima* 425 a 27, and it is suggested or implied in *De Anima* 431 b 5 and *De Partibus Animalium* 686 a 32. Translations include common sense, common sensation, *sensus communis*, sensorium, general sensibility, and common sensibility. The term *prōton aisthētikon* (primary sensibility) in *De Memoria et Reminiscentia* 450 a 12 is probably equivalent to *koinē aisthēsis*. Less probable equivalents are *aisthētikon panton* (total sensibility) in *De Sensu* 449 a 18 and *koinē dunamis* (common power) in *De Somno et Vigilia* 455 a 16. It is the unquestioned reality of the common objects of sensation which leads Aristotle to the certainty of the unity of sensation, i.e., if these objects of sensation can be sensed by two or more senses, then there must be a unity of the senses. But to affirm a oneness of the senses is not to affirm the reality of another sense with its own organ, medium, and objects.

Aristotle uses great caution lest he be misunderstood with respect to common sensibility. He begins *De Anima*, Book III, chapter 1, the chapter in which the clearest reference to common sensibility is located, with the statement "There is no sixth sense." Again with his one clear and undisputed use of the term *koinē aisthēsis* he includes the caveat that this does not refer to a special sense: "But in the case of the common sensibles there is already in us a general sensibility which enables us to perceive them directly; there is therefore no special sense required for their perception."³⁰ And in *De Somno et Vigilia* he says that every sense (not just sight and touch) has a peculiar or individual (*idion*) function and a common or general (*koinon*) function.³¹ Aristotle, perhaps in order to head off the view that there are ten senses considered functionally, i.e., one peculiar and one common function for each of the five senses, affirms that the sensory faculty is one.³² Yet, perhaps because of the substance-implicating nature of the Greek language, Aristotle approaches dangerously near the error he wishes to avoid when he makes the heart the organ of common of the sense-faculties in the heart, for it is here that we must look for the common

25. 425 a 16.

26. 437 a 8.

27. *De Sensu* 458 b 5.

28. 418 a 18.

29. 425 a 15.

30. 425 a 27.

31. 455 a 16.

32. *De Somno et Vigilia* 455 a 20.

sensorium belonging to all the sense organs."³³ "Now, it has been definitely settled already in another work that sense-perception in animals originates in the same part of the organism in which movement originates. . . . This in sanguineous animals is the region of the heart."³⁴ ". . . it is the region of the heart that constitutes the sensory center."³⁵ ". . . the heart . . . is the principle of life and the source of all motion and sensation."³⁶ Similar statements are found in *De Partibus Animalium* 647 a 25 and *De Motu Animalium* 702 b 21. In identifying the heart as the primary organ of sensation Aristotle is correct in that all sensation depends upon life, and life depends upon the functioning of the heart. To call attention to the fact that he often refers to the locus of common sensibility as "the region of the heart" does not bail Aristotle out of an absurd physiology, but this does call attention to Aristotle's teleological mode of reasoning. The central position of the heart in the body and its protecting rib cage suggests to Aristotle that very important functions take place in this area, and what is more important in the life of man than sensation which is the foundation of all art and science? Such is his thinking when he approaches sensation physiologically, but when he approaches it in terms of his functional behaviorism, he falls into no such speculation, treating common sensibility instead as a functioning of each specific sense in a manner which can only be described as common.

The word *aisthēsis* serves double duty for Aristotle: it is used for both sensation and perception, i.e., for that which results from the use of our senses and also for the identification which follows sensation. For example, we may be said to *sense* heat and light, and we may be said to *perceive* the sun. The special objects are the objects of bare sensation, and about them we do not err says Aristotle. The incidental objects are perceptions, i.e., they are formed by judging upon the bare sensations. But while the distinction between special sensibles and incidental sensibles is based on the distinction between sensation and perception, the distinction between specific sensibles and common sensibles is based on the distinction between an individual *idion* relationship and a common (*koinon*) relationship.

Plato, as we have noted, presents the view that sensation consists in an interaction between that which comes through a sense organ and that which comes through a sense object. In the case of sight it is the light from the eye interacting with the fiery particles from the object. Aristotle, accepting the general outlines of this view, argues that the sensation of color is a relationship between eye and object. But the sensation of shape is not like the sensation of color, for whereas the former is a relation solely between eye and object, the latter is a relation either between eye and object or between hand and object. The sense object qua color subsists in an individual relationship of eye and object, but the sense object qua shape subsists in a common relationship in that it may be a relation between eye and object, or between hand and object, or between both eye and hand and the object. Both sight and touch are able to discriminate shape, but sight alone discriminates color. Theoretically each sense organ has both one peculiar function and one or more functions which it shares with other sense

33. *De Juventute et Senectute, De Vita et Morte, De Respiratione* 469 a 10. This work is Aristotelian, but probably not Aristotle's.

34. *De Somno et Vigilia* 456 a 1, 4.

35. *De Partibus Animalium* 656 a 30.

36. *Ibid.*, 665 a 11.

organs : "... every sense has something peculiar, and also something common."³⁷ But Aristotle usually refers only to sight and touch when he discusses common sensibility.

Aristotle says in a remarkable statement, "It is doubtless better to avoid saying that the soul pities or learns or thinks, and rather to say that it is the man who does this with his soul."³⁸ If Aristotle had followed out the implications of this sentence, he might have headed off many of the absurdities of the mind-body problem and thus avoided some of the agonies of personal identity in western philosophy. But we must admit that this sentence probably has far more significance for us than it did for Aristotle. In the light of this sentence Aristotle's position on sensation may be stated as follows :

- (1) A person by means of each sense organ senses the specific objects of sensation which are appropriate to each sense organ.
- (2) A person by means of each sense organ perceives the incidental objects of sensation.
- (3) A person by means of each sense organ shares or can share with one or more other sense organs the sensation of the common objects of sensation.

Aristotle erred in not following out the implications of statements like "... all form a unity"³⁹ and "... it is the man who does this with his soul."⁴⁰ Perhaps he should have begun his analysis with the unified person rather than with the individual sense organs, media, and objects. But in his usual concern for details he began with a study of each of the five senses, and then turned his attention to the unity of sensation.

It is informative at this point to return to Plato and to note how unity of sensation was established by him. The senses, he says in *Theaetetus* 184 D, are ensconced inside us, like the warriors in the Trojan horse. It is by the mind (*nous*) that we perceive objects through the instrumentality of the senses. Color and sound are different, yet they are related by some power in the person which is obviously not sight nor hearing. This power discriminates existence and non-existence, likeness and unlikeness, one and many, sameness and difference, odd and even, etc. It identifies what is common and what is not common to a color and a sound. At this point the young man Theaetetus says, "I think there is no special organ at all for these things, as there is for the others. It is clear to me that the mind in itself is its own instrument for contemplating the common terms that apply to everything."⁴¹ This wins praise from Socrates, who adds that "the mind contemplates some things through its own instrumentality, others through the bodily faculties," i.e., the mind works with two sorts of entities : (1) the results of sense experience which can culminate only in opinion, and (2) the common terms or Forms which culminate in knowledge.

Aristotle cannot accept this interpretation, since it is built upon the assumption of the fundamental separation of particulars and universals. His common sensibility is to be regarded as an alternative to mind as here presented by Plato. The position

37. *De Sensu et Memoria* 435 a 14.

38. 431 b 14.

39. 425 a 31.

40. 431 b 14.

41. *Theaetetus*, 185 D.

toward which Aristotle gropes and which he never explicitly formulates is that the human individual qua sensing being as contrasted to the human individual qua rational being has a power of integration which is expressed through the five senses. This integration is inherent in the sense life of the individual and does not require entities transcendent to sensation such as the Platonic mind as presented in the *Theaetetus* or the child of the Good as in the *Republic*.

Aristotle's common sensibility is not a concept presented to solve a variety of problems of sensation left over from his treatment of the individual senses, but it is a concept arising from contemplation upon the transcendent integrations offered by Plato. The analysis of its functioning therefore is not to be regarded as argument for its reality but as evidence for its utility. In other words, Aristotle seems to have first arrived at the notion of the unity of sensation, and then to have spelled out its implications, rather than to have inductively discovered a variety of activities of the senses, and then to have formulated a mechanism to account for all the activities. If this interpretation is correct, then his references to the functioning of common sensibility support and illustrate his belief in the unity of sensation rather than provide a foundation for the creation of the concept. On the basis of this interpretation Aristotle's position on the unity of sensation may be stated as follows:

- (1) The human individual functions as a unit in his sense experiences. The one who sees is also the one who hears. "The senses perceive each other's special objects incidentally; not because the percipient sense is this or that special sense, but because all form a unity."⁴²
- (2) This unity is a power in the living being which perceives as one even though it receives each genus of objects of sensation through a different organ. "... the general faculty of sense-perception is one. ... it perceives each different genus of sensibles through a different organ."⁴³
- (3) This unity is in sensation, not in thought or mind. "Since it is through sense that we are aware that we are seeing or hearing, it must be either by sight that we are aware of seeing, or by some sense other than sight ... We must assume a sense which is aware of itself."⁴⁴
- (4) This explains how it is that we are able to sense movement, rest, number, figure, time, etc., by sight, or by touch, or by other senses. "... there cannot be a special sense organ for the common sensibles."⁴⁵
- (5) This explains how it is that we are able to discriminate the taste of sweetness from the sight of yellowness, as well as sweet from bitter and yellow from white. "Since we also discriminate white from sweet, and indeed each sensible quality from every other, with what do we perceive that they are different? It must be by sense; for what is before us is sensible objects."⁴⁶
- (6) This explains how it is that the activity of the sense organs becomes simultaneously inactive in sleeping or swooning. "... waking and sleeping are an affection of the common organ of sense perception."⁴⁷

42. 425 a 30.

43. *De Sensu* 449 a 7, 10.

44. 425 b 11, 16.

45. 425 a 15.

46. 426 b 11-14.

47. *De Somno et Vigilia* 455 a 26.

The doctrine of common sensibility in Aristotle is closely related to the activities of appetency, imagination, and locomotion, but these are activities which do not come within the present study since the intent of this paper is to demonstrate that Aristotle's conception of the unity of sensation is best understood as his attempt to offer an immanent unifying function as an alternative to Plato's claim that integration is separate from the activity of sensing.

The Eternal Quest

Different systems of philosophy define the eternal quest of man differently. Epicureanism would say that it is pleasure, Kant holds that it is moral perfection, theists suggest that it is the attainment of God, Vedānta and others point out that it is self-realisation and Buddhism would call it nirvāṇa. It is not possible to define the ultimate goal of man in a manner acceptable to everyone who ever cares to bother about this question? In the present paper, an attempt will be made in that direction.

I

It appears to us that the first criterion or characteristic of the ultimate goal should be that it is permanent or that it is never lost once it is attained. Whether such a goal is attainable or not and what that goal can be is a different question. But it is certain that no body would like to lose it after having it. This is obvious from the fact that even in our worldly life if we consider anything good such as money, health, name, fame and other things like that, we do not like to lose them even if they are lost with the best of our efforts. We try to preserve even what cannot be preserved. Even if we are not able to have things for ever, we try to extend their possession as long as we can. Our inner craving is for the permanent. This is why the Gita says that after attaining the highest goal, there is no return or coming back (*Yad gatva na nivartante tad dhāma paramam* Ch. XV, 6) "My abode is that from where there is no return or fall."¹ No body can possibly object to this.

The other characteristic which seems to be no less important is that the highest goal should be such that there arises no question of more or less about it. If such a question arises about any thing, then it cannot be our ultimate goal because then there will be ever a craving for more and more. A state of life in which we want some thing more and more can be hardly called desirable or ultimate. The possibility of being more

1. Atto, V, 21, Sukham akasayam.

or less regarding anything produces, apart from constant discontent, other feeling also such as envy and jealousy, and that is anything but good. All our worldly aspirations beside being impermanent are necessarily subject to the possibility of more or less. It follows there that they cannot be our ultimate goal. In other words, the object of our ultimate goal must be infinite, because it is only the infinite that cannot be more or less. This is why it has been said that real happiness can be only in the infinite and not in the finite (*yo Vai bhūmā tat sukham nahe sukhantasti* Ch. Up. VII 23). And the infinite is that where there is no duality; wherever there is duality there is also finitude. Further the *Upansad* makes it clear that the highest goal is such that it can neither be increased nor decreased (*na yaddhate karmāna na kanyān* Br. Up. IV, 4 23); it transcends the sphere of measure and quantity. The *Bhagavad Gītā* points out the same thing somewhat differently when it says that the highest goal is that after attaining which nothing higher or more valuable can be conceived (*yan Jobdhva na caparam labham manyate nadhikam tatah*).² Obviously it is only the infinite higher than or bigger than which nothing can be conceived.

Finally, there is a third characteristic also which may be regarded not so much as a criterion of the ultimate goal but rather as an evidence of our having attained the goal. The *Gītā* tells us that after having attained the goal, one is not perturbed or disturbed even by the worst of misery or misfortune (*Gītā*, VI-22). This is the test of our success in having attained the true goal. But let us understand it properly. Firstly the implication is that the goal can be attained even in this life, and not only that, it is even possible to put oneself to a test as to whether one has attained the goal or is the victim of some kind of self-deception. A goal which cannot be attained here and now and the attainment of which cannot be put to a test, remains always a matter of faith, and as such it cannot inspire us in the same way as a goal which we can achieve in this life itself. Secondly, it should be borne in mind that when the *Gītā* says that one who has realised the highest goal is not disturbed by any misery or misfortune, it also means that he is not elated by any gain or success. Because for a person who has attained the highest goal, any question of gain or loss is irrelevant. A mind which is elated by pleasure or gain retains in it the potentiality to be depressed and disturbed by loss and pain. From the point of view of the equanimity of mind pleasure and pain are at par; the one disturbs the mind no less than the other. The pleasure and pain are twins; it is a point which we in our fondness for pleasure do not see. Neither the prospect of pleasure nor the fear of pain disturbs the man of realisation (*Sukha duḥkha samē kṛiṣṭa tabhātābhāṣa jayajayam*, *Gītā* II, 38). Such a man is above all advances or pairs of opposites; he transcends the level of life where one is affected by them (*samatvam yoga uchyate*).

11

The other two important questions that arise in this connection are; what can be that goal which has the above characteristics? How are we to attain that? It is obvious that pleasure cannot be that goal however much we like it; pleasure is neither infinite nor permanent. What is worse, pleasure is never without pain. Can moral perfection be

2. Gita VI 22, V, 21.

that goal ? Does it have the above characteristics ? There is no doubt that virtue or moral perfection is a noble goal and definitely superior to the hedonistic ideal. But we should remember that morality, though it may not be relative, is definitely relational ; it refers to the relation between one individual and another and is therefore essentially social. Moreover, moral perfection is something acquired ; it does not belong to us intrinsically. How can we be sure that moral perfection can be attained in this life ? What is the guarantee that it will stick to us and will never diminish or drop down ? Further, how can we be sure that the morally perfect man, if there be any, will also be a happy man ? There seems to be no necessary connection between virtue and happiness. Kant saw this difficulty and left it to God to solve it. It seems to us that for Kant God is who is both morally perfect and happy is an unattainable ideal. There is a kind of self-transcendence in morality ; it must pass into religion. Mere morality cannot be our goal.

Kant's ideal of morality seems to have double self-transcendence or rather transcendence at two levels. At the social level, Kant seems to combine morality with humanism when he says that our goal should be to make ourselves perfect and others happy. Not perfection alone but also others happiness should be our goal. There is a self-transcendence of morality at a higher level where Kant introduces the idea of God. It becomes obvious that moral perfection is not a self-sufficient ideal ; it is incomplete without reference to God.

III

Taking a clue from Buddhism; some people think that the goal of life is to attain a certain peace and poise of mind, something which is necessary even to carry on our worldly life successfully. This equanimity of mind is different from mere morality. But the best thing about it is that it is just a matter of cultivation and actual experience and has nothing to do, as some people think, with any metaphysical or religious faith. Moral purity and even religious devotion may be necessary as means but they are not ends in themselves. Mental equanimity is good as experience and necessary as worldly policy and is possible to have keeping with our inclination. God, the all-perfect can be regarded as the natural object of our love and attraction once we become aware of His existence. Nothing would be more unnatural than not loving God after knowing Him.

In other words, the goal of our life may be conceived as the love of God or the attainment of the ever-perfect being, God. The logic of the devotional schools of philosophy is the same everywhere. They all urge us to change the direction of our love from the world to God, because that alone can bring us permanent and infinite happiness.

God-realisation as the goal of life is an ideal which is definitely more popular than any other ideal. It is upheld by all theistic religions. There is certainly nothing more ennobling and edifying than the love of God. But let us try to understand what it means precisely. Generally speaking love of God or Bhakti has been understood in three different ways. Bhakti for some people is a training and transformation of the will. For others, Bhakti is a gift from God. Still others would hold that Bhakti is the very nature of the soul. It is in ignorance that the soul loves other objects ; by nature

it ought to love God only. Let us now try to understand what God-realisation would mean from the point of view of these three different conceptions of Bhakti.

IV

In the Christian tradition those who wanted to emphasise the love and grace of God wanted to show the supremacy of will over the intellect. In this tradition love is taken to be a matter of will. If so, God-realisation becomes a matter of our effort in the same manner as moral perfection is. In that case, this cultivated love of God is open to the same risk to which cultivated morality is. What is the guarantee that this love will stay and will not suffer diminution and decay? The law is that everything that is produced is subject to decay and destruction. Where is the surety that God-love once acquired in this manner, there will be no fall? If Bhakti is to be permanent, it has to be conceived not as a without tears (without metaphysics) merely by some self-control and some detachment. All this sounds very good indeed. But the question is: Is detachment going to be merely a policy? On what basis is it going to be cultivated? Can mere practice without any vision stand the onslaughts of the waves of passions? What is there to sustain the practice itself? It is really a very superficial view of passions which have a deeper root. Passions are rooted in egoity and egoity is only strengthened and not uprooted by effort and exercise. The ego has to be transcended and not exercised. If the ego is all that is there, can it ever be free from the fear of death? And can there be any real peace of mind under the constant fear of death, one's own and one's dear ones? It is because of these considerations that the Gītā makes it clear that the relish for sense-object can go only when one realises the supreme and not merely by self-control (II, 59). The problem of the fear of death is also the problem of peace or equanimity cannot be solved empirically. There is no short cut to it; one has got to take of the problem of existence in its entirety; there is no escape from metaphysics.

V

Let us now consider the more positive view, namely, that our goal is permanent and infinite happiness. But the question is: how are we to conceive permanent and infinite happiness and how are we to achieve it? It may be held that the objects which we love and which give us happiness are finite and impermanent and so our happiness also is finite and impermanent. If we could turn our attention and love to something which is infinite and permanent, our happiness could be permanent and infinite. The quality of our happiness depends upon and corresponds to the quality of the object of our love. If we could substitute God in place of worldly pursuits as the object of our love, the quality of our happiness would change. An additional advantage in our love of God would be that unlike our worldly goals, the object of our love will not diminish by sharing, it may on the other hand increase with the increase in the number of shares. Moreover, love of the all-perfect will not be an uphill task but rather something in positive acquisition but as something negative. For example, Bhakti may be regarded as a surrender of one's will rather than a transformation of it. "Not my will but thy will

be done." This is the true spirit of Bhakti. It is the acceptance of only one Divine Universal will and rejection of every other. But how is the rejection or surrender of one's own will possible? This is possible not by an exercise of our will but rather by the realisation of the only supreme cosmic. Being Bhakti in this sense amounts to knowledge.

The second view of Bhakti as a gift from God seems to have the merit of making Bhakti not a matter of will and effort but purely a matter of grace. This view is more consistent with the spirit of Bhakti which essentially means utter dependence. This is the spirit contained in the concept of *Saranagati*. God is our shelter and our refuge; without Him we are nothing and no-where. We are His whether He accepts or rejects us. He has to hold our hands; we do not have the necessary strength to hold His Hands. There is greater security if He holds our hands than if we hold His. Are we to take this as gift in the literal sense? If so, a certain fear will always be dogging us here too, the fear of His leaving our hands. How can the fear of fall go. It can go only if the Divine gift is understood as inner illumination, an illumination which strikes at the root of our problem and solves it for ever. In the Gītā the Lord says that He gives to His Bhakta, the yoga of wisdom (*Dadami buddhi yogam tam* X-10). If the holding of hand is understood to mean becoming one with Him, then the fear of the fall will not be there. But this becoming one with God can be only a kind of discovery or knowledge and not a literal becoming or transformation, because all becoming is impermanent. But unfortunately most of the theists or the followers of the Bhakti School find the idea of becoming one with God unpalatable or unacceptable. More often than not, the difference between man and God is insisted upon, and what is more, *Bhakti* is in a sense made to depend on that difference. But the logic of Bhakti would actually lead us in a different direction. The different kinds of relation with God attained by Bhakti are admitted; *selokya*. (being in the *loka* with God), *Samipya* (being near God) *Sayujya* (being not only near but part of God), and *sarupya* (acquiring the same form as God). All these tend to suggest greater and greater nearness or unity. This unity in order to be permanent must be rooted in reality; it must not be merely some thing brought about or else it cannot be permanent. Whatever has a beginning has also an end, is temporal and not eternal. Whether we hold God to our bosom or God holds us, in either case, there can be no freedom from the fear of fall unless it means the realisation of the unity of man with God.

VII

The third conception of Bhakti as the very nature of the soul or as a natural relation between soul and God makes a great advance on the first two views and converts *Bhakti* into a metaphysical reality. It is not possible here to go into the question whether Bhakti can be so conceived or not. The analogy of the needle and the magnet is generally used to express the idea. When coated with rust or ignorance, the soul may not feel the attraction for God, but when there is knowledge, there is the inevitable and necessary attraction, and the soul feels happy and restored. Thus the soul cannot feel happy except as united to God. The soul's object of love is permanent and infinite, the soul's attraction for that object (God) is natural, and so our happiness is bound to be permanent and infinite when we have realised God. The only difficulty in

this view is whether it is possible for the soul or *Ātmā* to love anything else other than itself. The *Upaniṣad* lays down the principle that everything is dear to the self for the sake of the self. Our love for other things is secondary and derivative and not primary and basic. The love of the self for itself is primary and basic, the self in this context not meaning the ego which gives rise to all kinds of selfishness and narrowness, but the true self. There can be true love only where there is unity; where ever there is duality there is fear. If there is duality between God and self, then our love for God can be inspired only by fear and selfishness. But if we love God as our very self, if there is unity between myself and God, then there is true love. There must be some kind of unity and not mere union between the lover and the beloved; mere union cannot be permanent. It is true that it is not quite easy to understand the nature of unity between God and soul rationally but it must be there. The doctrine of *acintya bhedabheda* seems to appreciate this difficulty about the nature of love which requires both unity and difference. The *aśvaśāstra* explains the situation by taking recourse to doctrine of two levels; in love there is empirical difference and transcendent unity; it is a case of the lower self turning to the higher or the deeper self. Any way, in love unity there must be; it is not possible to feel drawn towards a wholly other being. There must be a basis, a root in reality; unity is the basis of union.

VIII

The problem of unity and union brings us to the consideration of a conception of the ultimate goal in purely negative terms. We have already shown how there is an element of negation even in positive conceptions of the goal. Morality rejects pleasure and *Bhakti* rejects not only pleasure but also morality in favour of love to God. We have also shown that the goal cannot be permanent and free from the fear of lapse if it is something to be positively acquired and not something already there in reality. The fear of relapse cannot go if the goal depends in any way on the will of man or even on the will of God. If so, such a goal can be realised only by knowledge, because knowledge alone can discover reality or what is already there. If the goal is already an accomplished fact and yet if I do not enjoy it, it can be only due to ignorance. Which can be removed only by knowledge. Certain peculiarities of this view may be noted. Firstly, there is no fear of relapse in this view because ignorance once destroyed is destroyed for ever. It is only ignorance that can be destroyed for ever and nothing else. If imperfection is conceived in realistic terms, it cannot be destroyed, much less by knowledge. Secondly, it is also to be noted that ignorance can be destroyed only by knowledge and not by anything like *karma* and *Bhakti* except indirectly. Thirdly, it is important to note that knowledge only destroys ignorance and does not bring about any transformation or change in reality; it just leaves reality to shine in its own majesty, in its own light and right. This is why *Vedānta* regards perfection as the hidden fact of self—a fact which has only to be discovered in order to be enjoyed. The *Vedānta* further, insists that in the realm of perfection there can be no duality, no possibility of fear and hesitance. The self is one infinite, eternal reality and the discovery of that self alone can be our ultimate goal.

In this respect, Buddhism, specially the *Mādhyamika* in its conception of

nirvāṇa, shows remarkable insight and comes very near *Vedānta*. *Nirvāṇa* is conceived negatively and is attained only by knowledge (*prajñā*). But a certain difference may be noted. Knowledge for the *Mādhyamika* is utterly negative and means merely the awareness of the falsity of everything. It is not that falsity is known, because cannot be known but only rejected ; reality alone can be known. In fact, falsity can be rejected only by knowing reality. But the *Mādhyamika* does not speak of any positive knowledge. So the *Mādhyamika* does not seem to be the way of knowledge as it is ordinarily understood. Secondly, the *Mādhyamika* is not able as point out how one can own or appropriate *nirvāṇa*. How can I say that it is my *nirvāṇa* unless it is related to myself. Thus there seems to be a lacuna in the *Mādhyamika* conception, a lacuna which is most probably due to his exclusive dependence on negation. The *Vedānta* is able to overcome this difficulty by taking recourse to *śruti*, a step which cannot be called dogmatic. Even the *Mādhyamika* has to do it to the extent he calls himself a Buddhist or depends on the Buddhist tradition. It is only on the basis of the Buddhist tradition that the *Mādhyamika* can believe in the possibility of attaining *nirvāṇa* and not by his dialectical negation. There is no way of demonstrating all this in a dialectical way. The *Vedānta* makes this dependence on tradition necessary and explicit.

The Growth of the Self

tion of them possible, then we must inevitably begin to assert with Hume that the self is only a succession of impressions, or with Hobbes that the self *is* the body.

The self is nonetheless real because it, like the body, comes into being and, at least in part, passes away.

But while the self is more than a single state or succession of states of the body, and more than a single action of the body, it is not, as the idealists hold, capable of leaving that to which it is tied and on which it is dependent. It is no more capable of parting from its body than a shadow can part from the substance which casts it or imagination can take flight from the slumbering body in which it originates. That is to say, the self, so far as it is an activity of the body, exists in space-time and is subject to the conditions and laws of space-time operating in the physical and biological realm; and so far as, in the qualities which it experiences and the relations it entertains, it "subsists," its subsistence is subject to and dependent upon that self-same domain of matter and space-time.

Nor is the self here interpreted as a mere illusion which masks or illustrates an all-inclusive cosmic Self. The self is, in a sense, a microcosm, having certain resemblances to the universe as a whole, and displays, like anything else, the generic categories of all existence. But the self is not just a "vacuous actuality," or a "bloodless ballet of categories," or a "moving image of eternity," obediently assuming the pose of material existence so as to glorify the great puppeteer who is not himself material. The self is real in its own right. Its body, its felt qualities, its entertained relations, its ideals, its processes of achievement or failure, its changes of heart and mind: these are real and belong to it, and it belongs to that universe of plurals and has as much status there as a star or a particular paramecium. In this view, the whole world—the space-time continuum of energy—is infinitely severed and severalized. Variety, though transient, is real. And so is contingency. And while it may be that some divine spirit broods on the face of the cosmic deep and imparts some measure of ultimate order to that turbulence and vastness, yet sports and experiments persist, causally and logically independent of other events, including those in which they took their rise. And the human self possesses such independence.

The human self is created out of certain factors—processes, qualia, forms—when those are brought together in a certain way. These materials of self may be divided into three classes.

II

The Bodily Factors in the Self

For a self to exist an organism of a certain kind and a certain normality must first exist. The self is an organized complex of experiences, arising in a social matrix, and funded through time. These are experiences of a body as engaged in transactions with its environs. The self arises as a function of the infant organism; it grows as the organism grows; it continues after the organism has reached anatomical maturity; and it begins to die, as living subject, as the organism dies, so that in senility the organism may have no more selfhood than it had as a baby.

To become a self, the organism must be of the species *Homo sapiens*. Careful

attempts to nurture the organism of a chimpanzee into selfhood have failed to bring it beyond a limited linguistic understanding. Similarly, the organism must be "normal." Cortical deficiencies, such as found in idiots, do not permit the self to develop beyond a mental age of two years.

The newborn organism is incomplete—in two senses. It lacks pre-established modes of response which might enable it to survive easily and on its own. And it is very immature, physiologically speaking; for while it possesses specific unlearned reflexes, such as breathing, swallowing, grasping, and the like, and also possesses all the organs for locomotor, sensory, and social development, many years will be required for it to come to full physiological maturity. At the same time the organism seems to be driven by a certain imperative of action, expressed in "gross random movements of large sectors of the organism."¹ It is these factors—the dependency, indeterminateness, and immaturity of the organism—which lay the *Anlage* for the development of the self. For coupled with drive to act—variously called by thinkers "operant,"² the "self-actualization" drive,³ the "id,"⁴ the drive for the enhancement of values,⁵ the will to live⁶—these characteristics of the infant organism issue in the continuous transformation of its experiences. The organism is like a fluid river running through the banks of its environment. Or, to use a more fittingly dynamic analogy, the individual plastic organism, propelled into various contexts, undergoes various transformations, accumulated and layered in the same way that protoplasm on this planet, driven by an expansive force to occupy niches on sea and land, in the air, has assumed millions of different forms. The individual biological organism is the thesis, physical environment and culture are the anti-thesis, and personality is the synthesis, which in turn becomes a new thesis in its interactions with others and with nature. 9017

There is another bodily factor. Each organism has a distinctive structure or somatotype. The somatotype is a fixed structure of the major bodily components, unchanging from birth to death. W. H. Sheldon has identified and described such types, and his own and other research has shown convincingly high correlations between body type and temperament, where "temperament" means the dynamic expression of the bodily components, as for example, aggressive activity is the expression of musculature.⁷ Temperament may also mean the tempo and qualitative "resonance" of an organism. In any case, temperament seems to be a direct function of the body type, which can be evoked or repressed by environment. The science of somatotype and temperament is comparable in psychology to the development of the periodic table in physics and chemistry. For as men could not achieve prediction and control over matter until it was broken up into its basic forms or types, analyzed into its component parts, described in terms of structure and function, so the science of

1. Harold Rugg, *Foundations for American Education*, Yonkers-on-Hudson, New York, World Book, 1947, p. 179.

2. See the works of B. F. Skinner.

3. See the works of A.H. Maslow.

4. See the works of Sigmund Freud.

5. Dildy Cassell, *The "H-By" of Man's Experience*, New York, Macmillan, 1950, ch. 2.

6. Arthur Schopenhauer, *The World as Will and Idea*.

7. *The Principles of Human Physiology*, New York and London, Harper and Brothers, 1940. *The Principles of Temperament*, New York and London, Harper and Brothers, 1944.

personality will fail to achieve precision of prediction and control so long as bodies, the basic foundation on which personality rises, are treated as irrelevant or as essentially identical, and are not treated as illustrations of general types and as unique combinations of universal variables. There is some evidence that when environment frustrates or throws into conflict the deep-lying dispositions of body-temperament the result is mental illness; and that when a thwarted temperament, through change of circumstance, "comes into its own" and realizes its native tendencies, it passes from a divided self to an integrated self. The dialectic between thesis and antithesis—between body and symbols, the real and the ideal, the past and the future, the individual and the culture—is resolved into a creative synthesis. This experience of synthesis has been described as "fulfilment," "moksha," "salvation", "satori" and "seeing God."

But, it may be asked, if the body is so important to the being and character of the self, is not the self determined and not free? The answer is, yes: to the extent that the body is the given and unalterable material on which the self rises and must use for its advance, the self is not free.⁸ The major choice of materials has been made at conception; secondary choices—what the pregnant mother shall eat, what the nursing mother shall feed the baby, etc.—can modify that initial and fateful choice but cannot undo it. From the point of view of the embryo conceived, the myth of Er, told by Socrates to Glaucon, is true, after a fashion: Lachesis, the daughter of Necessity, distributes among the yet to be embodied spirits her lots and samples of mortal lives, but once the lot is chosen the chooser must live with it the rest of his mortal days.⁹ This is an ancient teaching, recognized by Calvinists and materialists alike. Now the necessity is the laws of chance, which govern the meeting of ovum and sperm. And is this a matter beyond the control of man and woman? By no means. For mating is, or can be, a selective matter and an act of freedom. But it becomes freedom only when those mating know what is good and act accordingly. And if the good consists in the fulfilment of selves, and if the body is an indispensable part of the self, then to practice eugenics is to serve the good, and to free the future for the good and deliver it from evil.

III

The Environmental Factors in the Self

For a subject or self to exist, it must be participant in inter-subjective or inter-personal relations. Evidence from the psycho-social sciences indicates that the self cannot be adequately defined, predicted, or controlled apart from considerations of the environs in which it originates, continues, and grows. The view of mechanistic materialism, which posits the atomic self as a discrete, self-sufficient, and independent entity, must accordingly be rejected. These properties seem to be displayed at the finish of a given process, when an entity stands in isolation from all its contemporaries; they are therefore phases and not finalities.

While the self (any given self) is contingent and unique, it could not be so if it were not also characterized by certain necessary and generic features. But this does

8. Plato, *The Republic*, Book X, 614 B ff.

not mean that the self is, as the Upanishads says, the "Universal Self," or that, following Spinoza, it has a necessary, generic and eternal substratum which has necessarily issued in this particular entity. What is meant by saying that the self has necessary features is that in order for self to exist at all certain conditions must obtain—a biological body in a context of sustaining physical and biological bodies, a society, etc. What is meant by saying that the self has generic features is that in order for a self to exist at all and to be identifiable as a contingent, unique, particular being, it must possess characteristics which distinguish it as a member of the genus of selves, in contrast to what are not selves, and which also distinguish it *sui generis*. As permanent, the self is a structure of processes enduring through the temporal changes in its parts or contents. It is a "society", in the Whiteheadian sense, inclusive of its component experiences, and giving a common form to them.⁹

The self, in its particularity, individuality, and independence, is also dependent and socialized. It exists and continues as a self-identical entity in virtue of certain relations it bears to its environment, both its internal environment, (i.e., its body and its states of awareness) and its external environment (other bodies, selves and non-selves). When these relations alter, within a certain range, the self alters; and when they alter beyond that range, the self, as active subject, ceases to exist.

The self does not exist antecedent to the body, nor antecedent to the world of bodies, nor antecedent to the world of society of interacting selves. The self is an emergent; as protoplasm is a distinctive way of organizing physical matter, exhibiting distinctive properties, behavior, and laws, so the domain of self or personality is a distinctive way of organizing a particular kind of living matter. The self therefore begins—or at least the basis for the self begins—when the living organism, as embryo in the womb of a human living organism, begins, to interact with an environment and toprehend or "feel" it in a structured way. It is this *qualification of living process*, this qualified or affective unity of experience, which constitutes the distinctive datum or content of the self. Some indeed would say that insofar as *all* process prehends its environment of processes, it is psychic. But (with certain exceptions) we shall limit the term "psyche" or "self" to what is characteristically human. Accordingly, the embryonic form of a future human self is not a self but a "proto-self," for though it presumably feels its immediate world that life of feeling is not markedly distinct from the feeling of other primate or mammalian embryos.

After it is born, then, the infant begins to interact and to feel in new ways. New modes of perception come into play, and there is a new world to be perceived. Because of the constant conjunction of circumstances in the context of organism and environment, certain contents of awareness (qualia and forms) endure as images in the emergent life of feeling, and this endurance is reinforced by the recurrence of those qualia in interaction of organism and events. Moreover, through signs, these qualia become interconnected into a system, so that the evocation of one may lead to the evocation of another. Yet the self in its fullest sense, the self as an active participant in social processes, as an agent who uses and is used by language, has not yet

9. A.N. Whitehead *Adventures of Ideas*, New York, Macmillan, 1933, pp. 261-262. *Process and Reality*, New York, Macmillan, 1929, pp. 337-338.

emerged into being. In order for the biological organism to become minded, selved, and socialized, it must undergo certain prior transformations which prepare the way the emergence of self. To be a self, the organism must be acculturated; but acculturation does not occur immediately after birth.

Initially, the behavior of the organism is poorly coordinated, both as an individual system and in its relation to its world. The infant's relation to the world is receptive and passive, and its behaviour is dominated by the principle of physiological stability and comfort. Early in the first year this principle is qualified by the interest taken in *sensa*—light, color, sounds, tactile feelings. Sometime during the first year, ordinarily, culture begins to touch and affect the organism, and it ceases to live merely at an "animal" level. Behavior is determined not only by physiological satisfaction and sensory delight but also by the experience of participating in a certain kind of interactive relation with human beings. Accelerated muscular development in the second year and a surge of activity on the part of the child at this time carry him into, and engage him with, the activities, values, demands, and symbols of others—that is, into culture. This is the "training period" in which "regulatory" behavior is taught and the individual learns to harmonize his activities with those of his operative group. Through habit the child internalizes and individualizes the customs and rituals of his culture.

The basis for this socialization through habit—which is primarily mimetic and non-linguistic—has already been provided in the nature of the biological organism and the peculiar relation it bears to those who nurture it. The infant is physiologically dependent; his development is "foetalized," slowed down, prolonged. He is markedly unprotected and sensitive. These factors—his dependency, his slow physiological development, and his sensitivity—combined with the brain, the hand, and the voice mechanism¹⁰—constitute the individual potential for socialization. And when the infant comes into inter-action with persons who nurture him and employ a language in that nurture, socialization is the consequence.

The primitive foundation for socialization lies in the mammalian dependence of the infant upon his mother. Soon after birth the baby displays "anticipatory reactions" toward his mother, and empathetic responses. He begins to take on the affective tone of those who care for him. As the infant empathizes positively with the feeling-states of others he differentiates certain molar complexes of feeling-sensativity; and these familiar complexes are in turn connected into stimulus-response or sign-referent bonds. The sight of the mother's face excites an over-all empathetic response and also means pleasure to come—a promised land flowing with milk and honeyed words. Moreover, the mother happens to be a creature who makes loving sounds and whose sounds, because she reciprocates an empathy toward her baby, adapt themselves easily to the level of the baby's vocabulary—sighs, coos, clucks, and the like. Such sounds become signs participant in complexes of meaning, and by the second year the normal infant is imitating those phonemes and learning those meaning which constitute the language of its mother tongue. For its mother now is not only she who gives it suck at the breast, but is the whole matrix of language

10. Julian Huxley, *Man in the Modern World*, New American Library of World Literature, 1948, ch. 1, "The Uniqueness of Man."

connections, actual and potential, which make up its culture. And the infant is no longer just another mammal small and cute he has become transformed into a soul, a spirit, a personality, a self.

It is traditional to speak of three dimensions of the self—feeling, will, and intellect. The primary and affective content of the self consists of those qualia—feelings, emotions, sensa which arise as the young organism interacts with persons around it. These qualia are of the sensitive body and of the stimulating environment but strictly belong to neither alone. They belong to a zone where organism and environment interpenetrate; they comprise, in James Plant's words, an "comotic membrane"¹¹ which progressively takes on a structure, selective and integrative, and which acquires a direction.

For the qualia of the self are not static and fixed; they have a dynamic character of their own, and they are the functions of activity and inter-activity. They are of the body, and the body is organized activity. But the human body at birth is poorly organized; it has impulses and perhaps a dominant impulse. Psychologists have disputed over whether the new born is one or many, good or evil, active or passive. Let us say with Spinoza that it has a tendency to persevere in its own being, to express its power—or, as some recent writers have put it, to actualize or fulfill its being. Culture intervenes to give quality and direction to this aboriginal dynamism. It gives form to the raw impulses of the organism, and brings forth "will"; and it adds a third dimension, intellect or mind.

The self, in short, emerges only when the symbolic processes of culture touch the body and transform it into a dynamic structure of affect, activity, and mind. Man, to be man, must be "twice-born"—born of the womb, and born of the spirit. The self is an entity produced in and by culture; or, as Harry Stack Sullivan has expressed it, it is:

the relatively enduring pattern of recurrent interpersonal situations which characterize a human life.¹²

It was [the genius of George Herbert Mead to discern this fact and to describe the growth of the self in some detail.¹³ According to Mead, when the biologic individual responds to a sign as another does or would respond and then uses that response to guide his future behaviour, he participates in the socializing process, or becomes socialized. His meanings and his consequent behavior are thereby adjusted to the meanings and behaviors of others, and a system of mutual expectations arises which brings the dispositions, responses, actions, knowledge, and values of a plurality of individuals under prediction and control. "Society" consists of such shared meanings; and the participation in, or internalization of, such shared meanings is what is meant by "mind." For mind is the individualized use of such meanings—the capacity of the individual to signify to himself the meanings (responses and objects) which his own signs have to others and to regulate his behavior accordingly. "Self" arises simultaneously with society and mind. The self is made possible through the reflective acti-

11. *The Envelope*, New York, Commonwealth Fund, 1950.

12. *Conceptions of Modern Psychiatry*, Washington, D. C., William Alanson White Psychiatry Foundation, 1947, p. vi.

13. *Mind, Self and Society*, Ed. Charles Morris, Chicago, University of Chicago, 1934.

IV

The Formal Factors in the Self

The uniquely psychic factors are the functions of neither the body nor the environing events and orders alone but are the functions of a certain kind of conjunction of both. The body becomes psychic or acquires a self when it interacts in a certain way—i.e., uses the abstractive, evaluative power at the base of mentality to respond to the cultural and non-cultural environment. The term "psyche" or "self" or "soul" has been interpreted by some—Hartshorne, for example—to apply to any percipient subject whose "unit-experiences" or affective activities are bound together into some temporal, integrated sequence involving memory of past experiences, selection of present data, and appetition of future experiences.¹⁶ This is a doctrine of panpsychism; and since there is at least some evidence for it and it is difficult to refute, the question seems to be merely a verbal one as to how broad the term "psyche" shall be. Here, we shall limit it to the human psyche—which possesses in greater and clearer degree, and with a more direct vivacity, all the properties claimed (by panpsychism) for psyches, large and small.

It may be said that, in describing the soul (or self) as a function of the body, we have put the cart before the horse; for may it not be true that the body is merely the gross and, to our limited perception, static manifestation of multitudes of sentient occasions—little monads, with their own *petites perceptions*, electrons, atoms, cells? And if that is true, is not the human psyche a psyche among psyches? It must be acknowledged that our ordinary sensory perceptions of our own body—our sensations of its spatial extension, its color, its volume, its weight—are comparatively superficial—so superficial as to be of little use in science; moreover, they tell us little, if anything, about the inner movement and quality of the body, which, as Hartshorne, has observed, can best be grasped by our perception or feeling of what goes on in the region of our own bodies. But regardless of whether the body is viewed as a psychic or a physical substance, the fact remains that the human psyche could not come into being independent of it. The body is always the field of the human soul, the region of its awareness, the intermediary between it and the world, and above all, the means by which it feels what it feels, thinks what it thinks, and does what it does. The soul is a special organization of material events in the body by which a part (or the whole) of the body feels, thinks, and acts.

A necessary feature of the psychic is having an experience, or being an experience. To say that "the body experiences" involves us in difficulties: (1) it implies a false distinction between the experiencer and the experience; (2) it does not tell us whether the body as a whole or only parts of the body have the experience; and (3) it presupposes a clear-cut meaning of body. Leaving that issue aside, we can simply say, in the manner of Heidegger, "*Das Erlebte erlebt*"; or in phenomenological fashion, that an experiencer exists, or, there is experience occurring in and through the body. We usually assume that experience is always associated with a substantial body, judging by our own body-based experience. But the possibility of there being experience without an associa-

16. Charles Hartshorne, "Panpsychism," in *A History of Philosophical Systems*, Ed. Vergilius Ferm. New York, Philosophical Library, 1950, pp. 450-451.

ted body is given by radiant energy. The body seems to be the locus of cumulated and as yet unfaded qualities and meanings on the ground on which subsequent experience can rise and be retained. And experience is *qualia* feelings, emotions, sensations, and forms of various kinds. Such feelings and the like are the perceived resonances of material processes.

Now the infant body of the self-to-be, as it interacts with the things of the environments, gives rise to such experience. But it is an "original chaos," as James says, of transient and disconnected *qualia*. This experience would remain so fleeting, meager, and in the main unremembered if the infant were so isolated from human association and raised apart from interpersonal relations. The result would be so the studies of feral children teach us that the organism would not acquire a human self in the usual sense of that term. But when the infant is subject to the influence of an interpersonal, linguistic matrix; not only do the intensity and extensity (spatial and temporal) of its experiences increase, but in addition they acquire that special kind of integration or identity which we associate with "personality" or "self." But in passing we want to emphasize that the experience which makes up the content of the human self is *social* in origin, quality, structure, and direction.

An experience, as a dynamic act, is a prehension—a grasping together of portions of the world into a particular space-time pattern. It is a structuralizing, a differentiating, an individuating. It is an act of genuine creation. There is the creator, materials of creation, the creating, and the created. Strictly speaking, any given creator, or "bring," which is finished, cannot create; it is the product of past creativity, and can be involved in subsequent creating only as data or materials. So it is more accurate to say that there is the activity of creating, operating upon what is given as material, and issuing in something created. Only when such a process is completed can there be a creator in the full sense of that term. As Whitehead says, "The feeler is emergent from its feelings."¹⁷

The span of an experience moves from a state of need to a state of completion. Experience is thus what takes place—it is a spatial-temporal localization—between the impulse and the fulfillment. It is the consequence of the tendency of all things to move toward a "ground state."¹⁸ Experience is thus an "espousal" of activity with materials which are acted upon, the mating of subject and object so as to issue in "superject," the interacting of present process upon past product so as to produce a new product.

Now everyone knows that an espousal involves differential feeling or valuation. It also involves selection. And selection imports organization. Feeling, selection, and organization all signify "perspective," or definite experience. And this is the distinctive psychic factor, if it be remembered that perspective never arises in any uniquely human sense apart from interpersonal and symbolic relations between the body and others.

It may be asked: If the body has perspectives, then which part of the body is it which accounts for those perspectives, or feels them? Clearly the eyes and the visual apparatus account for visual factors in our perspectives; similarly, the organs in the abdominal region participate in our perspectives that are gloomy (it is the *perspective*

17. *Process and Reality*, p. 136.

18. Corinne Chisholm Frost, in an unpublished manuscript.

which are gloomy, we who are gloomy, and not the world), and the organs in the upper thoracic region which participate in feelings of depression.¹⁹ But these are specialized perspectives. Yet there is some evidence that even in them a large part of the body feels the feeling in question. And in the case of vague, diffuse feelings the evidence is even more conclusive that the body as a whole feels what it feels. This is evident in the reactions of small infants and in those overwhelming experiences of intense joy or sorrow, hope or fear, where feeling touches us to the very marrow of our bones.

A psychic is a thread of perspectives (of feelings, of "unit-experiences," of sensed material events) which has continuity or repetition in time. The recurrence of perspectives (quality and form) is what we mean by memory; and the intimation of their occurrence in the future—called prevision, imagination, *telos*—is also psychic. Since the continuity of atoms seems to be less subject to novelty than is the continuity of cells—atoms are maintained mainly by memory—we may say that atoms are less psychic than cells, which have a greater measure of purpose. The same distinction, which is one of degree, holds between plants and animals, and between animals and man. The psychic capacity flowers most fully in man.

The continuity of perspective in the human body is provided initially, and at the deepest level, by the somatotype. This is what Spinoza meant or could mean by saying that our first idea is the idea of the body.²⁰ A person's mood, the quality or timbre of his life, the persistent rhythm and direction of his activity, the typical affective orientation he has toward the world and himself, are all rooted in the kind of cells and tissues and organs uniquely organized to form his body. Since the form of his body remains more or less unchanged throughout life, his basic perspective remains so. These pervasive feelings provide a temporal ground for the other levels of continuity that rise in hierarchical structure upon it. They set the limits, formal and qualitative, within which further development of identity must take place. They are constituted out of the immediate affective responses of the parts of the body and of the body as a unit. They of course may be modified, by reason of emphasis of certain parts and functions and by environmental factors. A competitive and a cooperative society will induce different feelings and hence different personalities in the same somatotype. Also, the society may force the somatotype to adopt feelings and continuities which are alien and antagonistic to what is natural to it; and the result may be a self divided against itself, or a shattered self. Also, actual physical changes—operations on the glands or on various organs—can produce changes in feelings and in the continuity of feelings.

It may be that the animal body of the incipient human being is, as Whitehead says, a "restricted type" of society wherein no all-inclusive continuity of form operates to bind all the part-experiences into a single affective unity.²¹ Certainly the animal body does not have the structural unity of the cells, higher proteins, or atoms. Sheldon's research has shown the presence of dysplasia—a difference in somatotypical structure—

19. Although specific feelings like these can be localized, there is "a shifting, kinetic visceral pattern" of feeling that forms the pervasive background of awareness. See Norman Cameron, *The Psychology of Behavior Disorders*. New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1947, p. 74.

20. *Ibid.*, Second Part.

21. *Process and Reality*, p. 141.

not only in the body as a whole but also in specific regions of the body.²² And it was Freud who pointed out that the loci of bodily feelings and of psychic identity shift from one region of the body to another as the child develops. While, however, the body is a multiplicity of distinct continuities—what Whitehead calls “personal societies”—it also seems to be characterized, at least under certain conditions, by a vague sense of unity. This sense of unity is felt more vividly by fetuses and by children, in whom the differentiation of physical structure and function (especially the brain, the base of the psyche) has not proceeded as far as in adult bodies. It is also felt sporadically in the bodies of mystics, lovers, and heroes, whose affective or active commitment to some intensely felt value succeeds, for the time being, in suppressing the feelings of the various parts in favor of an over-all feelings, and in subjugating their diverse forms under the dominance of a single form. Of such is the kingdom of heaven, regnant over the discordant animal body of this world.

Continuity of perspective is, in addition, culturally induced. It arises when the organism of the infant comes into contact with others and, through the stimulation and direction given to behavior by social symbols, develops perspectives which are positively enjoyed, reinforced by others, and deliberately repeated. Such perspectives we call “interests,” for the term signifies an activity going on *between* subject and that which is of interest of value to the subject. A “live” interest is an indication of psyche; for interests are strands out of which the texture of personality is woven. If human beings were simple-minded and as selves developed only one interest, then the story of the growth of the human self and of history would be much less tortuous and tragic but it would also be much less variegated and interesting. What constitutes the great problem and the principal source of excitement in human life is the fact that interests differ and clash—within bodies, and between bodies. The problem of harmonizing diverse interests within the activity of one body is a problem of harmonizing a plurality of psyches or of psychic elements. And it is essentially no different—as psychology is now pointing out—from the problem of harmonizing one minded, selfed body, or personality, with another. The fact of “dual” or “multiple” personalities is the rule and not the exception; we notice only those extreme cases of genius (Leonardo) or of pathology (the Beauchamp case) or of both (Nietzsche) only because our own individual selves are sparsely developed or because we possess a dominant interest which succeeds in suppressing the others driving for expression.

We are brought, then, to the third dimension of self—the third source of continuity in perspective. That is the aim or ideal of the experiences in question. To the extent that this subjective aim, this conceptual valuation, is constant and is able to bind together the plural interests of the body’s activities into a common form—to the extent that it provides an interest in the harmonizing of interest—it serves to issue in a more inclusive self than the disparate interests previously developed. Some such ideals or forms are probably deeply laid in the form of the somatotype of the organism, and in an animal like man are dimly striven toward: it may be clearer what they are not than what they are. But they normally are not profoundly determinative of man’s self-development until they are articulated in the symbols of social intercourse and are

22. *Varieties of Human Physique*, *passim*.

23. Morton Prince, *Clinical and Experimental Studies in Personality*. Cambridge, Mass., Sciart, 1929.

communicated to the infant with feelings of approval. What is meant by saying that the infant "grows up" into adulthood, "grows into" his own, or "grows together," is that some abiding aim or dominant ideal or "ruling propensity" has begun to govern his various interests (whether established as habits or aborning as experiments) and has begun to weave them into a single unit of feeling, structure, and purpose. The infant Wolfgang Amadeus Mozart, richly endowed with musical talent, got encouragement in his natural musical aim from his father.

An ideal is a form abstracted from concrete experience, divested of the limitations and exemplifications which accompany it, and invested with value. This investiture gives it the power to unify diversities—i.e., experiences—and to enclose the changes of temporal experience in an envelope of permanence. Conceptual prehensions are derived initially from physical experience. Universal form is derivative from particular process—or from the interaction of one particular process with another. That is to say, ideals are generalizations from past particular experience, and they function to provide a fresh form of lure toward value for future particular experiences. They are illustrated by the hypotheses of science. In the case of the formation of a human self, the ideal is a projection, a hypothetical form, a plan for action of what is coming to be and is vaguely felt at the level of the somatotype and the interests, either severally or as a whole.

Some acquire such an ideal, lending identity to the plural self, soon in life; some acquire it late; some, diverted by diversity, may never acquire it at all. It may be the product of our own resourceful and inner life, nurtured in the sweet silence of solitude. "The bitter and the sweet come from the outside," said Einstein, "the hard from within. . . . I live in that solitude which is painful in youth, but delicious in the years of maturity."²⁴ The self-ideal may be the result of our own experience, forged in the fires of hard experiment or appearing to us in sudden insight. It may be taken over directly from those near and dear to us, through their own forceful personalities, or through the amalgamation of various personalities in us, or through our own attraction to an incarnate ideal that persuades by the gentle force of sheer example. It may be an identification derived from the valiant figures in books or the heroes of the hallowed, glorious past.

Such a self, once acquired, may not be easy to keep. "At times," says Emerson, "the whole world seems to be in conspiracy to importune you with emphatic trifles. Friend, client, child, sickness, fear, want, charity, all knock at once at they closet door and say,—'Come out unto us.' . . . No law can be sacred to me but that of my nature."²⁵ Our own interests, clamoring for attention and provender like so many precincts in a city, or so many children in a family, may delay or disperse that unity. The demands of the world militate against it, diverting our forces here and there until our overruling purpose is forgotten and we discover that the battle is half-over and our enterprise has wasted itself in scattered efforts. Our bodies may not be fit for the task of self-fulfillment which is guided and illumined by our ideal; and our circumstance and society and time may not be favorable. Even sleep may conspire to weaken that drive toward an intense, firm identity—unless sleep yield such dreams as may be the pleasant afterglow of our achievements and the eager rehearsal of what is to come, so

24. *Out of My Later Years*, New York, Philosophical Library, 1930, p. 5.

25. "Self-Reliance."

that we rise from those dreams rehearsed and refreshed for a new enactment of our unitary selves.

The health of the soul, as Plato and Aristotle observed, is the harmony of its parts—the harmony of its bodily selves, its interest-selves, and its ideal selves. Plato, who favored unities rather than pluralities, called the bodily selves by one name (concupiscence), the interest-selves by one name (spirit), and the ideal selves by one name (reason). He tended to overestimate the ease with which unity is achieved—even in superior persons—at the three levels as well as in the personality as a whole. Moreover, the social problem was arbitrarily simplified by a division of labor into bodily selves, interest-selves, and ideal selves—i.e., workers, warriors, and philosophers. Such division is based on the insight (developed also in ancient India) that the somatotypes of men are specialized and that in some visceral needs dominate, in others somatic needs, and in still others cerebral needs. But the state, no matter what form it takes, is not the individual writ large; because the individual (if we may use that term with wide license) is a congeries of bodily selves and interest-selves, striving toward an ideal, and the state is a congeries not of selves but of would-be selves. Statecraft is at least as difficult as the governance of the soul; and the unities it may perchance achieve are considerably inferior to the unities achieved by the individual soul.

As a biologist Aristotle was able to give a more specific description of the human soul. It is the dynamic principle of life; the generic functioning of the body; "the primary actualization of a natural organic body,"²⁶ determining and crowning, as a form, the natural evolution of a hierarchy of forms. Aristotle's nutritive soul, sensitive or locomotory soul, and rational soul are equivalent to what we have called the bodily self, the interest-self, and the ideal-self.

The harmonizing of the various continuities or psychic processes associated with a given body is as difficult as it is rare. Plurality and hence discord are more common than unity and harmony. It is only because people neglect to consider their concrete experiences in their specific and unique character that they glibly and abstractly assume, as Hume observed, a single self.²⁷ A modicum of harmony or soulhood is achieved at various levels. The pre-socialized child, like the pre-historical man—lacking language, social feelings, objects of identification, interests, or even complex bodily feelings—enjoys an Eden-like innocence and bliss not yet disrupted by the disharmonies of the life of interests of self and class and the life of the ideal. Once this aboriginal harmony is broken, then men may attempt to recover it, as Niebuhr has pointed out, by retreating downward to the animal level or suppressing the life of impulse in favor of the ideal.²⁸ Again, men may lose themselves in a round of activities, subjugating the desires of the body and the lure of final causes: in the language of the *Phaedrus*, the white horse of spirit runs away with the black horse of desire and the charioteer himself, and drags them after him.

Bodily needs conflict with interests and ideals; interests and ideals conflict. The unhappiness and sickness of the soul does not lie in frustration, though that may be a precipitating or contributory cause of sickness. It lies, as Paul said, in an internal

26. *De Anima*, Book II.

27. *A Treatise of Human Nature*, 1738. Book I, Part IV, Section VI.

28. *The Nature and Destiny of Man*, Vol. I. New York, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1941.

warfare ;²⁹ and medical and psychological science now recognize that all illness or malfunctioning has what is called (somewhat naively) a psycho-somatic origin. What is meant—or should be meant—is that diverse lines of experiential development—cells, tissues, organs, interests, ideal selves—*petites esprits*—have come into conflict and have begun to work destruction. This destructive conflict is reported to the self or selves at the ideal level as anxiety, or vague and unconscious fear of non-being ; it is reported at the level of interests as uncertainty and halted activity ; it is reported at the level of the body as disintegration of cellular structure. Evidence indicates that both “physical” and “psychic” illnesses are the concomitants of specific conflicts within the region of the body. Thus, for example, cycloid, or manic-depressive behavior is a conflict between the activities centered in the musculature and those centered in the viscera ; the element of detachment, the unifying force of an ideal, is weak or absent. Similarly, schizophrenic behavior is a conflict between visceral needs and the ideal self, with insufficient driving interest to join the two. And paranoid behavior is an absence of dependency needs and a conflict between interests and ideals.³⁰ Such conflicts are due to an unstable oligarchy in the soul. In the striking cases of illness, tyranny reigns : a single psychic identity runs wild and seeks to exert its power over all others. Extreme paranoid aggressiveness, and cancer, are examples. Dr. Nolan Lewis has called cancer “paranoia on the cellular level.”³¹ And paranoia is the assertive ascendancy of one psychic tendency over another, whether it be at the cellular level, at the level of personality, or at the level of society, where it is called crime in the person and imperialism in the nation.

The “mind” is an essential element in psyche. It is the factor that abstracts, conceptualizes, and provides the lure of the ideal. In the human being it is facilitated and expressed by significant or social symbols. The mind rises within the body and is a function of the body, as it interacts with symbol-using selves. The mind is dependent on the proper functioning of the nervous system especially, which abstracts and coordinates the bodily feelings derived in a social context. When the mind functions so as to provide an “ideal”—a lure for feeling that tends to unify the response of the whole body—then it is the psyche or soul performing its normative duty. But it may wander and become absent—as in the lunatic, the lover, and the poet, who are “of imagination all compact,” and whose minds may not attend directly to the matters at hand or under foot.

The psyche is different from the body as it (the body) appears to unrefined sensory observation. But the psyche is not other than the body save in abstraction. When we think of the concrete psyche of another we think of his bodily appearances—his color, size, shape, sound, gestures, etc.—for the psychic is the unitary activity of the body. But we also think of that which is other than bodily appearances—the “spirit,” as we say, of the person—his feelings, his intentions, his interests, the unique style of his life, his ideals, the subjective aspect of his person. Though we can never experience another subject *qua* subject, and what survives of him in us is always an abstract ver-

29. Romans VII.

30. Charles Morris, *Varieties of Human Values*, Chicago, University of Chicago, 1926, pp. 139-143.

31. Dr. Nolan Lewis, as quoted in W.H. Sheldon et al., *Varieties of Delinquent Youth*, New York, Harper and Brothers, 1949, p. 200.

sion of his concretion, still he may be participant in our living experience—not, indeed, as a surviving physical body but as a psychic content, either feeling or ideal.

Throughout the history of thought, various theories have been proposed as to the real nature and relation of the elements of the self. The problem has been stated as the "mind-body problem", or, in our terms, the psycho-physical problem. The present view finds that at least some of these major solutions of the psycho-physical problem are partially true.

Psychical monism is true insofar as it emphasizes that ultimate entities are processes which possess affective identity in time, and that bodies are the speciously present appearances of processes.

Physical monism is true insofar as it emphasizes that higher or more complex levels of process rise on lower and simpler levels, and that the human body is the foundation and means for the exercise of what is called the human mind.

The two-aspect theory (recently called Neo-Realism) is true insofar as it emphasizes that what are called minds and bodies are special organizations or funded identities of a reality which is, by itself, neutral to both.

Dualism and interactionism are true insofar as they emphasize that a body, as a structured record of past experiences, and mentality, as that aspect of the psyche which responds to form with valuation, can affect one another.

V

The Final Commitment of Self

The achievement of the human self is "natural," in the sense that the embryonic and infant body is impelled by its own inner dialectic of forces to develop, and in the sense that the self is a certain way in which the body feels, thinks, and acts. The achievement of the human self is also "cultural" or "acquired," for the inter-personal relations and the symbols of culture are needed to elicit, stabilize, and elaborate the forms of identity whose basis lies in the somatotype. The development of the self is a smooth and normal process, passing in ordered sequence from one stage to another and from one strength to another. But since it is a temporal process it is also discontinuous and instinct with conflict, struggle, and suffering. And it bears into its future the scars of its past.

The self is an attempt to bring harmony out of its disparate processes: it is the drive, under the guidance of a cherished ideal, to unify the various tendencies which rise and persist and conflict within the field of the body and of society. It is a child of the body and of its social relations; yet, like every off spring, it grows and influences the matrix which gives it birth and nurture. The emergent selfhood, which, if successful, cumulatively brings the melodic lines of each part into a symphonic whole, has a precarious existence. Disturbances within its body, or within its social relations, or within its biospherical nexus, can alter its delicate balance and maim, divide, or destroy it. Drugs, hypnosis, sleep, amnesia, physical disease, fatigue, starvation—all can suspend its unifying hegemony over the activities and feelings of the body, so that the soul disappears, in whole or in a part, and the minded, living organism relapses to the

level of sheer habitual interest or nutrition—to the level of animal existence, with its plural lines of endeavor, primitively coordinated by the lower centers.

The unitary tendency of the organism is manifest from conception onwards. The differentiation of the zygote demands a structure that will draw the two new cells together in a common form, and the dialectic of differentiation and integration continues throughout the life of the organism, with alternate ascendancy. Also, overlaid upon this bodily development, the processes of the psyche—the interests, and the overruling ideals—impose their own orders of specialized and integrative activity.

From birth onwards the human being—cannot say self—passes through a number of determinate stages each of which is the elaboration of certain capacities, a principle which determines choice, a ground on which the next stage arises, and is dependent and a modification of the previous stages, and an envelope of what is to come. The major stages are as follows :

- Physiological equilibrium
- Sensuous pleasure
- Ritualistic regulation in society
- Individuality and conscience
- Prestigious activity within a group
- Individuality and skill
- Consciously controlled growth of the self
- Shared growth
- Universal growth

Each of these stages is a new plateau of integration and a release from the limitations of the previous stages. The growth of the self issues in instruments which in turn facilitate further growth. The rise of language, mind, individuality or the self-concept, sociality, and conscience introduces a new factor not present in sheer biological growth. That is, as they are called today, mechanisms of feedback, by which the self becomes an object to itself and is thus able to control its own actions and its environment in the interest of its own self-development, the development of others, and the developmental principle itself. This is the whole meaning of—freedom and responsibility. Niebhor has called this factor “self-transcendence,” a notion expressed also in Kierkegaard’s famous definition :

The self is a relation which relates itself to its own self, or it is that in the relation which accounts for it that the relation relates itself to its own self.³²

Many philosophers—for example, Plato, Aquinas, Spinoza; and Kant—have recognized this dynamic, self-transcendent activity of the self. But they have either considered it the transient and illusory wrapping of something superior and beyond change, or they have inferred that man’s growth points beyond itself to some final end or state in which there shall at last be surcease of struggle, suffering, and growth. The present position takes a different view of the fact of human growth. It regards the development of the self—whether taken in a given act of consciousness, or in the life

32. *A Kierkegaard Anthology*. Ed., Robert Dittell, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1947. p. 390.

span—as real, as an irreducible datum which we do experience or can experience. It also takes growth to be final as a value. The process by which the self unifies its component processes and grows into a new level of achievement is not just a means to a state of satisfaction or to another level. It is good in its own right. And against Aquinas' argument that a gradation implies an end, the present view is that gradation indicates, a structure of change, a direction, a vector, and that the whole meaning of human life is to be found within that structure and direction.

The self is fragile and precarious, tenuous and episodic. Like a flower, it is "the labor of the ages"—lovely, brief, transient. It rises out of the massive compost of living and dying cells called the body, a living structure cumulative, continuous, and cresceive through myriad generations, itself rising on the rock and air, the water and light, and the forms of organic and inorganic existence of the whole biosphere. The self lives and breathes by the grace of this delicate balance of processes, deep and distant in time, vast in their extensions into space. But the self withers, as the flower fades; and all the goodlines thereof is as the flower of the field. And though that finer essence of the self may wander, like a rare fragrance, through the Elysium fields of the imagination, and absent itself a while from the locus of its origin, it cannot do so forever.

Odours, when sweet violets sicken,
Live within the sense they quicken.³³

But .

Odours fade from rich to poor
When the violet is no more.

The life of the psyche teaches us the meaning of its death; for the beginning of a thing contains in a dim sense its end. In every psychic process, to grow is to die; to put off past experiences for present ones, or present ones for future ones. It is true that psychic development entails a common form, and a pattern of persistence through diverse experiences; but the whole past is never retained exactly as it was; the very process of prehension prohibits that it can be perfectly remembered and preserved within the life of the psychic entity. Moreover, the process of achievement which is the inner life of all psyches and especially of the human self comes to an end as a dynamic process; it is worn out, it is finished. And in the case of the human psyche this must be so if satiety or weariness does not first overtake it, for the body, that too, too solid stage whereon the self enacts its whole career and plot, crumbles and falls into ruin, and will

like this insubstantial pageant faded
Leave not a rack behind.

Thus, as Socrates saw, we pass our lives, if we are wise, in learning how to die;³⁴ for as growth is the primary necessity once we are conceived, so death is the primary necessity into which our living process is, recurrently, and stage by stage, converted.

33. Percy Bysshe Shelley, "Music, When Soft Voices Die."

34. *Phaedo*, 64 ff.

The only question open to us is how we so grow as to die and to continue to grow, or how we may so die as, through dying, to grow.

While there is loss of concrete content and also form in the growth of the self, we can also discern endurance; for a psyche is an identity that persists through change. The growth of the self is a progression in identities and loyalties. Not only is there growth or elaboration of a particular form of feeling, such as the form of any given stage; there is in addition the growth from one form to another, so that when the possibilities of the first are exhausted the possibilities of the next come into view and are gladly greeted as opportunities, lures, and challenges.

All experience is an arch where through
Gleams that untraveled world.²⁵

In the advanced stages of the self reason and conscience not only develop so as to release the self from its narrow and unconscious identities. They also direct the self to an understanding and directed facilitation of the process of growth—in oneself, in other human selves, and in sentient or psychic beings at large. Maturity is measured by the degree to which the self commits itself to the process of creation of selves, and by the level on which this commitment is made. A man's highest self may be identified with his family; or it may be identified, as in the men of the Enlightenment or the Indian and Chinese sages, with all of mankind.

The form of psyche is the subjective aim of process: as a man thinketh in his heart so is he. Thus we grow up into our identities, and we are saved because we dare to struggle toward the unknown and inchoate good yet to be and at the same time sealed in the depths of our natures. Psyche is attaining—attainment attaining. The Greeks told of her as a fair maiden, doomed like her counterpart the butterfly to undergo the metamorphoses of suffering, all for sake of love. The story is told with philosophical embellishments by Plato in the *Phaedrus*: the soul is a winged creature that mounts upwards through the many-levelled heavens, passing in its progress from fair sights and sounds to fair forms. It is the story of growth in identity, until at last the soul identifies itself with what is of supreme value and, through that identification, achieves its supreme fulfillment and eternal value.

What truth is there in this trope?

First, we have a psychic immortality in and through our children. We can see our sonatotype (or genotype), combined with another, repeated in the sonatotype of our children. So far as the body has a form of activity and of feeling which are direct movements or expressions of the body, our own psyches are guaranteed immortality through their recurrence in the bodies of our offspring. The Hindus have a kindred explanation of reincarnation: the psyche is analogous to a wave which continues through a succession of bodies. And the Vedic peoples, the Jews, the Confucianists, and many others have placed great store on this kind of immortality. Bodily offspring give one the assurance that the form of his living process will continue, in the same manner that his adult life is a continuation of his infancy. The child is father to the man, and to the race.

Second, immortality is achieved when our activities are continuous with a line of

25. Alfred Tennyson, "Ulysses."

subsequent activities in the form of "interests." Interests are extensions of bodily feelings, but are not necessarily bound to the basic or body-sustaining and or body-renewing needs. A farmer's predecessors are immortalized in his interest in farming so far as his activities continue their form. This is the immortality usually conferred by teaching, or culture. It perhaps appears less substantial than biological immortality, partly because it is more variable and less stable; yet it is the continuity of process through generations.

Third, there is the immortality of identifying one's whole self—heart, mind, soul—with the source of all selfhood, which I take to be the developing ecological system of our planet. This is the "supreme identity," the embracing stay and guide of human life. This supreme and creative identity is the generic process of growth itself, which characterizes and participates in all manifestations of growth. It is immanent in the growth of the body, and in its reproduction of new bodies, but not confined to those processes. It is immanent in the emergence of the human psyche, but is not confined to that process. As the human self is a striving to unite the multitude of sub-selves within the region of the body, so the ultimate or cosmic identity is striving alongside it in that task but is also striving to unite human selves into communities, communities into a world society, and a world society into community with the non-human domain of nature. In this sense deity is, as Samuel Alexander has said, the next higher empirical identity toward which the diversified world drives.³⁶ The vision of deity is vouchsafed to all who have faith, courage, and sensitivity to respond to it. As the ideal that draws us on toward a wider and deeper community, deity is never realized. It is a symbol, a lure, which, unlike its perverse and opiate forms, leads people to devote themselves to the development of persons, society, and nature here and now on this planet.

The work of the growth process in the world requires our work. The price of our participation in the community of saints which binds self to self in a coral chain through the seas of history is the labor of love. Immortality is a temporal achievement—a genetic line of bodies, a cultural line of interests, a minded line of heroes, martyrs, and saints who lay down their lives for their friends, for unborn generations of children, and for the line of creative activity that sustains and advances all. To feed the hungry, clothe the naked, house the homeless, care for the sick, comfort the broken-hearted, educate the ignorant, smite the tyrannous, and cherish and nurture all the truly human abilities of our kind—such are our ancient and still demanded duties. In such sacrifice of self lies the whole meaning of the resurrection, the apostolic succession, and the church universal. He who loses his self in that way shall not find it, for it indeed shall be lost to him—as it is recurrently being lost in living—and lost as a pulsating psychic process aiming at something beyond itself. Yet he shall be found, and not found wanting, by others. "Blessed are those who die in the Lord: for their works shall follow after time."³⁷ In this final commitment—which is "a far, far better thing" than any self for its own self can do—the self is committed at last to something that brought it into being, raised to its highest levels of enjoyments, and will outlast it. Thus the self returns unto its source, and as its body has been its own

36. *Space, Time and Deity*, London, Macmillan, 1920.

37. Revelation XIV, 13.

instrument of development, so in life it willingly uses that body as an instrument for the development of others. Such is the travail of work that builds conditions for the uprise of better selves, and that says, with Tom Paine, "If there be trouble, let it be in my time, that my child may have peace."²⁸ The final heroism of the self is, as the spiritual put it, to "take my place with those who loved and fought before."

To so live, in devotion to what is truly great, is to lose oneself in the duties of the present. To so live, without taking thought for one's life is to cast off anxiety; for only in surrender and service to supreme value can our dread of nonbeing be conquered. To so live, making one's own psyche a droplet in the ongoing life, is the best life. To so live, in the struggle to unite what is alienated and at war, is to find peace. That is the final commitment and destiny of the human self.

On Understanding Philosophy

I

How is it that an intellectual discipline with thousands of years of tradition behind it is itself not clear about its own subject matter? Have we ever heard of a group of Physicists or Economists discussing the question—'What is Physics?' or 'What Economics'? But is this not a fact that the most stimulating topic for philosophical discussions and seminars continues to be the age-old question, namely, 'What is Philosophy'? Does it not lead us to think that there is something in the nature of philosophy that baffles understanding?

This paper does not claim to bring philosophy out of this situation, it does not aim to open any door leading to an easy understanding of philosophy. This deliberation is going to proceed in complete awareness of the fact that philosophical discipline is uniquely different from every other discipline, and that it is not possible to delimit the scope of philosophical thinking in a very clear and unambiguous manner. The undefined limits of its area give to it the thrill and the appeal and the freedom that other disciplines lack.

But then, it is not impossible for an individual inquirer to form his own idea about the nature of philosophy and be completely satisfied with it. This paper intends to add to the *equipment* of the philosophical adventure, it merely seeks to advise the curious individual to take note of certain factors in the absence of which the understanding of philosophy may become both tedious and baffling.

II

As it has been suggested above, the first recommendation is that one must not try to make philosophy a science. It is not possible to determine its field of study in definite terms. Indeed there is a vagueness about the nature of philosophy, but this vagueness gives to it a vitality and a broadness. One must never forget that a delibera-

tion becomes philosophical not on account of its subject matter, but on account of the manner in which a particular subject matter is approached. The way of philosophy has always been *reflective speculation*, speculation flies on its wings, and that is why it is able to survey a vaster area than any other study. Thus, one is baffled by philosophy and is at a loss to understand its nature because he invariably tries to determine its nature in very definite and precise terms.

III

Another condition that must be satisfied for a genuine understanding of philosophy is that it must be realised that philosophy never serves the function of giving knowledge; it has always served one and only one function—that of producing *intellectual satisfaction*. This distinction between Knowledge and intellectual satisfaction must be clearly appreciated. Intellectual satisfaction is not necessarily a cognitive function, it denotes a satisfaction which is not purely appetitive, which somehow quietens the fire of sceptical enquiry and gives more food for keeping further thinking and speculation alive.

In the primitive times philosophical speculation was considered to be a source of knowledge as at that time they did not have any other means of knowledge at their disposal. In fact, even at that time what philosophy gave them was not knowledge but intellectual satisfaction. But today knowledge stands on a solid foundation—that of science, it no longer has the need to lean on philosophical speculation for gathering knowledge. Therefore, when the philosopher claims to know or tries to press his claim of being a knowledge-giver, he is snubbed not only by the scientist, but by all empirically oriented and modern minded intellectuals. Even these people will give up their hostility and begin to look towards philosophy with both approval and respect if they are told that philosophy does not have any pretension of being a knowledge-giving study, but merely seeks to serve a purpose which even science with all its mighty equipments is unable to serve. Science also has its own limitations, there are certain questions that science is not in a position to answer. Knowledge has its own charms and utility, but it cannot always give that satisfaction which man hankers after. That is why even scientists at times tend to develop some philosophies of their own. It is true that philosophy takes from science certain data for philosophical speculation, but the main function of philosophy has never been acquisition of knowledge, it has always served the function of causing intellectual satisfaction.

IV

Another reason for not being able to have a proper understanding of philosophy is the fact that we fail to make a distinction between a 'philosopher' and a 'professor of philosophy'; perhaps no other world has been so freely used (or misused) as the word philosopher. Every individual is described as a philosopher (more so if is an Indian) and the poor professor of philosophy is invariably asked to justify this and to assume the leadership of this human race of philosophers. He is asked to show the way, he is considered to be the repository of readymade solutions of all problems. This careless and

free way of conceiving the nature of philosophy is the greatest obstacle in the way of understanding its nature.

Therefore it must be asserted that there is a basic difference between the imports of the expressions 'philosopher' and 'professor of philosophy'. It does not mean that a philosopher cannot be a professor or that a professor of philosophy cannot be a philosopher, but this a fact that a professor qua a professor is not a philosopher. A philosopher is a 'seer', he has a knack of having intuitions about the objects of his contemplation; on the other hand, a professor of philosophy is concerned with the statements of these seers or of other philosophers. That is way a professor as a professor is interested in, what is called, a second-order enquiry, and is at a loss to say anything when he is pressed to say something of the first order. At times, either in over-enthusiasm or in desperation he starts 'showing' the way and issuing prescriptions more or less in the manner of a seer or a prophet. He does not realise that such acts not merely mislead the hearer but also distort the very purpose and the function of philosophy.

Therefore, any attempt to understand philosophy must be clear about its aim. It must first decide whether it is trying to understand philosophy of the first order, or philosophy of the second order. If one comes to the university with the first type of request, he will almost invariably be disappointed. The academic philosophy, as it is taught and studied by professional men, cannot afford to have any pretension of being able to solve the problems of life. It is basically an intellectual discipline pursued with the sole intention of deriving intellectual satisfaction.

V

Now we come to consider a very relevant and a very important point regarding the understanding of philosophy. It is a fact that the philosophies that develop at a particular time are invariably consistent with the spirit of the time, they reflect some of the prominent tendencies of that time. In every age certain tendencies do become prominent, they, in their own ways, come to represent the general 'World-View' of that time. The philosophy that develops during that period tries, in its own way to give expression to those tendencies or and to that world-view. This is a very significant aspect of philosophical development, and therefore it is necessary to appreciate this fully in order to be able to understand the nature of philosophy. Let us try to illustrate this by following the course of the development of western philosophy.

The ancient frame of mind was not inclined to accept that what was evident to the senses represented the real. Experiences of various sort had led to the emergence of the impression that reality was invariably something different from what it appeared to the naked eyes. For example, an individual appeared to the ordinary view of the ancient man as a physical body-frame, impressive and full of vitality. But he could learn by experience that there was something more basic than the body, without which it was not possible for the body to prevent its own decomposition. Again, he could see that even ordinary objects were in reality different from what they appeared to be, for example, an ordinary box was described to him as a box of iron, but he could see that articles were kept not in the iron but where iron

was not—in the gap between iron pieces. Common experiences of that type led to the emergence of the general view that ordinary impressions of everyday objects did not represent the real nature of things.

This general attitude of mind expressed itself in the philosophies that emerged during that period. Since the time of Thales every philosopher tried in his own way to go behind the apparent impressions of objects of the world. At times, they came out with something crude, and at times with something non-sensuous. This attitude gets its clearest and finest expression in the most prominent philosophy of the time—the philosophy of Plato. Plato came to affirm the reality and the ultimacy of a different world altogether, the world of Ideas, and asserted that the world of sense was nothing but an imitation—an imperfect copy—of the real world. Even Aristotle's fundamental categories of reality—form and matter—were conceived more or less in the same manner. Thus, it is apparent that the general attitude that characterises the ancient period—the attitude of not accepting the obvious as real and of going behind the presented experience—gets reflected in the philosophy of the time.

The shift from ancient period to the mediæval period is a shift from 'free speculation' to 'circumscribed thinking'. In the ancient period speculation flying on its wings could indulge in any kind of adventure, but in the mediæval period the church and its order were given so much value that reason and reflection were not allowed either to challenge or to come in conflict with the accepted theological assertions. Church used to regulate, guide and control every aspect of life and activity.

Naturally therefore, the type of philosophy that was produced in that age became subordinate to Theology and allowed reason to deliberate only on such topics and ideas that came within the purview of theological deliberations. Although the span of the mediæval period is rather long, the philosophy produced during the period lacks freshness and novelty. Through out its span the period remained culturally almost static, and as such, the philosophies that were produced during the thousand years of its span remained more or less of the same type.

VI

This suppression of both reason and ordinary experience produced a reaction, as a result of which, in the Modern period two tendencies exhibit themselves rather very clearly, and they are observable almost in every walk of life. The modern man is either a lover of the concrete or a rationalist relying on the free use of reason. It is true that quite often these two tendencies come in conflict with each other. If one surveys the cultural life of this period (for example the literature produced during that period), he will at once discover the presence of these tendencies. Later on the conflict between the two tendencies tended to produce efforts for reconciliation. These reconciliatory efforts grew more or less in three directions: they tried either to maintain the ultimacy of both the two tendencies, or they attempted to determine their respective claims assigning to them both their due, or they tried to develop a synthesis either of the reflective type or of a supra-reflective type. Even a casual glance at the literature of the period or at the social and cultural activities of the period would confirm the presence of all these three tendencies during that time.

There is a perfect correspondence between the tendencies and the types of philosophies that were produced during that period. In the early stages of the modern period the two tendencies mentioned above were clearly represented in the two philosophies of Empiricism and Rationalism. Both recommend an overthrowing of the shackles put on philosophical thinking during the mediaeval period, both recommend a breathing of fresh air. One makes sense-experience its model, and the other relies on the innate capacities of the mind.

The reconciliatory tendencies are represented in the philosophies of Kant, Hegel and idealists like Bradley. Indeed the three ways of reconciliation are not similar with each other. Kant tries to assign to both these tendencies their respective places and thereby delimits their respective fields. According to him there are certain vistas that are not open to the senses, likewise, reflection has also its own limitations as it has to rely on the data gathered by the senses. Hegel proceeds in another manner and tries to comprehend in his mighty sweep all aspects of experience giving to them all (at times even forcibly) rational garb. Nothing, he feels, can have a being in isolation, and everything in a way involves everything else. That is how he comes to evolve the concept of an all-embracing and all-comprehensive whole. Bradley carries the Hegelian conclusion to a different height. He is aware that Hegel's philosophy is an expression of 'the tendency towards unity' prevalent at that time, but he feels that this end cannot be wholly served, by a rational whole, for the simple reason that reason or intellect is a tool for dissection and analysis. That is why he comes to assert that the Absolute is not merely 'reason', but is of the nature of experience. His sense of the word 'experience' is comprehensive enough to include even the empiricist's sense of the world. Thus, even Bradley's Idealism is an expression of the tendency that seeks to resolve the conflict between the empirical tendencies and the emphasis on the apriori.

VII

Thus, in every stage of its development western philosophy reflects the general tendencies of the time in which it flourishes. This fact is most clearly evident in the contemporary period. What are the broad and important tendencies of the present times? At least the following are clearly evident, (1) the present-day individual is a busy man—almost always in a hurry, and yet he is never satisfied with what he has. A sense of anxiety and boredom and a feeling of despair characterise his life, (2) he always wants definite and precise solutions, for his problems and he accepts them only when they have some experiential basis, (3) he somehow believes that every problem has to be tackled in its own way and that there cannot be a total or a complete solution of the whole situation, (4) he has come to realise the importance of *methods* and *techniques*, and consequently he tries to evolve a methodology for every kind of study.

All these tendencies have been given clear and vivid expression in some of the prominent philosophies of the recent times. The tendency of the first kind finds its expression in the philosophy of Existentialism. Existentialism does not promise to show the way out of despair or anguish, it merely paints a very vivid picture of the modern man. When an individual looks at this picture he finds it to be familiar, and

as he begins to increase his acquaintance with Existentialism he comes to realise that the picture is not actually a picture but a *mirror*. Now he gets a strange satisfaction in the realisation that his individual feelings and experiences represent the common feelings and experiences of the modern man himself. This explains the appeal that the philosophy of Existentialism is able to generate.

The tendency to seek precision and to rely ultimately on data of perception gets its expression in the philosophies of Logical Atomism, Logical Positivism and Formal Logic. The general attitude of facing problems as they emerge without ever thinking of the possibility of any total solution is reflected in the influential philosophy of The philosophical Investigation of later Wittgenstein, where it is explicitly suggested that doing philosophy is in fact playing the language-game on an *ad hoc* basis, meeting the problems (and analysing the uses of expressions used therein) as they are encountered. Likewise, the contemporary emphasis on methodology and technique has led some people to assert that philosophy is also a technique—a technique of analysis, a technique for the clarification of concepts. When such a technique is used for the clarification of the concepts of science, there emerges a philosophy of science. Likewise, philosophy of History and philosophy of Education apply this technique for the clarification of the concepts of history and those of education in their own ways.

VIII

This survey of the entire span of the Western philosophy clearly illustrates the fact that for an understanding of the philosophy of a particular time, one must have a general acquaintance with the prominent tendencies, attitudes and the common-sense views prevalent at that time.

In conclusion, let this be asserted once again that these conditions do not claim, 'to clear the mist' once for all; they make only a modest claim: if a curious individual approaches philosophy keeping in mind the points mentioned above, he will perhaps succeed in having for himself some understanding of philosophy—an understanding that will give him some intellectual satisfaction.

Towards An Educational Philosophy For A Viable Democracy

1. The Dilemmas Democracy Faces

Traditional forms of democracy are today on the defensive everywhere throughout the world. Even on those occasions when it can truly be said that democratic forms of government and the democratic spirit are in no sense being abused, the point is commonly made that *ignorance* of the social complexities created by modern, large-scale technology, expanding urbanization, and excessive, central governmental control of community functions, is so great that, in a sense, we are all living on borrowed, political capital and borrowed time. Neither the enlightened citizen nor his governmental representatives understand the complex, contemporary world, although they may make a stab at trying to understand a *mentally constructed* and overly simplified sector of it.

The world that we all inhabit is in reality—to paraphrase James Farrell—a world that everyone has made and one with all of whose parts no one is familiar. It is even more strongly insisted upon in some quarters, that the task of analyzing our contemporary problems—almost all of which tend to be interlocked—is too formidable for even the most sophisticated type of planning. Derivatively it is held that the task of formulating legislation and inventing new institutions to deal with the interrelated urban and regional issues of our time, is even more formidable. This latter difficulty is associated with the *pace of social change* and with the fact that unforeseen factors must arise which—even for the most perceptive planning—will knock even the best measures of attack upon our problems, into a cocked hat. With respect to world order, it is felt that the best laid schemes of mice and men gang aft agley.

In our time members of the younger generation are demanding, as a cure for the deficiencies of "representative" democracy, what they choose to call "participatory" democracy. The latter is *bottom-up* democracy, two-way democracy or—to phrase the matter most succinctly—democracy in which those who are affected by

conditions that we seek to improve by legislation, are to have a say in the framing of the legislation, itself. All victims of social inertia will be willing to submit to the guidance of figures in authority. However, authority figures will be expected to take on the role of servants, not masters. Those whose situation is to be ameliorated are to be given an *equal* voice in all decisions that have a bearing on their fate.

Obviously, however, an equal voice is not necessarily a knowledgeable one. And if it be literally true that extensive knowledge and a trained capacity to deal with complex abstractions are both necessary if solutions for our problems are to be arrived at, then the privilege of putting one's "two cents in," may not prove to be very creative. It is more important that a participant's proposals should show comprehension of the issues being thrashed out. At the same time, it is equally important the proposals prove to be workable. If *having a voice* in the Great Debate lacks these virtues, then even "participatory" democracy will not save us from the kind of decision-making behavior which, in the name of democracy, is so inept and ill-informed as to worsen the human condition.

Democracy was born in the Greek city-state. It was nurtured by the ways of life and the relatively simple and largely rural communities that the historian has described for us. Democracy was never intended for a large-scale, mass society overwhelmed by number, by industrialization, urbanization and centralization. Future history may yet record as a fact that the effort to graft the spirit of the Periclean Age upon the life of a modern metropolis proved to be both unworkable and absurd.

Sir Herbert Read in a sense has recognized this, as can be seen from a passage of his quoted in *The Catholic Worker* (December, 1969, 6). This distinguished writer puts the matter in the following fashion.

"Democracy just as a political concept, is meaningless for any society larger than a small city or a rural commune. Our so called democracies in the Western world are oligarchies subject more or less to periodical revision (which never changes their oligarchical structure), and in this they do not differ essentially from the oligarchies that rule the communist world. The people, in any human corporate sense, do not determine any policies outside their backyards. The world is governed by the representatives of industry, finance, technology, and by bureaucracies in the paid service of these powerful groups—governed, not in the interests of the people as a whole, nor even of all the people in any one country, and not even nowadays for personal profit, but primarily for the self-satisfying exercise of power."

What then is the basic reason that enables us to say that democracy *may not* be workable in an urban civilization the degree of whose social complexity is increasing all the time? I think that the most frequent and, perhaps, also the most valid answer that would be given to this question, would be one which says, in effect, the following: Ours is a tight-knit civilization whose problems tend to become strongly interrelated. Because of this meshing together these problems tend to produce marked effects upon one another, that are quite significant socially. This meshing is, to a large extent aided and abetted by the fact that the same technological spectra play an important, although not an exclusive role, in the generation of these problems.

But the *functional interdependency* of our problems creates what are now called "systems" and if we are to come up with viable solutions for problems that are part of our intricate and changing, social systems, both our methods of analysis for these problems and the detailed measures we propose for their solution, must be constructed within the framework of systems theory. This necessity is an unfortunate and unpleasant one, but also an inescapable one. If the proceeding assertion is true, then the notion that the typical government representative—usually with a legal background at best—is prepared to understand a systems approach and the solutions derived from it, will not stand inspection. This is a notion which, at best, is unrealistic and, at worst, absurd. This unhappy fact holds even more strongly for the citizen-electtor.

If, then, we are to restore democracy to its pristine vigor in a mass society, the electorate will have to be provided with that type of training, beginning either at the end of the elementary school or, perhaps, at the beginning of the secondary school, which will furnish some *general but adequate* ideas as to what is meant by a system. Such training should indicate in a *general way* how we go about exploring the properties of systems whose components have *high interdependence* and what are the methods by which procedures can be developed for the regulation of such systems—particularly social ones—that will enable them to remain fairly stable. Furthermore, we must present to the coming generations a picture of alternative ways open to man for the control of his own "social systems," while *guaranteeing* that those same social systems will have built into them certain traditional, political virtues of a democratic nature. These virtues that we must guarantee will have to be a system's capacity to preserve both the substance and the spirit of such traditional notions as freedom, individual choice and social responsibility. Finally, those same systems will have to guarantee the *accountability to the electorate* which we have always demanded of those who do the governing.

In order, however, for men to deal with the growing social complexity of their world, familiarity with the regular features of the systems approach may still not be enough. Planning which seeks to provide solutions to a host of problems which intermesh with one another and the nature of which, in turn, change over time, demands the coordination of all the different solutions to all the different, current problems which men must be prepared to tackle at the same time. This raises the level of difficulty of the analysis required. Yet such a coordinative approach is much more realistic in relation to the social and environmental problems faced by technologically advanced societies, than a straightforward, conventional, systems approach. The additional knowledge required will raise both the information load and the complexity of analysis that both planners and enlightened voters would have to bring to a study of the issues facing a modern community. There is no help for this burden if we really wish to understand our problems and if we wish to express by vote or referendum what we think ought to be done about them. A brief statement as to why this is so, will be attempted in the material that follows.

2. *The Problems of Coordinative Planning*

A community—whether it be only a city or whether it be as large as an entire country—

rarely faces a *single, social problem*. A community's problems come in batches. If its problems come in batches this generally means that they are *interdependent*. This in turn means that *the state of affairs* which constitutes each problem affects those states of affairs which constitute the other problems of the community. A single example should suffice to make the statement clear.

Suppose a community has the following three problems. (1) The solid materials dissolved in the effluents of its industrial plants, could be used to process valuable, economic materials that the community could well use, if private industry or government would give thought and financing to the problem. Otherwise some perfectly good resources, in a community that can ill afford to see any resources at all wasted, will, literally and figuratively, clearly go down the drain. The habit, then, of ignoring this possibility creates industrial waste and the question of how to eliminate this waste is *problem, number one*. (2) The rivers, lakes or streams into which these industrial effluents flow have become polluted. The degree of pollution has become so great that not only are local, commercial, shrimp beds being rapidly destroyed but fish kills downstream are occurring so frequently as to impair certain areas downstream for fishing and recreation. The question of how to reduce or eliminate entirely the pollution that has been created is *problem, number two*. (3) Water from the polluted water bodies involved has been customarily drawn upon in order to irrigate many farms in the area. But some of the pollutants that this water now contains have been injuring the local soils and the soils so affected have been growing nutritionally defective produce and nutritionally defective grass on nearby pasture land. The produce is becoming increasingly dangerous to public health and the milk from cows who graze on these pastures has been found to be dangerous for infants. The question of how to return the soil to its original richness and health is *problem, number three*.

The sense in which these three problems are interrelated can be made explicit. Unwanted industrial waste is causing unwanted water pollution and the latter in turn is creating unwanted poisoning of the soil used by local growers and stock-raisers. A solution to problem number 1 should be such as to provide effluent water which—free of the valuable, solid wastes—contains no other residual agents that will be toxic either to marine life or local soils. This problem may be solved by allowing effluent to pour out, *which contains different solid materials dissolved in it*, but which are far less valuable than the original materials dissolved in the mother liquor, and therefore can be regarded economically by the responsible industries, as constituting less of an industrial waste than the solid materials that were formerly dissolved in it. An approach of this sort will, of course, solve problem number 1 in a limited sense, but not necessarily problem number 2. In fact, this type of solution may aggravate both problems 2 and 3, if the new pollutants are even more toxic, both for marine forms and the local soil. Suppose problem number 2 was the only one that the community chose to solve. But suppose it were to be solved only in such a way that the cost of irrigation water would be prohibitive to local growers and cattle-raisers. This could occur, for instance, if local farmers and cattle-raisers found that they would be able to compete with farmers and dairymen elsewhere only with great difficulty, if they paid the new, higher costs of irrigation water. This would then give us a solution to problem 2 but only at the expense of being unable to provide a solution to problem

3. In this case the cure for water pollution would be purchased at the cost of creating an economic rather than an agrobiological difficulty for the farmers, the cattlemen and the diarmen involved. Finally, local growers and cattlemen might make use of one or more detoxifying agents for the water that they actually used, the costs of which still left them in a competitive position but with smaller, profit margins. If this were done, independently of the community making an attack upon industrial waste or water pollution, we would then have a situation in which problem 3 was solved but without any solutions for the other two problems.

In the example furnished there may be an ideal solution for problem 1 which, *at the same time*, proves to be completely effective for the remaining two problems. This could be spoken of as a "best possible solution." On the other hand, the three problems may require three solutions that are independent of each other, in the sense that the solution to any one of them has no effect, whatsoever, on the conditions that create the remaining two problems. This could be spoken of as "a maximum cost solution." Finally, we can have *intermediate outcomes*, in which the solution to problem 1 may also be a solution for problem 2 but not for problem 3, or the solution to problem 2 may also be a solution to problem 3 but will do nothing to eliminate problem 1. A complete outline of the contingencies and possibilities is shown in Table 1.

Table 1.

Different Contingencies that may arise for the three community problems in the example chosen

Status of A

Contingency	Solution For Problem	That Could Effect A Solution For Problem(s)	Judgment
(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
1	1	2 and 3	Possible
2	"	2 but not 3	Possible
3	"	3 but not 2	Possible
4	2	1 and 3	Impossible
5	"	1 but not 3	Impossible
6	"	3 but not 1	Possible
7	3	1 and 2	Impossible
8	"	1 but not 2	Impossible
9	"	2 but not 1	Impossible

Let us examine each of the contingencies in turn, shown in the table referring to them by number.

- (1) This contingency is clearly possible and represents what we have referred to as "the best possible solution."
- (2) This contingency is feasible, since the task of recovering valuable wastes by

- a procedure that *produces different but less valuable wastes*, may be such that the new class of wastes are not toxic for shrimp beds and fish. They may, however, at the same time, be toxic for the soil and that which grows on it. In such an eventuality, the public health problem will still be present.
- (3) This contingency is feasible, since the new types of less valuable waste may be of such a nature that they might clearly also affect marine life in the water body involved. However, because of the fact that toxicity may be differential, these new wastes may not be harmful either to the soil or its cover.
 - (4) This outcome is impossible. Consider a process that is used to save shrimp beds and fish life. Such a process may conceivably also detoxify the soil but it cannot prevent the loss of valuable waste effluents from production upstream.
 - (5) This outcome is impossible. A solution to problem 2 cannot solve problem 1, for the reasons given in the discussion of contingency 4. However, the solution to problem 2 may also be such that the soil is still rendered toxic by the water that flows downstream but, this time, the toxicity is due to a new set of causative agents. The latter, of course, derive from the process used to solve problem 2.
 - (6) Clearly a process that detoxifies the water for shrimp and fish may also prove effective in the detoxification of the soil. But that process clearly can have no effect on what happens upstream. Valuable waste effluents must be recaptured by another process, one that is independent of the process used to solve problem 2. The problem of finding means to recapture valuable wastes will clearly then become the responsibility of those in charge of the production site upstream, that is losing these valuable wastes.
 - (7) A process used to detoxify the soil by detoxifying the irrigation water that produces soil detoxification, will clearly not affect the problem of recovering the valuable wastes that were in the irrigation water before it was detoxified. By the same token the detoxification of the water downstream, used for purposes of irrigation, is local, so that shrimp beds and fish located between the production site and the irrigation area, will still perish from the intermediate water that is polluted by the original valuable wastes that were allowed to run off as effluent.
 - (8) This outcome is impossible because any process used solely to detoxify irrigation water is independent of any process that may be required to recover valuable wastes. It should also be clear that detoxification of irrigation water will have no effect on the still-polluted, upstream water which is killing shrimp and fish.
 - (9) This outcome is likewise impossible because any process used solely to detoxify the irrigation water will still leave both shrimp beds and fish upstream subject to destruction from the polluted water that has been created by the effluents from production upstream. And, of course, local detoxification of irrigation water has no bearing on the recovery of valuable wastes.

Another feature of the example I have furnished here is the fact that the *interdependence* of the problems involved is *unidirectional*, that is to say, we have assumed that the solution to problem 1 can aggravate problem 2 and that the solution to problem 2 can aggravate problem 3. But the solutions to other batches of interdependent problems may be *bidirectional* with *feedback effects*. Another three problems, for instance, could have been so related that a solution to problem 1 aggravated problem 2, a solution to problem 2 aggravated problem 3 and a solution to problem 3 aggravated problem 1. This is a type of situation that provides a *circular feedback effect*. But one could also have had a situation in which a solution to problem 1 aggravated the other two problems and the respective solutions for each of these two problems aggravated the other problem but had no effect on problem 1. There are still other feedback possibilities even for a batch of only three interdependent problems. As the number of problems faced by a community, increases, the nature of the *interdependencies* will be much more varied than those we have just pointed out and, in general, will show both *unidirectional* and *bidirectional* relationships. The reader can therefore see what staggering difficulties for the understanding are present when a community has a batch of *interdependent* problems to solve.

What about the solutions, themselves, that is the measures we take to solve our problems. The *solutions*, themselves, it should be emphasized, present a fresh set of difficulties. We want to make certain that a measure which solves some given problem does not aggravate some of our other problems and does not interfere with the ability of a proposed solution for any other problem, to do its work. In other words, solutions must be *compatible* if all our problems are to be solved *simultaneously*, for all practical purposes.

The force of these observations will be driven home more strongly if we take a look at how a set of community problems that are *interdependent* and call for joint solution at the same time, look to a group of professional planners who propose to attack them.

If the reader will allow me to indulge in some slight technicalities via the use of symbols, let us imagine that our planners are engaged in the task of solving three problems which we shall designate as A_1 , A_2 and A_3 . Let the three measures or solutions proposed for these be M_1 , M_2 and M_3 . These measures aim at achieving certain primary consequences namely, the elimination of three, undesirable, existing states of affairs, or the creation, perhaps, of three desirable states of affairs that do not exist at present, or possibly some mixture of these two types of primary consequences. In the example furnished above, the three primary consequences, symbolized as P_1 , P_2 and P_3 , would be as follows: P_1 —the recovery of valuable industrial waste; P_2 —the elimination of water pollution; and P_3 —the elimination of soil poisoning. The reader, however, should think of A_1 , A_2 and A_3 as any batch of three problems with mixed types of unidirectional and feedback features. The primary consequences are, as the reader can now see, the solutions to the problems, themselves. The problems are always either unwanted conditions or desired states of affairs which, unhappily for the community, are not in existence at the moment. The measures we actually take to solve the problems are, of course, not to be confused with their solutions. There may be several, equally good measures that will achieve the goal planned for, in connection with any

given problem.

Unfortunately, the measures men take to solve their problems are not perfect. Every solution to one of several, interdependent problems, carries a price tag. This is the fact that every measure will produce *foreseen* or *anticipated side-effects* or—as we shall call them here—*secondary consequences*. Suppose the planners realize that M_1 for A_1 will carry two such secondary consequence, S_{11} and S_{12} . These are to be read as the first secondary consequence of M_1 for A_1 and the second, secondary consequence of M_1 for A_1 . The first of the two subscripts will refer to the problem involved, namely, A_1 . The second of the two subscripts will refer to the secondary consequence involved, namely, the first and the second, secondary consequences, respectively. By the same token we shall probably have several secondary consequences of M_1 for A_1 and of M_2 for A_2 .

Now one further matter that we have to worry about is to hope that none of the secondary consequences of any measure for a given problem, will aggravate the other problems faced by the community. In addition, we also have to worry about the secondary consequences, themselves. Some of these are desirable; some are not. We want each measure to produce secondary consequences that are only desirable. But, in addition, if the secondary consequences of one measure affect the secondary consequences of another measure—as is very likely to be the case—we want *any* secondary consequence, whether desirable or undesirable, to reinforce the *desirable*, secondary consequences of other measures and to dampen the *undesirable*, secondary consequences of other measures. The ideal situation, of course, with respect to all our secondary consequences, would be for all of them to be desirable and for all the relationships they have to one another to be reinforcing.

Planners would also have to worry about one other major feature. The preceding analysis assumes that the community wants measures taken *now* that will jointly solve all its problems at the same time. If, because of bickering over who should bear the costs of certain particular solutions—industry or the taxpayer—or because of disagreements for any other reasons, only some of the problems are attacked at one time, while the remainder are left for later solution, we will almost always face a certain type of tragic consequence. I am referring to the fact that when planners intend to tackle all the community's problems *at once*, the proposed measures will make sense, since the planners will undoubtedly choose a set of measures whose secondary consequences are expected not only to be desirable but are also expected to reinforce each other. If, instead, our planners propose to tackle only some of the problems now and others later, we have an anomalous situation. Staggering the solutions to a community's problems produces certain dilemmas.

What I mean is this. M_1 and M_2 will go hand in hand at this time with M_3 . But if only A_1 and A_2 are tackled now, M_1 and M_2 may eventually prove to have been the worst, possible measures for the solutions of A_1 and A_2 . This is because the *total* system of *interdependent* problems and side-effects, will be quite different at a *later* time from what they are now. If M_1 and M_2 are used now, this may produce, by the time this later state of the community's situation has arrived, an overall set of new and fresh interdependent relationships, with properties quite different from what they are now. A_1 and A_2 may no longer exist as problems at this later date. But A_3 still does. However, the application of M_1 to A_1 at this later date, in the context of the new

interrelationships that have been ushered into being, may create new and unwanted problems or may even bring about the recrudescence of the two problems that were solved earlier.

In short, timing is important in picking measures to solve our problems. And at present planners *cannot always foresee* too well what the later state of the total, social system will be like and therefore cannot guarantee the feasibility of M_1 and M_2 for A_1 and A_2 , if A_2 , interrelated with A_1 and A_2 , is allowed to continue. Planners could not be sure that M_1 and M_2 , *used now*, will prove to be of eventual value if M_2 is used much later for A_2 . One result of this dilemma is that *all holistic and coordinate planning* for a complex, social milieu, may not prove to be very viable unless the community is willing to pay the costs of solving all its current problems *now* rather than sequentially. A sequence of solutions over time may prove to be the planning equivalent of buying a pig in a poke.

The preceding, then, represents the type of complexity that, in a sense, sometimes passeth understanding even for highly sophisticated planners who wish to give their best effort and thought to the solution of some of the pressing social issues and problems facing the modern community. If this is so for our planning experts, think how much less available to the modern, intelligent and concerned layman, is an understanding of the same type of situation. And yet without this understanding our votes—which, in a sense, are supposed to reflect indirectly our wishes with respect to government policy—become *unenlightened and incomprehending decisions*. Nor would the more direct expression of our preferences through participatory democracy be any improvement, if we come to face-to-face discussion with no more understanding of the issues faced by the community than we have when we go to the polls. To make matters worse, consider how much social complexity of this sort within a modern democracy, intellectually disfranchises the concerned, *average citizen* who has even less marked propensities for dealing with this sort of thing than the expert planner. Most ironical fact of all is that we have to recognize that citizens of less than average endowments or education or citizens who are usually unconcerned with understanding these social issues at all, can vote only under the limitation that their vote is cast without any relevance at all.

In this sense the participatory democracy that the young in the West now call for, makes sense only if their leaders are prepared to encourage members of their own generation to acquire an expertise—short of professional planning, itself—that will provide enough background to express good, social judgment. Such judgement will have to underly the support or rejection by vote, of the different proposals for the solution of the complex problems faced by communities in technologically advanced countries. *The hearts of the young are in the right place. Their compassion* for those who have been denied the right to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness is well taken. The insistence on action—that something be done—is absolutely sound. But compassion for those who are exploited and active and social concern for them will simply not be enough. The depth of understanding and the willingness to deal with abstraction—both of which are so characteristically required in the systems approach—are also vital. The price of a rebirth of democracy is a willingness to face the social complexity we have, ourselves, created. Will the democratic ethos in the West accommodate to this new demand? Only time can tell.

men and women have taken shelter under benevolent father 'Amitabh ! They took it as the way of the salvation. This clears the fact that the principle of "*Prapatti Bāhva*" along with the principles of *Ishvarvād*, and *Aratarvād* has also been referred to in Mahāyana Bhakti sect.

Mantra and *jāp* are the salient features of Mahāyana Bhakti Cult. *Mantra* and *jāp* has got much importance in countries like Tibet etc. Along with *Mantra* and *jāp* prayer has also got importance. Haarendra's pupil Shinrain was of the view that they should pray to Lord Buddha with devotion. They can attain their goal only by this support and strength.

The undermentioned factors have got importance for achievement of Bhakti :

- (1) The feelings of spiritual enjoyment by whole hearted devotion.
- (2) To have association with Guru and to worship Lord Buddha.
- (3) The study of Religious Canons and to spend life accordingly.
- (4) The purification of the soul.
- (5) To silently count beads uttering the *Mantra* नमो भगवते बुद्धाय (नमः भगवते बुद्धाय)

Ashwa-ghosh has emphasised very much on Buddha Bhakti in "*Prājñyapārmithā*" He took *Bhakti Bhāva* as the means for the uplift of the sinners. Shānti Deva in '*Bodhicharyavātār*' and '*Shikshā Samuchaya*' has put emphasis on anxiousness to know one self, the worship of Lord Buddha, the devotion in *Bhakti Bhāva*, to forget one self and surrender of the soul for the freedom from sins. This Ācharya advised to be the slave of Lord Buddha, and *Bodhi-Satvas*. Thus he is the first Ācharya who brought slave *Bhakti* in Buddha religion. The act of surrendering himself, the anxiousness of identification with the worshipped, the expression of moral ideologies are there in the *Bhakti* of Shānti Dev.

In Bodhi Charyāvatār :

एवं सर्वमिदं कृत्वा यत्तया साधितं शुभम् ।

तेन ह्येवं सर्वभूतानां सर्वदुःखं प्रशान्तिकृत् ॥

Meaning thereby -

May the suffering of all the living beings be ended by what ever has been collected by *Punya* and good deeds. In Shānti Deva's principle like humbleness, the control of egoism, the worship of Lord Buddha surrendering oneself and love towards God are same as of *Vaishnavās*.

The following are the divisions of Bhakti according to *Bodhi-charya* and *Shikshā Samuchya*.

(1) भजना और पूजा : The worship of Lord Buddha and *Bodhi-Satvas*. The want to worship *Bodhi-satvas* by offering everything available in this world. They offer every flower and fruit to their God. Even they want to offer themselves to Lord Buddha and *Bodhi-Satvas*. Being inspired by the kind feeling of Lord Buddha they offer their slave

feelings to His holy feet.⁴ The affection and self surrendering is also included in this worship.

(2) पाप देवता : Whatever has been called self praying in *Vaiṣṇava Bhakti* has been called *Pāpdeśanā* in *Bodhicaryāvatār*. In this a devotee brings out all his wrong doings and malice feelings of life with a repentance. He takes shelter of Bodhi-Satva and says with tears in his eyes. "I am responsible for all the mis-doings that I have done in this life and also in past life, or for others who have been encouraged by me. My heart is full with repentance, I have embraced death due to my ill-knowledge. Oh monk ! I have done many evil things against the "Triratna," I accept all those. I am sinner of all those wrong-doings. How can I be free from those sins.⁵ I am much afraid that I may die before I free myself from all those sins!" Shānti-Deva prays of *Bodhi-Satvas* to help him to free himself from all those sins.

(3) दुष्कृतमुपोदना : When every evil deeds are rectified in the fire of repentance, the devotee gets the strength to praise good-deeds. His heart gets ability for praising others. He gets pleasure by observing good-deeds of others.⁶

(4) अध्वेक्षणा : Prayer—*Adhyekṣanā* means to beg or to pray. In this a devotee prays Bodhi-satvas so that all the living beings may exist in the world, and he may be of help to them in lessening their sufferings. He prays to Lord Buddha in the same manner.⁷

(5) शरणगतमनु : To take the shelter - "I am in your shelter" a devotee should always think like this. The shelter of Lord Buddha religion and Sangh is essential for the freedom from sins.

(6) क्षान्तमनादि गरिमाय : There is emphasis on the release of egoism in Mahāyāna Bhakti cult. A man wants to identify his existence with the existence of men in the world. He wants that everyman should share the result of his good-deeds for their uplift. A devotee wants to work for the uplift of others, leaving his malice feelings. He wants every living being happy and gay through whatever he has collected as the result of good deeds. To share the unhappiness of all the living beings and to lessen their sufferings is the motto of the devotees of Mahāyāna sect. It is said - "As there is self knowledge by practice in one's body why not in others too".⁸ Thus in the divisions of *Bhakti*, leaving the malice feelings to promise for the uplift of the living beings and according to promise to act is included.

Parmitas of a devotee in Mahayana Bhakti cult

Much importance has been paid to *Parmitas* in Mahāyāna *Bhakti* cult. *Parmitas* have the same place in Mahāyāna sect as *Sādācāra*—Good deeds have in *Vaiṣṇava Bhakti*. *Parmitā* means wholeness.⁹ This word has been coined from Pali

2. *Bodhicaryāvatār*, 7/4.

7. *Iti*, 3/4.3.

8. मयागम बुद्धि रम्यानामवकाशेतिमनराजमते ।

पुनरपि नृपानाम् विमम्यानां यानि न ब्रह्मचर्यानां न ।

10. *Aspects of Mahayana Buddhism* p. 26

6. *Bodhicaryāvatār*, 2/28-32.

8. *Iti*, 3/4.5

parigraha word. A man get *parmitās* by doing good-deeds. *Parmitās* are of six kinds mainly :

(1) *Dān Pārmitā*—To give alms to all the living beings of the world without any self interest behind them is *Dān Pārmitā*. All the *Parihgrahas* are taken as the causes of the griefs of the world. So *Aparigraha* is the cause of liberation. A devotee has no attachment with any thing after being adorned with *Dānmitā*. He sees his own image in all the beings. For full success of this *Pārmitā* a devotee has to leave malice feelings completely like. (मद्वत्ता, मात्सर्ये, ईर्ष्या और वैयुक्त्यत्ता) After we are free of these malice feelings *Dān Pārmitā* gets its completeness.

(2) *Sheel Pārmitā*—*Sheel* means to have no attachments with wrong doings. In other words the release (*virakti*) itself may be called *Sheel*. There is a necessity for the refinement of the heart, tranquility of the feelings and the healthy body in this *Pārmitā*. *Smṛiti* means to remember *Vividh* and *Pratisidha*. A body who remembers what to do and what not to do and acts accordingly deserves *Sheel Pārmitā*. There should be no germination of the malice feelings with the observation of the heart and body—a constant attempt for the same is *Sheel pārmitā*. Without *sheel* you cannot get *Sambūdhī*. Thus *Sheel Pārmitā* is attached with *Bhakti*.

(3) *Shānti Pārmitā*—One may feel the necessity of this *Pārmitā* in lessening the *Rāga*dvēṣādī.

There are three kinds of peace.

- (a) *Dukhādi vāśinā Shānti*.
- (b) *Prokārmarshaṇa Shānti*.
- (c) *Dharma Nidhyān Shānti*.

In first, there is no ill feelings even a devotee is surrounded by griefs and troubles. One has to practice '*Muditā*' for the release of the ill feelings. *Shānti* in the 2nd Category is to be gotten by tolerance. A devotee has to hear the ill doings of others. In all the condition to have close attachment with religion leaving the anger aside is *Dharmanidhyān Shānti*. A devotee becomes habituated of tolerance in this *Pārmitā* and tries to become devoted.

- (4) *Veerya Pārmitā*—*Veerya* means enthusiasm. There is importance of *Karmavāda* in Buddha-religion. A man gets *Nirvāṇa* by his good-deeds. To have full enthusiasm in work is *Veerya Pārmitā*. *Karma* are of two varieties—one कुशल *Karma* and other अकुशल *Karma*. There should be enthusiasm towards Bad *Karma*. For this one should have to leave idleness and must be prompt to do his duties. The good deeds done enthusiastically a devotee gets his feelings fixed and gets his unhappiness lessened. To lessen unhappiness there are two means for that (i) *Shamath* (ii) *Vipashyanā*. *Shamath* means *Samādhi* and *Vipashyanā* means the valid knowledge. Both can be attained from *Bhakti*.

- (5) *Dhyān Pārmitā*—*Dhyān Pārmitā* is closely related with *Shamath* and *Vipashyanā*. *Shamath* or *Samādhi* is not possible without renunciation. That is why renunciation has been emphasized in Mahāyāna sect. The release of attachment is essential in the Mahāyāna sect and for this renunciation

एकान्तसेवन (isolation) is to be practiced. The welfare and prosperity of the living beings of the world is possible through *Dhyān Pārmitā* and *Bhakti* is helpful in this regard.

- (f) *Prajñā Pārmitā* - The meditation to a particular object is achieved by the practice of *Dhyān Pārmitā*. The self knowledge can be achieved by *Dhyān Pārmitā*. A man who preached meditation gets the glimpse of Truthfulness. अविद्या can only be removed by the acquisition of right knowledge. अविद्या is the root of all sins. The main object of *Prajñā Pārmitā* is to show the uselessness of religion. Every religious uselessness is felt by the *Prajñā Pārmitā*; and to feel every religious uselessness is the main object of Buddha religion. We get freedom from अज्ञान completely. By the freedom from अविद्या we get purification and refinement. And by purification and refinement we get freedom from grief. Thus it is clear that through *Prajñā Pārmitā* we get isolation and ultimately *Nirvāṇa*. This importance of *Prajñā Pārmitā* has established him in the form of a God. The *Prajñā Pārmitā* is taken to be the object of *Bodhisattva Bhakti*.

There are ten principles for the development of Mahāyāna *Bhakti* cult.

- (i) The attentiveness and devotion towards Lord Buddha's *Dharmakāya* and *Nirvāṇa Kāya*.
- (ii) The feeling of Jagat Santarak due to over kindness and the service of the humanity.
- (iii) *Mantra-jāp*.
- (iv) The synthesis of *Prapañc Bādhya* with the *Prati Pāda*.
- (v) The association and devotion towards *Guru*.
- (vi) To spend holy life.
- (vii) Emphasis on the purification of the heart and soul.
- (viii) Development of the various divisions of *Bhakti*.
- (ix) *Anuttar Puja*.
- (x) *The use of Pārmitās*.

In the life time of Buddha his pupils showed much more fascination for his worldly life. He has been able to change this into devotion towards *Dharmakāya*. The devotion developed as *Bhakti* after his *Pari-Nirvāṇa*. To have full devotion towards the birth phase of Lord Buddha is the seed of *Bhakti*. In Mahāyāna sect Lord Buddha has been described as a God worship to whom is essential. There came many Gods along with Lord Buddha; they are called बोधिसत्व. Lord Buddha became तत्त्वज्ञ born and by his benevolence became the सारथी of the world. Lord Buddha's blessing is the Bhagwati blessing. Mahāyāna sect has been undoubtedly influenced by Bhīṣṇava religion. The *Bhakti* cult of Mahāyāna sect seems to be influenced by the *Geetā Bhakti* cult.

Thus in short it may be said that *Bhakti* cult developed in Mahāyāna sect and idol worship too came into existence by the influence of Buddha religion.

In the Indian culture and religion the idol worship for the first time has been

practised by Buddha religion. So *Bhakti* cult of Mahāyana is the natural development of those devotional feelings which we get in Lord Buddha's original preaching or स्याविरवाद. The encouragement towards renunciation established in a true historical aspect is a salient feature of Mahāyāna sect. It is said in the Gāthā,

“सो भक्तिमा नाम च होति पण्डितो ब्रह्मा च धामेसु विसेसि ऊत्स”

In conclusion we find that the *Bhakti* cult was there in Lord Buddha's life; it was prevalent even before his birth and it has undoubtedly influenced the *Bhakti* cult of Mahāyana sect. In *Bhakti* cult of Mahāyāna there are not only the ancient elements of Buddha's philosophy but there are inclusion of some new elements too. शरणागति or प्रपत्ति is the prominent element among these new elements. Lord Buddha became the God. By uttering his name one can get *Nirvāṇa*. Due to the influence of the *Bhakti* cult even the *Narakiya* living beings begin to get freedom from the chains of *Karmās*.

Religion and Formalization

At the present time, religion receives much attention, despite the fact that in the Western European world the traditional approach to religion passes through a deep crisis. The number of Christians which still stick to the traditional rituals are quickly diminishing. But, we do remark that the interest in the several types of Asian religions and their metaphysical way of living very quickly expands. Look at the impressive number of books on Asian religions, which are sold in the common bookshops. Not only the interest, but also the positive involvement with these foreign religious traditions is steadily on the increase.

The youth strongly criticises the modern society, its violence, its corruption, the overwhelming role of power in it. Nevertheless they do believe in the future, in the possibility of liberation of all possible evils. Many among them believe to find this liberation in religion but not in the patrimonial religion which is Christianity. For, they believe that Christianity is so strongly integrated in their corrupt and boring society, that Christianity rather would impede the arising of a new society, of a new world. The arising of a new society, a new mankind, they hope to reach by approaching the Asian religions as Tao, Zen Buddhism, Hinduism, etc.

But not only the youth, also many older people are more concerned in the non-national religious traditions. So, a more or less general openness for and eagerness to know the several religious movements is in vogue. They like to have a better knowledge of the several types of religions, to be enabled to compare them with each other, in the hope to understand better religion itself. This explains the revival of the scientific approach to religion. Sociology, psychology, history, philosophy and logic of religion is getting more interest to-day.

What in religion does appeal so much? What in religion makes people believe that they will find there the liberation or the salvation, in whatever interpretation, of the individual or of mankind?

We want to argue that the knowledge of at least some aspects of the religion could be ameliorated, if there would be an attempt to formalize as much as possible

the description and the interpretation of the religious phenomena. What is meant here by formalization is the process by which (a) the analysis is made of the several components which constitute the description or the theory, and subsequently (b) the substitution of these elements by certain symbols. Then, (c) relations between the elements and properties of these relations are determined. On the basis of these relations and their properties, it must be possible to differentiate the several components in the observation set or in the theory.¹

In general, they agree that by formalization a better systematization of the data can be got. You can communicate more correctly your hypotheses, your points of view. This is so, because you get a much more distinct account of the situation. The formalization can also have an important heuristical value.

One big problem with the development of theories on religion is the strong tendency, one has, to distort the data, so that it fits in the theoretical framework. When in a ritual one hears an explicit contradiction, one does not treat it as a contradiction, but rather as a symbolic expression of a non-contradictory idea so that it can easily fit in a theoretical system, which fulfils the traditional logical requirements. Even the description and the interpretation of primitive religions are made in such a way, that one's own religion seems to be a normal continuation on a higher level of these religions.²

It would be a very important step forward, if one could try to differentiate as much as possible the phases (a) of describing the data and the collection of the material, and (b) the interpretation and the explanation of it: the building of a theoretical framework. In principle both phases can be formalized.

Of course, one must be aware of the fact that a description is not possible independently of any theoretical framework. Modern methodological research has exposed this very clearly.³ This does not mean, however, that no important difference exists between the low-theoretical, hypothetical framework which is sufficient for observation to take place and the highly systematized framework of the theory by which the phenomena themselves are interpreted and explained. We believe that there is an important quantitative and qualitative difference between both levels, as far as the type and degree of systematization are concerned.⁴

It is important to keep this differentiation in mind. With the two-level-approach one is in a better position to evaluate the explanative power of a theory, its hypothetical character and its scientific value. Also in this way the specific character of religion can better be brought to the fore. For, the danger is rather high that its peculiar characteristics are strained or concealed more easily in the process of putting everything in a traditional theoretical framework. In the two-level-approach, viz. the descriptive level versus theoretical level, the abstraction process is made explicitly so that clearly can be seen which data are neglected for the sake of the theory. In this way

1. A good approach to formalization can be found in Apostel (1970).

2. This tendency can be found rather clearly in Hoeselbarth's (1972) description of the death rituals in Africa.

3. Cf. Durheim (1914), Nagel (1961), Hanson (1971), etc.

4. Pike (1967) defends this point of view. This is illustrated by the differentiation he makes between the etic and emic level in the approach to the phenomena.

the evaluation of the explanative power of the theory and its empirical verification or falsification can more objectively be made.

Having these thoughts in mind, the workgroup "Logic and Religion" of the center for the scientific study on religion at the University of Ghent studies the religious phenomena.⁵ To test the value of the two-level-approach to the study of religion,⁶ the group thought it worth-while to use this kind of approach on the study of rituals. Rituals play an important role in any religion.

So attempts were made to describe and to formalize the description of several rituals. They have it done for the rituals in the several types of Jewish sacrifices, as there are the olah and the thysia.⁷ As a control on the value of the formalisation, they have formalized in the same way the description of an African death ritual, where the sacrifices play a crucial role.⁸

From the results got, it seems that as far as the formalization of the observational level is concerned, one needs at least four types of operations: (a) the unification operation, (b) the separation operation, and (c and d) two transformational operations.

By the unification operation (a) several objects are brought together by an actor in such a way that they form a new unity; e.g. water and wine together, fire and paper, etc.

In the separation operation (b) an actor breaks up one object into several parts by means of a certain instrument. The transformational operations (c and d) change the positions of the objects with the consequence that a different structure is got. This change of position of an object can happen in two ways. An object can be brought to another place (e.g. a cow is brought near the table) with the consequence that the overall structure is changed (transformational operation c). The object can also be changed internally, without being moved to another place (transformational operation d). So, when a priest spreads his arms, we have a transformation of the internal structure of the priest.⁹ Of course, the operations c and d can be executed at the same time.

These several operations can be formalized as follows:

- (a) The unification operation: $U(a,b)_c$
An object a is unified with an object b by the actor c .
- (b) the separation operation: $S(a, b, m)_c$
 a is separated from b by the actor c using the instrument m .
- (c) the transformational operation: $C(a_k)_c$

5. These thoughts are a result of a discussion with L. Apostel, R. Delacroix, P. Mathijssen, P. Van Geert and Saao; all members of the workgroup "Logic and Religion".

6. For sure, the two-level-approach has already proved its value in natural science, as also in the social science. The question is: "Can it be fruitfully used in the study of religion?"

7. L. Apostel (1974) and R. Delacroix (1974).

8. Vandamme (1974).

9. Of course, the unification (a) and the separation (b) operation can also be called transformations, but then in a more general interpretation of the term transformation. The operation (c) and (d) could then be called simple transformations.

The object *a* gets another position. Object *a* is brought to the place *ki* by the actor *c*. Of course, *a* can be the actor itself.

(d) the transformational operation : $D(ap)c$

Object *a* takes the form *pi* by the intervention of the actor *c* (here *a* can be also the actor itself).

Once the formalization of the description is made, it is easy now to make the comparison between several rituals and construct models for these.

The formalization of the description of the rituals has this advantage that one is obliged to look more carefully at the phenomena. We can illustrate this easily. 'Washing' is an operation which is very frequently executed in the rituals of sacrifices. Most generally it is interpreted as an operation by which the evils are separated from that what is washed. If we, however, describe this operation of washing more carefully, we see that this washing operation is in fact very complex. We only have to look at the proceedings we make when washing our hands. Firstly water and hands are unified, are brought together; secondly the water is separated from the hands. Therefore, this washing includes at least two operations.

Now we can give an interpretation of this hand washing. This brings us, however, to the second level : the level of the theory construction. In our interpretation we can stress the first or the second operation. In fact we see that for instance in the Mamabolo death ritual (a South-African negro population) the penetration in the hands of certain liquids by the washing operation and the subsequently colour changes it produces, is most strongly stressed. In the interpretation of the *thysia*, however, the separation operation : the separation of the evils from the hands, is mostly emphasized. Both aspects are still present and both can but must not have a symbolic value for the actors. Therefore, great care should be taken that one does not take a simple interpretation of a phenomenon as the only possible description of this phenomenon.

We hope to have illustrated somewhat (a) the importance of the differentiation between the observational and the theoretical level (how relative this differentiation also may be), and (b) the value of the formalization of each level.

Of course, we are aware of the fact that eventually not everything on religion can be put by means of formalization or by science in general. But that what can be said scientifically, can be better understood and has a higher methodological evaluation, the more it is formalized.

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A New Refutation of the Ontological Proof of God's Existence

In this essay I shall present a new refutation of the Anselmic-Cartesian ontological proof.¹ But is a new refutation needed? Aren't there already enough old ones around? Why increase the population?

One is tempted to say: Because the old refutations have obviously failed to dispose of the beast, witness its present, flourishing condition.² But this would suggest that our new refutation might hopefully succeed where they failed, and if we are correct in our subsequent analyses, it will not. The animal will remain alive and kicking, in spite of our refutation's being a genuine refutation. But what we shall be able to show, I believe, is that the proof's hidden mechanism of conviction is merely psychological; and hence, though we may find it impossible to resist its persuasive power, we shall see that our succumbing to it counts no more with respect to the truth of things than our finding that when we look at a duck-rabbit we now see a duck and now a rabbit.

But this is not all. Our new refutation will make possible a certain long-overdue distribution of justice. Everyone will remember that the ontological argument is used in Anselm's *Proslogion* to demonstrate that the fool denies the existence of God only by virtue of being "stupid and foolish." The present refutation of the ontological argument will force the philosopher, by his very assent to the argument, to deny that either he is a philosopher or that there can be such a thing as a philosopher. Who is

1. Much of Anselm's "ontological argumentation" can be, and has been viewed in terms of the concept of "possibility" and modal logic. But Anselm also refers in his argumentation to *natures* (see *The Proslogion*, chap. II, "But is there any such nature, since the fool has said in his heart: God is not?" (trans. A. C. McGill, *Classical and Contemporary Readings in the Philosophy of Religion*, ed. Hick, 1964, p. 28). By "Anselmic-Cartesian proof" I mean that form of the ontological proof, whether occurring in Anselm, Descartes, or elsewhere, that depends on a reference to the nature or essence of God.
2. See, for instance, John Hick, "Ontological Argument for the Existence of God," *The Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, ed. Edwards, Vol 5, p. 540: "Discussion of the Ontological Proof . . . is perhaps as active today as at any time in the past."

the greater lover in this arrangement of things, the fool or the philosopher, is a nice question which I shall leave for others to answer.

I begin, though I shall not end, with a perception of Professor Paul Miller's. In some recent lectures on the ontological proof,³ Professor Miller claimed that the proof depends for its credibility and force on our accepting what he called a Cartesian conception of essence as opposed to a conceptualist or nominalist conception. Since this perception of Professor Miller's is the first premise of my refutation I now want to elaborate and defend it. I might add: this elaboration and defense are not, so far as I know, part of anything that Professor Miller has claimed or would want to claim, though they might be.

Now one can see right off why Professor Miller did not refer to a realist conception of essence as being involved in the proof's credibility. If essences are all conceived as actually existing entities, as in the realist view, the ontological proof has no role to play. One need only cite an essence in order to establish existence. The unicorn's will do as well as God's. Descartes does not propose a realist conception of essences. Indeed, he purports to propose a conceptualist conception.⁴ But how then can a Cartesian conception of essence be opposed, as we have implied its being, to the conceptualist conception? To see how it can be, while also differing from the realist conception, we can do no better than to quote Descartes on the matter. In the Fifth Meditation he tells us: "As, for example, when I imagine a triangle, although there is not perhaps and never was in any place in the universe apart from my thought one such figure, it remains true nonetheless that this figure possesses a certain determinate nature, form, or essence, which is immutable and eternal, and not framed by me, nor in any degree dependent on my thought."⁵

Now the imagined triangle that Descartes refers to must surely exist no longer than an image usually does. Its form or essence is said, however, to be immutable and eternal. It must, therefore, be something distinct from the image of the triangle which is momentarily extant. This itself suggests that it is an entity of some sort; for what else but an entity can be immutable and eternal? At the same time the form or essence of a triangle is said by Descartes to be something not invented by my mind or dependent in any way upon my thought. From these comments we should have to infer that it is a mind-independent entity.

Does this independent entity, the essence of a triangle, itself exist? Descartes tells us that except in the case of God essence and existence are separable. What he might seem to mean by this is that only in the case of God does the fact that there is a certain conceivable nature entail that something exists having that nature. For example, we can conceive of a unicorn, a nature of a certain sort, but nothing compels us to grant that something exists having that nature. On the other hand, we are compelled

3. These lectures were delivered at the University of Colorado in October of 1972.

4. See Descartes, *Meditations and Selection from the Principles of Philosophy*, Open Court, trans. Veitch, p. 154: "Whatever objects fall under our knowledge we consider either as things or the affection of things, or as eternal truths possessing no existence beyond our thought"; and p. 159: "Number and all universals are only modes of thought."

5. *IBL*, p. 76.

by our very conception of God's nature to grant that something exists having that nature, namely, God. But the matter is really not quite so simple as it so far appears. If an essence or nature is an independent, immutable entity of some sort is God's nature one entity and God another? Here the realist complexion of Descartes' description of a nature or essence would seem to demand a quite different answer from the straightforward one we have just given. If we are not to divide God into two entities we should presumably have to maintain that God and what he is are one and the same thing. To say, then, that God necessarily exists is to say something like this: that the mode, existence, necessarily attaches to that entity which is indifferently God's nature or God. Correspondingly, to say that a unicorn or a triangle does not necessarily exist is to say that the mode, existence, does not necessarily attach itself to the essence of a unicorn or a triangle. It is in this way that Descartes' conception of essence or what we want to call a Cartesian essence differs from a realist conception. But it is because it is in other respects similar to the realist conception that it can endow the ontological proof with credibility and force, as we shall presently see.

Finally, a Cartesian essence is apparently something that anything with an identifiable nature "cannot help but have." We shall postpone for the time being consideration of this last characteristic. Minus it, we generate then from Descartes' prescription the following conception of an essence: it is an independent, immutable, eternal entity which may or may not take on, as a mode or property, existence. We shall henceforth refer to an essence so conceived as a "Cartesian essence," even though we may be doing some violence to Descartes' official intentions in doing so (and maybe even, to Professor Miller's unofficial ones).

In what way does such an entity enter into the ontological argument so as to lend that argument credibility and force?

In answer to this question we might first see what happens to the argument if we take essence to be nothing more than a way of conceiving. An essence in this interpretation is at best a concept entertained transiently by a mind. Now a concept entertained by the mind—even a concept of something whose definition includes *necessary existence*—plainly does not itself guarantee the existence of what it depicts. Suppose for instance I have the idea *that of which nothing greater can be conceived*. In the vein of someone who says, "I do not believe there exists a God but I think the idea of a single God is the greatest thing that exists or has ever existed—greater than any person, civilization, or anything else that exists or has existed," I could say, "The greatest thing that exists or that has ever existed is just Anselm's idea, *that of which nothing greater can be conceived*." If what I said were true, as it contingently might be, then the assertion, "A something *than which nothing greater can be conceived exists*" would be false just in case I could conceive of something greater than that idea; but surely can, e.g., I can conceive of something possessing necessary existence; and that, I take it, is something greater than the idea, *that of which nothing greater can be conceived*, though the latter happens to be the greatest thing in fact existing.

All this, let me repeat, is simply an illustration of the plain fact that our conceiving something does not guarantee that something's existence, no matter how we conceive it. Hence, if we suppose that an essence is merely a form of conceiving, neither we nor the ontological proof can proceed from essence to existence; the endeavor

collapses. And the same holds true if we construe essence in purely nominalistic terms.

On the other hand, if we interpret natures as Cartesian essences then quite clearly : If any such nature possesses by definition existence or necessary existence, and it does not matter which, that something, the essence, exists. For what we contemplate now is an immutable, eternal entity or object which possesses the mode existence (or, necessary existence). Patently, if an entity possesses the property or mode, existence, the entity in question exists. Thus, if we construe, *that of which nothing greater can be conceived* as a Cartesian essence, and if we suppose that existence or necessary existence belong by definition to that of which nothing greater can be conceived it follows that that of which nothing greater can be conceived exists.

Predictably, then, the ontological argument will seem to succeed when we construe the nature it mentions as a Cartesian essence and it will seem to fail when we construe it as a mere concept transiently entertained by a mind (or a mere name being used by someone). The history of the ontological proof has been that it has persuaded some philosophers totally, some not at all, and others (the majority, I hazard) it sometimes persuades and sometimes does not, much as the duck-rabbit now looks like a duck and now like a rabbit. If we have been right so far in our analysis this means that some philosophers always construe the nature mentioned in the ontological proof as a Cartesian essence, some never do, and others are sometimes inclined to do so and sometimes not to do so. But why should this be ?

The most persistent theory, that the force of the ontological proof rests illegitimately on our taking existence to be a predicate, would say that it is this very assumption that impels philosophers to construe *that of which nothing greater can be conceived* or its cognate *Perfect Being* as a Cartesian essence. But *prima facie* this does not seem to be a plausible thesis. For suppose, using the ontological argument as a pattern, we attempt to prove the existence of a certain being in this way. We define a Wump as a bird that flies backward, a Wumpo as a bird that flies backward and exists, a Wumpokan as a bird that flies backward and necessarily exists—say, an eternally existent bird (thus, a bird that cannot contingently exist, i.e., cannot come into existence or cease to exist). Is anyone now inclined to say that the Wumpokan exists or that it necessarily exists ? I hardly think so. But why not ? Evidently (if we have been correct so far) because no one is impelled to construe the natures of Wumpo or Wumpokan birds as Cartesian essences. Why then should persons be so impelled in the case of *that of which nothing greater can be conceived* or *Perfect Being* ?

At least part of the reason might seem to reside in the way that the mode or property exists or necessarily exists (i.e., eternally exists) is connected with the different natures in question. Patently, existence is connected in some internally necessary way with *that of which nothing greater can be conceived* or *Perfect Being*, while only in some arbitrary way with what we called a Wumpo or Wumpokan. We might argue : Finding ourselves forced to think of *that of which nothing greater can be conceived* or *Perfect Being* as necessarily possessing existence, we are led to think in terms of an objective something and hence a Cartesian essence, for we immediately realize that it cannot be the idea, *that of which nothing greater can be conceived* or *Perfect Being*, that has necessarily attached to it existence or necessary existence, and yet, clearly, something has 1

But if this explanation is the right one why is it that only some philosophers feel impelled to assent to the *ontological proof*? Why is it that some are never so impelled (to gather from the disdain they express for the proof)? Ought it not to be the case that every philosopher should immediately assent to the argument, for surely every philosopher will want to admit that *existence* or even *necessary existence* is somehow necessarily connected with *that of which nothing greater can be conceived* or *Perfect Being*?

Moreover, if the present explanation is the correct one, why should not the following argument, patterned exactly on the *ontological proof*, succeed in persuading us of an existence? We propose the term "*perfect island*." We go on to state that the perfect island must be perfectly round, perfectly temperate in climate, etc., etc., and (we add) it must clearly exist indeed, necessarily exist; for an island that necessarily existed instead of merely contingently existed would surely be more perfect than the latter, and hence the perfect island would, by definition, have to necessarily exist. All the attributes we have connected with our perfect island seem to be connected to it by some kind of internal necessity or at least by non-arbitrary bonds. But is anyone now tempted to maintain that the perfect island exists? The very fact that the perfect island has been used to form a logical analogy refuting the *ontological proof* tells us otherwise.

Thus, on closer analysis, it does not seem that it is the fact that *existence* is internally connected with *that of which nothing greater can be conceived* or with *Perfect Being* that accounts for the power that the *ontological proof* undeniably sometimes exerts. This means, of course, that the force of the proof has basically nothing to do with our taking or not taking *existence* to be a predicate. But what then does it have to do with? Clearly, a successful theory concerning the mechanism of the *ontological argument* will have to tell us why some persons are impelled to assent to it, why some are not impelled at all to assent to it, and why some persons are sometimes impelled to assent to it and sometimes are not.

One possibility that has sometimes been advanced is this: that when we speak of *Perfect Being* and in particular of the *Perfect Being* we can form a coherent, unique reference whereas when we speak of the perfect island or any other sensuous purportedly perfect thing we cannot. For instance, when we think of the perfect island we might conceive an island of such-and-such character but having done so we can always conceive another island, and still another, possessing just the same character or characters. Thus, the notion of "*the perfect island*," a definite description, dissolves in our contemplation, leaving us with either "*a perfect island*" or "*the perfect islands*," whereas the non-sensuous abstraction, "*The Perfect Being*" cannot lead itself to duplication since it does not, like a perfect island, lend itself to any spatial individuation. But on several counts this very sophisticated argument fails. For one thing, it fails because of its very sophistication. Assuredly, none of these recondite considerations typically insinuate themselves into the thought of the persons who rejects, assents to, or oscillates in his assent or rejection of the *ontological proof*. In addition, however, what is being maintained would appear to have nothing essential to do with the *ontological proof* and its peculiar force. Everything is made to hang upon unique reference. But suppose we had a pantheon consisting of a thousand gods and we

wanted to prove their existence. We could argue : "Perfect beings must exist or they would not be perfect ; hence, being perfect, our thousand gods all exist." So far as I can see this ontological argument possesses the exact powers to persuade or to fail to persuade as the traditional argument.

We are therefore led to repeat our original question : how are we to account for (a) the seeming force of the ontological argument and (b) the different ways in which it has typically elicited or failed to elicit assent ? With these requirements or criteria in mind, I propose that the power of the proof comes from outside the proof itself. It comes from our being led or seduced to connect the terms, *that of which nothing greater can be conceived* or *Perfect Being* with the term "God." Let me elaborate.

One way in which we respond to names, and other sorts of terms is *realistically*. Someone tells us that there is a deer on the front lawn. We crane our necks to see. We peer this way and that, and so on. The "referring" itself is no more an object of our attention here than the finger of someone pointing to a friend in the distance. This realistic (as we shall call it) response takes place even where it may happen that there exists no object which we crane to see, etc. Children who look searchingly into the Christmas night to see Santa Claus arriving are responding as realistically to the reference. Santa Claus, as the person who cranes his neck to see the deer on the lawn.

If we have occasion to say that these children "imagine" that there is a Santa Claus we are not using the term "imagine" to describe a form of behavior. We are using it epistemically : As a way of retaining a realistic interpretation of their responses while at the same time indicating that the object of their realistic responses, unknown to the children, does not exist. Discourse is still logically focused on an entity existing or purportedly existing in the world. On the other hand, if these children were pretending or making-believe that one of their number, say Tom, was Santa Claus, we might again speak of them as imagining a Santa Claus, but not we should be using the term "imagine" to describe a form of behavior and we should no longer construe their responses to the name, Santa Claus, realistically. We should construe them as mere conceivings or making-believes, and that is all. Thus, the questions that we should want to raise, or assessments make, would have to do with their conceivings of making-believes taken as such, not with independently existing terminations. For example, we might say to one of the children, "Do you think that is really what you would do if Tom were actually Santa Claus—would you really try to kick him?" but not, "Santa Claus does not exist; so how can Tom be Santa Claus ?" We might call these sorts of responses "conceptual responses" as contrasted with what we called "realistic responses."

Now the society in which we live by and large entertains the belief in a deity which is called "God." As a consequence, persons in our society respond to references to God in a realistic manner. They do this not only in their individual behavior, as when this person trembles at the name or that person beams hopelessly, but in their conventions of behavior ; for example, in their patterns of speech. One might say : In our society the response to the name, God, is by convention realistic. Thus, should I individually come to the conclusion that there exists no such thing as this God, I should still find myself, in communicating with my fellowmen, compelled by conventions of language, forms of address, etc., to express my disbelief in realistic and not

conceptual responses; that is, in the ways that one would concerning an accepted existence. Thus, I would be expected to offer evidence for my denial of God's existence; and using a realistic grammar, I would have to say, e.g., "I no longer believe that God exists."

In contrast, the terms "that of which nothing greater can be conceived" and "Perfect Being" are not in fact connected by convention with realistic responses. Unless external forces intervene, as they may, our responses to these terms are conceptual. Like the terms "perfect island" or "Wumpokan" we treat them as conceivings. Thus, unless some extrinsic connection has been formed, we will be inclined, presented with them, to ask what sort of thing is meant rather than who is meant. We may, for instance, puzzle indecisively over whether we can conceive anything by them. Or more vividly illustrative of their conceptual status, if someone said, "Perfect Being is an absurdity" or "That of which nothing greater can be conceived is some kind of nonsense" people would not respond with the sort of outrage and sense of *lese majeste* committed that they would if he said, "God is an absurdity" or "God is a hoax." The point is, of course: We may commit *lese majeste* against real beings; not against what are deemed mere conceivings or imaginings.

Now what occurs where the ontological argument succeeds in convincing us, I want to maintain, is that we are led to transpose our realistic responses *viz* the reference, God, to the proof's verbalisms, *that of which nothing greater can be conceived* or *Perfect Being*. This transposition in effect converts conceptual essences into Cartesian essences; for when we treat, e.g., *Perfect Being*, no longer in terms of conceptual but realistic responses, we assume the attitude of a person pointing to some independently existing object. At this juncture, but only at it, the property or mode, *existence*, plays its peculiarly persuasive role in the proof. While use of the term "God" is connected by convention with realistic responses and while these responses import, as it were, *existence*, *existence* does not form an integral part of the definition of the term "God" itself; no more than it forms an integral part of the definition of "man" or any other term to which we respond realistically. Thus, there is no contradiction in affirming that God does not exist. On the other hand, while the conceptual responses connected with the terms "that of which nothing greater can be conceived" and "Perfect Being" do not import *existence*, the terms themselves have been so constructed that *existence* or even necessary *existence* is an integral part of their definition, just as is the case with the terms "Wumpokan" and "Perfect Island." Thus, a kind of conceptual or verbal contradiction attaches to the affirmation, "Perfect Being does not exist," comparable to the verbal contradiction that attaches to "A Wumpokan does not exist." But when the realistic responses belonging by convention to "God" get transposed to, e.g., "Perfect Being," and so convert the latter into a Cartesian essence, we end up at the same time with an entity that contains as a definitional part of itself *existence* or *necessary existence*. Thus, where before we were engaged in a merely verbal contradiction in denying that Perfect Being existed we now seem to be engaged in something like an ontological contradiction. Conversely, having already equated the term "Perfect Being" with "God" it seems to us that we cannot deny God's existence without something like an ontological contradiction.

In terms of this description of the argument's mechanism of conviction one can see that, though there is some point in attacking it on the ground that existence is not a predicate, for in this way we draw the ontological sting from "Perfect Being" or "that of which nothing greater can be conceived," in doing so we are engaged in as much philosophical imposture as the argument itself. We have met one cheat by perpetrating another; but we have not, for one thing, penetrated to the heart of the proof and for another, we can expect persons to agree with us that existence is not a predicate, which is a purely tendentious, philosophically dogmatic assertion, only to the extent that they are not or do not want to be convinced by the ontological argument itself. Thus the predicate-existence refutation (as it might be called) really amounts to nothing more than a further way of expressing our initial responses to the ontological proof but not a justification of those responses. In addition it fails to explain the divergent responses of philosophers to the proof, and above all the fact that, without being aware of there being such a thing as the question, "Is existence a predicate?" a philosopher can feel impelled to reject or assent to it.

But has our own theory accounted for these facts? Indeed, have we not left unaccounted for and suspended in mid-air the very most crucial step in our own reasonings on the matter? We said that persons are led or impelled to transpose the realistic responses belonging by convention to the term "God" to the conceptual terms "Perfect Being" and "that of which nothing greater can be conceived." But what exactly leads persons to do this?

Now so far as I can make out the major if not the only force that impells them is the worship and hence adulation that convention directs upon God, or, more accurately directs into our realistic responses to the term "God." The terms, *that of which nothing greater can be conceived* and *Perfect Being*, embody by design adulation and flattery; indeed, supreme adulation and flattery. They also, by design, lend themselves to being used as denoting phrases. How easy, then, and natural, in praise of God, to shower these flattering terms on Him and next equate His name with them! And that, I submit, is precisely what we sometimes do and why we do it; that is, when we assent to the ontological proof. At the same time this account explains why we sometimes do not and why we sometimes oscillate in our responses to the proof, one moment finding it irresistible and the next mere sophistry.

A person who believes in God and who has no prejudice, philosophical or otherwise, to flattering God, but at the same time is of sufficient philosophical cast of mind to find himself at home with recondite conceptualizations like *that of which nothing greater can be conceived* or *Perfect Being*, will naturally tend to equate the term "God" with them. After he has done this a few times he will tend to do so by habit, and so the conceptual evocates, *that of which nothing greater can be conceived* and *Perfect Being* will become for him habitual Cartesian evocates, and each time he goes through the argument, more so? He will therefore be one of those persons who are totally convinced by the argument.

On the other hand, a person who disbelieves in God, and especially a person who takes the very thought of a God or denies God's existence on moral grounds, will tend to reject outright any equation of the term "God" and the conceptualizations *that of which nothing greater can be conceived* and *Perfect Being*. And so will the person

who entertains the philosophical or theological prejudice that it is *infra dig* to flatter God or treat Him in any manner suggesting anthropomorphism. Thus, the ontological proof will typically and ironically exert no persuasive power just upon the strictest haters of God and the strictest worshippers of Him.

In the case of most persons, however, conventions of attaching flattering epithets to God and the original conceptualness of our responses to such terms as "that of which nothing greater can be conceived" and "Perfect Being," meeting together like opposing tides, result in the usual ambivalence of response elicited by the argument. Sometimes one psychological force will momentarily win out, sometimes the other. Thus, held back by the given conceptualness of response to "Perfect Being," we sometimes fail to transfer to the term the realistic grammar of the term "God," and then find the ontological argument unpersuasive and remote. Sometimes, having done so, the artificially imposed transference of responses turns out to be, like Van der Val bonds, too weak to endure and we then pass from a moment of conviction to ones of unconviction. At other times the Van der Val bonds of the transference endure longer, in which case we shake our heads in amazement at just how persuasive the ontological proof really is! It is in this way, for instance, that I would explain my own reactions to it: One moment, being gripped by it and thinking it almost irresistible; the next, wondering how anyone could have ever been persuaded by such sterile sophistry, and so on.

So far as I can see, the theory that I have been proposing entirely succeeds in explaining the divergent ways in which the ontological proof actually affects different minds. I want to maintain, therefore, that our account has really penetrated to the very heart of the proof's mechanism and not, like the usual disquisitions on existence and predicates, merely exchanged one philosophical cheat for another. On the other hand, we have so far merely reduced the persuasive force of the proof to psychological factors. Having done so we have undoubtedly cast some suspicion on its force. We have not, though, refuted the proof. We may now see that our past responses of assent to it were fraudulently elicited. That still does not mean that the proof itself cannot rationally be assented to.

This segment of our original task, then remains to be carried out. And here what we shall try to show is that the ontological argument cannot appeal, as it must if it is to warrant assent, to Cartesian essences without also convicting itself of absurdity. But to carry through this demonstration we shall want to add to Professor Miller's premise concerning the proof and Cartesian essences two additional ones.

The first is, I think, hardly debatable. This premise says that, as there is a Cartesian essence possessed by a triangle, there must be a Cartesian essence possessed by a philosopher. For surely, if there is reason to affirm the one, as Descartes does, there is equal reason to affirm the other.

At first blush our second contention or premise is not nearly so apt to command agreement. This premise says that, except for some accidental features and except for not possessing the property or mode, *existence*, a Cartesian essence that does not actually exist does not differ from an actually existent thing denominated by the same name. In support of this premise we argue as follows. If the essence of a triangle is, as Descartes says, a determinate form which a triangle "cannot help having," then it

will not suffice to say, e. g., that three lines are the essence of a triangle, because though a triangle cannot help but have three lines it also cannot help having the character of a closed plane figure. Moreover, the three lines it cannot help having must be straight lines. Thus, by "cannot help having" we must in the end mean all the properties that a form must have to be a triangle. But a form that has all the properties of a triangle is a triangle. Granted, it may lack existence or some accidental features, like the length, live inches, for a hypotenuse, but the absence of none of these features in any way diminishes its being a triangle. Add, then, the mode, *existence*, to it and we have an actual, existent triangle. But the same arguments that hold with respect to the essence of a triangle surely hold with respect to the essence of a philosopher. That is, add existence to his essence and we have an actual philosopher existing, just as we have God existing.

Now in conjunction with our original premise that the essences referred to in the ontological proof must be construed as Cartesian essences to warrant conviction by the proof, the two additional premises just discussed can be demonstrated to entail the following consequence: Either an actual philosopher has always existed or there is no essence of a philosopher, though there exist philosophers. Since, however, the last alternative contradicts one of our premises we shall have to reject it. What we shall want to defend, therefore, is the first alternative: That the three premises in question entail that an actual philosopher has always existed.

Now to be a philosopher, one has to think, inquire, examine; surely at least these. Since a Cartesian essence is the determinate form that a thing cannot help but have if it is to be that thing, the Cartesian essence of a philosopher must then possess the same properties of thinking, inquiring, etc. These properties, however, presuppose activities involving change. A Cartesian essence that does not actually exist must surely be a completely unchanging, motionless entity. Such an entity cannot possibly engage in activities involving change; indeed, cannot engage in activities at all. How, then, is a Cartesian essence of a philosopher possible? We do not deny that all the evidence points in the direction of its not being possible. We have, however, rejected that alternative. Only one option, therefore, seems available to us—speaking as a Devil's advocate of the ontological proof. We shall have to suppose that when the mode, *existence*, attaches itself to a Cartesian essence the latter can participate in change, now being something actually existing. Let us, accordingly, adopt this radical proposal. It follows that the mode, *existence*, necessarily attaches to the Cartesian essence of a philosopher. Otherwise there cannot be the essence of a philosopher. But this means, according to our third premise and the description of Cartesian essences as eternal that an actual philosopher has always existed, and that is to say, a philosopher in the same sense that Aristotle or Plato or Descartes is a philosopher.

But is this not absurd? According to the latest bulletins of science, some billions of years ago the present universe began with a Big Bang. If, then, we are to warrantably assent to the ontological proof, our assent requiring as it does the conversion of evenness into Cartesian essences, we have to maintain that an actual philosopher—no different essentially from Descartes himself—existed before and during the Big Bang! No one, surely, will want to entertain any such piece of utter nonsense.

How, though, is this affirmation of nonsense to be avoided and warranted

assent to the ontological proof at the same time made possible? Since the conclusion of the proof follows only if essences are Cartesian essence there is, so far as I can see, only one last desperate remedy left. If we suppose that what is an impossibility cannot have a Cartesian essence, and there can be said something in favour of this contention, then we might accept the ontological proof without having also to suppose that an actual philosopher existed during the Big Bang by claiming that a philosopher is an impossibility. It follows, therefore, that if the ontological proof is to have any title to assent no one who assents to it can consistently claim to be a philosopher nor can he *be* a philosopher.

This is where the proponent of the ontological proof must stop: He has come to the end of his road; to the fool a no doubt highly amusing denouement, but hardly to the proof's proponent. For our parts, who are not die-hard proponents of the proof, a next step is possible and called for. Taking this step, we simply point out that it is absurd to suppose that a person who assents to the ontological argument cannot be a philosopher. Thus, the ontological proof demonstrably concludes in an absurdity and so stands refuted; an absurdity, moreover, which even its most zealous proponent will have to admit to be *ou*, since he cannot defend the proof without pretending to be a philosopher.

Dialectical Meditation

The Art of Balanced and Mature Growth

It is my great pleasure and privilege to have the opportunity of making a little contribution to the symposium volume in honour of the renowned Indian philosopher Dr. B.L. Atreya. My grateful thanks are due to Professor J.P. Atreya for kindly giving me this opportunity.

On the basis of my life long research, both theoretical and practical in the field of various yoga disciplines and meditation techniques, I have developed the art of Dialectical Meditation. It is a dynamic synthesis of the rationalistic approach in the West and the intuitionistic approach in the East in search of self-fulfilling union with the ultimate. A brief account of this integrated approach is presented below.

Dialectical meditation is the technique of self-discipline most appropriate to the ideal of balanced and mature personality growth. It is specifically designed to achieve Integral Self-realization by integrating the seemingly incompatible aspects of personality : the intellectual and the intuitional, the rational and the transrational, the critical and the mystical.

Dialectical meditation is like the art of gardening in the domain of consciousness. It aims to transform one's total being into a beautiful garden with a thousand flowers in blossom, each with its own unique charm of design, melody of colour and thrilling touch of fragrance. But in the maintenance and creation of the garden, the sharpness of the pruning knife and the tenderness of the appreciative hand work together. A beautiful garden needs the judicious use of pesticides and construction of protective fences no less than adequate fertilization and regular watering. Likewise, the critical evaluation and ruthless rejection of the irrelevant and the incompatible no less than positive concentration and assimilation of the relevant and dedication to the chosen goal.

Dialectical meditation is the dynamic synthesis of the rational and the transrational, the evolutionary and the transcendental modes. Such a synthesis alone can serve as the

firm foundation for integrated and fruitful living.

Transcendental Consciousness

According to the traditional view, the ultimate goal of meditation is the attainment of transcendental consciousness (*turiya*). Whereas empirical consciousness consists in perceptual awareness of the phenomenal world of change and relativity, transcendental consciousness is believed to reveal with unerring immediacy the immutable being and eternal perfection of the absolute reality or the ultimate ground of all existence. The absolute or the ultimate has been variously designated as God, Supreme Being, Brahman, Tao, timeless Spirit, eternal Logos, absolute void, indeterminable existence-consciousness-bliss (*Saccidānanda*). The ultimate goal of meditation in the Eastern spiritual tradition is blissful union with the ultimate ground of all existence, no matter by what name it is called.

Unfortunately, oftener than not the concept of transcendental consciousness has proved very misleading partly due to the inexactitude of language and partly due to the intellect's proclivity to wishful thinking and misconstruction.

How is the absolute, eternal and ultimate reality of meditation, related to the phenomenal world of change and relativity? Is the phenomenal world an entirely different kind or order of reality existing in complete separation from, or out of continuity with the absolute? In that case we have an unmitigated dualism of two absolutes separated by a gulf of ignorance.

Is the phenomenal world an inferior, imperfect and secondary type of reality existing in separation from and yet in utter dependence upon the absolute? This also implies a metaphysical dualism militating against the nondual unity and eternal perfection of the absolute.

In order to avoid the consequence of metaphysical dualism some boldly go to the extreme length of declaring the phenomenal world as absolutely unreal or non-existent from the ultimate standpoint, even though it may be real from the standpoint of ignorance (*avidyā*) i.e., the empirical and conventional standpoint. This is, to be sure, a logically perfect sequel to the doctrine of meditation as direct revelation of the eternally perfect absolute. But alas logical perfection in the mode of vertical consistency is a sheer abstraction which hovers like a shadow, at the opposite extreme to the concrete fullness of life.

It is the doctrine of unreality of the phenomenal world, a logical sequel to the timeless perfection of the absolute of meditation, which has been largely responsible for the Eastern peoples' lack of progress or comparative backwardness in the phenomenal world due to blissful indifference to the values of time, evolution and history.

According to integral philosophy—the philosophy that affirms the integral fullness of life and reality—transcendental consciousness *must not* be interpreted as the revelation of any separate, self-existent, absolute and eternally perfect reality. Correct interpretation reveals the true meaning of meditation as a higher perspective—as a penetrative insight into the depth dimension of the same universe which is disclosed to our sensory perception. Our perceptual experience focuses attention upon the endless details, the perishing moment, the disparate segments of the infinitely variegated

universe. Meditative intuition or illumination reveals the nonspatial, nontemporal, undifferentiated, and unmanifest depth dimension of the same universe. This unmanifest depth dimension, when interpreted by different illuminati, under different historical circumstances, gives rise to pragmatically different concepts of the same cosmic whole such as Brahman, Tao Void, Nothingness, Emptiness, Indeterminable Being, pure existence consciousness-bliss, and the like. Even though symbols of the same experience, these different metaphysical concepts represent mutually exclusive metaphysical systems of mysticism. This gives rise to dogmatism, mystic claims to absolutism and cognitive monopolism, and consequent divisiveness in global human society.

The world renouncing mystic's denunciation of the physical and phenomenal world is an indication of the lopsided character of his spiritual realization. Over-exaltation of the mystical experience and the consequent deprecation of the physical-social world justify the life-negating mystic in his peace-loving decision for splendid isolation or apathetic aloofness from the creative advance of time and evolution.

On close examination it will be found that the mystic's metaphysical interpretation of the transcendental consciousness as absolute knowledge of eternal perfection commits the fallacy of false superimposition (*māyā*) inspired by wishful speculation and untrained subjectivism. It ignores the fundamental epistemological truth that thought and experience or intellect and intuition are inseparably interrelated and interpenetratingly coextensive factors of all human knowledge. The mystic's fallacious absolutism is due to his lack of sufficient training in critical analysis and evaluation of the content of transcendental mystic realization.

The mystic affirms on the one hand that the ultimate is absolutely indeterminable and at the same breath characterises the same ultimate as Being, Non-being, Tao Void, Emptiness, Nothingness, Divine Darkness. This is evidently an euphoric exercise in self-contradiction. All these awe-inspiring terms, in so far as they are distinctively meaningful, are interpretive categories of thought or intellect. It is as meaningful metaphysical or ontological categories that they have been elaborately developed in their respective systems of philosophy. Rightly understood, these terms signify *not* any eternally self-subsistent metaphysical substance or reality over and above the world of flux and change but the all-comprehensive nonduality of the cosmic whole.

The mystic's affirmation of the ultimate of meditation either as the only absolute reality or as a higher order of reality in addition to the lower world of perceptual phenomena creates unresolved philosophical problems of thought. An unresolved problem of thought produces either hypocritical conduct in society or a schizophrenic behaviour pattern. For instance, take the case of a person who is uncertain and undecided regarding the problem of the dualism of God and Man, i.e., the conflicting ideals of dedication to truth and unscrupulous pursuit of money. Due to his inner uncertainty, he may develop a hypocritical life style. On Sundays he will go to the church to satisfy his wavering faith in God, the True, the Good and the Beautiful. But during the remaining days of the week he will pour out his whole being into the mad pursuit of money, casting to the four winds all moral scruples and religious injunctions.

Real solution to the aforesaid problems inherent in the doctrine of absolutely valid knowledge (revelation or spiritual intuition) would consist in the frank recogni-

tion of the fact that even the highest religious faith or the purest transcendental consciousness of man is only relatively valid, not absolutely valid knowledge. All knowledge, whether scientific, religious, mystical or, transcendental is the interpretation of thought and experience, reason and intuition, elaborate intellectuality and sensory immediacy. The notion of absolute immediacy and unerring knowledge immanent in the doctrine religious revelation or mystical intuition is a transcendental illusion of nescience. It is a projection of wishful speculation prompted by unconscious needs of the psyche. It is a false superimposition of *Māyā*, the mind's projective mechanism, presenting longed-for possibility as immediately given actuality. In ultimate analysis, the essential structure of all human knowledge is that in which sensory, imaginative or intuitive immediacy, rational interpretation and emotional reaction inseparably interpenetrate.

In order therefore to promote the integral growth of personality as well as the continuous advance of culture and civilization, the practice of meditation should include adequate training of the critical, interpretative, and analytical functions of the intellect as well as cultivation of the holistic, synthetic, appreciative, and penetrative functions of intuition.

The inherent contradictions and inadequacies of the purely intuitional or devotional approach of meditation drive us then by immanent necessity to a careful consideration of the role of intellect or reason in human self-development.

Free Functioning of the Rational Self

We have seen that the predominant keynote of the Eastern culture and civilization is to be found in its profound intuitive faith in the transcendent nonduality of ultimate reality or the universe. By contrast, the predominant keynote of the mainstream of the Western culture and civilization has been the intellectual faith in the rational or logical structure of the universe. The West confronts the East by emphasizing the primacy of Reason in the human psyche and the supremacy of the world's rational structure. On the other hand the East confronts the West by laying stress upon the primacy of intuition or authentic mystical experiences such as *Nirvāṇa*, *Samādhi*, *Sambodhi*, or *Satori* in the human psyche and the dichotomy-dissolving non-duality of the universe.

The finest flowers of modern Western culture bloomed in the hectic atmosphere of radical rational thinking and meditation in the form of critical self inquiry and rigorous rational investigation into the nature of things. Socrates developed the technique of rational meditation as critical self-knowledge and analytical dialogue.

Descartes and Kant, Freud and Marx, Heidegger and Sartre, Einstein and Bertrand Russell, William James and Alfred North Whitehead carried on the meditative search for truth in the mode of critically focussed rational inquiry with unrestricted freedom. In the East meditation assumed the form of all-out search for truth with increasing freedom from the fetters of the unconscious personal psyche, including instinct, ego and unconscious motivation. In the West meditation mainly assumed the form of all-out search for truth with increasing freedom from the bonds of the unconscious social psyche including mythology, tradition and authority. Eastern meditation has been primarily designed for insightful union with the nondual ground of the

universe. Western meditation has been primarily designed for thoughtful union with the rational structure of the universe.

In order to achieve a clear vision of the rational structure of the universe, meditation in its rational form ruthlessly exposes all dogmatic structures of faith and naive tenets of belief, whether mythological or religious; ethical or mystical. With relentless logic it analyses all things into their ultimate constituents, and with uncompromising rigor it chases away whatever looks like the magical and the mysterious, the logical and the irrational.

The problem, however, is that the relentless application of logic in the search for reality drives a wedge into the heart of reality itself. Under the sharply differentiating light of logic the reality of the universe is pulverised into irreconcilable opposites such as the rational and the irrational, the emotional and the intellectual, the perceived reality and the mystical unreality, the conceptual ideality and the empirical facticity, the friendly world sharing a common ideology and the unfriendly demonic world opposing with a counter-ideology or no-ideology.

The same bifurcation-policy of the rationalistic contemplation of truth splinters human personality into two incompatible halves, to wit, the libidinous self and the rational self, the shadow self of the Freudian unconscious and the virtuous self committed to tradition and authority, the self imprisoned in the house of instincts and desires and the higher self inspired by "the unconditional imperatives of practical reason."

Thus meditation in the mode of rational pursuit of truth generates tremendous tensions and conflicts without any rational means of resolving them. Inside the psychological life of individuals such tensions and conflicts give rise to all manner of mental illness and disturbed behaviour. Within the collective life of humanity it keeps the cauldron constantly boiling with all manner of rivalries and antagonisms, crises and confrontations, threatening to tear civilization to pieces.

Yet the distinctions made by the analytical function of intellect and penetrative evaluation of reason are not void of significance. In truth, they are immensely valuable. Valuable for growth and increasing self-actualization. Valuable for the evolutionary advance of culture and civilization. Valuable for the crowning fulfilment of history in an internationally unified order of planetary human society.

Since the rational distinctions give rise to divisive forces in life and society; many young people today are disenchanted with the establishments of highly industrialised societies of the West. Seeking inspiration from the traditional mysticism of the East, they feel motivated to reject in total disdain the entire rational outlook and its value distinctions. This is undoubtedly a swing to the opposite extreme. Modern leaders of the East have themselves outgrown the transcendentalist—other worldly orientation of traditional mysticism. They are firmly convinced of the paramount need for a new comprehensive integration of the rational and the intuitional, the logical scientific and the metaphysical-humanistic values of existence.

Revival of traditional religion and mysticism in its other worldliness cannot amount to anything better than ghost worship. It would mean regression to the pre-scientific age of primitive living and elementalistic thinking. It would mean relapse into incestuous identification with nature and return to the infantile stage of undifferentiated oceanic feeling.

The practice of meditation as thought-annihilation and unthinking protest against civilization can only lead to the peace of escapism, bliss of primitivism and beatitude of paganism or nature worship.

Thus we find ourselves involved in the spiral movement of the dialectical process. Ancient mysticism shows its inadequacy by ignoring the rational structure of evolutionary and historical processes in the world. The progressive spirit of modern civilization shows its imperfection and self-destructive trend by failing to unify on a rational and ideological basis the gaping splits of human personality and the antagonistic divisions of collective humanity.

The goal of dialectical meditation is to realize the total self as the indivisible and integrated whole of the rational and the non-rational, the logical and the analogical, the intelligible and the luminous aspects of personality. To realize the total self in its dynamic and evolutionary wholeness does therefore entail the task of developing a total perspective of the entire human species engaged in an exciting process of creative adventure on earth.

To sum up, integral self-realization has a threefold significance. First, it means an active appreciation of the distinctive functions of the instinct, intuition, intellect, volition and emotion in the integrated growth of personality. Secondly, it means a natural, social, dynamic integration of the humanistic and cosmic dimensions of existence. Thirdly, it implies illumined participation in the planetary process of human evolution by rising above the divisive forces of racism, religious parochialism, cultural provincialism and ideological combativeness.

The Dialectical Technique

How do you go about achieving the process of dialectical growth—that of increasing self-realization, meaningful self-manifestation and a pattern of integrated living? What is the dialectical technique?

A few essential factors of the dialectical process of Self-realization are listed below:

- (1) Dialectical meditation which is the most effective technique of integral yoga aims at dynamic and creative self-integration. It must begin with the clarification of self-realization as an unceasing creative process. Self realization is neither a static dead-end fact, nor the final destination of all spiritual acts. The true Self is a dynamic centre of diversified manifestation of the inexhaustible riches of Being. It is an image of Being as the unity of consciousness and energy, wisdom and creativity. So concentrate on the Self, not as timeless finality, but as the dynamic unity of being and becoming, of liberative knowledge and creative action. The Self is the inmost centre of an ever-expanding movement of selfless action. Don't therefore allow meditation to take an extremely introverted turn cutting off the inmost centre of consciousness from the outward flow of life-affirming and life-enriching action.
- (2) Develop a balanced scheme of living in which a program of meaningful social, humanitarian and cosmic-ethical action is judiciously combined with meditative exploration of the higher levels of consciousness. Since higher

consciousness is boundless and immeasurable, nobody can legitimately claim to reach the boundless, measure it all, and thus adopt a static posture of smug self-complacency.

So practise meditation in action. Let all actions be performed in the spirit of self-offering to the Supreme and for the good of all fellow beings, maintaining serene self-poise in the midst of all reverses of fortune.

- (3) Search for success in society and happiness in life on the one hand, and the quest of God and the Ultimate on the other, are not contradictory but complementary impulses flowing from the same cosmic energy. Don't therefore imagine any rivalry or incompatibility between God and the world, between Spirit and Nature. Both the impulses are designed to grow together by strengthening each other. The apparent contradiction is ultimately traceable to dichotomous thinking and ignorant polarization of World and God. This is the central message of the Bhagavadgītā. This is also the meaning of the Upanishad which says: "Enjoy life and the world by renouncing." (*tyaktena bhunjitva*).

- (4) Don't allow progress in meditation and increasing experience of inner peace to stimulate the narcissistic impulse of self-adoration, monadic self-sufficiency and ecstatic self-deification. This is the greatest of all dangers on the path of yoga and meditation. A little power, a small measure of bliss, a few flashes of insight, and that is so often enough to blow up the meditator's mind into the magnified image of a demigod, placing himself on a pedestal, enjoying the blind worship of disciples and ruling with ex cathedra pronouncements of absolute truth.

Meditate in the mode of continual self-study and critical self-examination. Don't blindly walk into *Māyā's* trap of self-deification or self-styled *avatarhood* or *messiahship*. Extreme intuitionism and emotionalism are no less illusory than extreme intellectualism and ritualism. Focus on the elements of truth in all of them, and harmonize them in the light of integrated consciousness—the light of the Supermind.

- (5) Make a list of all the opposites of psychic existence and seemingly conflicting trends of the basic life energy.

Here is a sample of some fundamental polarities of human life :

- (a) *Extroversion and introversion*. Introversion or withdrawal (*pratyāhāra*) should be followed by return (*pratyāvartanā*) to the arena of social action.
- (b) *Ascension and descension*. (*Bhōhan and avarohan*) Rising to the summit of transcendental consciousness should be followed by return to the mental, intellectual and physical levels of being, to even the darkest corners of the unconscious, with a view to transforming one's total being into a channel of expression of truth, beauty, love, freedom and harmony.
- (c) *The individual and the universal, the unique and the general*. Meditate in the form of total self-surrender to the supreme truth so that the

bonds of ego, intellect and conventional morality may be dissolved in the illumined vision of the supreme good. Let the illumined vision then transform individuality from the ego-centric to the cosmocentric orientation. The result would be the humble self-affirmation of the transformed individual as a servant of cosmic welfare. Ecstatic vision of the universal, the collective or the transcendental should not be allowed to annihilate individuality along with egoity. Don't allow your total surrender to the Supreme Being be unconsciously shifted from the Supreme Being to any finite symbol of the Supreme such as a Scripture, a System or a Guru.

6. *Objective understanding and appreciation of other viewpoints.* The joy of self-realization is the joy of freedom from all fixed ideas and frozen values, from theological creeds and metaphysical systems. The joy of freedom is essentially different from the easily attained joy of exclusive identification with a given creed, thought system or ideology. No thought system is absolutely valid knowledge or exhaustive manifestation of the infinite truth. By the very nature of the case that would be a sheer absurdity. Truth is omnipresent. But all human knowledge is only relatively and conditionally valid. A teacher may find some unknown elements of truth in the statements of his students. A great guru may discover some new insights from the experiences of his disciples. A theologian or metaphysician, if he keeps an open mind, may find many things to learn about life and reality from the criticism of his opponents.

So practise meditation in the mode of dynamic *open mindedness*. Never close the perception doors of your mind. Never withdraw into the ivory tower of a fixed theological or metaphysical or mystical posture. Have courage to throw yourself into humble situations of exposure to unrestricted criticism and unfettered discussion on a footing of equality with all fellow beings, learned or illiterate.

7. *Develop a balanced attitude to all popular symbols of divinity* such as holy Scriptures, Guru or Pope, *Aratār* or *Messiah*. Idolatrous worship of any of them leads to the polarization of life resulting in the loss of authentic individuality, freedom of thought and illumined creativity. It can produce only the peace of arrested spiritual growth and immature emotional exuberance.

On the other hand complete lack of faith in this aforesaid symbols of divinity prematurely shuts the door to valuable sources of spiritual nourishment and inspiration.

Meditate in the mode of *dialectical self-opening*. Open the door of your heart, with sufficient faith, to whatever important elements of truth and value might be embedded in the deified scriptures and mystique personalities. But never put to sleep your human prerogative of critical intelligence and balanced evaluation. Even the most exalted *Guru* or God-man is there to help you realize your own indwelling divine *Guru*, not to enslave you to the hypnotic spell of his personality or spoken word.

8. Train yourself to be able to subject even the holiest of inner experiences to

critical examination without undue interference in their free flow. The avalanche of ever-new experiences on the levels of *samādhi*, *nirvāṇa*, *satori*, enlightenment or unitive consciousness always appear at first as absolutely immediate and therefore unerringly valid. This is a transcendental illusion of *Māyā*. Under the spell of such an illusion, mystics and transpersonalists sometimes fall into the trap of *māyā* and regress to the infantile or primitive way of living. They stay away from the sphere of social action and planetary evolution, allured by the transcendental bliss of self-annihilation in the ocean of undifferentiated consciousness or emptiness. This is an unthinking departure from the integral ideal of illumined self-poise in evolutionary action. They fail to notice that complete rejection of intellect unconsciously leads to fallacious intellectual interpretation of mystic experiences. It is indeed an irony of fate that complete rejection of the ego-self or phenomenal self leads to false deification of the transcendental or transpersonal self. Forceful suppression of the instinctual or libidinous nature leads to overexaltation of the transcendental bliss as the criterion for absolute truth and ultimate reality. Gods in heaven can hardly control their laughter when by ruthlessly driving away all hedonism the austere ascetic falls a prey to sublimate hedonism as the standard of supreme truth.

In fact there is no human experience in which intuition and thought immediacy and meditation, revelation and rational interpretation, do not inseparably intermingle. This is true even of the highest wisdom inspired by *samādhi*, *satori*, *nirvāṇa*, or God-realization. Relativity is indeed the essential structure of all human knowledge. That is why the more a person knows the more he becomes humble.

In order to prevent dogmatism, idolatry, or self-deification, dialectical meditation involves a continuing process of critical self-study and self-examination in the light of ever-deepening insight into fathomless depths of Being. Illumined self-awareness is of such a nature that at any given moment of time the liberated person is simultaneously at perfect peace and efficiently poised for action. That's exactly what Krishna said in the *Gītā*: "Be peacefully united with the Divine, and fearlessly participate in the battlefield of life."

So dialectical meditation combines perfect assimilation of authentic mystic experiences with historically meaningful interpretation in response to the call of destiny. It combines quiet self-opening to the light of Being with creative self-expression as a centre of evolutionary becoming (*Śakti*).

As a synthesis of the rationalistic evolutionism of the West and the intuitionistic transcendentalism of the East, dialectical meditation is an effective means of intelligent participation in the advent of the new global age.

This Original Sins : Gullibility and Nincompoopery

"Humanism" is now widely proclaimed by a variety of leading thinkers. A whole series of schools has emerged that use the term "humanism"—from humanistic psychology and humanistic social science, to humanistic religion, medicine, law, even architecture. Many assert that we need to enhance and develop "humanistic values" or create a "humanistic society." What do we mean, however, by the term "humanism"? In the following paper I wish to point out the close affinity of humanism and skepticism, which should not be overlooked in the current discussion. In other words, for the humanist there are two original sins—gullibility and nincompoopery—that result from a failure to apply reason to thought and to conduct.

I

The human species has a perverse streak that runs deep in its nature. It is the capacity for being easily deceived, the tendency to allow our wishes, desires, fancies, hopes, or fears to color our imagination or to influence our judgment or beliefs. Bacon identified this as the idol of the tribe.

Gullibility is the best term to describe this tendency—for humanists it is the cardinal sin corrupting human nature. It is our willingness to be culled, lulled, or dilled into assenting to a truth claim without adequate evidence or grounds for its support. Gullibility is so widely distributed among humans that few are without it entirely. No one can escape its temptation, though there are obviously degrees of perversity or wickedness; but some, by hard therapeutic efforts of will, can cultivate virtue by means of critical intelligence. The most gullible sinners in our midst are those who are willing to swallow whole whatever they hear or are promised, to gulp it down—hook, line, and sinker. They are, as it were, the sitting gulls, ducks or pigeons—choose your own metaphor—prey to every huckster at the fair; they are the suckers, if you will, game for every con man, willing to gobble down everything fed them, unsophisticated, green horns, fall-guys. In the most extreme form these are

the *taugenichts* (good-for-nothings), pleasant, perhaps charming, yet weak-minded, yokels, willingly taken in by the proverbial city slickers.

The problem usually is not so much in the con men—the purveyors of false gods and empty services—who are waiting in the wings for the kill, but in the sitting gulls who are, as it were, pigeonable even to fellow gullibles—that is, they are readily given to self- or co-deception, searching for faith and belief. For the foolables, dupables, stuffables, deludables, hoodwinkables, bamboozables, hogwashables, humbuggables, horni-yesterdayables, there is almost a psychological necessity to be taken.

In ordinary life, the plain man of common sense can easily spot both the dupes and the con men, and he is able to guard himself from falling prey to their snares and vices. Opposite of the gullible, he is usually the hardnosed skeptic. That is, the person who can smell a rat a mile away, who takes everything with a grain of salt, and who is often difficult to convince. He is usually from Missouri, has a look of disbelief when faced with humbug, tends to shrug his shoulders or shake his head, and exclaims, "In a pig's eye!" If he is French, he is likely to roll his eyeballs up and, with a sign of disgust, mutter under his breath, "Merde!" Or if he is from the Bronx the response he emits is popularly known as the raspberry. The contrast between the gullible and skeptical is between *instant recall*—repeating what you have been taught, and *instant recoil*—being reluctant to assimilate. Like bitter pills, if swallowed whole they go down easily, but if chewed over, they are instantly spit up.

The skeptical person asks for proof and demands evidence; he tests claims by how well they work out in practice. His antidote for the original sin is critical analysis; it is difficult and demanding, for we are forever prey to its temptation. The mind is often weak—how delicious to be gulled into belief. The skeptic is more hoax-proof; but, as I said, it is not easy.

Some people believe that education and a good dose of book learning is the only cure for gullibility. This is important, but there is no guarantee that it will overcome our innate perversity of the will to believe. It depends upon the kind of education we are exposed to. Indeed, some of the most cultivated intellectuals are the most easily gulled by the latest fads and fashions of intellectual snobbery. Men of practical wisdom often are less easily gulled than the sophisticated products of the higher learning. There is a kind of native intelligence at work as one goes about the business of living: in finding out why the roof leaks, the toilet is stopped up, the car doesn't start.

Generally people are most easily gulled when they enter unfamiliar ground away from home. Here, they are all too willing to throw caution to the wind, to leap in, whereas skeptical persons tread carefully, raising difficult, probing questions. It is especially in fields that require a smattering of learning that gullibility is strongest. Historically the best illustration was in religion, though it also applied to science, philosophy, morality, and politics. Nevertheless, religion is notorious because, since it was held sacred, it was especially immune to critical scrutiny by common sense; and there was a great battle between believers and unbelievers—between those who were committed to the orthodox dogmas, or received opinions, and the heretics, who were not. Each age has its holy gulls, old beliefs deeply ingrained and inculcated generation after generation as the gospel truths by authority and tradition. The gullibles continue to accept the received doctrine on the basis of faith and custom. The skeptic

questions its veracity.

Historically the term "freethinker" was used to describe a person skeptical of religious credulity. The freethinker rejected systems of doctrine that rested upon dogma, revelation, custom, or authority, and he held that the individual must himself investigate—at least in principle—the claims made and abandon any position whose validity could not be rationally or evidentially demonstrated. A number of epithets, mostly uncomplimentary, have been used by the believers to characterize freethinkers in the historic debate—I should not say debate, because for a long time they burned freethinkers at the stake. They were the doubters, dissenters, nonconformists, heretics, agnostics, atheists—or stronger: infidels, apostates, miscreants, recusants (those who refuse to comply with or conform to religious regulations or practices), nullifidians (persons of no faith or religion), minimisfidians (irreligious unbelievers) or, just plain backsliders.

At the turn of the century the term "rationalist" was often used interchangeably with "freethinker", pointing to those who attempted to ground religious and other beliefs on reason. More recently, the term "humanist" has been used to designate those individuals who are skeptical of religious faith; it is supposed to be a code word or a more polite term for "atheist," a word whose usage is still considered to be in bad taste. Most humanists generally resist the simple equation of atheism and humanism, for atheism is primarily a negative rejection, whereas the humanist claims to have a more positive ethical philosophy. Indeed some post-modern humanists define humanism preeminently in ethical terms. Nevertheless, I submit that, whatever else he may be, the humanist is at root a skeptic; and his natural tendency is to combat gullibility wherever it occurs—though, God knows, many humanists are prey in their own philosophies to the same vice of original sin as other mortals.

II

When I say that the humanist is committed to reason, I mean in two ways: first for judging descriptive, cognitive, or explanatory truth claims; and second—far more controversial—for making normative or ethical evaluative and prescriptive judgments. And, once embodied in one's life and culture it has an attitudinal effect on the whole person in creating an active disposition.

Humanists, with freethinkers, rationalists, and atheists, have invariably been skeptical about classical religious theism. Thus humanism more often than not is in opposition to the claims of supernaturalists concerning the existence of God. And humanists have been skeptics about a whole range of religious phenomena: miracles and revelation, Biblical truths, mysticism, immortality of the soul, and personal survival.

In every age there are people of overweening faith, insisting that this, that, or something else is absolutely true, ultimately real, and the source of salvation, even though it transcends the limits of ordinary understanding or evidence. Today, we are deluged by a whole series of new sects and cults, from demon-possession, exorcism and with craft, astrology and occultism, Krishna cults, scientology and dianetics, UFO's and chariots of the Gods, to paranormal phenomena.

Sir John Eccles, brain scientist and Nobel Prize laureate, a colleague of mine at the State University of New York at Buffalo, is greatly distressed by the current intellectual scene. He believes that we may be reaching the demise of Western civilization without

being aware of it, with the emergence of these cults of unreason. Stephen Toulmin in "The Alexandrian Trap" (*Encounter*, January 1974), raises the same fears: Are we witnessing the end of enlightenment and science, now under attack after three centuries? Or is it rather, as I suspect, that our perverse streak-gullibility—which requires battling in every age, is reappearing? With the collapse of the traditional orthodox religions, many people tend to grasp new faiths and new cults. Still, I find no real difference between Christianity, Mohammedanism, the 19th-century Mormonism of Joseph Smith, the Christian Science of Mary Baker Eddy, Jehovah's Witnesses, or Rosicrucians, as earlier mythologies and sects, and some present-day exuberances. What is the difference between a myth founded by a poor itinerant carpenter in Galilee and the cult of a teenage guru in a silver Rolls Royce. A cult is a nontraditional mystery religion or rite for the initiated, not yet accepted by the Establishment. Once it is adopted, it becomes an established religion. But most of today's religions were yesterday's cults: they all strain credulity. I am afraid that we most likely will have cults and sects as a permanent part of the social landscape, for they seem to fill a deep psychological need: a search for meaning, identity, security, certainty, and hope in a changing and puzzling world.

III

If the humanist is a skeptic, what are his grounds for belief? My answer is that they are the same as those used by ordinary men in everyday life, as he tests claims close to him. The scientific method is common sense extended and formalized by scientists and logicians. Yet these are not different in kind, only in elaboration and rigor. I should perhaps use the term "nongullibility" to describe a responsible and objective procedure by which we test truth claims in many areas of life. I can only sketch this method.

First, there is the demand for clear linguistic definitions. If we want to decide whether something is true or false, we need to get rid of ambiguities and confusions caused by vague abstractions. We need to clarify the meaning of the language used. A term or sentence must have some identifiable referent or interpretation based upon human experience, directly or indirectly, if it is to have cognitive significance and meaning. The empiricist criterion, the principles of verifiability and nonfalsifiability, the pragmatic criterion, all point to this same requirement of experience. Here, I am not referring to all linguistic terms and sentences, but only to those within the context of description; nor am I excluding those items of language that have different functions and uses, such as moral, analytic, expressive, or performatory functions.

Second, there is the bedrock instance upon evidence, supporting tests, "the damned facts," as they are called, to test the claim. To accept a belief, there must be some range of observable data. One can perhaps dispute about what constitutes evidence or about the nature of experience itself. Here we are referring to an individual's own direct experience, or that of second—or third-hand testimony that is impartially obtained. I surely am not able to check out each occurrence myself, yet if I believe that a sufficient number of reliable observers have done so, I am willing to defer to their judgment. Where the facts are slender or the so-called authorities special pleaders, I had best suspend judgment. Mere subjective or private appeals that resist any

independent confirmations and that cannot be repeated by competent observers must be questioned. The evidence for a belief surely need not be direct, it often is not in the most advanced theoretical sciences, yet there must be some independent predictive test that will confirm the hypothesis.

Third is the criterion of logical validity. We can ask whether the belief is internally contradictory, whether it is logically consistent with other well-founded beliefs that we hold.

Fourth, we also test ideas by how well they serve us in practice. Beliefs are judged by whether they are convenient in helping us to explain data or resolve problems. To evaluate ideas in pragmatic terms is surely never sufficient in itself. We cannot say simply that ideas without supporting evidence or reasons are true because they work. Nevertheless the pragmatic criterion may be a factor that we consider in a reasoned justification for a belief.

To illustrate the use of objective criteria: Widespread reference to demon-possession, fanned by *The Exorcist*, awakens public interest. Yet until careful scientific tests are introduced we ought to be skeptical. Blatty's novel violates every canon of objectivity. The notebooks of the alleged Georgetown case of possession are locked away. The chief witnesses were an hysterical mother and two impressionable Jesuit priests. "Possession" is a psychological abnormality—a split personality—that can be explained in psychopathological terms, without need for demonological explanations.

The above in some broad sense describes what I consider to be the principles that govern nongullibility; they make up what constitutes more or less an objective method for testing belief claims. But there are other aspects to objectivity. These not only guide inquiry, but they characterize the normative attitude.

Fifth, where we do not have sufficient supporting data, we ought to suspend or withhold judgment. We should be doubtful of whatever has not been adequately verified. Skepticism and agnosticism accordingly are important responses for areas in which we do not, as yet, have sufficient evidence. On many topics, then, we should have no opinion until all the data are in. That UFOs exist is surely possible; that we were visited by intelligent beings from other planets is possible. I do not find Van Daniken's alleged evidence for this thesis convincing, however.

Sixth is the principle of fallibilism, as Charles Peirce labels it. Beliefs should be taken as tentative hypotheses, no more than probable, open to revision in the light of new evidence. New facts need to be accounted for, and if they cannot then the theories must be modified. The world view of common sense is often mistaken. We should not be restricted by existing scientific or commonsense explanations of the world. Thus we need to be willing to introduce new theories that go beyond the prevailing perspective, whether in ordinary life or in the sciences. When I refer to common sense, I simply mean that at some point we need to test our hypotheses by hard evidence. Related to this is the need to keep the door open to inquiry. We should be willing to investigate any area. We should not foreclose future investigation on a priori grounds.

Seventh is the need to be receptive to creative imagination, new hypotheses, alternative explanations, fresh departures in thought. Subjective intuition and introspection may be important as the source of novel ideas. While they may help to originate ideas, however, they cannot at the same time validate them. It is one thing to

have a glimmer of a new possibility ; it is another to maintain that therefore it is true. I reiterate, we need continually to check the authenticity of ideas by independent evidence.

IV

There are certain objections that have been raised to the above procedures. Critics maintain that the logical-empirical method is arbitrary, excluding by definition whatever cannot meet its antecedent criteria, that this closes us to glimpses of the "transcendent," or that it cuts us off from forms of subjective truths that cannot be known in any other way.

I am perplexed by these objections. We should not dogmatically preclude any kind of knowledge. As I have already indicated, we must always leave the door ajar to unsuspected possibilities ; we must always be prepared for new dimensions in experience and thought. Surely, our knowledge of the universe is meager, given the vast infinity of events. Surely, there are many things that we do not now know that we will uncover in the future. We must not insist that our present world-view or the existing categories of our understanding are final. But when all is said and done, however, we still have the question of where do we go from here. What are the options that are proposed, which beliefs shall we accept ? Here the only approach to take is a responsible one—let us weigh claims as they are introduced. If someone claims to have a new belief or theory, a new range of fact, a new kind of expanded consciousness, let us examine it carefully. Perhaps he *has* discovered something. But then, we must examine not only his experience or findings, but his *interpretations* and explanations of them and what he infers on the basis of his inquiry. In all such matters, I would be at a loss to know *how* to proceed—unless the proponent of a new truth is clear about what he means, is coherent and makes sense, and allows us to check his beliefs by reference to our own experience and those of others. We should always be willing to investigate new visions of the universe and pose new questions—but none of this can be accepted as true until it is supported by some responsible evidence. That's all that the skeptic or freethinker or humanist asks of the believer. Is it too much ?

Heightened subjective awareness, mystical experiences, feelings of reverence or awe, powerful emotional states are all part of human life, and we should not seek to delude life of them. But we should also not delude ourselves about what they mean or point to, if anything, unless and until we can certify or validate their claims. There is always lurking, as I have said, a danger that that original sin—our perverse tendency to gullibility—will overwhelm us. There are large areas of the unknown and even vast powers of untapped experience that may await further explanation ; but again, let us proceed to investigate and explore them, without prematurely announcing what they portend. For example, we should be willing to investigate extra-sensory perception and paranormal phenomena—without drawing premature claims on the basis of sketchy evidence as to what they mean about man or the universe.

V

Thus far we have been discussing descriptive claims about the world and examining how to analyze and appraise their veracity. But there is a whole area of life where what is at

stake is not what we believe but what we ought to value or do, how we ought to live. Again, there is a tendency to rush in—to follow astrology, to go on a crash diet, to enroll in an encounter group, to devote one's life to God or country, socialism, or sexual hedonism.

We are living through a moral revolution today that in many respects is a humanistic revolution. This involves among its values: a new sense of individual freedom; the need to humanize alienating institutions, to actualize the human potential, to recognize the equal rights of all groups in society, to extend participatory democracy to a whole range of social institutions, and to build a genuine world community:

Many people representing different points of view today claim to be humanistic in their concern. The question that I want to raise is whether and to what degree reason can intervene. Can objective criteria play a role in warranting value judgements?

This is the most complex area, for the moral life is full of feeling and passion, impulse and habit.

We surely recognize that there are important uses for reason in ordinary life. Whatever one's values or norms, it is possible to avoid stupid mistakes, foolish or impetuous action, and to use practical reason to control life, moderate desires, mollify passions, and direct actions.

Thus we say that some people are reasonable. They have horse sense, good sense, plain sense, and sound judgment. They manifest prudence and foresight. They are level-headed, sensible, thoughtful, sagacious, experienced, or deliberate in making choices. On the other hand, gullibility in belief has its counterpart in choice and action. Some people are foolish, irrational, imprudent, impetuous, artless, or inexperienced in their conduct. They manifest a notable lack of wisdom in life. They may bungle and botch, blunder and fumble in their choices. They are, if extreme, muddleheaded, mutton headed, thick-skulled, fatheaded, boneheaded, noodleheaded, or empty headed! These are the people who cannot see an inch before their noses, or are willing to cut off their noses to spite their faces; they don't have enough sense to come in out of the rain, or they invariably put the cart before the horse, or are penny-wise and pound-foolish, don't know their elbows from holes in the ground (to mix metaphors), are apt to go on wild-goose chases, have too many irons in the fire, play with fire, are willing to buy a pig in a poke, count their chickens before they are hatched; they tend to bark up the wrong tree or to carry coals to Newcastle. They are, if you will, the nincompoops of this world!

VI

What I am suggesting by this string of synonyms and proverbs is that there is a kind of critical intelligence in judging values and making choices: in buying a house, selecting a mate, taking a trip to Florida, or studying for an examination. There is, if you will, a practical logic of decision-making, which we all recognize. This is analogous, in part, at least, to the use of objective intelligence in formulating beliefs about the world. What are its characteristics in outline?

First, practical intelligence seeks to define values, ends, goals, to understand wants and needs, to be clear about interests and ideals.

Second, it seeks to ground choices to some extent in a knowledge of the context

of action, an inquiry into the circumstances in the situation, the facts of the case. We cannot make intelligent choices unless we know what is at stake, and this includes knowledge of the causal determinants of the present states of affairs.

Third, there is here involved a process of deliberation in which judgments are examined and evaluated, in part by their consistency with other values that we hold.

Fourth, this involves an evaluation on the one hand of the means at our disposal, the alternatives and available options before us, as well as an appraisal of the probable consequence of one course of action rather than the next. In a deliberative process we calculate costs and efficiencies, anticipate likely effects and results, and then decide whether or not it is worth it. Practical intelligence requires both a realistic appraisal of our powers and opportunities, a willingness to engage in creative experiment, and some sense of our limits and constraints.

There is then a significant difference between a choice based upon a reflective process of inquiry and one based upon capricious or impulsive reaction—between a reasonable person and a nincompoop. If I were to locate a second sin, a perverse streak within our nature, it would be *moral nincompoopery*. The contrasting humanist virtue is to eat of the fruit of knowledge, of good and evil. Alas, nincompoopery, like gullibility, is also widely distributed among human beings who stoutly resist moral inquiry.

For to be committed to a reflective approach to one's values implies some willingness to change, modify, or reconstruct one's values in the light of new facts. This also implies some tolerance of others, a willingness to learn, appreciate, and respect other viewpoints. Its opposite response is dogmatic, intransigent behaviour that is unenlightened, hidebound, opinionated, or, if you will, bullheaded or pigheaded: A reflective person in morality is apt not to consider his values absolute, ultimate, final, eternal, but to recognize that they are open to criticism and may require reexamination and justification. Hence, moral ideals should be treated as hypotheses or guiding principles, to be judged by experience and reason. When our values are based upon a false picture of the world or are patently inconsistent, we should be willing to modify them. Given such an alternative, we are more apt to be willing to find common ground with others, negotiate our differences, frame a new basis for compromise.

VII

For the humanist, all of this points to the *autonomy* of ethics (Sidney Hook, the humanist philosopher, considers this to be the definition of humanism). Moral judgments ought not to be derived from antecedent theological, metaphysical, or ideological premises, but need to be worked out and formulated independently and on their own in the light of reflective inquiry. Surely the main quarrel that humanism has had with orthodox religionists has been precisely on this point: it concerns the need to liberate moral judgment from undue ecclesiastical or political authority, legislative authorities, rules, and laws.

Does humanism have its own unique first principles beyond its commitment to inquiry? I am dubious of first principles, from which we derive basic values. If one rejects false notions of a providential universe and immortality, then the good

life and happiness is a human goal, including the satisfaction of basic needs and creative actualization. But the humanist does not seek to impose a set of values to suppress individuals. The good and the right begin—as John Stuart Mill said—with existing human desires and wants. Reason as a constitutive principle intervenes in the processes of human valuing, seeking to revise them, and negotiate possible differences in the light of intelligent appraisals. This enables continuing processes of reconstruction.

Given the great pace of social and technological change in post-industrial society, the old morality cannot always be easily stretched. Only new moral principles, appropriate to present desires and future needs, seem appropriate. Only critical intelligence can help us to clear our way onto new terrain.

It is apparent that it is possible to be a humanist in this second sense—helping to develop a new morality—without being a humanist in the first sense—being a skeptic in religion. Secular humanists have many allies within the churches in their efforts to mold a new morality. Similarly, one can be a skeptic in religion and yet intransigent in his moral values; some secular humanists are authoritarian in morality. Thus there are two senses of humanism: one in regard to belief and other in regard to values. Though, here, I must also point out that many so-called ethical humanists often get carried away by emotion. One can be committed to “humanistic values” in the present context in an unthinking and fanatic way. I have in mind certain excesses in humanistic psychology and education: for example, those who emphasize affective education and ignore cognitive development, or stress freedom and ignore self-discipline, or are against hangups, yet ignore social responsibility. They are all too often moved more by passion and rhetoric than by reason.

If, as I have argued, the basic element in the humanist point of view is the use of critical intelligence in belief and action, then there can be no absolute or final values that we need—not even those that we presently defend—but a constant process of inquiry. Of central significance here is the importance of cognitive and moral education for children and young adults. The schools should attempt to teach children how to think, how to detect deception, how to avoid gullibility, but also how to engage in moral reflection. The most appropriate kind of moral education is that which emphasizes awareness, inquiry, growth—not one that seeks blindly to impose values or inculcate virtues as the be-all and end-all of moral instruction. The colleges and universities have a vital role here too: in education in the liberating arts—humanistic and scientific—in order to keep alive the sense of wonder, to expand the horizons of knowledge, to be able to formulate critical value judgments.

VIII

Thus humanism is not to be defended simply as equivalent to a set of epistemological principles. For although an essential characteristic of humanism is its commitment to objective criteria of knowledge, the difference between the statement of epistemological meta-ethical criteria and humanism is that the latter involves a commitment to a set of rules of evidence and validation that is *normative*. In other words humanism is basically, whether in epistemology or ethics proper, a normative

ethical posture, which seeks to ground knowledge and values on autonomous grounds, to judge all truth claims by reference to independent reasons, and to develop the free mind. If epistemological principles are developed in a purely intellectual sphere they are apt to lack all conviction. Only when they are embodied in the whole personality and culture, and rooted deeply within the psychology of motivation and action, can they inspire conviction and force. People need to be inoculated against original sin, but unless reason is ingrained in their psychological makeup they are liable to get tripped.

Humanism then is first and foremost a normative ethical posture, perhaps even the basis for a new religious commitment. In the best sense, this form of ethical humanism expresses high ideals that can move and stimulate humans to aspire. What higher constitutive normative principle of individual and social life than a commitment to reason? Though we need to point out that the commitment to reason in any culture requires continuing efforts and that the achievements of the previous generation will not necessarily prevail for the next, given the powerful natural impetus for gullibility and nonconspicuity, both of which need to be overcome.

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The Religion We Need

From the time immemorial religion has been the craving and support of a vast bulk of mankind. A history of the mankind reveals this very fact. Religion connotes a distinct type of consciousness about the notion of the most Supreme and most elevated. It signifies an attitude towards the Truth accepted by heart with due faith and capable of transforming one's conduct and even life. It is not a mere supposition. It is a hearty acceptance of the supreme truth in the light of one's enlightening knowledge. That is why the nature of religion has changed from age to age, and from individual to individual. Where religion has been accepted as the common creed, even there individuals have concealed in their hearts certain variations. Of course, such variations have been less in number where the individuals have been least inclined towards independent thinking or where rational thinking could not be developed to the desirable extent. But as rationality has become alive and awakened, this tendency of variation has tried to assert itself. This is why there was a terrific unity in the individual constituting the original tribes. But the modern societies cannot find such a unity of faith in their folds.

But a more fundamental question is whether we need religion at all in the modern period? An answer to this question underlines the importance of religion itself. Religion has been said to mean according to Chamber's Twentieth Century Dictionary "belief in, recognition of, or an awakened sense of, a higher unseen controlling power of powers, with the emotion and morality connected therewith : rites or worship". Therefore, there is no dispute as to the fact that religion means two things ; first, belief in a higher power, and second, morality connected therewith. Now these both are very important. A person derives his attitude towards the world from his basic concept about the Supreme. If a person believes in a God that is pleased only with help and cooperation rendered to one's fellow beings, one shall try to cooperate with one's fellow-beings and will inculcate a spirit of self-sacrifice.

Then it should be noted that the word 'God' should mean not only the Supreme Being of monotheistic religions, the Creator ; it should also mean and does mean the object of excessive devotion. It should be remembered that this object of excessive

devotion can be anything ranging from a spiritual and superhuman entity to any ideal of life that can excite a feeling of attachment and desirability in a human heart. If we restrict the meaning of the term God merely for a superhuman entity we do not go deep into the inner meaning of the term God and therefore sometimes try to criticise or even condemn religion. There cannot be any religion without a God if we interpret the term 'God' in this rational manner and try to understand the true connotation of the term 'religion'. If we are not liberal enough to understand the broad meaning of the term God, we shall be constrained to exclude Jainism, Buddhism and even Advaitism from the realm of religion altogether. It should be kept in mind that those people who restrict the meaning of God to a superhuman entity, as well as those people who try to condemn religion like Karl Marx by describing it as "the opium of the people" make the common mistake of not grasping the true import of the term religion. The former condemn the latter by calling the latter as atheists, while the latter repay the compliments by describing the former as cheats. But in their unwanted exuberance both fail miserably in understanding the spirit of religion and therefore make a blunder. It is forgotten that true religion is invariably universalistic, constructive humanistic and desirable in character, and is never a tendency that can demand our condemnation. It is, moreover, not a set of certain tenets and principles accepted on paper or verbally but denied in actual conduct. It is essentially an inner faith that transforms an individual mentally and therefore expresses itself in the actual conduct and character. Where such a sincerity of character and conduct is absent there one cannot find any trace of religion whatsoever. This point should be noted with utmost care. Generally what goes under the name of religion is merely insincerity hidden under the garb of an outward show. This type of imposture and deceit cannot be called religion by any means.

We have stated herein above that religion signifies acceptance of certain truth as the highest truth of life and then conforming one's character and conduct to it. This statement must be understood very clearly. There are two types of people in this world. According to one type of people, spirit is the sole reality of life and God is the ultimate objective of human life. But there is another point of view which believes that nobody can see God and no rational proof can establish His existence. Their religion consists only in aiming at the ideal of social welfare and cohesion. Humanity is the only God ; to serve it is the only worship.

In a way both these standpoints are not contradictory. The former view too believes that God is pleased only through a service of all beings. But the entire nature is derived from God. Hence God is a reality that transcends the visible world. The second view on the other hand does not think it proper to concede the existence of God at all. But so far as both the views are concerned they agree in the service of mankind. There is, however, one difference between the two. The former view is at times distorted by fanatics and sometimes a division is created in the fold of mankind in the name of religion. Hindus and Muslims have been divided in this manner. Even the followers of the same sect are divided into subsects due to this befogged attitude. However this should be kept in mind that religion cannot be held responsible for such distortions, nor can it be condemned for the defects of the followers. If at all blame is to be laid at the doors of any body, it should be laid at the doors of the individual who refuses to be enlightened due to his undeveloped rationality and persists in his wrong attitude. The

civil and unenlightened education as well as misleading preaching by the priests and the leaders of religious folds also play their own part in this direction. The second view, however, does not admit such confusion as the aim is clear like day-light.

One should not be surprised therefore that the former view of religion has sometimes been severely criticised by certain social thinkers like Marx. The world has seen that many atrocities have been perpetrated in the holy name of religion. People have been subjected to the worst possible exploitation, persecution, violence in the sacred name of religion. People were taught to tolerate everything by the selfish religious heads who joined the ruling powers to subserve their own petty ends. The rulers also helped such elements because they found in religion that power which can deaden the spirit of revolt and give a spirit of complaisance on the part of the public which gave rulers security and protection which were not otherwise possible.

It should not be imagined that all religious leaders were of this nasty kind. In fact only the counterfeit religious hearts thus conspired against the welfare of the common men. The true and devout religious hearts made tremendous sacrifice to get justice to the underdogs. An impartial reading of the history of mankind shall convince every human heart that real religion has always produced brave souls like Buddha, Socrates, Gandhi etc., who sacrificed even personal comfort to get the wellbeing of one and all. We should, therefore, be very careful when we read the criticism of the institution of religion. In fact every such criticism is the criticism of only fake and false religion. True religion remains unaffected by such criticism. It is unfortunate that in a craze of condemning cruelty and exploitation people descended to the level of be heading the truth itself.

Those who believe in a supernatural entity like God in a way serve mankind in a much better way than a humanist who does not believe in the existence of God at all. The reason lying behind this fact is that a person believing in God has a sentiment that everything is replete with God and filled with His presence. Hence if any being is hurt, it would amount to hurting the Supreme. A God-intoxicated person, therefore, loves every being from the bottom of his heart. His dominant ambition is to please his Lord. It is his natural urge. The humanist on the other hand does not have that background of emotional fervour. It is a well-known fact that a mere intellectual man cannot rise to that height of self-sacrifice to which a God-intoxicated man can easily ascend. A humanist standing merely on the ground of intellectuality not ripened in the emotional warmth is always in a danger of losing his horizon.

The two approaches meet, however, on this point that the ideal of serving humanity, or to express the same thing in other terms, to oppose the forces of suppression and oppression is a covetable ideal. Any person who asserts that religion supports injustice either fails to imbibe the meaning of religion or purposely distorts the import of religion. Any cruelly and ignorant acts perpetrated in the name of religion cannot spoil or soil the true nature of religion just as we cannot assert from certain cases of food-poisoning that food is bad. Gandhi has rightly stated, "Religion is not what is grasped by the brain but by the hearts." (*Wit and Wisdom of Mahatma Gandhi*, edited by N.B. Sen, p. 191, 1960). Radhakrishnan asserts "True religious life must express itself in love and aim at the unity of mankind. Bead necklaces, rosaries, triple paint on forehead, or putting on ashes, pilgrimages, baths in holy rivers, meditation, or

image worship do not purify a man as service of fellow-creatures does." (*Occasional Speeches and Writings*, 1950, p. 260) It must be remembered that ritualism does not mean religion. Religion must go deeper and purify an individual heart to this extent that the traces of selfishness, cupidity, personal ambition, temporal avarices all are destroyed and a warm-hearted attachment for the Lord is born. It is something basically different from superstition. Kabir declared very emphatically that the Lord cannot be realised through 'namāz' or rituals like shaving the head etc. Truly religious personalities like, Buddha, Christ, Gandhi, etc., have always worked against the superstition and oppression. They loved man. Religious soul never makes any compromise with injustice, never bows before cruelty and power, never cares for prestige or self-aggrandisement. They are the uncompromising rebels against social injustice and inequity. They are the fence-uprooters, fermenters and the sons of righteous revolution. Their revolution is so lofty that they fight, but never crave for any prize; they struggle, but always try to give the maximum benefit to the sufferers. They are content with thorns and offer the flowers to humanity; they are eager to suffer, but never desire any reward for their acts. Their movements are, therefore, truly constructive and creative in nature. They always make a bold bid to take humanity to the height of prosperity and real happiness. Gandhi rebelled against colonialism, fought against it throughout his whole life, but never paused to share the prosperity and prestige and rushed to the places where the sufferers were hit and needed him most. Where one finds any superstition or clinging to the past tradition rather blindly, one should be sure that there is no trace of religion, or under the cover of religion irreligion is hidden.

True religion is always ceaselessly working for rejuvenation of humanity, for the betterment of mankind, for the real and constructive transformation of man and society. Religion does not reject the world. It only gives it new shape, new face; it dissolves the traces of ugliness, and ruins the forces of destruction and oppression. Its ultimate objective is well-being of one and all (*Joka-samgraha*). And the revolution brought about by religion is more abiding, more effective, more constructive than the one preached by a mere humanist who has merely intellectual attachment for it.

Religion is essentially all-comprehensive and integrative in nature. It affects every aspect of human conduct. Poems and stories, plays and films, preaching and teaching, science and technology, politics and social conduct all are given new shape and form by religion which brings about a unique change in their nature and being. It need not be added that this change is always constructive and never destructive. It always tries to bring people together; it always endeavours to bring about prosperity and happiness to every member of mankind without any distinction or difference. Religion has a capacity of enlarging the personality of an individual to a very enormous extent. The individual ceases to be an individual, and becomes the world in his thought and conduct. Therefore he goes beyond the confines of selfishness. A religious soul therefore writes

"The stream of life that runs through my veins
night and day runs through the world
and dances in rhythmic measures.

It is the same life that shoots in joy
through the dust of the earth
in numberless blades of grass and breaks
into tumultuous waves of leaves and flowers.

It is the same life that is rocked
in the ocean-cradle of birth and of death,
in ebb and in flow.

I feel my limbs are made glorious
by the touch of this world of life.
And my pride is from the life-throb of ages
dancing in my blood this moment."

(*Tagore's Gitanjali*, No. 69)

"A handful of dust could hide your signal
when I did not know its meaning.
Now that I am wiser I read it in all
that hid it before.

It is painted in patterns of flowers ;
waves flash it from their foam ;
hills hold it high on their summits.

I had my face turned from you,
therefore I read the letters awry
and knew not their meaning."

(*Tagore's Fruit-Gathering*, No. 5)

And "When to a man who understands, the Self has become all things, what sorrow,
what trouble can there be to him who once beheld that unity ?" (*Iśa Upaniṣad*)

A God intoxicated person always prays :

"This is my prayer to thee, my Lord—
give me the strength to make my love fruitful in service."

(*Gitanjali*, 36)

"Give me the strength never to disown the poor
or bend my knees before insolent might."

(*Gitanjali*, 36)

A truly religious soul rebels against every social injustice
because God is not present in the temples, mosques or churches :

"He is there where the tiller is tilling the hard ground
and where the path-maker is breaking stones.

He is with them in sun and in shower,
and his garment is covered with dust."

(*Gitanjali*, 11)

The result is that a truly religious soul discards every vain formalism.

This aspect of religion has to be grasped very firmly by a true follower of religion. If this aspect is neglected or ignored to any extent, the result can prove very disastrous for the individual and the world.

A spiritual craving is a very laudable objective. But for an average man such an endeavour has no much significance, because he has his own doubts about the very existence of soul and God. But he can certainly perceive the outward conduct of the individual devoted to the Lord. If his conduct has social value, the religion becomes valuable; and if his conduct is anti-social in character, it becomes fruitless and vain.

Every age demands certain modification in our attitude towards religion, social outlook, political pattern, in fact, every such thing. Therefore, in the modern age we should be fully prepared to recast our view about religion. Religion in the modern period to be up-to-date must pay excessive importance to the social and individual aspects of religion. For the common men these aspects are important. The spiritual side of religion is not very important for them. If we try to interpret and define it in terms of socially constructive attitude alone then there shall not be any occasion for its criticism, nor there shall be any opportunity of its being misinterpreted. The modern religion must be free from any occult tinge and must be scientific in nature.

We should not forget that the unscientific nature of dogmatic, religious beliefs and the socially destructive tendency of religious practices has brought sharp criticism of religion from some of the most gifted persons of history. At present when a scientific pattern of thinking has become an inseparable part of the mental equipment of individual minds, it is not possible for us to revive faith in religion by simply emphasizing its spiritual content, or its attachment to the Divine and the Superhuman Entity. Let us not forget that the myths of creation are daily being repudiated by modern astronomy and geology; the crude notions about mind and soul of the yesterdays are being challenged by the modern sciences of psychology and biology; supernatural events of the olden period are being explained in terms of natural activities in the domain of sciences. We are no longer satisfied by accepting certain notions of God uncritically; we want a clear and an ambiguous proof of His existence. If we stick to the old notions and items of faith of the older religion in this age of rationality and critical thinking, we cannot hope any future of religion.

It will not help us to criticise the modern sciences which are serving mankind better than the olden religion. We must give religion a garb of rationality and divest it off its crude, uncritical garb. In this context two thinkers from the east and west are ready to support us. Radhakrishnan declares "Dharma is an elastic tissue which clothes the growing body. If it is too tight it will give way, and we shall have lawlessness, anarchy and revolution. If it is too loose it will strip us and impede our movement. It should not be too far behind, or too far ahead of, intelligent public opinion."

(*Religion and Society*, 1948, p. 119)

In the same strain Whitehead adds :

"Religion will not regain its old power until it can face change in the same spirit as does science. Its principle may be eternal, but the expression of these principles

requires continual development."

(*Science and the Modern World*, 1926, p. 235)

Hence religion must be prepared to accept a change—a change in the emphasis to be laid on the socially constructive tendencies. If this change is emphasized and the mystical element is subordinated, then religion can become a mighty force. Man is essentially a rational being and as such necessarily a religious being because religion is but the other name of an enlightened social tendency that tries to serve society in a sincere manner. U. Thithila in his work *The Path of the Buddha* has stated :

"It (religion) means truth, that which really is. It also means law, the law which exists in a man's own heart and mind. It is the principle of righteousness. Dharma, this law of righteousness, exists **not only** in a man's heart and mind ; it exists in the universe also. All the universe is an embodiment and revelation of dharma. When the moon rises and sets, the rains come, the crops grow, the seasons change, it is because of dharma, for dharma is the law residing in the universe which makes matter act in the ways revealed by the studies of modern science in physics, chemistry, zoology, botany, and astronomy. Dharma is the true nature of every existing thing, animate and inanimate."

The marks of true religion are love for truth, respect for humanity, readiness of making any amount of self-sacrifice, and greatest identification with the widest possible extent of humanity.

For all must love the human form,
in heathen, Turk or Jew ;
Where mercy, peace and piety dwell.
"There God is dwelling too."

We can bring about the distinction between the old religion by stating that the new religion helps a person to love humanity from the bottom of his heart.

Coupled with this social aspect is an individual aspect of religion. An individual who has drunk deep at the fountain of religion gets an exciting joy at the effacement of his ego and at enlarging it to this extent that the entire world becomes his own self. Thus religion is socially constructive and internally an agency yielding supreme joy which rises with utter spontaneity. Such an enlargement of individual self need not rest on the acceptance of a God ; it can very well spring from an acceptance of certain lofty ideal. Religion does not care whether God exists or not ; it only cares whether an individual has accepted an ideal that is as big as the world itself and his actual conduct conforms to this ideal spontaneously.

I recommended acceptance of such an ideal by all the people. Then we shall cease to classify people as Muslims or Hindus, Christians or Jews or Communists and non-Communists. Only then the new world of our dream shall arise, because to be in contact with the old customary religious sects is to kill the very spirit of enlightened religion.

Antigone : Study in Conflict

The standard interpretation of the *Antigone* since the time of Hegel has been that both Antigone and Creon were justified in their actions and that the conflict between them is the result of their adherence to two conflicting ethical principles, both of which are legitimate so long as they are not universalized. Hegel wrote :

In this case, family love, what is holy, what belongs to the inner life and to inner feeling, and which because of this is also called to law of the other gods, comes into collision with the law of the State. Creon is not a tyrant, but really a moral power; Creon is not in the wrong ; he maintains that the law of the State, the authority of government, is to be held in respect, and that punishment follows the infraction of the law. Each of these two sides realises only one of the moral powers and has only one of these as its content ; this is the element of one-sidedness here, and the meaning of eternal justice is shown in this, that both end in injustice just because they are one-sided, though at the same time both obtain justice too.¹ I shall argue that this interpretation is mistaken, that Antigone was justified in her actions but Creon was not, that Creon was a tyrant, and that the principles which he espoused cannot be given moral justification.

I

One of the reasons for critics not having seen that Creon was a tyrant is that they have been too greatly impressed by his opening speech. This speech, an eloquent defense of public service, makes such a magnificent first impression that it has unduly colored most critics' view of Creon's character. If one had only this speech from which to judge, Creon would appear a grand and noble king. Yet, indications that is not so, that he is in reality a tyrant, can be seen in even this speech.

1. Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, *Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion*, trans. The Rev. E. B. Seis and J. Burton Sanderson (New York: The Humanities Press, Inc., 1962), II, 264.

Creon is quick to label Eteocles a hero and Polynices a traitor. However, there are reasons for being wary of this evaluation. According to one account Eteocles and Polynices were twins and agreed to rule in alternate years, but at the end of the first year Eteocles refused to give up the throne. According to another account, one given by Sophocles himself in the later play *Oedipus at Colone*, Polynices was the elder brother and, therefore, legitimate heir to the throne. If either of these accounts were accepted, then it would be Eteocles and not Polynices who was the traitor. All that we are told in the *Antigone* is that the brothers quarreled. Polynices was banished and returned with an army to besiege the city, and they killed one another in battle. We have only Creon's word, then that Polynices was a traitor.

Creon also accuses Polynices of intending to burn the temples and to enslave the people, but once again we have only his word that this was the case. Polynices may have planned only a palace revolution, i.e., his quarrel may have been only with Eteocles and his followers, not with the people of Thebes.

Since Creon remained in Thebes rather than flee with Polynices, it is reasonable to assume that he was a supporter of Eteocles. If so his decree that Eteocles be given a state burial with honors, while Polynices' body is to be left in the field to be devoured by dogs and vultures, was a highly partisan act. Since there were likely supporters of Polynices among the people, it was also an imprudent act. Prudence would have dictated actions to heal wounds, not actions which might prolong conflict. Creon's hatred of Polynices seems to have been so great that he was not content to see him dead; he wanted to heap even further indignities upon him. Finally, in issuing the decree Creon acted hastily. Although he later says that he values advice, he issued the decree before he called the elders together. He called them together only to inform them of his action.

Creon not only remained with Eteocles but was his uncle, so it is likely that he held some position in the government. If this were true, it would account for the seeming anomaly that while he has been king for less than a day he is treated and acts as though he had held office much longer. If he had held office previously, his tyrannical character would no doubt have been well known to the people of Thebes. This would explain the fear which the guard exhibited in reporting to him. It would also explain the obvious reluctance of the elders to disagree with him. Finally, it would explain his belief that political enemies were trying to bribe people in an effort to undermine his rule.

Despite his hasty, imprudent and partisan action in issuing the decree, Creon appears anxious to prove himself a good king. In particular, he seems concerned to establish a reputation as a stern but impartial judge. Thus in addition to praising public service and labeling Eteocles a hero and Polynices a traitor, Creon vows in his opening speech to punish wrongdoers without exception. He says that even if a wrongdoer were a member of his own family he would punish him. It does not seem to have occurred to him that a member of his own family might in fact violate his decree. He is visibly shaken when Antigone is brought before him and asks whether she knew that her act was prohibited, apparently expecting her to answer negatively. Antigone not only replies that she knew the act was prohibited, but in one of the most famous passages in literature says :

I did not rate
 Thy proclamations for a thing so great
 As by their human strength to have overtrod
 The unwritten and undying laws of God :
 Not of to-day nor yesterday, the same

Throughout all time they live ; and whence they came None knoweth.²

There is no doubt, then, that Antigone is guilty. Creon, therefore, seems to face a moral dilemma. If he puts Antigone to death he will be killing his own niece and his son's fiancée. On the other hand, if he sets her free, he will be violating his vow. He appears to resolve the dilemma by deciding that he cannot set her free because to do so would undermine his authority as king and lead to civil disorder. He tells Haemon :

I will not break the sworn pledge that I gave
 My people ; she shall die. Oh let her rave
 of kith and kindred and their patron Zeus ;
 If mine own kin must practice such abuse
 As this unpunished, what will strangers do.

.....

I praise not him who' flows with idle pride
 Does violence to the laws, who seeks to fling
 Defiance and give orders to his King
 This disobedience of all human ills
 Is deadliest
 Wherever cities safely stand,
 Be sure Law is obeyed and saves the land.

This speech, like Creon's first speech, is a grand and noble speech expressing the highest sentiments. His overriding concern appears to be the necessity to maintain law and order. However, he does not stop at this point ; he immediately continues :

Never shall a woman's will
 Break me. If fall I must, some man must hurl
 Me down. Call me not weaker than a girl

Similarly, after Antigone's speech quoted above he says :

This girl showed insolence before, to brave
 The ordained law ; and now, new insolence,
 She mocks us and hath pride in her offence.
 No man were I, more a man were she,
 Should she now triumph and be gone scot-free.

2. Gilbert Murray, trans., *The Antigone* (London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1941). With the exception of that cited in footnote three, all subsequent quotes are from this translation.

It is not an obligation to keep his vow which motivates Creon here ; it is wounded pride. More specifically, it is wounded masculine pride. Creon's pride is also evident in his refusal to take advice. He says that he has contempt for the man who will not speak out firmly and clearly, stating what he thinks to be in the public interest. Yet when the leader of the elders suggests that the dust storm which covered the body may be the work of the gods, he replies :

Silence, before my anger break its bound
Gainst one so old and eke so foolish found !

And when Haemon offers him advice he becomes angry and says :

Shall I then at the fulness of my age
Be tutored by this stripling to be sage ?

The elders are too old to advise him ; Haemon is too young and wet behind the ears. And when the prophet Tiresias attempts to warn him that his actions have offended the gods, he accuses him of having been bribed.

These prophets always had a lust for gain.

Nor is it law and order which Creon demands ; rather it is absolute and unquestioning obedience. There is no room for pride, he tells Antigone, in one who is a slave. And in talking with Haemon he says :

Whomso the city raise, we must obey
In small things, right things, and their opposites!

When Haemon replies that the people of Thebes are opposed to his actions, Creon asks who are they to dictate laws to him. "The City is the King's."

In demanding total obedience from others, Creon strips them of their humanity, making them instruments of his own will. He brushes aside affection, devotion to family, religious sentiment and the value of the individual. For Antigone, her brother remained her brother after death. No matter how perfidious the cause for which he might have died, he was a human being and deserved to be treated as a human being. His body should therefore be given a proper burial. For Creon, on the other hand, Polynices' body was only carrion, food for dogs and vultures. In his opinion neither gods nor men should have concern for the dead.

Since he had no concern for the dead and did not honour the ancient laws of kinship and piety, Creon failed to see any distinction between someone who breaks the law for personal gain and Antigone who broke it from love and a sense of duty. Thus he treated Antigone, daughter of a king and his own niece, as though she were a common criminal.

Creon's debasement of human personality and his brushing aside of affection, devotion to family and religious sentiment can be seen in other actions also. When

asked if he intends to put his son's fiancée to death he replies, "Why not. He can find other fields to plough." His attitude is also apparent in his threat to put Antigone to death in Haemon's presence. Were he to have felt concern for Haemon, he could never have made such a threat.

Had Creon considered himself forced to put Antigone to death against his will for the good of the state, then it seems that he would have exhibited an agonized conscience and remorse. But he does not show the slightest sign of either. Furthermore, had he felt remorse, it is unlikely that he would have then decided, without even hearing her story, that Ismene should be put to death also.

Interpretations of Creon's actions as resulting from conflict between obligation to the state and obligation to his family are, therefore, extremely implausible. He seems to have no genuine concern for his family at all.

I conclude that Creon was not a "moral power" as Hegel maintained. He was a tyrant. Indeed he is a paradigm of a tyrant. No better picture of a tyrant has ever been drawn, or is likely to be drawn.

II

What about Antigone? Was she justified in her actions? She has often been interpreted as unyielding, cold and aloof. It is true that she was unyielding, but she was not cold and aloof. Her warmth and affection for other people was not only indicated by her concern for the dead Polynices, but by her relations to Ismene and Haemon. Both felt intense loyalty to her. Ismene did not consider life worth living without her. "What life have I," she asks, "when thou art here no more?" Ismene even confessed to an act which she did not commit, hoping to share Antigone's cause and death. Similarly, Haemon attempted to kill his father and committed suicide because Antigone was killed. It is inconceivable that this kind of loyalty could have been felt toward someone who was cold and aloof.

Antigone's unyielding devotion to her cause was due to the fact that she was motivated by both love and duty. Since the action required of her by religious duty and the action to which she was urged by her love and respect for her brother were one and the same, she had great strength and unity of purpose. She pursued a course of action she knew would very probably bring about her death. This is not to say that she never at any point had doubts about the legitimacy of her actions. There was one awful moment as she was being taken away to be imprisoned when she believed herself to be abandoned by the gods as well as by men:

How dare I look to Heaven, and hope to get
Pity or help from there? I sought to ensure
Our purity, and lo, I am found impure!

No matter what one's cause, doubts about its legitimacy would be normal under conditions such as these. Christ, too, felt himself abandoned at the end. Like Christ, Antigone immediately regained her composure. And like Christ, she forgave those who brought about her death. Immediately after the above remark she says:

If these things by God's pleasure, before long
 By pain I shall be taught mine was the wrong ;
 But if the wrong lies with my judge, may he
 Meet no worse pain than he has wrought on me

Antigone did what love and duty required of her. She did it with great resolve and purpose. Furthermore, she consistently acted so as to avoid suffering and pain for others. That is why she refused to allow Ismene to join her at the end. Because she simultaneously exhibited both the resoluteness required to pursue a moral goal and the concern for others which one must show in pursuing it, she may be spoken of as a moral heroine. In fact, just as Creon may be taken as a paradigm of a tyrant, Antigone may be taken as a paradigm of a moral heroine.

III

Even those critics who have seen that Creon was a tyrant have usually maintained that the principles which he espoused were very noble. For example, H. D. F. Kitto says :

In his grand sentiments there is nothing to which we need take exception : complete loyalty to the Polis is his theme.⁴

Kitto states that he disagrees only with Creon's application of this principle, not with the principle itself.

Are the principles which Creon advocates legitimate ones ? Do they have the grandeur which at first they seem to have ? Or are they, like Creon, noble at first sight, but on further examination ignoble and unworthy ? Are the activities of the state more important than all other areas of human life, and is our obligation to obey it higher than all our other obligations ? Should we obey "whoso the city raise . . . in small things, right things, and their opposites" ? Is civil disobedience the deadliest of all human ills ?

The answers which most of us who live after Hitler would give to these questions is obvious. The principles which Creon espouses are not noble ; they are morally indefensible. Instead of arguing for the validity of this judgment, I think it more appropriate to ask what answers Sophocles gave to these questions. Although the attempt to attribute opinions to a playwright on the basis of his plays is a perilous matter, I believe that in this case we can say with some probability what Sophocles' position was.

At the beginning of *The Antigone* it is Creon who appears to have reason on his side while Antigone appears stubborn and proud. However, we gradually come to realize that it is Antigone who has reason on her side and Creon who is stubborn and proud. Similarly, at the beginning of the play it is Creon who appears the defender of law and order and Antigone who appears lawless and a threat to society. But once

4. H. D. F. Kitto, *Form and Meaning in Drama* (London : Methuen and Co., Ltd., (1956), p. 151.

again we gradually come to realize that it is Creon who is lawless and a threat to society, and Antigone who is the defender of law and order. For law as Sophocles conceives it is conformity to the order and purpose of the universe. Thus when Creon finally sees the error of his ways he says :

My judgment is reversed. Since it was I
Who tied this knot I also shall untie.
Yet, Oh, I fear. The wise are they who wend
The ways of law even to their being's end.

It is evident that Creon is not referring to man-made law. The only man-made law to which he was subject was his own decrees. He is referring to the same divine, eternal law which Antigone cited as justification for her actions. Creon acted foolishly and immorally because he disregarded this law.

The final words of the play, uttered by the Chorus as Creon is being led away may be taken as indicating Sophocles' position :

Supreme in man's felicity
Is Wisdom ; and the wise in awe
Bow them beneath God's ancient law.
Vain-glorious lips and vanity
In heavy stripes their payment earn,
And men grow old before they learn.

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Tulsidas, Precursor of Psycho—Analysis ?

Tulsidas was, according to Vincent Smith, the greatest man of his age in India, greater even than Akbar himself; and Sir G. A. Grierson thinks that the religion in Northern India is marked by two great steps forward : Buddhism and, two thousand years later, the teaching of Tulsidas. Besides being a great poet-saint of India, he was a deep thinker. Some of his writings reveal that in the medieval age he was the precursor of what is now known as Psycho-analysis.

The Nature of a Complex

Wholesale repression of desires leads to the formation of complexes. A knot (*granthi*), says Tulsidas, is due to the union of *jaḡā* and *cetanā*, that is, of ignorance and mind; and though it is only false, it is difficult to untie. The soul becomes worldly and knows no happiness. The more the effort to untie it, the greater is the entanglement.¹

A 'Complex' Causes a Disease

As a result, physical and mental diseases, make their appearance. Just as there are physical diseases, so there are mental ones (*manasambhavadōṣa*)². A patient suffering from a physical malady craves for unwholesome food, which he requests his physician to give him, but the physician does not allow it. Similarly, a sufferer from mental ills knows neither the cause nor the remedy of his illness. It is for an expert to judge what is beneficial or needful for a person suffering from a mental malady, as Lord Viṣṇu once told Nārada³ with a view to curing him of his feeling of superiority⁴.

1. *Rama Carita Manasa*, VII, 197, 2-3.

2. *Ibid.*, VI, 137, Ch. 3.

3. *Ibid.*, I, 160, 1.

4. *Ibid.*, I, 154, 3-4 ; 155.

The sage was unduly proud that he had conquered lust. But who is there in this world who has not been over-powered by infatuation, amour, anger, sorrow, envy and anxiety ?⁵

Cause Analysed

Kāka explains to Gacūḍa, at the latter's request, the nature, cause and remedy of mental diseases. Infatuation (*moha*) is the root of all ailments and pains. Of the humours, lust (*Kāma*) is flatulence (*vāta*); greed (*lobha*) is phlegm (*kapha*); and anger (*krodha*) is the bile of passion (*pitṛa*). When all the three combine, there results the painful pneumonia (*santipāta*). Who can tell the names of all the diseases represented by the various obstinate sensual cravings ? But some of them are the following: Selfishness is the ring-worm ; envy⁶ is the itch the experience of joy and sorrow is rheumatism ; malice at the sight of another's prosperity is consumption ; and crookedness is leprosy ; egoism is the excruciating gout ; and want is the dropsy. Again, heresy, hypocrisy, vanity and pride are the thread-worms ; the three conations (*gaṇḍa*s) are the tertian agues ; and jealousy and indiscrimination are the two (remittent and intermittent) fevers. Maladies are many and beyond description⁷ ; one suffices to kill a man.⁸

Unguarded Saint is Liable to Mental Diseases

Thus, all creatures in the world are diseased, distracted alternately by joy and sorrow, and by love and fear.⁹ Many are the remedies suggested, such as pious and religious observances, penances, sacrifices, prayers, charities meditations. But the disease does not abate¹⁰, for few, only, can detect it.¹¹ Such a disease springs up even in a saint if he should lead a materialistic life, not to speak of an ordinary person. On detection it diminishes a little, but does not get destroyed completely.¹²

Catharsis

Human instincts and desires, as the modern psychologist believes, are either expressed, repressed, or else modified. The rigours of *brahmacharya* (celibacy) are well-known to every reader of *Sūtras* and sermons of saints who constantly advise, and sometimes over-emphasize, the renunciation of gold and women. Yet the ancient sages of India have recognized the value of restricted expression of crude emotions on certain occasions. Hindus, too celebrate their own May Days and April Fools. The

5. *Ibid.*, VII, 99, 3-4; 100, 1-3.

6. Tulidās compares *rāga* (love) and *dveṣa* (envy) to fire, vide *Vairagya Sandipani*, 60.

7. *Rama Carita Manasa*, VII, 207, 15-19.

8. *Ibid.*, VII, 208.

9. *Ibid.*, VII, 207, 1.

10. *Ibid.*, VII, 207.

11. *Ibid.*, VII, 207, 1.

12. *Ibid.*, VII, 207, 2.

laxity in speech and behaviour on the Holi festival and indulgence in gambling on Govardhana festival are some examples in that direction. Again, women indulge in abusive, though loving, strains on marriages ; and Tulsidas does not miss to chuckle over the matter on both the occasions, once at the marriage of Śiva and Pārvatī¹⁹ and twice at that of Rāma and Sītā.²⁰ The custom of such festal strains prevails in India even today as in the days of Tulsidas, four hundred years ago. The manner in which he narrates the whole thing definitely shows that the saint approves of it, although he is aware of its dark side also. For the Creator, he says, has made abuse out of the quintessence of ambrosia and poison ; that is why a word of abuse causes both love and enmity. It is the prudent, not the dullards, that understand this.²¹ A foul word is cathartic sometimes.

Nature of Right Treatment

Mental diseases can be uprooted if rightly treated, and treatment has a negative and a positive method. As a negative or preventive measure a distaste for the pleasures of life (*bhava-rasa virati*)²² and for envying others and their property (*paradroha*) should be picked up. Materialism is like an unwholesome diet (*viṣaya-kupathya*)²³ and should, therefore, be shunned. This is what is known as *saṁnyāsa* (control). Besides this, a patient requires a good preceptor (*sadguru*), as physician to treat the malady ; confidence in the tenets of the *Vedas* for a prescription ; devotion to God for the life-restoring drug ; and full faith and intelligence for accompaniments to the medicine.²⁴ The company of the good (*satsaṅga*) leads to happiness and can serve as amusement to the patient.

Tulsidas a Psycho-Analyst

Tulsidas speaks like a psycho-analyst when he prescribes equanimity (*saṁatī*)²⁵ to kill worldly distress and conceit. It abides when one does not get puffed up on receiving homage, does not pine away on getting an insult, remains unagitated in loss or gain, and aloof from the wicked ways.²⁶ It abides when one is just the same on obtaining suitable means, suitable opportunity and the desired fulfilment of an object.²⁷ It results from the cultivation of discipline (*vinaya*), detachment (*virati*) and discretion (*vivaka*). The four sages Sanata, Sanandana, Sanātana, and Sanātkumāra visit Lord Rāmacandra at Ayodhyā and pray thus : 'O Rāma, destroy our mental

19. *Ibid.*, I, 123, 1.

20. *Ibid.*, I, 361, 1-4; *Pārvatī Māṅgalā*, 150; *Jānakī Māṅgalā*, 167, 179.

21. *Dohraṭī*, 328.

22. *Rāma Carita Māṅgalā*, II, 327.

23. *Ibid.*, VII, 209, 2.

24. *Ibid.*, VII, 209, 3-4.

25. Cf. *Samata* and *Samata* (*Gītā* X, 5, 11, 48). Compare Jung's doctrine of compensation and antithesis.

26. *Vinaya Patrikā*, 268, 3; 126, 3.

27. *Dohraṭī*, 539.

sufferings. Diffuse equanimity. Bestow meekness, discretion and detachment to prevent hope, fear, envy and other passions and impulses.²² It has already been noticed that Tulsidas is quite aware of the dominant nature of the selfish impulse from which neither gods nor men are free, not even parents. It is this impulse which actuates man to commit vices and sins and which infatuates and causes him to injure others' interests and, thus, mar his own prospects here and hereafter. Tulsidas, therefore, denounces envy and injury to others (*para-droha* and *para-piḍā*) and recommends non-violence (*ahimsā*) and benevolence (*paropakāra*).²³

The Nature of Equanimity

Equanimity (*samātā*) is but the unmanifest form of benevolence (*paropakāra*), which is nurtured on discipline (*śhūnya*), detachment (*vīraśi*) and discretion (*viveka*). The doctrine of confession in Christianity and Islam is but an effort to know the criminal hidden in the mind. The secular psycho-analyst practically does the same thing by reading the patient's mind. This he may do by inducing hypnosis, by interpreting dreams, or else by using the method of free-association. Tulsidas recommends *viveka*, that is, discernment and discretion, which can be cultivated by leading a well-disciplined and unselfish life. Their combined result is benevolence (*paropakāra*), which, sublimated further, is equanimity or *samātā*. All this is in conformity with the modern views²⁴ on psychiatry, psychotherapy, psychopathy and psycho-analysis. "The greatest trouble with the person who is always in trouble is selfishness. The person who is persistently bowed down with grief is one who is wholly occupied with thoughts of self. . . . Selfishness leads to misery; and misery is only disguised anger. The person who is miserable is angry; angry with himself. He is angry at what he thinks he might have been, but is not. . . . Selfishness is the curse of creation. . . . It is responsible for filling our work-houses, our jails, and our lunatic asylums. It is the weed of the psychical garden, the roots of which spread and sprout in parasitic profusion until they eventually starve out all that is good and desirable in the personality."²⁵ "Happiness is a flower which blossoms in the soil of persistent effort. . . . No one who has lived with a desire to help humanity at large has ever died of a broken heart."²⁶

Panacea for all Mental Ills

So much from the standpoint of psychology. Tulsidas goes deeper still. He dives into meta-psychology and brings out the panacea for mental ills. This is devotion

22. *Rāmā Curita Mānuṣa*, VII, 57, 2-3.

23. *Ibid.*, VII, 34, 1-63, 1-3; 49, 3; 207, 7.

24. The views of Hans Feinborn, Friedrich Schultze-Matthier, Karl Jaspers, and Carl G. Jung, as stated in the article on *Religion and Psychiatry (An Approach to European Psychology of Religion)*, by P. C. Sermon (Howard Univ.), in the *Encyclopedia of Psychology*, edited by Philip Lawrence Hartman (Philosophical Library, New York: 1946).

25. *How to Psychoanalyse Yourself*, by Joseph Ralph, pp. 243-242.

26. *Ibid.*, p. 241.

to God or Rāma. Such devotion consists in listening to the story of Rāma, in devotional prayers to Him and also in repeating His name. The grievous mental diseases which make creatures miserable have no effect on him who has the jewel of Faith : not even in a dream can he feel the slightest pain.²⁷ Devotion to Rāma is the herb which restores life (*sāṃśṛvānamūrī*).²⁸ Anger, lust, greed, pride, infatuation, all get dissipated by the grace of Rāma.²⁹ No creature can be happy, or even dream of rest to his soul, until he worships Rāma after forswearing lust, that fountain of remorse.³⁰

Criteria of Mental Health

Such is the means and end of human life. But what is the criterion by which to judge whether or not the prescription is restoring health to the mind ? Tulsidas gives it : "This is how the disease may disappear, otherwise all your efforts may end in smoke. Then alone know that the mind is free from disease when it begins to notice the gradual disappearance of the weakness (*darbalaṭā*) of material hopes (*āśā*) ; to feel fresh strength (*bala*) in self-control (*virāga*) ; and to cherish appetite (*kṣudhā*) for good thoughts (*śumatti*). The patient then has a bath. He bathes in the water (*jala*) of divine knowledge (*vīṇula jñāna*) and suffuses his whole soul with faith in Rāma (*Rāma-bhakti*)."

Self-Realization has a Limited Value

The greatest good can be attained by knowing one's own self. It should be seen heard and meditated upon³¹ but it cannot be attained by a weak fellow.³² These are some of the stock phrases of the *Upaniṣads* which emphasize the realization of the self. Self-knowledge is also recommended through 'introversion' by C. G. Jung in the domain of psychopathology. "The more one becomes conscious of one's own self through 'self knowledge and corresponding action,' he says, "the more that layer of the personal over-lying the collective unconscious vanishes. Then arises a consciousness no longer captive in petty and personally sensitive ego-world. This broader and deeper consciousness is also no more that sensitive, egoistic bundle of personal ambition, wishes, fears and hopes that must be compensated or perhaps corrected by unconscious personal tendencies, but it is a function of reference connected with the object, the outer world, placing the individual in unconditional binding, and in dissoluble community with it."³³ Jung also thinks that the psyche is a self-regulating system, there being no self-regulating system without opposition. "All that lives is energy and is therefore based upon antithesis. . . No : a conversion into the

27. *Rāma Carita Mātasa*, VII, 205, 4-5.

28. *Ibid.*, VII 209, 4.

29. *Ibid.*, III, 49, 2.

30. *Ibid.*, VII, 205, 8-9.

31. "Ātmāṃ vā are draṣṭavyaḥ śrotavya mantavyaḥ", *Bṛhad. Upaniṣad*, 2. 4. 5; 4.5.6.

32. "Nāyātmā balahinena labhyaḥ", *Aṣṭādaka Upaniṣad*, 3.2.4.

33. *Two Essays on Analytic Psychology*, by C.G. Jung, p. 189.

contrary but a conservation of the former values together with a recognition of their contrary is the goal."³⁴ Jung's line of thought reminds one of Hegel's dialectical method. Tulsidas knows and he also says definitely that some of the maladies of the mind can be subdued, but not totally uprooted, by 'knowing' their existence. "On detection the wretches diminish somewhat, but these tormentors of men are not completely destroyed. For they spring up even in the soul of a saint if fed on the unwholesome diet of materialism".³⁵

Two More Recipes

Tulsidas gives two more prescriptions. One is psychoanalytic; the other, metaphysical; the first might, per chance, fail; the other is unfailing. The psychoanalytic recipe, it must be remembered, was the prescription of Equanimity or *Samatā* which had three ingredients—the three English D's or the three Sanskrit V's—namely Discipline (*Vinaya*), Discernment (*Viveka*), and Detachment (*Virāga*). Of these ingredients, the first regulates the senses, brings about the control of the self and paves the way for the second; the second leads to the acquisition of knowledge and cultivation of discretion and discrimination and also to true acquaintance with the world-order and paves the way to the third, which effects the extinction of desires and selfishness. The three D's combined result is Equanimity (*Samatā*) which manifests itself as benevolence (*paropakāra* or *loka-saṅgraha*) and, finally, as happiness (*sukha*) or bliss (*ānanda*).

Equanimity and Devotion

In the recipe of Tulsidas, to conclude, knowledge or discernment is only an ingredient. He, therefore, recommends Equanimity which has the three ingredients of Discipline, Discernment and Detachment. Hadfield's "Complete Self-realization"³⁶ attempts an approach to Tulsidas. But the saint is aware that even the threefold D's may fail in some cases; so his final prescription is Devotion to Rāma. For, as Karl Jaspers later thought, a hold to the infinite is the supreme value. "With a hold to the infinite the mind feels itself as infinite and free".³⁷

34. *Ibid.*, p. 79.

35. *Rama Carita Mānasa*, VII, 339, 2.

36. Hurman *Op cit.*

37. *Ibid.*, p. 217.

The Family : External and Internal Attractions

I

Introduction

In his *kinetic-potential theory of human needs* (Bardis, 1973; 1974b), the author attempted to demonstrate an analogy between the well-known Bernoulli's principle and the changing needs of *Homo sapiens*. In other words, it was stated that, "as science and technology advance and the resulting affluence generates higher levels of satisfaction for man's physiological drives, our emphasis on sociopsychological needs becomes greater and greater" (Bardis, 1973: 37). If we represent a person's physiological needs by PN, his socio-psychological needs by SPN, and the sum total of his needs by a fairly constant C, then, as in the case of Bernoulli's principle, we obtain the following approximate formula :

$$PN + SPN + C$$

Thus, for the value of C to be retained, when the term PN is reduced, the second term must increase, and vice versa. Once more, this association is only approximately represented by the above formula.

Nevertheless, similar analyses help us explore some of the relationships between fluctuating human needs and changing social institutions, including the family. In addition, we can compare general with specific attitudes and thus more objectively ascertain the nature of man's response to various institutional innovations on the basis of his needs.

In the present paper, an effort is made to contribute an original approach to the study of the so-called anti-family movement, the most radical forms of which assume

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that the family institution is no longer needed by modern man, and it is therefore obsolescent or dying (Burgess, 1974; Pierson and 'D' Antonio, 1974; Whitehurst, 1974). A more objective approach is especially necessary when both the mass media and even social scientists tend to emphasize value judgments instead of more empirical data.

II

Family Functions

Some of the most important human needs have been satisfied by the family institution, which, according to a study based on 250 societies, is a universal phenomenon (Murdoch, 1949 : 3). It is obvious, then, that changing human needs affect the family considerably—of course, this institution may operate as both a dependent and an independent variable. Therefore, it seems relevant to summarize the functions of the human family, which have often been classified as follows (Bardis, 1974a) :

- (1) Regulation of sex relations.
- (2) Procreation. The production of offspring may be secondary importance in some societies. Among the Nayar of India, for instance, a group that practices hypergamy, the husband is not part of the family and biological paternity is not recognized. Similarly, in Melanesia, physiological fatherhood is sometimes rejected, while social definitions of paternity are dominant. In one area, for example, a newly born infant belongs to the man who plants a cycad (sago palm) outside the child's house, and to his wife. In another area, he who pays the midwife becomes the baby's father, his wife being the mother of the child. In general, biological fatherhood is not understood by all primitives.
- (3) The education and socialization of children. Usually, the first institution into which human beings are born is the family.
- (4) Common residence.
- (5) Affection and emotional support.
- (6) Companionship.
- (7) Recreation.
- (8) Religious activities. In some civilizations (Rome, Greece, and so forth), the father has functioned as a priest.
- (9) Economic cooperation. The family may be a unit of production and consumption.
- (10) Protection.
- (11) The creation of a common subculture.
- (12) Placement in the social class system.
- (13) Social control.

III

Divorce and the "Death" of the Family

Despite these contributions, the anti-family advocates assert that the family is obsolescent, if not already obsolete, one of their main arguments being the extremely high divorce rate.

However, although the divorce rate has been rising, such increase is not sufficiently cataclysmic to justify lugubrious and lachrymose jeremiads.

Indeed, in the United States, the divorce rate per 1,000 population was 2.0 in 1940, 2.2 in 1960, and 4.0 in 1972. In 1971, there were 21,96,000 marriages, or 10.6 per 1,000 population, and 7,68,000 divorces, or 3.7 per 1,000 population (United States Bureau of the Census, 1973 : 65-66).

Part of the world, scene has been as follows (the rates are again per 1,000 population—United Nations, 1972 : 89-94) :

- Canada, 1971, marriages 8.8 ; 1970, divorces 1.4.
- France, 1971, marriages 7.9 ; 1969, divorces .8.
- Greece, 1971, marriages 8.0, divorces .3.
- Japan, 1971, marriages 10.5, divorces 1.0.
- Mexico, 1970, marriages 7.3, divorces .6.
- United Kingdom, 1971, marriages 9.4, divorces 1.1.
- USSR, 1971, marriages 10.0, divorces 2.6.
- USA, 1971, marriages 10.6, divorces 3.7.
- Venezuela, 1970, marriages 6.0 : 1968, divorces .2.

Besides, as Pierson and D'Antonio (1974 : 3ff) have recently stated, "at least three out of every four first marriages never end in divorce in the United States. And among these, a high proportion express themselves as subjectively happy or very happy in their marriage."

More significantly, historical data indicate that much greater crisis have not caused the death of the family. In ancient Rome, for instance, "divorce was exceedingly common, since the prevalent belief was that no marriage was possible without *affectio maritalis*. Consequently, as soon as conjugal affection between two spouses disappeared, it was considered desirable to dissolve their union. Even in small towns, as Cicero's comments on Cluentius and Sassia indicate, divorces were secured quite frequently and for the most insignificant reasons. The dissolution of aristocratic unions was especially common. Tertullian thus observed that 'The fruit of marriage is divorce,' while Juvenal spoke contemptuously of a woman who had eight spouses in five years. Similarly, St. Jerome mentioned a lady who married 23 men, the last one of whom had already had 20 other wives. Accordingly, Seneca stated that women no longer measured time in terms of Roman consuls, but in terms of their husbands' names ! Of Rome's famous men, Ovid had three wives, Pliny the Younger three, Antonius four, Sulla five, and Pompey five. Other prominent Romans contributed to the high divorce rate as follows : Cato divorced Marcia in order to

facilitate her marriage to Hortensius, but when her new husband died and Marcia became a wealthy widow, Cato married her once more. Cicero divorced Terentia, his wise and virtuous first wife, although they had lived together for 30 years and had two children, Marcus and Tullia, and although she had helped him considerably during the most critical periods of his life. His new wife was a very young woman, but Cicero divorced her, also . . . Julius Caesar married four times . . . Maccenas had so many marriages and divorces that the Roman wags said that he had married the same woman a hundred times . . . Augustus himself divorced his wife because of an argument that he had with his mother-in-law. Since his new spouse, Scribonia, who had already had two other husbands, seemed ill-tempered, and since he now loved Livia Drusilla, Augustus divorced Scribonia a few hours after she bore their daughter Julia. Unfortunately for Augustus, Livia was not only married to Tiberius Claudius Nero; she was also six months pregnant. Nevertheless, in 38 B.C., at the age of 25, the future emperor forced Nero to divorce his wife. In this way, Augustus finally became Livia Drusilla's husband" (Bardis, 1972 : 1, 11-13).

IV

Sex and the "Death" of the Family

Another argument involves sexual permissiveness. Indeed, according to Burgess (1974), a "continuous dialogue in the media has been taking place about a 'sexual revolution' that supposedly is replacing traditional values regarding sexual behaviour in the 1970's. Social scientists add to the confusion in that they, too, are widely divided pro and con on the issue."

Numerous empirical studies deal with this issue. In 1929, for example, a large sample of college women revealed that 11 percent of them had premarital coitus (Davis, 1929). Thirty years later, the corresponding percentage among Colorado college females was almost 15 (Ehrmann, 1959: 34). In 1969, a study including 21 American colleges indicated that 43 percent of the female subjects had premarital sex relations (Luckey and Nass, 1969:375). Two samples of women at the University of Colorado were represented by similar percentages namely, 44 had 41, respectively (Kaats and Davis, 1970). A report on college women in 1958 and 1968 gave the following percentages: for dating partners, 10 and 23; for those "going steady," 15 and 23; and for those who were engaged, 31 and 39 (Bell and Chaskes, 1970). In 1965, a large sample of British girls aged 15-19 revealed that 12 percent of them were not virgin (Schofield, 1965:38).

On the other hand, in a survey of female college students in Georgia, Robinson *et al.* (1968) found that premarital coitus had been experienced by 29 percent of the respondents, which, the authors assert, is not different from Kinsey's 1953 findings. Similarly, it has been stated that there has been no major change in this sphere since 1950: "There is a widespread belief that much has changed in terms of premarital sex behavior in the last 20 to 25 years. However, the evidence from all the available major studies is in strong agreement that although attitudes have changed considerably... many areas of sexual behavior, such as premarital coital rates, have not...Of course,

milder forms of premarital sexual behaviour have increased.... But this is not the major significance of the changes" (Reiss, 1966:125-126). Part of such disagreement may be explained by the fact that most of these studies have been based on samples that are not exactly comparable.

A more careful survey (Burgess, 1974) has supplied part of the answer to this difficult problem. According to Burgess, whose study involved American and Norwegian students, actual behavior, which was distinguished from stated attitudes, proved to be more conservative than the latter. Indeed, 25 percent of the American sample approved of abstinence before marriage, while 20 percent of the Norwegian respondents considered premarital coitus permissible as long as there is a physical attraction.

Then, there are various forces that influence sex behaviour, which forces must be explored more extensively and intensively if we are to view changes in this area more objectively and scientifically and less emotionally and ideologically. Helmsley and Broderick (1969), for example, have found that among whites the relationship between sexual permissiveness and religiosity has been high and negative.

Still, in general, it seems that a major sexual revolution generating the death of the family is nonexistent. According to Pierson and D'Antonio (1974:267, 278), "in the United States and in some other Western countries at least, a significant percentage of young people, both females and males, remain virgin during most of their adolescence." Moreover, "interviews with older adolescents indicate that group sex and group marriage have little appeal.... Casual sex, devoid of other social commitments, seems to be a prize of little value to this new generation of young people." And "membership in the Sexual Freedom League has not grown very much in recent years ...it hardly seems a threat to traditional sexual patterns."

And, once more, lack of historical information often tends to make a person conclude that even the most infinitesimal innovation constitutes a major and unique change that threatens the current social structure. An author has stated that our "sexual revolution" is "somewhat similar to those of Greece and Rome in about 300 B.C. and 300 A.D., respectively. Three basic differences must be mentioned, however. First, those revolutions were more gradual than ours. Second, sex and religion were closely related then. . . . A final difference must now be presented. It seems that, despite what some Cassandra's are prophesying, our greater knowledge of the medical and socio-psychological worlds of man will prevent catastrophes similar to those which history has witnessed" (Bardis, 1971b).

V

Communes and the "Death" of the Family

Modern communes of various types, as well as related experiments, have also been employed as an argument against family survival (W. and J. Breedlove, 1964 ; Bartell, 1971 ; Roberts, 1971 ; Horwitz, 1972).

But the Oneida Community, founded by John Noyes in 1848, with its system of "complex marriage" and sexual promiscuity, failed completely as early as 1880. The Bolshevik experiment, which considered the family an undesirable and obsolescent

social institution, and which made birth control, abortion, and divorce exceedingly easy, had an even shorter life—1917 to about 1935. In fact, the Soviet Union soon adopted traditional measures which strengthened the family. Similarly, the kibbutzim, which at first opposed marriage, later had to reverse their family policy (Taubin, 1974).

In the United States, during the 1930's, various other experiments were advocated. "Term marriage would have permitted a couple to marry for five years with an option for renewing for another ten years. If they elected to stay together they would be permanently married. Trial marriage would have permitted a couple to live together for a period of one year to see whether they were suited to one another. Companionate marriage would have made it possible for marriages to remain childless and would have accepted divorce by mutual consent. These were radical proposals, but they were not taken seriously by many people and they are almost forgotten today" (Leslie, 1973 : 147 ; cf. Bardis, 1974a). Leslie (1973 : 147-149) has also stated : "Today's communal living experiments may involve 20,000 people. . . and the people involved are tactically important beyond their numbers ; they are predominantly young, well educated, and potential leaders. . . On the other hand, there are few signs, yet, of significant long-term change. . . most of the individual groups are quite small and without stable organization. Many members remain with the group for only a few months to a year or two. The absence of a firm ideological base contributes to this transiency. . . Attempts to eliminate the family are relatively few, small, and short-lived." Other authors are equally skeptical : "Communes seem to be short-lived, even when pressures from the outside community do not hasten their disintegration" (Pierson and D'Antonio, 1974 : 278). Moreover, whether "the marriage is of group or communal structure, it seems that the chances for survival are increased if sexual interests are not the primary reason for the formation of the unit" (Pierson and D'Antonio, 1974 : 297).

V1

The Barramean Family

It appears, then, that the anti-family movement has been overrated. According to Whitehurst (1974), recent "discussion in the literature and among family professionals suggests a budding anti-family movement." But there is "no truly anti-family movement," despite the existence of the counterculture families that oppose traditional marriage. In fact, even the radical literature in no way was "found to be suggesting radical reform or abolition of the family unit. Most criticism. . . was deemed mild and cautious in its claims for needs for reformation of the family." Whitehurst wisely adds that we need "a positive and constructive approach. . . as a means of giving all possible aid to counterculture families and in turn learning from them all we can to make this new knowledge available to others." After reviewing the same literature, Pierson and D'Antonio (1974 : 310) conclude that "marriage continues to be a viable social institution, a satisfying form of social interaction and a human group with a future" (cf. N. and G. O'Neill, 1972 ; Otto, 1970). Moreover, in an impressive study dealing with values, a large sample of American males and females gave 18 terminal and 18

instrumental values. It is significant that the former category included "family security," and the latter "independence" (Rokeach, 1973). Even in the Israeli kibbutzim, there is now a tendency to emphasize the nuclear family and familism: the "rebellious teen-agers who set out to dissolve the nuclear family half a century ago are now 'the ancients' doting on their grandchildren and great grandchildren. The kibbutzim are experiencing the evolution of strong familism... and combined family and community responsibility for members. . . . The kibbutz federations estimate that about 15-20 percent of kibbutz-born youth leave kibbutz life" (Taubin, 1974).

Still, the general feeling seems to be that extreme individualism is rampant and regnant, and that familism is virtually nonexistent. Moreover, the author's own preliminary investigation of this subject revealed that immediate, superficial, and spontaneous reactions by a variety of persons indicated a fairly prevalent anti-family attitude of a *general* nature. Upon closer examination, however, it was realized that *specific* attitudes toward the family were characterized by a healthy combination of familism and individualism. It appears, then, that the fads and ephemerals that have misled even some social scientists have generated a superficial inconsistency among the masses, namely, desultory, perfunctory, and vociferous expressions of *general* anti-family attitudes, which are contradicted by more profound, intense and *specific* pro-family sentiments. It is such findings that have led to the formulation of the theory of the Borromean Family.

The main elements of this theory are as follows :

- (1) The human family, as its history suggests, is a viable, adaptable, tensile, and resilient social institution that can survive even major crises.
- (2) Human needs, which fluctuate according to the kinetic-potential theory, influence attitudes toward the family, and the family itself, accordingly.
- (3) In view of their physiological and socio-psychological needs, family members value their independence, often superficially exaggerating its actual extent, and thus achieving a certain amount of gratification through self-deception. This is similar to the seeming independence and apparent autonomy of the *Borromean rings*,¹ which are employed here merely as a striking analogy without implying any structural coincidence or functional identity between this interesting mathematical phenomenon and the family institution.
- (4) Still, as in the case of the Borromean rings, family members combine such independence with fairly strong ties and rather permanent bonds that create a lasting group with its own identity--the human family.
- (5) This theory explains the controversy between "anti-familists" and "pro-familists," since, in reality, both independence and familism are, to a certain extent each, present in modern societies. Thus, we now have a social insti-

1. The Borromean rings are a "configuration of interlocked rings The device appears in the coat of arms of the Borromeo, a famous Italian family in the Renaissance times; for this reason the rings are sometimes known as the Borromean rings. A peculiarity of the arrangement is that no two of the rings are linked, yet the group cannot be separated. If any single ring is broken and removed, it can be seen that the remaining two will not be connected (Marks, 1964:23).



tution that may be called the Borromean Family, whose individualistic elements are overestimated by some authors, and whose familistic features are exaggerated by others. Both sides seem to emphasize value judgments and ideological considerations at the expense of empirical data pertaining to this issue.

Since, as Rokeach (1973 : Part V) has demonstrated, it is both possible and fruitful to quantify individual and group values, the author has attempted to operationalize the concept of the Borromean Family by means of a double instrument that can supply us with such empirical data.

VII

Borromean Family Index : For Single Persons

The first of these instruments, the Borromean Family Index : For Single Persons (see Appendix A), was constructed on the basis of the reactions of part of a large, heterogeneous sample. The sample, which came from various parts of the United States, but primarily from the Midwest, consisted of whites and nonwhites ; males and females ; single and married persons ; children and parents ; teen-agers and adults ; Catholics, Jews, Protestants, and members of other faiths ; persons with a high school education or more ; and members of the lower, middle, and upper social classes.

The subjects were asked to list the five strongest forces that attracted them to their respective nuclear families (the family of orientation for single persons, and the family of procreation for married respondents), as well as the five strongest forces that pulled them away from those same families. In other words, these were internal and external attractions, or pro-family and anti-family values, sentiments, or attitudes.

When these responses were tabulated, the nine most frequently mentioned internal attractions pertaining to single persons, and the nine most frequently mentioned external attractions also pertaining to single persons, were selected for one of the two final indices, that is, the Borromean Family Index : For Single Persons. This index thus consists of two parts, one pro-family and one anti-family.

Since each item is represented by a value on a 5-point scale (0-4), the score for each of the two parts of the index equals the sum total of the nine numerical responses. In this way, the theoretical range of scores is 0-36. Ideal-typically, then, for the internal attractions section, 0 means most anti-family, and 36 most pro-family, whereas, for the external attractions part, 0 means most pro-family, and 36 most anti-family.

A. *Validity.* The validity (Blalock, 1972 : 13-14) of the index was tested through the reactions of various heterogeneous samples to the Bardis Familism Scale (Bardis, 1971a). Since this scale consists of two parts, only the subjects' responses to the nuclear family section were correlated with the internal and external parts of the Borromean Family Index. The findings were as follows :

- (1) A sample of 30 : internal Borromean versus nuclear familism :
Pearson $r = .88$ (Bailey, 1971 : 551, 600-602). With 28 degrees of freedom, this value was significant beyond the .001 level (Arkin and Colton,

1962 : 24, 155).

- (2) A sample of 35 : internal Borromean versus nuclear familism :
 $r=.81$, $df=33$, $P<.001$.
- (3) A sample of 28 : external Borromean versus nuclear familism :
 $r=-.93$, $df=26$, $P<.001$.
- (4) A sample of 40 : external Borromean versus nuclear familism :
 $r=-.85$, $df=38$, $P<.001$.

B. *Reliability*. Other samples provided data for the reliability tests (Garrett, 1966 : 337-354) of the index :

- (1) Internal Borromean :
 - (a) Split-half (Moser and Kalton, 1972 : 354-355) : a sample of 30 :
 $r=.85$, corrected r by means of the Spearman-Brown prophecy formula (Roscoe, 1969 : 103) $=.92$, $df=28$, $P<.001$.
 - (b) Odd-even (Roscoe, 1969 : 105) : a sample of 40 : corrected $r=.88$, $df=38$, $P<.001$.
- (2) External Borromean :
 - (a) Split-half : a sample of 30 : corrected $r=.80$, $df=28$, $P<.001$.
 - (b) Odd-even : a sample of 30 : corrected $r=.79$, $df=28$, $P<.001$.
- (3) Entire Borromean Index : test-retest (Young and Schmid, 1966 : 376) :
 - (a) sample of 40 : $r=.90$, $df=38$, $P<.001$.

VIII

Borromean Family Index : For Married Persons

The second index (see Appendix B) was constructed in exactly the same way, except for two differences : first, only married subjects were included ; and second, this index deals with the family of procreation. Therefore, the 5-point scale, scoring, the theoretical range of scores, and their meaning are the same as in the case of the first index.

The validity and reliability of the second instrument, which were tested similarly, were as follows :

A. Validity.

- (1) A sample of 30 : internal Borromean versus nuclear familism :
 $r=.77$, $df=28$, $P<.001$.
- (2) A sample of 30 : internal Borromean versus nuclear familism :
 $r=.86$, $df=28$, $P<.001$.
- (3) A sample of 30 : external Borromean versus nuclear familism :
 $r=-.90$, $df=28$, $P<.001$.
- (4) A sample of 30 : external Borromean versus nuclear familism :
 $r=-.82$, $df=28$, $P<.001$.

B. *Reliability.*

- (1) Internal Borromean :
 - (a) Split-half : a sample of 35 : corrected $r=.87$, $df=33$, $P<.001$.
 - (b) Odd-even : a sample of 35 : corrected $r=.80$, $df=33$, $P<.001$.
- (2) External Borromean :
 - (a) Split-half : a sample of 35 : corrected $r=.91$, $df=33$, $P<.001$.
 - (b) Odd-even : sample of 35 : corrected $r=.84$, $df=33$, $P<.001$.
- (3) Entire Borromean Index : test-retest : a sample of 30 : $r=.83$, $df=286$ $P<.001$.

IX

Borromean Typology

The data collected by means of both of these indices have facilitated the development of a typology of Borromean families.

First of all, since the theoretical range of scores on each Borromean half is 0-3 it was easy to divide each internal and external section into three equal parts, namely:

<i>Internal</i>	<i>External</i>
High=25-36	High=25-36
Middle=13-24	Middle=13-24
Low=0-12	Low=0-12

Then, the terms *cohesive* and *adhesive*² were employed to describe four of the above types. The former refers to pro-family attitudes or values, plus a considerable degree of ideological homogeneity within the family concerning this institution (personal interviews have revealed much agreement between Borromean scores and corresponding family types). The latter term, on the other hand, represents anti-family values or attitudes, plus substantial ideological heterogeneity within the family. This gives us the following :

<i>Cohesive</i>	<i>Adhesive</i>
Internal High	Internal Low
External Low	External High

Finally, when the three internal and three external levels are combined, we have nine possible types (3X3). Two of these, however, should be omitted, since they do not, or should not, occur in the empirical world. These are Internal High-External

2. Cohesion and adhesion actually represent different degrees of pro-family attraction. Here we also have the elements of homogeneity and heterogeneity. This partly justifies the analogy referring to physics, where cohesion is the molecular attraction of like substances (e.g., glass plus glass), and adhesion the molecular attraction of unlike substances (e.g., glass plus water) (Brunauer and Copeland, 1967 : 3-93).

High and Internal Low-External Low, both of which are inconsistent and self-contradictory. Indeed, the countless data thus far collected have never fallen within these categories. Below are four fairly typical samples of single and married subjects, together with their internal and external Borromean mean scores :

- (1) Single : internal 22.90, external 19.43.
- (2) Single : internal 21.76, external 15.23.
- (3) Married : internal 30.71, external 6.86.
- (4) Married : internal 28.97, external 9.15.

The remaining categories are as follows :

- (1) Internal Semi-Cohesive Borromean Family : Internal High-External Middle.
- (2) Cohesive Borromean Family : Internal High-External Low.
- (3) External Semi-Adhesive Borromean Family : Internal Middle-External High.
- (4) Borromean Family : Internal Middle-External Middle.
- (5) External Semi-Cohesive Borromean Family : Internal Middle-External Low.
- (6) Adhesive Borromean Family : Internal Low-External High.
- (7) Internal Semi-Adhesive Borromean Family : Internal Low-External Middle.

X

Conclusion

In brief, the debate concerning the obsolescence or death of the family institution has been dominated by value judgments and indological arguments at the expense of empirical evidence. The author has, therefore, introduced the concept of the Borromean Family, and constructed two Borromean Family Indices, which have been found to be both valid and reliable. The empirical data thus far collected by means of these new instruments have led to the following preliminary conclusions and suggestions for further research :

- (1) People do not really believe that the family is obsolescent. On the contrary, their values and attitudes indicate that this institution is quite viable and resilient.
- (2) In our modern world, it seems that the Borromean Family is becoming prevalent, that is, the form now emphasized by most people includes a healthy combination of independence and familism.
- (3) Single persons appear to stress a greater balance between familism and individualism.
- (4) Married people, on the other hand, experience much stronger attractions to their respective families.
- (5) The Borromean Indices may easily be employed in teaching, thus encouraging discussion dealing with the changing family.

- (6) The instruments may also be used profitably by counselors in various relevant fields.
- (7) The Borromean theory may promote our understanding of both traditional and counterculture families, and thus diminish the emotional component of the current debate dealing with the obsolescence of the family institution. Needless to add, both sides may find a less emotional approach mutually helpful.
- (8) Additional knowledge thus secured will facilitate the adjustment of the human family to a perpetually changing world.
- (9) Such knowledge will be more valuable if we conduct systematic research and compare Borromean scores with variables such as sex, age, occupation, education, religiosity, family size, and so forth.
- (10) Finally, longitudinal studies may give us additional insight into social change.

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APPENDIX A

Bartomean Family Index ; For Single Persons

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This instrument deals with your attitudes and feelings about *your own family* (*father, mother, brothers, sisters*). Please read *all* statements *very carefully* and respond to *all* of them on the basis of *your own true feelings without* consulting any other persons. Do this by reading each statement and then writing, in the space provided at its left, *only one* of the following numbers : 0, 1, 2, 3, 4. The meaning of each of these figures is :

- 0 : Absent.
- 1 : Very weak.
- 2 : Weak.
- 3 : Strong.
- 4 : Very strong.

(For research purposes, you must consider all statements as they are, without changing any of them in any way.)

Forces That Attract You to Your Family

(Remember : 0 means a force does not attract you to your family at all ; 1 means the attraction is very weak ; 2 means weak ; 3, strong ; and 4, very strong.)

- 1. Family love.
- 2. The fact that we are related.
- 3. Financial help I receive.
- 4. Freedom to express myself.
- 5. My family understands me.
- 6. Family advice about problems.
- 7. Physical comforts (cooking, laundry, and so forth).
- 8. A feeling of responsibility for my family.
- 9. Companionship.

Forces That Pull You Away from Your Family

(Remember : 0 means a force does not pull you away from your family at all ; 1 means the pull is very weak ; 2 means weak ; 3, strong ; and 4, very strong.)

- 1. Family problems.
- 2. Friends outside my family.

- 3. My job.
- 4. School responsibilities.
- 5. A desire for financial independence.
- 6. I want freedom from family control.
- 7. A desire for privacy.
- 8. Difference between my ideas and those of my family.
- 9. Looking for a mate.

You may add a comment concerning your feelings about your family :

(Scoring : the sum of the first 9 numerical responses represent the internal attraction score, while that of the remaining 9 items is the external attraction score. Theoretical range for internal : 0, least pro-family, to 36, most pro-family ; external : 0, most pro-family, to 36, least pro-family.)

APPENDIX B

Borromean Family Index : For Married Persons

Panos D. Bardis

Toledo University, Toledo, Ohio, USA

This instrument deals with your attitudes and feelings about *your own family (spouse and children, if any)*. Please read *all* statements *very carefully* and respond to *all* of them on the basis of *your own true feelings without* consulting any other persons. Do this by reading each statement and then writing, in the space provided at its left, *only one* of the following numbers : 0, 1, 2, 3, 4. The meaning of each of these figures is :

- 0 : Absent.
- 1 : Very weak.
- 2 : Weak.
- 3 : Strong.
- 4 : Very strong.

(For research purposes, you must consider all statements as they are, without changing any of them in any way.)

Forces That Attract You to Your Family

(Remember : 0 means a force does not attract you to your family at all ; 1 means the attraction is very weak ; 2 means weak ; 3, strong ; and 4, very strong.)

- 1. Family love.
- 2. Physical attraction to my spouse.
- 3. Common interests.
- 4. Communication.
- 5. Companionship.
- 6. Physical comforts of home.
- 7. Financial sharing.
- 8. A feeling of responsibility for my family.
- 9. My attitude is that having children and caring for them usually makes a family happier (0 means such an attitude is absent. . . , 4 means very strong).

Forces That Pull You Away from Your Family

(Remember : 0 means a force does not pull you away from your family at all ; 1 means the pull is very weak ; 2 means weak ; 3, strong ; and 4, very strong.)

- 1. Too many social activities.

- 2. Sexual maladjustment with my spouse.
- 3. Personality clashes with my spouse.
- 4. My career or job.
- 5. Financial problems.
- 6. House chores.
- 7. Physical attraction to an outsider.
- 8. I want freedom family responsibilities.
- 9. My attitude is that having children and caring for them is undesirable (0 means such an attitude is absent, . . . , 4 means very strong).

You may add a comment concerning your feelings about your family :

(Scoring : the sum of the first 9 numerical responses represents the internal attraction score, while that of the remaining 9 items is the external attraction score. Theoretical range for internal : 4, least pro-family, to 36, most pro-family ; external : 0, most pro-family, to 36, least pro-family.)

Integral Approach in Contemporary Indian Philosophy

The author of this article is convinced that integral approach is the only sound philosophy for man in his individual as well as collective life. It is the proper perspective for understanding individual and social problems. It is characteristic of man, due to his peculiar nature and his status in the cosmic scheme of things.

Inter-disciplinary Approach in Social Sciences

It is now being more and more realised in the field of social sciences that the complex problems such as the nature of man cannot be studied by any one science or by different sciences separately. Thus interdisciplinary approach is being utilised to understand such problems. Man's behavior cannot be understood purely by biological, psychological or social perspective. It requires a Bio-Psycho-Sociological approach. Human personality can be understood in total perspective.¹ Human life can be understood by a global view. This interdisciplinary approach is the integral method in science with the characteristic limitations of scientific method.

Integral Approach in Philosophy : Author's Position

Philosophical activity is synoptic. Speculative behavior involves man's search for harmony with the world around him and with the cosmos. The philosophical system is the outcome of the philosopher's search for an all round understanding of cosmos and his own place in it. Whatever may be its limitations, system building is natural to man. And the more comprehensive a philosophical vision is the more wise it is for man. Experience is the basis of all philosophy. The more integral the experience, the more integral will be the philosophy based upon it. Philosophy should find place for all types of experiences, sensual, religious, occult, vital, spiritual etc. Integral reality

1. Sharma, R.N., *Quest for X In Human Personality*, Psychological Researches, No. 2, 1966.

satisfies our whole being. A true philosophy is a philosophy of affirmation. A catholic and synthetic approach is the need of the time. Philosophy should be close to life. It should bridge the gulf between man and man and man and nature. The widest and the most comprehensive seeing is the wisest one. Logic must be based on experience. Methods should change according to the type of enquiry. In science, philosophy, religion, psychology or any other field of human knowledge the integral theory should give place for all other theories, show their limitations and weld them all in an integral whole. Different branches of human knowledge need not conflict among themselves. Philosophy should present a "Weltanschauung" which justifies the truth of each branch of knowledge.²

Integral Approach in Contemporary Western Philosophy

This integral approach in philosophy is characteristic of the present evolutionary stage of man's speculative activity. It is hence that many philosophers in the West are working on similar lines. The organicism of Archie J. Balam is an example of such a thinking. The word organicism, however, exhibits biological bias. Integralism is a better word for it signifies not only a philosophical view-point for the academician but a perspective for the layman as well. In fact it can be applied in all the fields of human knowledge. Onesidedness and limitation is characteristic of human ignorance. On the other hand, the more he proceeds towards the ideal of integralism, the nearer he is to reality and knowledge. The success of man's life lies in living integrally, in depth as well as on surface, horizontally as well as vertically. The validity of the integral approach is derived from the complex and multisided nature of man, from the wide variety of his needs, from the distinction of various levels on which he lives and from his status between beast and God.³

Integral Approach in Contemporary Indian Philosophy

This integral approach is characteristic of the thinking of most of the contemporary Indian Philosophies. "The work of philosophy" maintains Sri Aurobindo, "is to arrange the data given by the various means of knowledge, excluding none, and put them into synthetic relation to one truth, the one supreme and universal reality."⁴ Similar quotations can be traced in the works of Radhakrishnan, Vivekananda, Ramkrishna, Tagore, Gandhi and Bhagwandas. This is because all these contemporary Indian philosophers have acclaimed ancient Vedanta philosophy as the basis of their philosophical ideas. They are all neo-vedantins and the Vedanta philosophy is characteristically monistic, idealistic and integral. The integral spirit has been characteristic of not only the philosophic thinking of these thinkers but also of their multisided life involving not only religious and philosophical activity but also intense activity in social and political fields. Most of them have been great social reformers and political

2. Sharma, R.N., *The Philosophy of Sri Aurobindo*, Introduction, pp. XVII-XVIII.

3. Sharma, R.N., *Problematic Treatment of Western Philosophy*, (Hindi) Chapter on 'Integralism' pp. 322-323.

4. Sri Aurobindo, *The Renaissance in India*, p. 72.

leaders, religious saints and thinkers.

Idealistic Metaphysics

Most of the contemporary Indian philosophies are idealistic. Sri Aurobindo, Vivekanand, Radhakrishnan, Tagore, Gandhi and Bhagwandas all interpreted the world as the play and evolution of spirit. Matter, life, mind are the manifestations of the spirit in the world. Spirit is not a substance but life itself. In the words of Radhakrishnan, "It is the basis and background of our being, the universality that cannot be reduced to this or that formula."² The self, God and *Absolute* are all names of the one universal spirit in different aspects. Thus the most characteristic feature of the spirit is its integrality. It leaves nothing out of its ken. It integrates all, it permeates everything. In order to know it we must look to life from all sides, gross as well as refined, higher as well as lower, primitive as well as civilised.

Spiral Evolution

Contemporary Indian philosophers believe in the evolutionary explanation of creation. They, however, reject linear, dialectical, emergent and creative theories as one sided. Evolution according to Sri Aurobindo, Radhakrishnan and Bhagwandas is spiral in nature. To quote Bhagwandas, "The words 'evolution' and 'in-volution' embody, with 'instinctive' correctness, the idea that these processes are 'forth and back', circling and cycling in a spiral."³ Spiral evolution includes what Sri Aurobindo has called ascent and descent. It admits order as well as emergence, eternity as well as continuity. In it each higher level includes the lower and also transcends it. This spiral is the integral movement characteristic of the spirit.

Intuitive Method in Philosophy

While pointing out the limitations of empirical, rational and critical method in philosophy and accepting their limited value, the contemporary Indian philosophers have utilised intuitive method in philosophy because spiritual intuition is the only method to delve deep into the recesses of spirit. The self can be known only through spiritual intuition. Sri Aurobindo, Radhakrishnan and Bhagwandas have distinguished spiritual intuition from mental, vital and physical or instinctive intuition. To quote Bhagwandas, "It is the immediate cognition, or rather awareness of the self by the self, eternal self consciousness."⁴ According to Radhakrishnan, "The deepest things of life are known only through intuitive apprehension."⁵ Sri Aurobindo, Radhakrishnan and Bhagwandas, to mention only three of the contemporary Indian philosophers have, however, admitted the role of reason in life and thought. As a higher instrument of knowledge, intuition does not negate but fulfils the lower instruments such as

2. S. Radhakrishnan, *An Idealist View of Life*, p. 205.

3. Bhagwandas, *The Science of the Self*, p. 44.

4. *Ibid.*, p. 137, Footnote.

5. Radhakrishnan, S., *An Idealist View of Life*, p. 242.

*Integral Perspective of Human Personality and Education.*¹³

The contemporary Indian philosophers have looked to human personality from an integral perspective to discover the kernel which is often missed by social sciences. They emphasised the spiritual aspect of man as an integrating principle which alone can boost his future evolution. It is because of an integral theory of human nature that Sri Aurobindo, Radhakrishnan, Tagore, Gandhi and Bhagwandas have advocated a multisided scheme of education including physical, moral and religious education. Again, they have visualised a national system of education true to the spirit of Indian culture, in spite of incorporating latest scientific truths. "The aim and principle of a true national education," said Sri Aurobindo, "is not certainly to ignore modern truth and knowledge but to take our foundation on our own belief, our own mind, our own spirit."¹³

Harmony of Nationalism and Internationalism

Sri Aurobindo, Radhakrishnan, Bhagwandas, Gandhi and Vivekanand have been the leaders of the rise of nationalism in India. They have relentlessly criticised and opposed foreign rule in India. They have everywhere pleaded for swadeshi and swadharma. Sri Aurobindo gave a crushing reply to western attacks on Indian culture. Radhakrishnan counteracted Western attacks on Indian philosophy. Gandhi launched political movement of Swadeshi. Bhagwandas, comparing ancient Indian socialism with its modern Western counterpart, pointed out the virtues of Indian system. And yet all these strongly supported internationalism and the ideal of world brotherhood. It was because of their integral perspective of social and political philosophy in which the higher does not contradict the lower but fulfils it. "The wider patriotism," to quote Radhakrishnan, "does not supersede but embraces the narrower patriotism."¹⁴ Tagore, the poet of Indian nationalism established a truly international university at Vishwabharati, Sri Aurobindo established an international university at Pondicherry.

Meeting of Extreme

tures, Upanishads and Gita. They revived ancient vedanta philosophy in modern garb. They synthesised spiritual truths with scientific discoveries. They pleaded for a meeting of Eastern and Western culture and religion. They advocated a world government and a world state, so that humanity may march in its onward progress as one solid community. They reconciled modern activism with ancient ideals of renunciation. Thus in meta physics, epistemology, psychology, ethics, religion, education, social and political thought Sri Aurobindo, Tagore, Vivekanand, Gandhi, Bhagwandas and Radhakrishnan have maintained integral approach, the only proper perspective for the future speculative activity of man. The present very brief note only touches the broad outlines of this integral approach in contemporary Indian philosophy. The job of presenting it in all its intricacies and details has been left for the future researchers.

*Everyday Life in Literature and
Psychological Research*

can hope to gather data on a prerepresentative sample of subjects in the same detail and develop measurements which enable us to make use of this information? And how can psychology ever hope to be able to observe the stream of behavior going on covertly and overtly in the individual during one day in this continuity as described by James Joyce?

1. *Psychology and Average Day Behavior*

Some sociologists, psychiatrists and psychologists have chosen the middle road between challenge and threat: they do not try to compete with James Joyce regarding amount of information gathered on one day. However they accept Joyce's principle "put all space in a nutshell". "All space" is equivalent here with the whole biography, "nutshell" equivalent with the behavior record of one day. Therefore they believe that the behavior of an individual on an average day can be regarded as a sample somewhat more representative for his behavior during longer units of his life history than those behavior segments which are measured by tests or questionnaires. It should be mentioned here, that sociologists are using the daily round interview for cross national studies, on time budgets or for measuring the degree of social participation in the different age groups. It more and more is being used in psychological research also.

Some Neo-Marxist psychologists like K. Holzkamp (1971) blame traditional experimental psychology for not taking into account man's everyday behavior. He even states that the relevance of any psychological approach should be evaluated in the frame of reference of "everyday life" (1970, p. 118). However as he does not know anything of the recent developments regarding the assessment of everyday behavior he believes that only a new Marxian philosophy can offer psychology a chance to come closer to "everyday life".

2. *Methodological Problems*

From these more recent developments in this approach we can regard the method of the daily round assessment as a compromise between the principles of measurement within controlled settings and the aim of gaining information on the behavior of the average man within his social life. Barker and his co-workers (1963) demonstrated the value of this approach for the ecology of children's and adolescent's behavior. Instead of relying on the subjects' reports he used a team of observers who followed the actions of a small sample of subjects during a day. Furthermore he demonstrated that these behaviour record can be analysed in an objective way and that measurements of different aspects of these behavioural records can be developed.

There exist, however, several obstacles in following an adolescent or adult in all his activities during one day. Therefore Lehr and Bonn (1974) in a study on ecological aspects of development during adolescence used the interview on the "behaviour on an average day". The same method was used by Paulsickhoff (1965) in psychiatric studies and by the author (1968) for the elaboration of a cognitive theory of personality.

One of the major objections against the use of the interview method refers to its lack of reliability and validity. The reliability problem can be solved by adapting

interview and evaluation procedures to principles of objective measurement. The validity problem, however, does not longer exist if we apply principles of cognitive theory of personality. As, according to this theory behaviour is a dependent variable of the situation as perceived by the individual (Baldwin 1969, Thomae 1968/1973) a record of perceptions of an individual's behaviour during an average day can be regarded as a useful instrument for the assessment of those systems which influence his decisions and reactions.

Following the instructions as applied in the Kansas City Study (Cumming & Henry 1959, Tobin & Neugarten 1963) we gathered taped interviews on average days of app. 500 men and women (age 40-75 years). Whereas in the American studies mentioned the daily round interview was used to measure degree and quality of social participation in different age groups we tried to analyse these reports in terms of formal aspects of behaviour and perceived qualities of the situation.

3. *Formal Aspects of Every Day Behaviour*

Several approaches to comparative analysis of small, medium and long behaviour units (i.e., single actions, behaviour during an average day, behaviour during a life stage or during a socially defined life episode) point to 6-10 dimensions of the formal aspects which can be applied to each of these units (Thomae 1968). These dimensions are products of reductionism if we compare them with the huge variety of changes in formal aspects of Bloom's behaviour as reported by James Joyce. They are very global descriptions of these aspects of the behaviour of average men and women as studied by psychologists. However, in James Joyce's novel as well as in systematic interviews of the daily round there can be observed at least these dimensions, which we defined in a bipolar way :

- rest—activity
- uniformity—variability
- low—high ego-involvement
- not open to demands of situation—open to demands of any situation present
- unbalance—balance
- dependence—independence
- low—high stability
- low—high centralisation

The content analyses of the tape-recorded interviews were done by two raters independently who obtained a 90% agreement.

One of these analyses refers to reports given by middle class employees (age 40-55 years) on their average day. The ratings were done separately for working hours and leisure time. It turned out that perceived formal aspects of everyday life did not differentiate generally between these two sections of the day who are as different as possible if we define them in terms of S-R-psychology, that is from the objective situation. At least in this middle class sample there exists an almost normal distribution regarding this similarity or difference of perceived formal aspects during working hours

respectively leisure time.

The degree of difference in the perceived behavioral streams during these sections of the day is dependent on variables observed in quite different parts of the interview or even on different days. General satisfaction with job, perceived congruence between desired and attained goals, and perceived balance of the life situation generally are more often related to small differences between the scores of the two parts of the day. As most of these employees were working in lower supervisory positions the variation of these differences cannot be explained by the objective situation (or the stimulus pattern).

It can be explained only by reference to the individual worlds who enter the daily behaviour and interact with each other in the same close or distant way as the heroes and semi-heroes of Joyce's novels.

A second analysis was done of reports on daily life behavior of retired workers. For this evaluation the separation of scores for leisure and non-leisure time was not possible. The scores for the formal aspects of perceived everyday behaviour were correlated to a set of variables measuring different personality, health, and social characteristics of these subjects during the last 2 years. The majority of these informations again was forwarded by interviews which were taken at a different day than the daily round interview.

Perceived activity on average days correlated to a significant degree with education, SES, frequency of part-time jobs, perceived stress in job during the last 2 years as well as ten years ago, active coping with economic situation, and positive attitude toward future.

Perceived independence of own behaviour during an average day was correlated with satisfactory social contacts in family, clubs and with neighbours and with questionnaire data on positive attitude toward future. Those subjects who reported that they become active more "independently" (from own initiative) reported of better health, of lower readiness to social adjustment; they did not wait for help from others in problem situations (e.g., financial situation).

High ego-involvement as perceived by the subjects in the report of their everyday behaviour was correlated most closely to the feeling of being needed. The same was true for the intensity of family contacts and degree of activity and responsiveness as rated by trained psychologists who observed these subjects during one week. Persons, who showed in their report on their everyday behaviour that they perceived this behaviour stream as well balanced were more often of higher social status, lived in more-person-noushöfus, had a high satisfaction score regarding their roles as parent, grandparent and as spouse. They, too, had a better performance at a multiple-choice-reaction test where speed of information processing was required.

This last correlation was found, too, for the dimension "openness to the situation". Those persons, who perceived their behaviour during an average day more closely related to the requirements of the different situations reacted more efficiently in this high-speed multiple-choice reaction test. They also had a higher *Wais*-score and were rated by observers as more adjusted than the persons who reported of less "open to the situation" behavioral series. In interviews related to the way how these persons cope with problem situations it became evident that the high-scores in openness-to-the-

situation behaviour on average days prefer more rational coping techniques, but they rely also on their ability to adjust to the needs and preferences of others.

Perceived Life Space and SES

The same formal dimensions as described before can be used also for the assessment of perceived life space given in interviews on daily life. Lehr and Bonn (1974) in their study on adolescents found that upper middle class adolescents did not perceive their life space as more 'open', i.e., free of external restrictions than lower middle class students. This was explained mainly in terms of stress within the German high school system. Contrary to widely held views the same evaluations of daily round data point to a higher degree of disturbance and frustration in the daily lives of UMC adolescents. The life space of LMC adolescents was perceived as more monotonous, however as more well-balanced than that of UMC adolescents.

While this finding points to the possibilities of the daily round method in raising new issues concerning SES-personality relationships there are other ones which confirm previously held views. Just to mention one: there exists a higher degree of family centeredness of the daily life of LMS-adolescents. On the other hand the average day of UMC adolescents pointed to a greater extension of the perceived life space—although it was stressful and frustrating.

Findings like these might help in specifying theories of adolescence in terms of the structure of the life space as formulated by Kurt Lewin (1941).

Self Perception During Average Days

From many other findings emerging from the systematic evaluation of daily life records we should like to mention those concerning the dynamics of self perception. The many changes in formal and content aspects of self perceptions as verbalized in interviews on an average day as well as in an assessment of Joyce's 'Ulysses' raise some questions concerning the stability of the self-concept as assessed by questionnaire methods. They support a theory of personality like that of Walter Mischel (1973) which emphasizes the idiosyncratic organization of behaviour within individuals (1973, p. 255). The abstraction of self-concepts from records on average-day behaviour has its limits due to the situation-specific modifications of these perceptions. Therefore any trait-oriented theory of personality becomes doubtful in terms of the continuous however ever changing stream of behaviour during one day as delineated by Joyce in his *Ulysses* and as becoming evident in any careful assessment of taped interviews on daily rounds.

We might show this, too, in terms of a thematic analysis of different episodes in James Joyce's book and in psychological records on average day behaviour; we might point to the scientific as well as the applied value of the daily round methods from findings which compare the 'life space' of employed and non-employed mothers (Lehr 1969) or of those, which point to the different structuration of the average day of patients whose behaviour is very food-centered (and who get over-weight therefore U and those who are not).

Conclusion

The different theoretical as well the applied uses of the daily round method can demonstrate how a medium sized unit of Biography like the daily round can serve as a frame of reference for psychology. Even if there was no direct contact between Joyce and William James the idea of the continuous stream of consciousness with its cataracts and ever changing manifestations is the same here and there. And in some of the detailed descriptions of Bloom's behaviour (e.g., before going to bed) we get an idea what other human kind of behaviorism is possible even if the Watsonian conception of it cannot be approached. But especially it is a certain idea of man which is common to Joyce and this humane kind of behaviourism. It is the idea of a being which exists in the movement from one moment (morning) to another through many episodes and changes. We may conceive constructs by which we abstract from these movements and changes or we may apply techniques by which we eliminate these changes by defining them as error variations. However the final challenge of Joyce's *Ulysses* to psychology is defined by specific dynamics of human nature to which it points.

We can behave like rigorous psychologists and evaluate this idea of man as 'literature' (i.e., nothing worthwhile for a psychologist). On the other hand, there have been many changes in our own science which enable us to see that this challenge can become stimulating in designing methods and in formulating theories regarding personality.

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The Concept of Unreality

1. System, Method and Language

In discussing the meaning of reality, it involves (a) *The Question of System*—a variety of metaphysical systems are inevitable, like idealism, realism, transcendentalism etc. (b) *The Question of Method*—a variety of methods are involved, like inductive, deductive, intuitive etc. (c) *The Question of Language*—a variety of methods of intelligibility are involved, like verbal, symbolical and language of silence.

In any case, inquiry into the nature of reality is involved and in every case of such an inquiry into the nature of reality, some sort of criterion is involved.

2. Reality and its Criterion

The question as to what is reality depends upon what we understand by reality. Any reply can be framed only from a particular viewpoint.¹ The meaning of metaphysics implies a metaphysics² and the meaning that we ascribe to metaphysics is our own meaning. So ultimately the reality is our own interpretation of the real. Everybody, except a consistent sceptic who must be nothing short of solipsist of the present moment³ would assert : "Nothing is real", or "there is no reality". In fact, he would believe nothing and affirm nothing.

The opposite view would be that of the Objectivist, to whom, "Everything is real." However, there are others who would say that "There is reality behind the appearances". This means that all that is "real" and all that "appears to be" belong

1. Deenen, D A, *A Modern Introduction to Metaphysics* (Glencoe, Free Press, 1963), p. 1.
2. Marmas, L.N., "The Meaning of Metaphysics" *Indian Philosophical Annual* (Madras, Centre of Advanced Study in Philosophy, 1963), vol III p. 192.
3. Datta, D M., *The Chief Currents of Contemporary Philosophy* (University of Calcutta, 1961, 2nd ed.), pp. 346-351 esp. "consistent idealism, in short, must be nothing short of 'solipsism of the present moment', both in theory and practice".

to two distinct categories of things. However, to yet another class of people, "what appears to be real is only real". This perhaps means that something is taken to be real if it fulfils a certain criterion assumed by us.⁴ These criteria might be opposed or even contradictory to each other. Let us consider a few of these important criteria here :

- (a) Anything is real which is beyond spatio-temporal conditions.
- (b) Anything is real only in a spatio-temporal position.
- (c) Anything is real which is normally perceived.
- (d) Anything is real what is unrelated.

It seems that the reality is sought to be distinguished from unreality. Real, therefore, implies non-real or unreal. The question of 'what is' is inseparable from the idea of 'what is not'. Thus unreality is as natural to thought as the reality.

3. The Concept of Unreality

But the Concept of unreality is more difficult to define than reality, because the concept of unreality is a negative concept and hence it is more ambiguous and vague. Popularly, we conceive of Being or Reality as filling a void,—which we call as "Nothing". Thus real exists within unreal as milk fills the empty bottle or the sugar fills the empty gunny bag. Thus we cannot conceive of the reality without the unreality. In this sense the concept of unreality is prior to reality. In any way, the concept of unreality is wider than reality. However, there are thinkers who think that the reality is self-sufficient and the idea of unreality has no content. It is a word without a meaning,⁵ hence it is called a conventional idea or an intellectual myth. This is the view of thinkers like Bergson. But if we accept this position, there will be difficulties in reconciling "reality as meaning" with "reality as creative", for the reality as becoming points to an insufficiency. Then, reality is not 'meaning' but 'meanings'.⁶ Hence, we have to accept unreality and reality as implying each other. The concept of unreality is inseparable from the question 'what is unreal?' The idea of "what is" necessarily implies "what is not".

4. Differential of Unreality

However, the concept of unreality is often confounded and confused with many other notions, such as (a) with contradiction (b) Untruth (c) Appearance (d) Śūnya or Void (e) uneternity etc. Let us examine.

5. Unreality and Contradiction

The notion of unreality must be distinguished from the notion of contradiction

4. Compare G.R. Malkani's statement "Reality would not be the reality it is but for the interpretation it received from me"—*A Study of Reality* (Amalner The Indian Institute of Philosophy, 1927), p. 4.

5. Majkani, G.R., *The Problem of Nothing* (Amalner, I.I.P., 1918), p. 13.

6. Bergson, H., *Creative Evolution*, p. 315.

or inconsistency. There is contradiction, where we characterise the one with the property of the other. For example, "the child of a barren woman" or "Sky-lotus" or "Circular triangle" are contradictory. They cannot be thought of even. They are neither actual nor possible. There is no consistency between one idea and another idea, less to speak between idea and object. In these cases, the thought-constructs are unmeaningful and hence no proof is necessary to repudiate them. They are unacceptable on thought-level. However, the concept of unreality is not so.⁷ They are there so long as the concept of reality is there, because we know that there is no reality that explains itself. Every reality is conceivable only in the background of some unreality.

6. Unreality and Untruth

Then the notion of unreality has to be distinguished from the notion of untruth or falsehood.⁸ For example, when I wilfully make a false statement that "Mohan dies" to create a rumour, others are bound to be deceived but I shall remain unaffected, because I know that this is false. The fact of "Mohan being dead" cannot be real, for it is not affirmed by me in sincerity. Hence, the question of this statement being 'unreal' does not arise. This is not a question of unreality but untruth or wilful falsehood. Unreality only appertains to an object of actual experience, and not to something that never assumes even the semblance of reality for us.⁹

7. Unreality and Appearance

Appearance is not reality, it is illusion or wrong perception. It is neither real nor unreal. For example, when we see a snake in a piece of rope, it is appearance but we cannot say it is nothing. At least, something *positive appears*. There is superimposition of the snake upon the rope. Appearance seems to be real and genuine so long as it is not contradicted by some better evidence. But unreality only appertains to an object or actual experience, and not to something that never assumes the form of reality to us. Unreality, in other words, refers to the realm of actual experience; appearance appertains to the world of *māyā*. "Reality is the correlation of knowledge. It is that which is known."¹⁰ Apart from our knowledge, there can be no distinction between reality, and unreality, being and non-being. It is true that objective illusions are universally accepted but not so the subjective illusions but it is wrong because of our experiences. While they characterise the subject, have also a necessary reference to the object. The subjective stands or falls with the objective.¹¹ We can therefore sum up that the concept of unreality should not be confounded with the concept of appearance.

7. Malkani, G.R., *A Study of Reality*, p. 20.

8. *Ibid.*, p. 20.

9. *Ibid.*, p. 22.

10. Malkani, G.R., *Vedantic Epistemology* (Amalner, II, P., 1953), p. 95.

11. Malkani, G.R., "The Philosophy of Advaitism" in a *Life Sketch of Srivastava Pratap Sethi* (Amalner, I.I.P., 1945) p. 91.

8. Unreality and Void

Sometimes the concept of unreality is confounded with the concept of void, Zero or *Śūnya*. In his four-cornered dialectics, Nāgārjuna says that the conception of *Śūnya* is above the four-fold attributes of reality.¹² Here the conception of void is neither nihilistic nor positivistic but transcendentalistic. The Real is Transcendent to thought. The Tathāgata is free from all theories and his silence means the consciousness of the indescribable nature of the Unconditional Reality. Thus void to the *Mādhyamika* can never be unreal.

The Zero of mathematics is rather fictitious, because mathematics wants to arrive at Zero only by a process of diminishing. But we know that any particle however small can be divided and sub-divided ad-infinitum but we shall never arrive at Zero. But since the necessities of action leads mathematics to point zero which is gulf between something and nothing.¹³

However, the Zero of Advaitism is not the fictitious Zero of Mathematics. It says "This is the reality and there is no other" so what is true Zero is also the most positive reality in itself.¹⁴ There is no other than this. Hence it is the true Being. Hence the Zero of Absolute cannot be identified with the concept of unreality. Zero is real, the only real—one without a second.

9. Unreality and non-eternality

The unreal can never be; the real can never be destroyed. The real never ceases to be¹⁵. It means that which is real must be real always.¹⁶ There can be no relation between being and non-being. Nothing is real which is not real from the beginning. So the real is already real and therefore immutable and unchangeable. We can say that what does not exist in the beginning, and does not exist in the end, and only appears to exist in the middle, does not really exist.¹⁷ The image of eternity is connected with reality. Now, the concept of unreality is bound to be related to the concept of non-eternality. But this is a wrong tendency to measure unreality, by its uneternity: We have seen that reality and unreality are inseparable. Reality is curved out of the unreality.

10. Conclusions

Unreality belongs to an object of actual experience and not to some phantasy. Something is known to be *unreal* when it is cancelled on some better evidence. The reality on other hand has its own evidence and hence it is never cancelled or falsified by any other or better evidence. It is real always. The unreal is different from what appears and contradicted by better apprehension. So while reality is its own evidence, unreality has something else as its evidence.

12. Nāgārjuna, *Mādhyamika Karika*, I-7.

13. Malkani G.R., *The Problem of Nothing*, p. 37.

14. *Ibid.*, p. 39.

15. *Bhagavadgita* II. 16.

16. Malkani, G.R., *A Study of Reality*, p. 60.

17. *Ibid.*, p. 64.

Personal Growth and Societal Functioning

In an incredibly short span of time we have moved from a traditional, lineal, relatively static, preindustrial society through a series of technological and ideological holocausts. The personality of Western Man used to be conceived as a developmental unfolding within a closed system dependent upon determinism and to a lesser extent upon teleology. Such psychoanalytic beliefs were well suited to traditional civilizations in Europe and the United States. Suddenly, the new fact of existence was a perishable humanity encapsulated in a finite and diminishing universe of resources. Human beings were confronted with a kaleidoscope of change and a constant necessity for adaptation. The result has been a continuously modulated relationship between the person and a variety of environments.

Psychologists turned first to behaviouristic attempts to control persons and environments by imposition of their technologies. Such behavioural innovations, however, are only effective while their rules and reinforcers are physically present. Ultimately, a responsible, internalized locus of control within the person is required to direct behaviour. Some psychologists then rediscovered the environment and abandoned themselves to the idea that behaviour (and personality) can be guided solely by the demand characteristics of the immediate situation. Generalization was not envisioned and fragmented parts of the person were deprived of any glue that would make an individual uniquely identifiable.

Other psychologists, however, were unable to accept the Newtonian view of science implied by either strict behaviorism or environmental determinism. A third force—humanistic theory¹⁴—perceived respect for the person as a survival quality necessitated by both the facts of social change and the rate of its occurrence. Humanistic theory emphasizes personal growth. Cognitive, affectual, and physical modes become human characteristics. A growth theme sustains an evolution of human beings in continuous self-renewal and self discovery of the means by which to incorporate increasingly diverse, complex, and fragmented experiences. This paper will describe

some taproots of a human growth ideology and present notions on the relatedness of personal growth to societal functioning.

A recent credo for providing clinical psychological services illustrates the consequences of focus on respect for the persons': accountability by means of contracted services, phenomenological equality of clinician and client, and emphasis on client ownership of services—ultimately through education. Thus, the "something of value" potentially contained in clinical services is shared and understood as a catalyst for the personal growth of both clinician and client⁴.

Growth apparently comes about by enhanced self-awareness or self-consciousness. In Rogerian terms, organismic valuing process transmutes experience from the phenomenal field that we co-inhabit into an expanding consciousness of self. Such experience is motivating and directive. A first implication thus, is that learning about the self—from whatever experiential source—is power to recreate the dimensions of experience, to reinterpret one's own locus in the phenomenal field that is the environmental circumstance.

The Jungian archetype self moves from arcane and unconscious sources to become a conscious and self-conscious balance system and the focus of personality. Similarly, Maslow's inner core⁵—the perdurable shared and unique fount of humanness—is discovered, created, and accepted by satisfaction of deficiency and Being needs. Hearing and responding to oneself or one's inner voices is a mark of authentic selfhood and part of the self-actualization experience. Assagioli¹ posits a centre for inner self-control or "will power" in order to enable directional, means-end activity. Since the self, inner core, or centre are ways of conceptualizing an internal process whose development coincides with the experiencing of the phenomenal field (or environment), a second implication concerns an ultimate personal responsibility for one's own growth.

Each of us presumes a lonely journey by means of an experienced internal process in which the flesh we cherish is only a symbol and a guide. A third implication is that there are substantial notions of how to further sign the self-expansion and self-exploration that I have preferred to call "humanization"^{4,6}. For example, Erikson⁷ provided such benchmarks in epigenetic format. We become what we will be from what we have been and how we live at the painful instant of the present. Identification of these inner foci (or virtues) as hope, will power, purpose, competence, fidelity, love, care, and wisdom provides an idiom for conceptualizing humanization. This language is independent of the specific experiences that resonate across prototypical developmental crises.

A fourth implication sets limits upon individual human growth. Freedom to grow is limited by a matrix of external and internal constraints and by the state of consciousness at any time. We think of freedom and responsibility—especially responsibility before—the—act⁸—as being coupled to the existential condition of other persons both those we experience directly and those hidden from our direct regard but sharing our humanity.

A fifth implication is that growth is future-oriented. The concept of a future—personal and collective—is hinged to our freedom within these external constraints that are components of our personal well-being. We cannot grow without attending to

the future, the reasonable and fantasy-tinged extrapolations of our ability to be subject and object simultaneously, to bind time, and to transmogrify the hypothetical by fusing the inner core with past experience.

A sixth implication is that growth occurs in the present. Essential to any apprehension of the future is attending to the present, being responsible for each decision as a consequence of personal meaning, being "fully functioning" in every feeling and every act, and living each minute as the only and ultimate expression of oneself. Sartre's anguish is a realization of the mutual dependency of freedom and responsibility in an equation of unknown parameters and acted upon in changing and often arbitrary circumstances. Because each human decision is a culmination of where one has been, where one is going, and how one discovers meaning in the present, it always involves transition from inertia to action.

Inherent in such transitions from mass to motion are several opportunities for crisis. Thus, the seventh implication is that growth is painful and exquisitely difficult to endure. These crisis occasions are to be protected or to grow, to be personalized or to be human, to be identified or to be anonymous⁷. Human growth is predicated upon clear awareness of personal reality, upon belief in one's own intactness, and upon sharing oneself and being oneself simultaneously. However, personal reality is often painful and this pain may be alleviated by private parables. Beliefs in one's intactness are fragile and sometimes distorted at the expense of others. Anonymity in the sense of surrendering human obligation.

Since there are at least these three ingredients in every human decision, risk is inevitable, crisis is unavoidable, hurt is omnipresent, and anguish is an immutable part of human experience. Under such conditions that we grow at all is a testimony to the strength of the inner human structure and the drive, or "will" that may be invoked for humanization.

An eighth implication concerns the mutual interdependence of growth experiences. As we grow—fitfully, intermittently, and for long periods seemingly not at all—we interface with the growth struggles of many other persons. We all contend with different facets of a common set of social structures—institutions that live by non-human rules for survival. We all compete for living space as though it were a commodity. Along with Dylan Thomas⁸, we all "rage, rage, rage against the dying of the light", experiencing the violation of perishable time—more quickly consumed in happiness than despair. We are all caught in nets of instant compromise and unremitting folly. We fail and agonize and often cannot penetrate the mini-space and mini-time of personal circumstance. And we have no good nor ready words for our experiences of being. Encapsulated in our aging skins, we are surrounded by the phantasmagoric future shock of too much change, stimulation, and choice⁹. Seeking sensation when meaning is desired, we can become insensate and stultified by a rigor mortis inherent in our own experiences.

Such is the transition from some concomitants of the growth toward self-controlled selfhood to the larger social milieu in which we often feel acted-upon rather than actors, controlled rather than responsive, and conforming rather than free. If human institutions cannot be enjoyed as contexts for humanization, then we face an almost certain self-destruction.

Since growth is affected by the person's phenomenal field which includes society, the central societal issue for human beings is contained in the phrase "quality-of-life". Maslow believed in a psychology of how to make Good Persons in a Good Society¹³. Such persons may only flourish in societies that offer a high quality-of-life for all members.

Quality-of-life is a sensitizing concept relating to the intentions and awareness of human being regarding their own social condition and their own capability for mustering environmental and personal resources toward the goals of satisfaction and happiness. More specifically, Harland¹² has referred to quality-of-life as the state of satisfaction of essential social and human needs and wants represented by goods, services, situations, and states of affairs.

In an era when many Western societies are losing the capacity for Utopian thinking or leaving such fantasy to social philosophers, science fiction writers, and futurists, the idea of quality-of-life is worthy of reiteration in a context of personality. In this context, what is "good" for human being becomes equated with what is required within a society in order to foster the most complete expression of the human potential, or the growth of human beings.

In order to experience high quality living conditions, it is necessary to have a master social plan and the machinery for monitoring salient social events and rendering them into data descriptive of the functioning adequacy of society. Such a master social plan has been envisioned in this country by governmental¹⁴ and private groups (e.g., the Institute of the Future) and some relevant data has recently been published¹⁵. The Social Science Council of Canada and the United Nations Research Institute for Social Development have prepared similar plans. We already have a nomenclature exemplified by *social indicators*, or measures of discrete aspects of quality-of-life, *social reporting*, or the summarization and reporting of such indicators, and *social accounting*, or the welfare balance sheets for large areas of society¹¹. We lack consensus on specific indicators. This fact becomes one way of admitting that we do not know or agree upon what social conditions foster humanization. We do not have a political system that can readily exchange economic for human goals even in the service of ultimate species survival. A responsible system for providing information, feedback, and self-conscious awareness by citizens would lead to more direct usages of political power in the interests of a more satisfactory life for all persons. However, the imposition of values as to what constitutes the "good" life is the most critical issue. Who is to do it? How is it to be done?

Etzioni¹⁶ has provided one model for an active, or self-controlling society whose values can be mediated through social structures in order to permit authentic living by individuals. Authenticity implies a balanced relationship between commitment, awareness, and sharing societal power. Present, post-modern society is inauthentic in political processes and institutions and inherently unstable due to blocking of recognition and treatment of social problems. Human beings react by alienation, or feeling imprisoned and powerless, and by inauthenticity, or feeling cheated and manipulated. Etzioni¹⁶ eloquently proffers a concentrated, time limited act, a personal project that should be symbolic and collective to provide at least a new societal insight and at most a societal change:

"But there are moments. . . in which each man sees the roots of his uneasiness, the shadows of his captors, and the hands of his manipulators, and he, thus, has an irreducible element of freedom which he can extend by committing himself to a project (p. 648)".

Elaborating on Miller's theme¹² that we can give our science away, Smith¹⁶ invokes new priorities for a *humanized science* that also may enhance individual freedom. Skinnerian technology is seen as a negation of human freedom and dignity while *humanistic romanticism* is no antidote for "strategies of disciplined inquiry". We need these human problem-solving strategies by applied reinforcement principles and we also need the belief in persons as responsible actors in a self-created world. Such union of head and heart means that a shared scientific enterprise can give something away that is worthwhile.

Now to return to the credo for providing clinical psychological services, an example that has been given substance by a discussion containing the following points of focus on the vital and awesome union of human and society :

1. Learning about the self is the source of expanding consciousness.
2. Growth is a personal responsibility.
3. There are external signs of internal self-development.
4. Freedom to grow is never absolute, but is limited by both external and internal constraints.
5. Growth is future-oriented.
6. Growth occurs in the present tense.
7. Growth is painful and always involves risk, crisis, hurt, and anguish.
8. Individual growth processes interface with those of other persons such that mutual interdependence is the human condition.
9. Growth is affected by the person's phenomenal field which includes society.
10. Societies as well as persons may be referred to as authentic, or fostering individual growth, or inauthentic, when individual growth is blocked or distorted.
11. The societal contribution to personal growth may be called the experienced quality-of-life.
12. High quality-of-life can only occur as an indirect individual consequence of a master social plan for a particular society.
13. Master social plans depend upon consensus regarding those conditions fostering humanization and a political climate that values human goals.
14. Interferences with individual growth as a result of societal restriction have been described as alienation or inauthenticity.
15. The recourse for the individual in the face of an inauthentic society is participation in order to nurture freedom by means of commitment.

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The Concept of Error

The problem of error has been the subject of interesting discussion in Indian Philosophy. Every School has tried to make this concept clear from its own point of view. Advaita thinkers explain the appearance of the world in the light of illusory perception, therefore they discuss the concept of error in great details. We shall try to see some of its main points.

In the School of *Mīmāṃsā* the possibility of error is denied altogether. The *Affirmāṣakas* hold that the familiar example of a snake-rope illusion is not really one simple kind of knowledge, but rather it is a mixture of perception and memory and non-discrimination between the two. The *Advaita* objection against this is that the judgment expressing an illusory perception 'this is a snake' shows that it is a single piece of knowledge. If the memory of the snake perceived in the past did not combine with the perception of the present rope to constitute one state of cognition there cannot be the judgment, 'this is a snake'. If the percept and the memory of the thing lay simply undiscriminated, there would be two judgments: 'I perceive this' and 'I remember a snake'. When we feel and a snake in the rope, it shows that snakehood is predicated of the rope present before us as an object. It is, therefore, a case of positive identification of the perceived and the remembered objects and not merely non-recognition of the difference between the two. If there be no identification between the perceived rope and a remembered snake the reaction of fear which naturally follows such erroneous knowledge cannot be explained properly. The *Naiyāyikas* admit this but they put forth a realistic type of explanation and try to show that it is only an extraordinary case of perception in which the memory idea of a snake perceived in the past is so vividly aroused in the mind on account of the similarity of a snake with the rope that it appears as an immediate awareness. So what really existed in the past is presented here to the mind as the object present before us through the instrumentality of a vivid idea. There is no possibility of the perception of an eternally unreal thing in an illusion. Therefore if there is no real world ever perceived in the past, its present illusory perception too cannot be explained. The

Advaitin's is the vain efforts in proving the unreality of the world at all times on the analogy of the snake-ropes illusion.

The position of the *Advaita* is however different. It rejects the *Nyāya* view on the ground that the perception, at present place and time, of an object which existed at some other place and time is absurd. However vivid the memory idea may be it will be an idea of a thing perceived there in the past and never of a thing present here and now. The quality of the present belonging to the illusory object remains unexplained by the *Naiyāyikas*. It is also absurd to think that a memory idea can really dislocate a real object from its own time and place and transport it to a different time and place. It is more consistent to hold that in illusion, on account of our ignorance of the thing, present here and now what does not really exist here and now can appear as present. According to the *Advaitins*, then, ignorance conceals the form of the existing object in illusion and constructs instead, the appearance of another object. The non-perception of the existing form is produced by different factors like defective sense organs, insufficient light, etc. The perception of similarity, and the revival of memory idea caused by it held ignorance to create the positive appearance of an object. This apparent object must be admitted to be present as an appearance, it may be said to be a temporary creation (*sr̥ṣṭi*) of ignorance.

Ignorance is the ultimate term for the explanation of error in the *Vedānta*. It explains the ordinary illusion and also the world. The world is taken to be illusorily created. But the activity of such creation cannot take place without prior ignorance. In other words ignorance is the presupposition of error. It is static and beginningless. Ignorance is the cause of error, but we cannot go beyond ignorance to something else as its cause. Error is removed only when ignorance as its cause is removed, ignorance of that reality which makes error possible. For the removal of ignorance all we need is knowledge.

According to *Advaita Vedānta* we are ignorant of many things in life. But behind all the different forms of ignorance there is one pervasive and primary ignorance. It is the ignorance of Brahman. It has metaphysical significance. The task of Philosophy as *Parmārtha Vidyā* is to remove ignorance, much as empirical science tries to remove ignorance about empirical matters.

The ignorance of Brahman, *Advaitins* hold, persists throughout our life. It forms the general background of all other kinds of knowledge. Whatever knowledge we have about this world cannot remove our general ignorance. Rather the world which we empirically know is a product of our ignorance. Once this ignorance is removed there is no world left any more. When the *Śruti* says for Brahman that "knowing which all else is known"; it means that when Brahman is known, there is no world left to be known. We know the world directly through our perception and believe in its reality. In order to conceal this knowledge of the world an indirect or inferential knowledge of Brahman will not do. What we need here is a direct, immediate and non-sensible awareness of Brahman, which is more certain than the perceptual knowledge of the world. Therefore what we need to remove our ignorance for good is an absolutely intellectual intuition called *aparokṣānubhūti*.

As to the nature of ignorance, *ajñāna* the *Advaitins* hold that it is not merely absence (*abhāva*) of knowledge. It is not something negative. Knowledge of the negation of something implies knowledge of the thing negated. If one has the know-

ledge of the negation of a table, then he must know the table. If then *ajñāna* is the same thing as negation of knowledge, we cannot be aware of ignorance without that very knowledge of the thing which contradicts *ajñāna*. *Ajñāna* is therefore something positive, *bhāvarūpa*. It is beginningless, yet positive and removable by knowledge. Though it manifests itself in all ordinary things that begin in time, yet it itself has no beginning, for it is associated with pure consciousness which is beginningless. *Ajñāna* has been described in the *Vedānta* as positive-*bhāvarūpa*, but its *bhāvatva* does not mean the opposite of *abhāva*. To term *ajñāna* as *bhāvarūpa* here is just to bring out its difference from *abhāva*. *Ajñāna* is not positive like an ordinary positive entity. It is rather called positive simply because it is not the mere negation. It is a category which is believed neither to be positive in the ordinary sense nor negative, but a third one which is different both from positive as well as from negative. The *ajñāna* is the indefinite which is veiling everything and as such it is different from the positive and the negative.

Though *ajñāna* is defined by the Advaitins as the indefinite which is neither positive nor negative in the ordinary sense of the term, they claim that it is directly experienced by us in such perceptions as "I do not know, or I do not know myself or anybody else," or "I do not know what you say," or particularly "I had been sleeping so long happily and did not know anything". Such perceptions, the Advaitins say, point to an object which has no definite characteristics, and which cannot properly be said to be either positive or negative. If it is said that the perception "I do not know" is not the perception of the *ajñāna*, but it indicates simply the negation of knowledge, Advaitins reply that had it been the perception of a negation only, the negation must have been associated with the specific object to which it applied. As a matter of fact negation generally appears as a substantive with the object of negation as a qualifying character specifying the nature of the negation. But the perception "I do not know or I had no knowledge" does not involve the negation of any particular knowledge of any specific object, but points to the knowledge of an indefinite objectless ignorance. Such an Indefinite *ajñāna*, *Vedānta* holds, is positive in the sense that it is certainly not negative, but this positive indefinite is not positive in the same sense in which other definite entities are called positive, for it is merely the qualityless passive indefinite showing itself in our experience.

Let us be clear here that according to the *Vedānta* ignorance, like knowledge, cannot be known through any ordinary method of knowledge. They are both known to the pure intelligence called *sākṣi*. An act of knowledge is not known through another act of knowledge. It is revealed by the higher intelligence. The same is true of *ajñāna*. We do not know ignorance through an act of the mind or through the intellect. To know ignorance intellectually we must also know its objects which will dissolve the ignorance. Similarly, prior ignorance, when no act of the mind is possible, cannot be known intellectually. This is also the case with the state of ignorance in all these cases is pure intelligence. This intelligence knows both ignorance and knowledge together with their objects. It knows all objects, some as the objects of ignorance and therefore as unknown, and others as objects of knowledge and therefore as known. Ignorance is therefore known as something positive in the sense of indefinite. It may well be compared with darkness. Darkness is something that exists in the

absence of light and is incompatible with light. And yet it is not merely the absence of light. Absence cannot be perceived, but we do perceive darkness as we perceive light. Both *ajñāna* and darkness are in this sense positive.

The illusion, therefore, according to the *Advaita Vedānta* is a temporary creation which can neither be described as real since it is contradicted by later perception, nor as real because it appears even for a moment. Thus it is an indescribable creation, *anirvacanīya sṛṣṭi*, and the theory is of the appearance of the undescribable *anirvacanīya khyāti-vāda*. The Advaitins use it in the explanation of the world-appearance as the creation of ignorance which has the power of concealing and distorting reality. The realist objection, as to how the present world can appear unless there were experience of a similar one in the past, is met by the Advaitins by describing the world experience as a beginningless series of previous births. Even if this hypothesis is not accepted, we can well say that in every case of illusion the possibility of the appearance of some form of existence in place of another is clearly demonstrated. It shows that in illusion what does not really exist at present can appear as such. And though the world of our waking experience is explained in the light of illusion and as the product of the ignorance, the Advaitins make a distinction between the two kinds of appearance. They call ignorance responsible for the waking world as the root ignorance-*mutāvidyā*, and ignorance causing the temporary ignorance *tulāvidyā*. Objectivity thus is given by the Advaitins in both the cases to the normal world and the illusory object. What they really assert as a distinctive point is that "objectivity does not imply reality, nor does unreality imply subjectivity". Every object of the world can well be seen to have contradictory nature. Therefore it is not real in the sense in which the Brahman of the *Upaniṣads* is.

Transition From Comparative Philosophy to the World History of Philosophy

Personal Note

Since I owe a very personal and indeed very profound note of gratitude to Dr. B.L. Atreya for his genuine altruism during my connection with B.H.U. (1950-57), I feel deeply honored to attempt some contribution to this Souvenir Volume in honor of Dr. Atreya-ji. Since he was a pioneer in bridging continents in the field of Comparative Philosophy, nothing that comes to my mind could be more appropriate than a résumé of my findings and thought, such as they are, in terms of some basic generalities which seem to me to need re-examination, if not radical restructuring. Indeed, it was during my association with Dr. Atreya and others at B.H.U. and at Mysore University under the late Professor M. Yamunacharya (and I must not omit the name of Swami Satyabastab Brajbasht at Dasaswamedh Ghat in Varanasi) that some of the seeds of the following considerations were sown.

It is well known that the field of Comparative Philosophy has had a rather pious history thus far; and since it has (or so it seems to a few of us in that field) got entangled in some out-of-focus stereotypes, it may be time to take stock and check our bearings lest we sail inadvertently or even jet impulsively into some dangerous territory.

First, we are perhaps inadequately aware that the ancestry of Comparative Philosophy in the field of Comparative Religion still bears its indelible stamp; and often it is difficult to differentiate between these two fields.

Second, whereas the field of Comparative Religion has virtually been, at least in some quarters, superseded by the History of Religions, one wonders whether a parallel transition is not well overdue in the field of Comparative Philosophy.

Thirdly, in the popular public mind, the shadow of Hegel—indeed, one might say his ghost—still haunts us and has even influenced systems of classification in our libraries. The notion, for example, that Indian and Chinese philosophy are at best to be equated with pre-Socratic Greek philosophy, or at least with pre-scientific philosophy, still prevails in a way that sorely needs correction. For that matter, the very term

"Oriental" philosophy, although historically it has very little meaning, has come into such common use that it has become a marketable item for selling popular paperback books. In spite of the efforts of the late Dr. Charles A. Moore to "exercise" this ghost, and to deliver us from the "myth of the mystical Orient and the materialist West" the ghost is still there, and the myth still conditions subconscious attitudes far too universally. Indeed, one grows weary of whipping what should have been a dead horse long ago, for that myth even more than the ghost of Hegel, has no historical blood or flesh left. Most of us would like to go on from there into new constructive research; but some must carry on the work of those like Dr. B.L. Atreya and Charles A. Moore, in enlightenment of the public consciousness.

The obvious corrective for the first is an intensification, following the lead of such as Joseph Needham, René Taton, George Sarton *et al*, of research and re-investigation of the world history of science and its relation to the world history of philosophy. There is also the myth (for it is no more than that) that in Ancient Greece and there alone "science" was born, and that "science" was absent from the rest of the world until Western Europe drained all the wealth of the rest of the world into its coffers and succeeded all too well in convincing the rest of the world that nothing was truly "scientific" until and unless it was given a name with a Greek or a Latin derivation. This myth also needs to be exposed before it works even more havoc than it already has done.

A corollary to this corrective, and related to the second point above, is the need to reinvestigate the histories of the realist traditions of philosophy in India, China, Japan, Islam, Byzantium, etc., and to put them into proper perspective along with the histories of the idealist philosophies in those areas. As a matter of fact, it may well be that since the history of philosophy, even in modern Western Europe, was first the fruits of the labours of German Idealists, this correction is still incomplete even in the history of European philosophy, which, by the way, has strangely omitted the history of philosophy in Byzantium and Russia and the rest of Eastern Europe. Thus we still see most books advertised as the 'History of Philosophy' overtly assuming, in woeful ignorance, that the history of "Euramerican" philosophies is all that can be called philosophy. How utterly absurd!

On the other hand, of course, there is in some quarters the danger of the opposite extreme. One indeed welcomes, for example, the efforts of the Chinese to review if not to reconstruct the history of Chinese Thought from the standpoint of realistic social justice by vindicating folk heroes who were not acknowledged as such by the Confucian Literati. But if this should go so far as to transgress against objective historical records, it could be another case of where the cure became worse than the case, the remedy too severe for the disease, and the patient might suffer from it as much as from the disease itself.

Concerning the second point, namely the emphasis on history and historical developments, we may note that, in a sense, the remedy has already begun to ferment. We are increasingly getting very readable histories of Indian, Chinese, Japanese and Islamic Thought and Philosophy, and even on some campuses the students are more aware of these things and of their importance than their professors. This is especially true in "third world" countries, at least in those areas where engineering has not crowded

philosophy out of business. Meanwhile, word from Professor Walter Liebenthal about a year ago reported that interest in these fields is waning in Europe.

However, it is strange that in many of these countries, European philosophy has become the universal standard of comparison. We get far too few contrast and comparisons between Japanese, Chinese and Iranian (both Sufi and non-Sufi) philosophers; and for that matter it is great pity and a shame that within our own generation, India and China have become alienated from each other after so many thousands of years of amity. Indeed, one might even query: In the past China received so much from India, may be some contribution from China to India might be in order?

But the appearance of the new African countries, most of them with universities built on the, "Euramerican" model, is a fresh challenge to all. The oral heritage of African wisdom needs to be included, perhaps, in "comparative" philosophy alongside the inclusion of African Islamic thinkers in proper objective historical perspective. This oral heritage must quickly be included lest some new myth about African wisdom of the past romantically blind us to the real problems of today. Surely, young Africans should be open to *all* philosophies and to philosophy's role in the planetary Drama of Man rather than merely the role of the philosophies of those nations which once enslaved them and sold them as chattel.

But more emphatically, complaint must be registered against the fact that the books that are being published everywhere in comparative philosophy (as far as I know) have not yet followed the lead of Trevor Ling in the field of the History of Religions in presenting us with a *synchronologized* approach to sound historical perspectives. To cite just one heinous example, the 'Arab' philosophers are usually treated not in their own right, but only as a prophylactic as it were, to the emergence of Latin Christian Scholasticism. Moreover, the term 'Arab' still survives even though scarcely there is an educated Muslim anywhere who would call Darah Shikoh an 'Arab'; and even Ibn Sina had very little, if any, Arabian ancestry. Even the Library of Congress classification of books reflects this nonsense, as though there were not any Islamic philosophy or philosophers after Ibn Rushd (Averroes).

However the case is almost as bad in the history of Indian philosophy and in the Chinese field as well. The former is still woefully limited to the form given to it by Madhva during the apogee of the Vijayanagar Empire; and the popular notion of what constitutes 'Chinese' philosophy, even in philosophy departments around the world, remains in woeful ignorance of the reportings even of Carsun Chang and of Volume II of Fung Yu-lan's *History of Chinese Philosophy*.

In other words, Hegel's myth still survives, namely that Wisdom travelled from the "East" (i.e., East Asia, Southeast Asia, South Asia and/or Southwest Asia ?) to the "West" (i.e., not western USA or even western Asia, but western Europe, eastern Europe being ignored completely !); and that only in 'Antiquity' (whenever that was) did this "East" have any 'philosophy' worth mentioning. How utterly absurd ! This myth critically needs to be replaced with factual world history, including the *continuous* and *contemporary* developments of philosophies of *all* kinds in *all* lands.

In the history of European philosophy, we think nothing of putting Francis Bacon and Campanella in the same category, even though they came from different languages and countries; and in the history of Indian philosophy, even though regret-

fully thus far the Śaiva systems have not yet been adequately integrated chronologically along with the Vaiṣṇava systems, we think nothing of ignoring geographical boundaries even though, for example, when Digṇāga went north to Nalanda, no doubt he had to learn a different vernacular to get along. Chaitanya and Vallabha are sometimes mentioned virtually in the same breath, although one was a Bengali and the other a Gujarati.

There is still confusion between the North and the South in the case of Chinese Buddhism if not of Chinese philosophy as a whole after the Neo-Confucian "renaissance" in the Southern Sung Dynasty. Similar differences obtain between the 'Aryan' North and the 'Dravidian' South in India, the Latin South and the Germanic North in Europe, and the Latin American South and the Anglo-American North in the "Western" hemisphere. But these actually make as much—or as little—sense as the terms "East" and "West" that still are in common use, utterly confusing whether by "east" is meant the Soviet Union or the "mystical" Orient of 'Antiquity'. But whereas we speak of Hegel as a 'German' (not a European) philosopher, and Descartes as a 'French' (not a European) philosopher, we do not call Rāmānuja a 'Tamillian' but an 'Indian' philosopher; whereas Abhinava Gupta is called not a Kaśmīri but an 'Indian' philosopher. Similarly Chu hsi (b. 1130) of Fukien Province, Yen Yuan (b. 1635) of Hopeh Province, Tai Chen (b. 1722) of Anhwei Province are all known simply as 'Chinese' philosophers. Or again, if we took Guigo the Carthusian (d. 1136), Rāmānuja (d. 1142), and Chu Hsi (d. 1200) together, we would find more in common between them than between each and his modern 20th century fellow-countryman, while actually Guigo was more of a mystic than either of his "oriental" contemporaries! Meanwhile, where does this leave the Persian Al-Ghazālī (d. 1110)? Is he "Eastern" or "Western"—or somewhere in between? Finally, even in the 20th century, which is more "Eastern": M.N. Roy or Teilhard de Chardin? Vladimir Soloviev or Chu Te? Kawakami Hajime or Thomas Merton?

Indeed, philosophy is still philosophy, in all places and at all times, consisting essentially of the basic problems of man, including epistemology, ethics and aesthetics and their sub-fields and related fields. Geographical characterizations make very little difference, although it might be claimed that Time has taken its toll, perhaps equally in every area. As a matter of fact, whereas Toynbee and Jaspers wrote of the 5th century B.C. as the 'Axial' Age research will vindicate the claim that there have been several of such 'axial' ages, stretching across Eurasia and thence to the Americas as well. Indeed, until further correction is forthcoming, I would like to suggest periodizing these 'axial' ages in the world history of philosophy as occurring around 50 A.D. (C.E.), 300 C.E. (A.D.), 625 C.E., 850 C.E., 1250 C.E., 1550 C.E., 1750 C.E., 1900 C.E., and perhaps in an accelerated pace, already around the mid-1960's, with the beginning of the Space Age and the Nuclear Age.

Thus, eventually the World History of Philosophy will be simply that, ignoring "east" and "west" and north and south everywhere; and then *synchronologically* we shall view (and hear) each philosopher in his actual factual historical milieu.

Nevertheless the *Problem of Periodization* remains a difficult one. There may be not only 'periods' but actual *cycles* in the patterns of development of types of philosophies which have not been discovered or at least have not yet been adequately

mapped out as yet. The Cultural Anthropology approach is yielding something; but more is needed. Perhaps we need some sort of *metahistory of metaphysics* as well as the metaphysics of history in order to provide the remedies. Indeed, just as there is a metaphysics of history, so the metahistory of metaphysics needs proper restructuring.

One friend, Bob Richmond, has even suggested an entirely new term, which no doubt Dr. B.L. Atreya would warmly embrace : SOPHIOLOGY, the science of investigation of systems of wisdom without regard to nationality, "East" or "West", North or South. Perhaps we should try to determine whether it is applicable.

Postscript

This article assumes familiarity with *Sarva-Darsana-Sangraha : A Bibliographical Guide to the Global History of Philosophy*. John C. Plott and Paul D. Mays (Leiden : E.J. Brill, 1969).

Unpublished research material available upon request.

Patanjala Yoga and Integral Yoga

At the All India Seminar on the Philosophy and Yoga of Sri Aurobindo held in Vārāṇasī in September 1974 one of the participants raised the question as to whether the peculiar terminology of Sri Aurobindo found its equivalent in the technical vocabulary of *Pātañjala* Yoga. If so, then these classical antecedents would offer a precious key to the interpretation of Integral Yoga. The speaker answered that Sri Aurobindo's terminology 'must be entirely his own'. This would mean then that classical yoga has had no appreciable influence on him. Integral Yoga would have been designed *ab ovo*. However, creation *ex nihilo* does not commend itself to many.

A clue was offered by a fourfold division common to both. In Book Two of *The Life Divine*, chapter 26, "The Ascent Towards Supermind", Sri Aurobindo distinguishes the four degrees of Higher Mind, Illumined Mind, Intuition and Overmind. Curiously, the *Yoga-Sūtras* too spell out a fourfold gradation. Thus *sūtra* I. 17 reads: "The Cognitive Trance is accompanied by the appearance of philosophical curiosity, meditation, elation and egoism"—*vitarka-vicār-ānand-āsmitā-rūpānugamāt-saṁprajñātaḥ*.¹ Could it be that the four degrees within 'supramental transformation' would match the four steps within *saṁprajñātaḥ samādhi*, 'concentration with objective content'?

This numerical identity was tempting enough, all the more so that a similar fourfold division recurs a little further in the *Yoga-Sūtras*. Indeed, *sūtras* I. 42-44 enumerate four forms of *saṁāpatti* or thought-transformation, *nl.*, *śavītarkā*, *nīrvītarkā*, *śarīcārā* and *nīrvīcārā saṁāpattiḥ*. Unfortunately, the present fourfold distinction does not match the earlier one. Rather, the first and second degree of *saṁprajñātaḥ samādhi* split up in pairs to yield the four modes of *saṁāpatti* or thought-transformation. Which of these two series of four corresponds to Sri Aurobindo's four degrees of mind?

Nor is this all. Later commentators as Vyāsa and Yācaspati Miśra have developed further the gradation which the *Yoga-Sūtras* seemed to have left unfinished. The

1. Reference to the *Yoga-Sūtras* and commentaries are from:

Rama Prasada, Patañjali's *Yoga Sūtras with the Commentary of Vyāsa etc.*, in *The Sacred Books of the Hindus*, vol. IV, Allahabad, 1924.

remaining two degrees of *samprajñātaḥ samādhi* were equally split in pairs of *sānandā/nirānandā* and *sāsmṛitā/nirasmṛitā samāpatti*. As one knows, the fourfold division within *samprajñātaḥ samādhi* is ruled by a fourfold gradation is the object of meditation, nl., gross and subtle objects, the knowing activity and the knowing subject or *buddhi*. The eightfold division results from the presence, resp. absence, of *vikalpa* or confusion of the object of meditation with its predicates. Not all commentators, however, accept this eightfold division. Thus *Vijñāna Bhikṣu* accepts only six.²

Number four seemed to be a promising find. The track we followed, however, soon got confused: the *Yoga-Sūtras* know not one, but two divisions of four; and the commentators multiply the one by the other so as to obtain eight, if not six. Are we then to abandon the first suggestion and admit that Sri Aurobindo's fourfold gradation is indeed 'entirely his own'? If the *prima facie* equation of four with four has proved to be hasty, a more patient *a posteriori* investigation may yield better results. Sound method will require that we first accurately analyse the four 'minds' of Sri Aurobindo and determine their respective distinctive features. A similar investigation of the various gradations devised by the *Yoga-Sūtras* and its commentators will reveal whether they share a common characteristic with one or other of the four 'minds'. Which conclusions we are to draw from an eventual parallelism cannot be anticipated at this stage. Nor should this be dictated by any *a priori*, which either refuses to accept any influence of *Pātanjala* Yoga on Sri Aurobindo, or perforce wants him to be indebted to classical tradition. Let us then take up the four degrees of mind in turn.

The first grade in the "Ascent Towards Supermind" is called Higher Mind. Indeed, it surpasses ordinary mind inasmuch as it can dispense with its laborious procedure of logical reasoning. "But here in this greater Thought there is no need of a seeking and self-critical ratiocination, no logical motion step by step toward a conclusion, no mechanism of express or implied deductions and inferences, etc."³ The very description immediately calls to mind the category of *nirvicārā samāpatti*. Yet, the confrontation of Higher Mind with the second degree of Illumined Mind makes us reconsider this assumption. While Higher Mind operates as suprarational Thought, Illumined Mind functions by an immediate vision, "a Mind no longer of higher Thought, but of spiritual light"⁴. Unlike Higher Mind, which still needs the support of verbal expression, or at least that of a mental word, Illumined Mind seizes upon the truth of things apart from any such representation. "In the spiritual light there is a deeper perceptive response from the very substance of consciousness and a comprehending formulation in that substance, . . . no verbal representation is needed for the precision and completeness of this thought knowledge".⁴

Now, the comparison between *śavītarkā* and *nirvītarkā samāpatti* reveals a similar gradation. In the first the yogi still associates the object of concentration with its corresponding concept and verbal expression. In the second the object is shorn from these mental associations and caught in a pure intuitive grasp. Similarly, the elimination

2. See G. KOELMAN, *Pātanjala Yoga, From Related Ego to Absolute Self*, Papal Athenaeum, Poona, 1970; p. 158, n. 53, with reference to *Vijñāna Bhikṣu, Yoga-dāśikā*, I, 46.

3. *The Life Divine*, India Library Society, New York, 1963; p. 213. Abbreviated as LD.

4. LD p. 229.

of verbal expression secures the transition from Higher to Illumined Mind. This, I believe, would guarantee sufficiently the identification of Higher Mind with *śavitarkā samāpatti* on the one hand, and of Illumined Mind with *nirvītarkā samāpatti* on the other.

Intuition, the third degree, is characterised as 'knowledge by identity'. "Intuition is a power of consciousness nearer and more intimate to the original knowledge by identity . . . It is when the consciousness of the subject meets with the consciousness in the object . . . that the intuition leaps out like a spark"⁶. The *vīṭarkā* mode of *saṁādhi* being accounted for, we are naturally led to test the merit of the *vicāra* mode as possible counterpart of Sri Aurobindo's Intuition. However, the distinction between *śavicāra* and *nirvicāra samāpatti* is ruled by the presence, resp. absence, of the attributes of space and time in the object of meditation. To this the description of Intuition makes no allusion. One could perhaps argue that the "spiritual reality of things"⁷ which Intuition grasps matches the subtle (*sūkṣma*) nature of the object which is proper to the *vicāra* mode of *saṁādhi*. But a more convincing parallel is found in Vyāsa's *Bhāṣya* on *Yoga-Sūtras*, I, 44. As Intuition consists essentially in identity with the object, so too *nirvicāra samāpatti* moulds consciousness on the form of the object. "As to the cognition it is called ultra-meditative (*nirvicāra*), when it becomes the object itself, and thus as it were, becomes void of its own nature"—*prajñā ca svarūpaśūnyavārthanātrā yadā bhavati*⁸. There is some solid evidence to associate Intuition with *nirvicāra samāpatti*.

The fourth and last degree is that of Overmind. It is marked by the elimination of ego-consciousness. "When the overmind descends, the predominance of the centralising ego-sense is entirely subordinated, lost in largeness of being and finally abolished"⁹. *Nirasmītā samāpatti* is the obvious counterpart for Overmind. While *sāsmītā samāpatti* concentrates on a *buddhi* that is still affected by *ahaṁkāra*, *nirasmītā samāpatti* eliminates this last *vīkalpa* and contemplates a pure egoless *buddhi*, which reflects the self almost to perfection.

The comparison of the four 'minds' with the classification of the *Yoga-Sūtras* then yields the following set of pairs: Higher Mind and *śavitarkā samāpatti*; Illumined Mind and *nirvītarkā samāpatti*; Intuition and *nirvicāra samāpatti*; Overmind and *nirasmītā samāpatti*. Sri Aurobindo therefore neglects both *śavicāra* and *sāsmītā samāpatti* of the eightfold division of the commentators. More important, he omits the *ānanda* mode of *saṁādhi*, so that the fourfold division of *Yoga-Sūtras*, I, 17, is lost in the fourfold gradation of the "Ascent Towards Supermind".

Our initial clue was an identical fourfold division. The presumed parallel has stood the test of a critical analysis, but only up to a point. It is good to remember at this stage that *Yoga-Sūtras* I, 17, distinguishes four stages within *samprajñātaḥ saṁādhi*. But this 'concentration with objective content' is not the highest: it is crowned by an objectless concentration, *asaṁprajñātaḥ saṁādhi*. While the former needs the support of some objective content, egoless *buddhi* in the ultimate stage of *nirasmītā samāpatti*, the latter entirely prescind from any such objective content and is absorbed in the

6. LD p. 841.

7. *Ibid.*

8. Translation Ramn Prasada.

9. LD p. 844.

sole pure self. Curiously, as the four stages of objective concentration are succeeded by objectless *samādhi*, so too the four degrees of 'mind' are topped by Supermind. This indeed is the summit of the yogic ascent as mapped out by Sri Aurobindo in the last chapters of *The Life Divine*. Summing up Sri Aurobindo writes: "These gradations may be summarily described as a series of sublimations of the consciousness through Higher Mind, Illumined Mind and Intuition into Overmind and beyond it; there is a succession of self-transmutations at the summit of which lies the Supermind of Divine Gnosis"¹⁰. Supermind then would correspond to *samprajñātaḥ samādhi*, as the four stages of Higher Mind etc. match the four grades of *samprajñātaḥ samādhi*.

Having put in place some pieces of this jig-saw puzzle, the rest automatically follows. In Pātanjala Yoga *samādhi* itself is but the third degree of *saṁnyama*; i.e., *dhāraṇā*, *dhyāna* and *samādhi*: *trayaṁ-ekatra saṁnyamaḥ*.¹¹ Inevitably one is reminded of the 'Triple Transformation' in Sri Aurobindo's yogic itinerary, psychic, spiritual and supramental. If the various phases in *samādhi* are matched by the series from Higher Mind to Supermind, then the suspicion arises that the triple *saṁnyama* of the Yoga-Sūtras may well find its reflection in the 'Triple Transformation' of the *Life Divine*. We are not going to attempt, however, to establish a strict parallel between both triads. *Dhāraṇā* is defined as "steadfastness of the mind"—*desabandhaścittasya dhāraṇā*; *dhyāna* as "the continuation there of the mental effort"—*atra pratyayalka-tānatā dhyānaḥ*¹². The psychic transformation, on the other hand, consists in the integration of body, life and mind around the psychic self. As to spiritual transformation, while the previous stage is one of interiorisation, this initiates the ascending movement which will be pursued in the fourfold supramental transformation. There is little here to suggest a parallel between the first two stages of the Triple Transformation and of the triple *saṁnyama*, except perhaps Sri Aurobindo's insistence on permanence in perfect spiritual transformation. "For the full spiritual transformation more is needed, a permanent ascension from the lower into the higher consciousness and an effectual permanent descent of the higher into the lower nature"¹³. *Dhyāna*, in like manner, prolongs the concentration effected through *dhāraṇā*; *ekatānārā*, which Rama Prasada translates as 'continuation'.

But the numerical correspondence is highly suggestive. A triple *saṁnyama*: *dhāraṇā*, *dhyāna*, *samādhi*; and a triple transformation: psychic, spiritual and supramental. *Samādhi* itself can be either *samprajñātaḥ* or *asamprajñātaḥ*. Objective *samādhi* is fourfold: *vitarka*, *vicāra*, *ānanda asmiśā samāpatti*. Similarly, supramental transformation goes through four stages: Higher Mind, Illumined Mind, Intuition and Overmind. Finally, objectless *samādhi* corresponds to Supermind. The parallel is perfect: the complicated structure of the Yoga-Sūtras exactly matches the no less intricate division of *The Life Divine*.

One will have noticed that we identify supramental transformation with the fourfold 'Ascent towards Supermind'. The literary structure of the relevant chapters of *The Life Divine* (Book Two, Chs. 25 and 26) entitles us to do so. Indeed, these chapters are composed on the basis of a gradation, the last term of which unfolds into a

10. LD p. 133.

11. Yoga-Sūtras, III, 4.

12. Yoga-Sūtras, III, 1 and 2. Translation Rama Prasada.

13. LD p. 111.

new gradation, which the subsequent chapter develops. Thus, chapter 25 of Book Two on 'The Triple Transformation' distinguishes the psychic, spiritual and supramental stages, but leaves it to chapter 26 to develop the last into the four stages of 'The Ascent Towards Supermind'. This we already noted in our *The Philosophy of Evolution in Sri Aurobindo and Teilhard de Chardin*.¹⁴ But neglecting this literary indication, we proceeded there to coordinate the three stages of the Triple Transformation with the four of the Ascent towards Supermind in the wrong way. Misled by the name of 'supramental transformation', we equated this with Supermind, and were thus compelled to relegate the four minds to the stage of spiritual transformation. This was an error and we take this opportunity to redress it.¹⁵

To conclude : which answer can we give to our initial question ? Does Sri Aurobindo's terminology for the various degrees of consciousness reflect that of Pātañjala Yoga ? The answer must be in the negative. However clearly the stage of Overmind e.g., which transcends ego-consciousness, corresponds to that of *nirāsmīṭā samāpatti*, as expressions they are not reminiscent of one another. By way of contrast : the case of Sri Aurobindo's distinction between the realms of Knowledge and Ignorance, which plainly translate the pair *vidyā/avidyā*, is a clear instance of terminological equivalence.

But our inquiry into a possible identity in technical vocabulary has disclosed a more important discovery. Whatever it be of the terms used, the stages or degrees of consciousness which they indicate do correspond, point by point, in both *The Life Divine* and the *Yoga-Sūtras*. In either case there is a first threefold division (triple *saṁyama* ; triple transformation). In either case the third stage unfolds first into a fourfold gradation (fourfold *saṁprajñātaḥ samādhi* ; the four 'minds' from Higher Mind to Overmind). And in either case this gradation culminates in a supreme state of consciousness (*asaṁprajñātaḥ samādhi* ; Supermind). The exact parallel between both schemes, for all their intricacy, is too striking to consider it as mere coincidence.

Our conclusion is then that there must be admitted a certain influence of Pātañjala Yoga on Integral Yoga. Sri Aurobindo himself acknowledges that Rājayoga does cover the entire range of higher states of consciousness. "Rājayoga . . . includes the attainment of all the higher states of consciousness and their powers by which the mental being rises towards the superconscious".¹⁶ We spoke of 'influence', and this suggests dependence. That, however, Sri Aurobindo is not prepared to concede. On the contrary, on the next page he reasserts his autonomy in the matter of yogic methods. "The methods of the integral Yoga must be mainly spiritual, and dependence on physical methods or fixed psychic or psycho-physical processes on a large scale would be the substitution of a lower for a higher action". Nor was it our intention to discredit his originality in elaborating his Integral Yoga. What we did demonstrate is that this undisputed originality consists in a free adaptation of an age-old tradition. All true innovators must need have their roots in the past. The perspective of Pātañjali enhances the dimensions of Integral Yoga.

14. K.L. Mukhopadhyay, Calcutta, 1973; p. 151.

15. *Ibid.*, p. 173, scheme and explanation. R.S. Srivastava's *Sri Aurobindo and the Theories of Evolution*, Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series, Varanasi, 1968, Chapter, VI, rests on a similar misconstruction.

16. *The Synthesis of Yoga*, Sri Aurobindo Ashram, Pondicherry, 1965; p. 303.

17. *Ibid.*, p. 304.

The Personalistic Metaphysics of George Howison

At the beginning of the century an idealistic Monism dominated Western metaphysics. In contrast to Post-Kantian thought in British centers of learning, Glasgow, Edinburgh and London Spencer, Huxley and kindred thinkers more successfully captured the public mind with a different monism, one that alarmed orthodox believers of that day.

In America John Fiske popularized Evolution modifying Spencer's Unknowable with his conciliation with Theism. But it remained to Borden Parker Bowne to formulate the first thorough and systematic philosophy in America. Like many British philosophers he studied in Germany drawing inspiration from R. H. Lotze 1817-1881 who deserves title to founder of modern Personalism.

Bowne (1847-1910) represents the first and most important force in the fourfold development of American Idealism, a glance at which puts Howison in perspective for us. Second in Cornell University, home of the *Philosophical Review*, James Creighton ably represented Objective Idealism and was to a degree influenced by the British thinker Bernard Bosanquet. . . . At Harvard Josiah Royce (1855-1916) Absolutist Personalism with unmatched eloquence and learning for many years expounded and defended his Idealism William James and his circle thought was too close to Hegel.

But Royce's most brilliant and severest critic was in the friend he became associated in later years, one with whom he produced an important, unique book of studies in Idealism, **THE CONCEPTION OF GOD**, Macmillan Co. 1898 which is important here because containing Howison's philosophical credo and criticism of Le Conte's Evolutionary Theism. Howison, gallant critic of Royce and foe of monisms, clearly defines a fourth type of Personal Idealism that never won wide acceptance for in spite of his utter dedication to truth he left no school of thought. And yet it is par excellence the philosophy of democracy with its emphasis on the reality of human free-agency in an Eternal Moral Order, as he likes to refer to it, for it carries the "unlimited spiritual hope for every soul".

1834-1916 Howison has so much that is typical of the American character at its best, great moral integrity with a profound respect for historical Christianity yet that

openness to truth and new idea, that almost apostolic zeal to teach and share his knowledge. It was fitting that he found at last his historical mission in the far West in that newly founded university named after his precursor Bishop Berkeley. Though in a sense a radical innovator his philosophy reaches back into the Great Tradition of Western thought beginning with Heraclitus and Socrates. He looks to Aristotle and Descartes rather than Plato and Plotinus. He assimilated many of the permanent elements in the thought of Berkeley and Leibniz. But it was with Kant he wrestled for his soul, on whose permanent insights he built his philosophy. Kant's permanent achievement to Howison lies in the revolution he effected in men's minds, in their idea of what reality is. But he feels Kant should be amended and recast in taking a new view of the Categories and dismissing the "Thing-in-itself" which blocked the path to God, Freedom and Immortality by way of the Moral Reason. Howison holds the Moral Reason as really *primate* making the reality of the scientific thinker as a moral being the supreme condition of science itself and pointing to God amid his Realm of Eternal Spirits. Howison adds a realm of Uncreated Spirits, an important point for here he breaks with Bowne's Personalism and traditional Christian thought. All through Howison's thinking is the persistent belief that a created spirit cannot be free. Hence his difference with his Berkeley friend Joseph Le Conte, who saw in a spiritually inspired Evolution the process of soulmaking. These and other points were vigorously and brilliantly argued in Howison's Union in one memorable session in Berkeley 1895. It was here Royce defended his Monism against the Pluralism of Howison. Le Conte was a participant in a forum of minds never seen in America before or since.

It is interesting to note Howison's unique genius developed gradually and only in middle life did he find his place after many disappointments and curious setbacks. In 1865 we find teaching logic, mathematics and grammar in St. Louis, Missouri. He was already distinguished before arriving as an able teacher of the classics and fine school administrator. Here he met the pioneering Hegel scholar William Torrey Harris who founded the Journal of Speculative Philosophy first of its kind in America. He and others welcomed the new Easterner to their Kant club and other study groups to which such celebrities as Emerson and Bronson Alcott came to speak from time to time. This frontier town in midst of the ruins of the just closed Civil War promised to be new Athens, so it must seemed to a rather frustrated teacher of grammar who longed to teach philosophy. But although this was an era of inquiry, of a great intellectual awakening, there were not more than six colleges recognizing philosophy as a discipline. And German scholarship was practically unknown.

After five years in St. Louis, such important ones for his philosophical development, he moved to Boston with his young wife only to find disappointment in finding a permanent position. However in this period he worked with Emerson and Olcott in the famous Concord School of Philosophy for a short time before making a pilgrimage to the sages of German philosophy who had been his lights. He was much impressed with the great Hegel scholar Michelet who received him warmly and strove to capture him for Hegel. On returning from Europe spiritually refreshed at wells of learning he still for a time faced closed doors and disappointment, ominous for a man nearing fifty.

Before his sojourn in Europe which seemed to bring his intellectual powers to a

new level he thought he had at last found his milieu teaching philosophy in Boston and aspiring to a post in Harvard. His remarkable lectures in the Concord School of Philosophy were to bring him renown as a leading scholar and thinker. But unexpected disappointments awaited him in spite of the efforts of many friends at Harvard and elsewhere. About this time his life long friend William James wrote from Harvard : "When I see the disconsolate condition of poor Howison, looking for employment now, and when I recognize the extraordinary development of his intellect in the past four years I feel almost guilty of having urged Royce's call hitherto. . . . He gave that best philosophic lecture, in point of form and impressiveness, I think I ever heard, the other night at the Concord School."

It is curious how a small incident may sometimes completely change the direction of a man's career and in this case influence the cultural history of the U. S. to some degree at least. A vacancy occurred in the new University of California, then a most unpromising prospect for a New England scholar. Philosophy was not formally recognized in "that wilderness" off to the very Pacific far west. And yet it was here Howison's genius was to flower and enrich the cultural life of a great and growing community. But it was nevertheless a reluctant move on the part of Howison whose ties were with New England. William James thought California "a poor place" but others wrote reassuringly. His friend James Angell president of University of Michigan wrote encouragingly :

"I think you have decided wisely. Reid's letter relieves the matter. I hope and believe you will find your life in many respects agreeable and fruitful out there. I know of no place (except Chicago) where a spiritual philosophy is more needed. You will find some wonderfully bright men. And as for climate—how we shall envy you in our dreary Springs."

And so in 1884, his spiritual Odyssey and trials behind him Howison though now fifty entered on his remarkably creative and influential career of teaching and writing. His Philosophical Union became the focal point in the intellectual life of the West attracting the best minds from far and near. He discovered California and its people were not long in discovering him, and valuing his immense scholarly worth, his moral earnestness. In his work as a teacher many felt they saw some of the zeal of an Old Testament prophet in his keenness for truth and professional integrity. When some one complimented him on the successful teaching of former student who had settled in the East Howison replied : "Yes, but is he teaching the truth ?" His attitude toward the students was perhaps not unlike the Hindu sage toward a *chela*. Philosophy was a way of life for him. He was no stiff lecturer with a take it or leave it attitude. Like Plato he placed the emphasis on the spoken word and a personal relationship with students ; he was a pulpit, a friend.

Howison believed philosophy in the seemingly eternal quest for unity more often than not lost sight of some important truths. Even after they reach the view that moral, rational Consciousness is a First Principle complete Personality at the center of things, far from being held as personal, becomes the impersonal Absolute Mind. And so idealistic philosophy with all its hostility to materialistic Materialism as the annulment of moral agency, substitutes another Materialism to reveal an unmitigated determinism though in n

different way. For Absolute Mind as the final and only Free Agent in the end cancels personal freedom, reducing finite mind to the status of an aspect or even an "idea" of Infinite Mind. Instead of monism Personal Idealism puts forward a pluralism of many minds eternally possessing self-direction and real free agency and yet not individualistically incompatible with a universe of final harmony, sustained by God as Final Cause.

William James and Howison opposed a pluralistic Idealism to the Absolutism the Neo-Hegelians and the materialistic Monism resulting from an alliance of Darwinian Evolution with French Positivism that dominated so much of the thought of their day. And yet Howison believed James's idealistic pluralism was not thorough going enough. This is evident in his criticism and reply to James' famous Ingersoll Lecture Immortality.

Howison's own incisive lecture on immortality is one of his important writings appearing in his volume **LIMITS OF EVOLUTION** published in 1901. But let us for a moment recall his three categories of Being or levels of Reality. First is changing sense world in space and time, the evolving cosmos conceived as phenomena existing in and for consciousness. Here he closely follows Kant and stresses the contribution of minds to nature as dependent on mind, on its legislative, normative being. Second is the Eternal Community of Spirits sustained by God the highest category of Being who relates to them as Ideal and Final Cause. An American theologian cited this as an example of a "personal Idealism with a vanishing theism." The point overlooked is that without God there can be no co-existing Spirits, no "City of God" as Howison puts it. The two forms of self-active being imply and complement each other, one eternally perfect, the other holding defect in its very nature but moving toward making itself whole by its infinity that embosoms finitude and makes itself whole in the never ending process of victory over finitude of the natural life. Sometimes "it may be by paths never so dark and devious." But onward still the "undying free spirit goes" secure in its own growing vision of an eternal Ideal. And yet divided from identity with God by its own individualizing principle reaching out to establish the spiritual over the mortal and natural.

Spirit as free and eternal must be taken in the Kantian sense as logically prior to Nature acting on the metaphysical plane as source of the space-time order of experience. Here we are reminded of T. H. Green's thesis that a consciousness organizing experience on a priori principles cannot be the product of experience. In reference to evolutionary Philosophy Howison writes in **LIMITS OF EVOLUTION** :

"Unless there is a real man undervived from Nature, unless there is a spiritual or rational man independent of the natural man and legislatively sovereign over entire Nature, then the Eternal is not a person, there is not God, and our faith is vain." (Page 53 Macmillan Co. 1901)

William James in his defense of immortality argued with much plausibility that mind is a function of the brain not as a product of cerebral activity but of its "releasing or transmissive" activity. It may act as a time-mask refracting "the one infinite Thought" from behind the surface-veil of phenomena. Howison regarded this as a

merely permissive conclusion providing reasonable hope of immortality, an "open chance". To suppose our finite mortal mind continuous with a nonmenal mother-sea of Mind Howison believed reduces us to means rather than ends, to stage properties of an eternal drama rather than proper persons in our own self-definitive right as eternal spirits. For him the soul far from being a result of mere aggregates of experience, or a manifestation of an Oversoul gives evidence of a self-activity that transcends time itself and subsists independently of every contingent event.

Howison agreed with James the production theory certainly leaves no hope of immortality but questions does James's transmission theory, though an emendation, afford hope of individual immortality? This is the only immortality we can be concerned with. The Absolute Mind of transcendental idealism lends itself to this transmission theory without really assuring a personal immortality. No doubt James's handling of his theory was inhibited by his failure to avail himself of the Kantian criticism. Further light on the soul as eternally real is found in Howison's LIMITS OF EVOLUTION the general theory and groundwork of which is so well formulated in his Preface we quote in closing. The first statement reminds us strongly of Berkeley with whom Howison is sometimes confounded. As we read on the resemblance ends and we see close affinities with Kantianism and a striking reminder of Leibniz Monadology. In contrast with Berkeley Howison shifts the permanent centre of Natural Order from God to Eternal Spirits other than God, thus avoiding the merely theocentric idealism of Berkeley.

"All existence is either (1) the existence of minds, or (2) the existence of the items and order of their experience; all the existences known as 'material' consisting in certain of these experiences, with an order organised by the self-active forms of consciousness that in their unity constitute the substantial being of a mind, in distinction from its phenomenal life.

2. Accordingly, Time and Space and all that both 'contain', owe their entire existence to the essential correlation and coexistence of minds. This coexistence is not to be thought of as either their simultaneity or their contiguity. It is not at all spacial, nor temporal, but must be regarded as simply their logical implication of each other in the self-defining consciousness of each. And this recognition of each other as all alike self-determining renders their coexistence a moral order.

3. These many minds, being in this mutual recognition of their moral reality the determining ground of all events and all mere things, form the eternal world; and by a fitting metaphor consecrated in the usage of ages, they may be said to constitute the "City of God". In this, all the members have the equality belonging to their common aim of fulfilling their one Rational Ideal; and God, the fulfilled Type of every mind, the living Bond of their union, reigns in it, not by authority, by the exercise of power, but solely by light; not by efficient, but by final causation,—that is, simply by being the impersonated Ideal of every mind.

4. The members of this Eternal Republic have no origin but their purely logical one of reference to each other, including thus their primary reference to God. That is, in the literal sense of the word, they have no origin at all—no source in time whatever. There is nothing at all prior to them out of which their being arises; they are

not 'things' in a chain of causation.

5. Still, they exist in and only through their mutually thought correlation, their "eternal city" and out of it would be non-existent. But through their thought-reciprocity with each other, God being included in the circle, they are the ground of all literally originated, all temporal and spacial existences.

6. Hence, relative to the natural world they are free, in the sense of being in control of it : so far from being bound by it and its laws, they are the very source of all the law there is or can be in it. Relatively to God also, and to each other, all minds other than God are free, in the still higher sense that nothing but their own light and conviction determines their actions toward each other or toward God.

7. This Pluralism held in union by reason, this World of Spirits, is thus the genuine Unmoved One that moves all things. (see Aristotle *Metaphys.* xi 7). Not the solitary God, but the whole World of Spirits including God and united through recognition of him, is the real Prime Mover of which since the culmination of Greek philosophy we have heard so much. Its oneness is not that of a single inflexible Unit, leaving no room for freedom in the many, for a many that is really many, but is the oneness of uniting harmony, of spontaneous co-operation, in which every member, from inner initiative, from native contemplation of the same Ideal, joins in moving all things changeable toward the common goal.

8. This movement of things changeable toward the goal of a common Ideal is what we have in these days learned to call the process of Evolution. The World of Spirits, as the ground of it, can therefore neither be the product of evolution nor in any way subject to evolution ; except in the case of minds other than God, who have their differentiation from Him in a side of their being which is in one aspect contradictory to their Ideal, this sense-world of theirs is by its very nature, in its conjunction with their total nature, under the law of return toward the essential Ideal.

From the last sentence it is evident evil is not in God but in the phenomenal world of developing beings under the law of evolution, an evolution that cannot cross the gulf between the Metaphysical and the Phenomenal realm in space-time. It is unfortunate Howison never completed his long intended definitive exposition of his system. In a sense his eloquently written *LIMITS OF EVOLUTION* remains an unfinished symphony. And yet with its spiritual activism, its suborning Efficient causes under Final Causality and freedom it has much of suggestive insight for the world of Relativity and Quantum Physics. In its view of relation of creative mind to Nature it suggests philosophical applications of Nils Bohr's Principle of Complementarity. Much more could and should have been written to fill out the scheme of Howison's Personalism but his vital comprehension of our spiritual life remains a potent heritage of thought and rational Faith.

The Future Course of Indian Philosophy

The future course of Indian Philosophy depends on its own internal possibilities and environmental influences. As to its extent, we observe that Indian philosophy is becoming vast and limitless in scope, and is losing its boundaries. This is because of its open character which comprehends and engulfs in its organism whatever is good, universal and eternal. The contemporary Indian philosophy, which is in transition, manifests these characteristics in rudimentary form. It forms many syntheses and integral systems of thought by assimilating the truths coming from different sources. The East and the West, Spirituality and Science, Ideology and Ethics, Mystic experience and Reason, Art and Culture all contribute to the making of the future course of Indian philosophy. If we observe the direction of Indian thought-systems of twentieth century we come to the conclusion that philosophical knowledge is increasing with the investigations of science and laws of nature. Psychology and para-psychology open the potentialities of human consciousness, physics shows the formless and indeterminate nature of matter, biology shows the vital life-force as conscious energy and yoga reveals consciousness to be ubiquitous and all-pervading existence. We may outline the salient ideal features of Indian Philosophy briefly as follows :

Firstly, Indian thinkers realise that the theories of matter, life and consciousness as propounded by the physicists, biologists and para-psychologists and mystic seers have to be integrated in a holistic philosophical system. The future of Indian philosophy consists in assimilating the truths of the philosophies of matter, life consciousness existence, being and essence. What is necessary is to examine, evaluate and verify the validity of theories and then to organise them in a philosophical system. If philosophy is to be the presiding deity over arts and science, if it is the 'art' of arts and 'science' of sciences it is essential for it to be an all-comprehending knowledge. Philosophy is the study of different theories and truths of natural sciences, social sciences, humanities and religious faiths. It develops a holistic and integral philosophy uniting the principles of different sciences. By so doing, philosophy again becomes the presiding deity over other systems of thought and disciplines of science. The arena of

philosophy becomes vast and all comprehensive. It is a synthesis of the truths of intuition and natural and social sciences. It will then become, we hope, once more the presiding deity over all the arts and sciences extending to all fields and branches of knowledge. It will be deep, high and extensive and intuitive well as empirical in form and content.

Indian philosophy will be open ; comprehensive, and integral systems of thought. It will break the traditional and ancient syntheses of thoughts. The closed, narrow, partial and narrow syntheses will give way to the dynamic and creative systems of thought. It is by widening the scope of philosophy, by integrating the truths and principles of different systems of thought, and by raising and uniting them with the revelations of mystic experience that one can develop the Indian Philosophy to perfection and fulness in the recent future.

Secondly, positive attitude towards the world and problems of life has been the important feature of contemporary Indian thought which will continue to grasp and condition the future philosophies of India. We observe that the rejection of *Māyāvāda* is the dominant note of the thinkers of modern India. The growth of philosophical systems consists in the evolution of positive approaches to the world. A philosophy of humanism, equality, cooperation, brotherhood, world economy, world government and world religion is in offing. The view that the world is an illusion and that it is in nature sinful has been discarded from all quarters of Indian thought. The philosophy of Mahatma Gandhi advocates service to salvation, action to mere teaching and righteous life to the ascetic escape from duties or refuge in forest.

The reality of the world and the inherent unity in plurality of existence will be the cardinal principles of Indian Philosophy in future. Matter, Life, Mind, Soul, Supermind and Absolute are the forms and contents of the Reality. Reality manifests itself in different forms, principles, objects and realities. The plurality of objects have unity and oneness in themselves, for they all emerge from the same Reality.

The world is, therefore, real and spiritual. What is necessary is, therefore, to evolve a uniform and coherent system of thought in which the spiritual experience and reason, the ideal and the actual life on earth, the ethical values and economics, politics and domestics find unison in the Indian Philosophy of tomorrow.

The principles for social, moral and spiritual transformation of mankind will, therefore, form essential part of Indian Philosophy. The amelioration of mankind and the perfection of humanity will be the cardinal principles and aim of Indian thought. Each philosophical system will have a social philosophy and will advocate a spiritual humanism in which man finds expression and fulfilment of his spiritual and physical aspirations. Indian humanism will not be economic or political in nature, nor, will it be a form of naturalistic humanism but will be one in which man as a whole perfects and fulfils his physical vital, mental and spiritual aspirations.

Indian philosophy will combine the material life of man with his moral and spiritual ends. It will obliterate the distinctions of the East and the West, and will evolve a philosophy of synthesis in which the material and spiritual ends would unite in the common endeavour of man. Indian philosophical systems in future will, we hope, be no mere mystic systems. We observe that the truths of physical science, ethical values and

spiritual experiences of seers will join together in building up new philosophies of India. With the comparative study of metaphysics, ethical values, logical systems and spiritual experiences will develop new syntheses in philosophical systems to which the Contemporary Indian Philosophies are moving today.

Thirdly, the monism of Spirit and Matter is the one basic principle which has been accepted by all Contemporary Indian Philosophers. The dualism of Spirit and Matter has been rejected. Matter is a form of Spirit. Reality is Spirit in its manifest form and matter its unmanifest state. Matter is a form of Spirit. The distinction between the two is fast disappearing. The physicist discover that Matter is energy or wave, or formless substance. It is a dynamic and indeterminate reality. The universe is not a blocked and static one. Nature is a dynamic reality. It is energy and consciousness, Matter is, therefore, Conscious force. It is Spirit. The substances are modes of its existence in different forms. Matter is Spirit or Brahman. It is all pervading, formless, indeterminate, dynamic, creative, force and Consciousness.

Fourthly, a philosophy of absolute-theism or the absolutism will be the dominant note of the future thought of India. There will be reconciliation between the principles of Absolute and God in a Comprehensive system. Reality will be Conscious-Force with self directive energy. It is not mere consciousness and force but it is self. Conscious Reality with inner motivation and will. The organisation in nature is possible because of the self-conscious character of the Reality. To control, move, guide and perfect the world of man and nature it is essential that the nîsus in Reality is self-Conscious. It fills the world with dynamism and moves the world to the realisation of cosmic perfection and divinity. It has personality and is God in which the personal and the impersonal Absolute remain in oneness. The Absolute is Reality, Consciousness-Force, Bliss, Being and Truth in its impersonal form, and God is its personal aspect. It is omniscient, omnipotent, just, merciful Creator, maintainer and destroyer of the world. God is immanent in the world and is the Supreme Person. Though the religious gods with different attributes, qualities, powers and forms are losing their concrete and manifest shape, an implicit faith in His Unity and Oneness in Reality as a self-Conscious Reality is obtaining the future conception of God in Indian Philosophy.

Fifthly, the conception of self as a dynamic entity which grows and develops in power, consciousness, bliss, infinity and divinity will characterise the future thought of India. As a center and nucleus of the self-Conscious Reality, the self has all the cosmic powers in it. The self has infinite consciousness, power, bliss, truth and perfection when identified with the Reality. Just as a material element in nascent condition has wide and manifold powers, a self has infinite powers when it is identified with God. In the spiritual life of an individual the soul becomes more open, manifest and explicit.

When the individual develops the soul-personality, and the soul controls the body, life and consciousness, the individual realises a high grade of perfection in him. After the self-realisation is achieved the process of spiritualisation and divinisation continues ahead. It comes in active communion and identification with God. The individual divine soul becomes related with God as an active lover to the beloved.

Sixthly, Indian Philosophy would centre round 'man'. However divine and

blissful his transcendental for other worldly life may be, the life in the world cannot be sacrificed for that distant end. India took the world and human life as means for the realisation of other-worldly and which resulted in the neglect of its social progress. It is essential, therefore, to give immense importance to the life of man in this world. If there is a life beyond man's perfection in this world will further evolve to its heights in that world. Refurther will be the gradual process of ascent, spiritualisation and divinisation of man. If one is fully perfect, divine, spiritual, God-Man or Jivanmukta there is the Certainty of his realisation of eternal perfection, divinity salvation and Godhead after he leaves his earthly abode. Therefore, to be a Jivanmukta or divine being in the world is of utmost importance to man. A Jivanmukta is bound to realise eternal salvation and form oneness with God after he leaves his physical body.

Indian philosophy will be man-centred and not God-centred. The final aim of man can neither be material nor transcendental realisation. Whether the problems are physical or spiritual they invariably refer to man. Human life and the world have to be uplifted and spiritualised and they cannot be taken as mere means. If a human being fulfils his aspiration in his economic, social, political, cultural, intellectual and spiritual aspects he achieves all that he needs. The development of man in all his aspects make him superman. But superman is neither a demon. As Nietzsche thought nor is a supernatural being, for both make strange beings of men. Such a being can hardly be called superman. A superman is a totally perfect being in whom there is the fulfilment of all human aspirations.

Indian philosophy will lay the principles of ethics, economics and politics which will be oriented to the perfection and ascent of man. The state and society, the moral laws and economic principles will no longer remain 'State-Centred' but will be 'man-Centred'. State and social laws are means for an individual's ascent and perfection. They are merely means for man's evolution and transformation. Indian philosophy will guide the principles of education which will awaken, stimulate and evolve all the human potentialities, enhance the value of man, create interest in one's life and evolve social Co-operation. The State is a means for the perfection of man. It cannot be an end in itself. The educational system should be such as to develop all the latent potentialities of man. Though the pragmatists have given a shape to the philosophy of education, but they have committed mistake in confining the fruits of it to material achievements. It would be an error to tie 'bread, house and clothes' to the neck of education. It is essential to base education on a philosophy envisaged for the total development of man.

Seventhly, the conception of salvation is taking a different turn. Salvation is a condition of transformation from man to superman. Man perfects himself in the realisation of gnostic state. When man is transformed into spiritual being and becomes Krishna, Christ or God-man he achieves perfection in mind, life and body. It is a state of the realisation of omniscience, Omnipotence and bliss in his human existence.

The Philosophers who advocate the evolutionary nature of the Absolute will view that the human evolution would lead to the transformation of body, life and mind in a way that they become conscious, immortal and omniscient. Salvation is a state of divine birth. We observe that new approaches to salvation are being made by contemporary Philosophers. Some conceive of salvation as a purified state of individual self in Constant Communion with God, some others view salvation as a state of God-realisation in

which man is completely dedicated to the service of humanity and still others take it to be a condition of God-man in the world. The perfected souls take higher, spiritual and divine births and serve the world as its social, moral and spiritual leaders. It is a state of *Jivanmukta* in which the individual becomes God-man on earth and has the divine life ever engaged in the total transformation of mankind into gnostic beings.

The conception of cosmic salvation in which the entire humanity is raised to divine state has been advocated by many contemporary Indian thinkers. The spiritual and divine life on earth extend in the evolution of spiritual humanism. More stress in Indian philosophy is being given on the human values connected with social service, brotherhood, righteous action and universal love.

Lightly, the Yogas are the scientific methods by which an individual derives immense consciousness and power. Indian philosophy will revive the different Yogas for his perfection. *Rājayog*, *Jñāna yoga*, *Bhakti yoga*, *Karmayoga*, *Hathayoga*, *Kriyāyoga*, and many other ones will help humanity in its spiritual ascent. Self-realisation and oneness with the Absolute. The spiritual and conscious energy is available to an individual when he achieves oneness with God. Human and cosmic evolution is towards consciousness and the realisation of the supreme Reality.

Lastly, religion, spirituality and philosophy will lose all distinctions and will merge in togetherness in Indian Philosophy. The rituals, dogmas, sacraments, etc. will soon be out of vision and a cultless scientific, social and spiritual form of religion will draw to it most of the rational and mystic people of India. The myths and superstitions will fade away and a form of spiritual philosophy and religion will be the basis of faith in India. We therefore observe that the future religion will be spiritual philosophy bereft of myths, dogmas, superstitions, beliefs and sacraments. Indian philosophy will be spiritual in the true sense and will be catholic, open, free, dynamic, cultless, non-dogmatic and non-ritualistic. It will be a religion of humanity which will include the best of all religions. Indian philosophy will be an open religion based on the intuitive experiences of God and expressed in selfless work for mankind as a whole.

The essential features of the future course of Indian Philosophy will comprise (1) the truths of scientific theories on matter, life and consciousness, (2) positive attitude towards the world and union of spiritual with the material life of an individual, (3) monism of spirit and matter, (4) absolute-theistic systems, (5) self as dynamic entity, (6) man-centred philosophy, (7) salvation as a state of *Jivanmukta* or God-man on earth and faith in cosmic salvation, (8) Yogas for the realisation of salvation and, (9) oneness of religion, spirituality and philosophy. The philosophical systems would serve the need of humanity and will guide it with conviction and firmness. Indian Philosophy will be an addition to the series of Contemporary philosophies of Sri Aurobindo, Rabindranath Tagore and Mahatma Gandhi. It will offer to mankind the method and means for cosmic and supra-cosmic spiritual transformation and divinisation.

The Empirical Proof for the Existence of God

Many attempts have been made throughout history to prove the existence of God. Especially the schoolmen put much effort into supporting their faith with such proofs. Well-known is for instance the so-called Ontological Argument put forward by Anselm of Canterbury. He professed to prove from the definition of God as the most perfect being, that such a being exists. C.D. Broad has formulated this alleged proof in this way: "Anything that lacked existence would lack a positive property which it might conceivably have had. Nothing which lacked a positive property which it might conceivably have had would be a most perfect being, for it is logically possible that there should be something superior to it, viz., a being which resembled it in all other respects but had the additional property of existence. Therefore no most perfect being would lack existence. Therefore all most perfect beings exist".¹

Another argument is known as the Cosmological Argument. It might loosely be said to show that God exists because the universe must have a first cause. And this cause is God.

This proof was accepted by Thomas Aquinas and Locke, but rejected by Hume and Kant. Very few, however, would accept either the Ontological or Cosmological Argument today.

There is in the main three ways to justify a belief in the existence of God. One is to believe in authority, for instance on the authority of the Bible or the Koran. The second way is to prove that God exists by logical reasoning from premisses which are accepted, implicitly or explicitly, as either self-evident or very likely to be true. The third kind of proof is based on the claim that it is possible to know God directly. Such a knowledge can be of two kinds. One can either argue that the proposition "God exists" is self-evident in the sense that most people would regard the statement "If the propositions a and b are true, then a is true" as self-evident.

The other possibility is to claim that one can know God empirically. He can

1. C. D. Broad, *Religion, Philosophy and Psychological Research*, London 1953, p. 180.

somehow be perceived analogously to the way people can see a house or a cloud.

In those cultures where God was identical with for instance the sun, the moon, or an animal like the ox Apis in ancient Egypt, then the existence of God could of course be verified empirically by the senses.

But some have also claimed to have perceived God as Christians or Moslems understand Him. Such claims have been made by many mystics. It is this alleged empirical proof for the existence of God which will be discussed in this article.

But before doing so, it is necessary to define the terms "God" and "empirical proof". Especially the term "God" is very ambiguous.

The various concepts of God are usually divided into pantheistic, deistic, and theistic ones.

Pantheism is often vaguely defined as the view that "God and the universe as a whole are identical". There are many forms of pantheism. Pantheism is common in Indian philosophy, but most interpretations of this concept are rejected by both Islam and Christianity which emphasize the distinction between God and His creation.

Deism is the view that God is wholly transcendent to the world and which denies His immanence.² Deism generally assumes that God has created the world. But after having done so, He takes no part in what is going on in it. Shaftesbury, Voltaire, and Rousseau are regarded as deists.

Sometimes deism is formulated as the view that there exists something in the world which is not existentially dependent on anything else. But the rest of the world is dependent on this part for its existence.³ This part is then called God.

To make this last definition consistent with that just mentioned, it is necessary to hold that the universe is dependent on God for its existence only, but that otherwise God is not interfering in the world.

Theism maintains that God is both immanent and transcendent to the world. His immanence can, however, either be understood in the pantheistic sense, according to which God is in everything. But it can also be understood in the sense that He can be present everywhere He wants to. His presence is possible everywhere. But He needs not necessarily be in all things at all times.

Theism generally maintains that God is a person in some sense, or at least is one with whom personal relations are possible. Theists usually also regard God as the Supreme Value and the creator of all that exist.

Christianity is a theistic religion, but so are also some non-Christian ones. The distinctive characteristic of Christianity is in the first place the doctrine of the Incarnation and of the Trinity.

Pantheism, deism, and theism render a more abstract and philosophical concept of God than the more concrete ones of many primitive religions, where God might be identified with some physical object. Common for the more philosophical concepts are also that they can be interpreted in a great variety of ways. It would lead too far to discuss if all these different concepts of God could be empirically verified. For this reason I will confine myself to a concept of God, which might be accepted by most Christians.

2. See *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, Chicago 1966, on Theism.

3. See Broad, *op. cit.*, p. 145

I will therefore define God as a theistic (1) being who is either a person or a whole consisting of three interrelated persons as explained by the doctrine of the Trinity, (2) He is a holy, (3) and loving, (4) being who has created the universe, (5) He is also the supreme good, (6) and is morally perfect (7).

That God is theistic, will imply that He is transcendent to and independent of the human mind and brain, although He also is or can be immanent in it. God can for this reason not be something confined to the human brain, or a "product" of it, like hallucinations. This point will be important in the discussion further on.

To distinguish the Christian God from the God of other religions, I will further define God as a being having been incarnated in Jesus Christ (8), and as having addressed Himself to man through the Bible (9). The Christian God is also unique (10). There is only one God.

Theologians have often described God by what they call the *via eminentiae*, i.e., that all positive attributes are ascribed to God, but they must be raised to the highest possible degree. God is not only powerful, He is omnipotent, and He does not only know much, He is omniscient. Omnipotence (11) and omniscience (12) are probably the most important of these positive attributes, so I will include them in my definition.

Christian theologians generally agree that God is basically ineffable and unfathomable (13), and I will also regard this characteristic as an attribute of God.

My complete definition of God will then be a being having the characteristics (1) to (13). Most Christians will probably agree that God cannot lack any of these characteristics if they shall regard Him as God. But some will perhaps ascribe certain additional attributes to Him.

I will then define what I will call an empirical proof in this context.

By the empirical proof for the existence of God I will understand the claim by certain mystics that they have experienced God directly during mystical experiences, that they have had contact, or have been united with Him. Plotinus wrote about this experience: "He who has seen it knows what I say, that the Soul then has another life, when it comes to God and having come possesses Him, and knows, when in that state, that it is in the presence of the dispenser of the true life, and that it needs nothing further. On the contrary, it must put off all else, and stand in God alone (. . .) Then we can see Him and ourselves."⁴

Meister Eckhart wrote the following about the contact between God and the soul: "By nature the core of the soul is sensitive to nothing but the divine Being, unmediated. Here God enters the soul (. . .) through its core and nothing may touch that core except God himself."⁵

Not all experiences, however, generally classified as mystical, are described as a contact or union with God. Also atheistic mystical experiences exist, as in Hinayana Buddhism, the followers of which do not believe in a God. Many modern western mystics are also either atheists or describe their experiences in non-theological language.⁶

For this reason I will confine myself to that subclass of mystical experiences

4. W. T. Stace, *The Teachings of the Mystics*, New York 1960, p. 119.

5. *Ibid.*, p. 145

6. See for instance Arthur Koestler's description. *Ibid.*, p. 232-235

which represent an experience of a divine being with certain personal aspects, by the mystics called God. It must be emphasized that it is the mystics who claim that his experiences are a realisation of God. I will later discuss whether this claim is justified or not !⁷

It must be noted that this divine being can be experienced either in the mystic's own mind or in his surroundings, in nature. Some have for this reason divided the mystical experiences in two main groups, in so-called extrovertive and introvertive experiences. In the extrovertive experiences, the mystic looks outward through his senses and perceives a divine presence in his surroundings. In the introvertive experiences he looks inward into the mind and perceives the divine there.⁸ Some mystics have had experiences of both the extrovertive and introvertive kind.

The quotes from Plotinus and Meister Eckhart seem to be examples alleged realisation of God in the soul, or mind, to use a more neutral term. As an example of an alleged experience of God in nature, Jacob Böhme can be quoted who wrote about one of his experiences : "In this light my spirit saw through all things and into all creatures and I recognized God in grass and plants."⁹

When discussing this alleged proof for the existence of God, one has to take both these possibilities into consideration.

7. It is clearly this subclass W. R. Inge has in mind when he defines religious mysticism. See W. R. Inge, *Christian Mysticism*, Living Age Books, New York 1956, p. 5 : "Religious mysticism may be defined as the attempt to realize the presence of the living God in the soul and in nature, or, more generally, as the attempt to realise, in thought and feeling, the immanence of the temporal in the eternal and of the eternal in the temporal."

Arne Naess is probably also limiting his conception of a mystical experience to the same subclass when he defines a mystic. See Arne Naess, *Filosofiens historie*, Oslo 1957 ; (a mystic is) "a representative of the doctrine that man can attain unity with God by means of some kind of introspection" (My translation).

8. A Scholar who has used this distinction, is W. T. Stace, who also suggests a definition of mystical experiences being more minute than most of the others in this field. See W. T. Stace *Mysticism and Philosophy*, London 1961, p. 131-132 :

**"Common Characteristics of
Extrovertive Mystical
Experiences**

1. The Unifying Vision—all things are One,
2. The more concrete apprehension of the One as an inner subjectivity, or life, in all things.
3. Sense of objectivity or reality.
4. Blessedness, peace etc.
5. Feeling of the holy, sacred, or divine.
6. Paradoxicality.
7. Alleged by mystics to be ineffable.

**Common Characteristics of Introvertive Mystical
Experiences.**

1. The Unitary Consciousness, the One, the Void, pure consciousness.
2. Nonspatial, non temporal,
3. Sense of objectivity or reality.
4. Blessedness, peace etc.
5. Feeling of the holy, sacred, or divine.
6. Paradoxicality.
7. Alleged by mystics to be ineffable."

The characteristics on these lists are something empirical something immediately given. When I in this article speak about mystical experience, I mean the concept as defined by Stace. When the mystics instead of One or the One in the lists above say God, one gets the subclass I will discuss here. Stace points out that the mystics often do so. See Stace, *op. cit.* p. 133.

9. Stace, *The Teaching of the Mystics*, New York, 1960 p. 16.

It must be emphasized, however, that visions and auditions do not belong to mystical phenomena. A vision of the Holy Virgin or St. Paul's vision of Christ on his way to Emmaus are thus not mystical experiences. Nor have the voices heard by Socrates, Mohammed, or Joan of Arc anything to do with mysticism. That visions and auditions do not belong to mystical experiences, are also generally assumed by the mystics themselves. Some of them, like Teresa of Avila, had themselves visions. But she did not regard them as mystical experiences. And John of the Cross in His: "The Ascension of Mount Carmel", tried to show at some length that visions are an obstacle on the way to illumination.

Empirical experience is usually assumed to mean sense experience. This is so because the overwhelming majority of empirical facts are provided by the senses. But mystical experiences are also empirical, because by "empirical" is generally understood something that is directly experienced by a perceiver, as mystical experiences are. Such an empirical fact, be it a colour-experience in sense-experience or a feeling of bliss in mystical experience, can then be given various interpretations by the intellect in order to understand it and perhaps make it fit into some theory or hypothesis. The validity of any interpretation can always be doubted, whereas a directly given empirical fact cannot. As with sense-experience, it is also difficult to distinguish between the content immediately given and the interpretations put upon it as far as mystical experiences are concerned. But roughly it can be done.

In this article only the empirical contents of mystical experiences are discussed and not empirical sense-data. The reason is that philosophers and theologians generally agree that God, as Christians understand Him, cannot be experienced by the senses. With other concepts of God, however, He could be experienced by the senses, as in certain tribes where the sun was held to be God, as already mentioned.

Some may think that when the mystics claim they have had contact with God, this is a formulation of something empirically experienced. Some people may assume that God is experienced in *unio mystica* in a similar way to how a colour is experienced by the eyes. If this was so, then the experience of God could be proved empirically since God then was an empirical fact, given directly to the mind.

But it could also be claimed that when the mystics claim to have experienced God, this is an *interpretation* of the empirical content of a mystical experience, i.e., that they put more into their experience than what is empirically justified. If this is the case, the experience need not be a proof for the existence of God.

I will try to show that the mystics claiming to have had contact with God and saying that their experiences are a proof for the existence of God, are interpreting those experiences and drawing conclusions from them which are not justified. To do so, I will investigate whether the characteristics (1) to (13) mentioned above, which I have used to define God, are empirically given attributes of the being some mystics experience or not. When investigating this, I will not try to show that the same mystic mentions all these characteristics as belonging to the being perceived in one of his experiences. I will only try to find out if each of the characteristics at least once is among the empirical attributes of the being experienced by one mystic. If, however, it is impossible that one or more characteristics, for some reason or other, can be the empirical attribute of any being perceived during a mystical experience, or if no mysti-

cal experience gives sufficient information so that one can decide whether one or more characteristics belong to at least one experienced being or not, then no empirical proof exists for the existence of God, as defined here, based on mystical experience alone. My intention is to show just this, and consequently that the proof is not valid.

I will first discuss whether any being the mystics experience can be theistic or not, i.e., if it can be both immanent and transcendent to the world.

None of the concepts "world", "transcendent", or "immanent" is particular precise, so I will try to define them.

By "world" one can mean "everything that exists". In that case everything existing according to the definition would belong to the world, and it would consequently be impossible for an existing God to be transcendent to the world, when I define that something is transcendent to the world by saying that it then is independent of and does not belong to the world.

Instead one can define the world as the physical universe, or as the totality of both the physical universe and everything mental, that which Spinoza called *modi extensionis* and *modi cogitandi*. I will here define the world in the latter sense, thus getting a concept "world" being wider than that used by physics.

As already mentioned I define that something is transcendent to the world by saying that it then is independent of and does not belong to the world. Some would perhaps define "transcendent" as "outside of". But this would involve the concept of space, and most philosophers and scientists would probably deny that anything could exist "outside" the space of the physical universe.

That something is immanent in the world I will understand to mean that it belongs to the world.

I will now try to show that no experienced being can be theistic since it cannot be proved to be transcendent to the world. Then it will not be necessary to show whether it is immanent or not.

It must be stressed, however, both at this point and later, that all conclusions reached are only valid when the concepts involved in the reasoning are understood in the sense I have defined them.

To find out whether any experienced divine being is transcendent or not, I will first consider the problem W.T. Stace calls "the problem of objective reference". By this he understands the question whether mystical experiences are objective in the sense that they reveal the existence of something outside the mystic's mind and independent of his consciousness.

Stace tries to find out whether this is true for all mystical experiences or not. I will, however, confine myself to that sub class which is claimed to be experiences of some divine being.

In my view there is no way to know whether any being experienced during unio mystica is objective or not.

What the mystic experiences, either in his own mind or in nature, is something divine. But he cannot know how this divine being originates and comes to his knowledge. It might be subjective, dependent upon his mind and brought forth by certain brain-processes, so far unknown to science. As regards the extrovertive experience one

can assume that a subjective element is projected into nature, in a way like hallucinations.

But the experiences, both the extrovertive and introvertive ones, might also be interpreted as being objective, caused by some divine being independent of the mystic's mind revealing its existence.

We have here the same situation as often in science, namely that some facts and experiences can be explained by various theories. And so long that no one can point out a method to verify one of them and falsify the others, all theories have to be accepted as possible solutions.

It is true that the mystics themselves usually describe their experiences as objective. Some feel that this objectivity is self-evident.¹⁰ But such a feeling is no proof that they really are so. Too often one philosopher has found something self-evident which another has not. Just a subjective conviction with nothing else to support it is no proof.

The great similarity of the descriptions of the experiences are no proof for their objectivity either. If it should be so that all mystical experiences are basically of the same kind, this can be explained by the theory that the processes in the brain causing these experiences are the same for all mystics.

I therefore conclude that there is no way to decide whether the alleged divine being the mystics experience is objective and independent of their mind, or subjective and dependent, something produced by the brain like hallucinations and delusions.

But if it cannot be proved that any divine being experienced during unio mystica is independent of the brain, it cannot be proved that it is independent and transcendent to the world either, since the brain is a part of the world.

But on the other hand, it cannot be disproved that this experienced being is independent of the brain either, so the *possibility* still exists that it also is independent of and transcendent to the world. But a mystical experience in itself gives no solution to this problem, and consequently it does not solve the problem whether any divine being experienced by the mystics is theistic or not. Characteristic (1) can thus not be proved by mystical experiences to belong to any being perceived during unio mystica.

Most mystics, who have had this experience of a divine being, feel that it is in some sense personal in the same sense that the human mind is personal. Some mystics, however, like Meister Eckhart and Shankara, claim that this experience of something personal might develop into something impersonal. Meister Eckhart claimed that what he experienced and called God is personal. But what he experienced and called the Godhead is impersonal. Shankara had a similar distinction between the lower and higher Brahman. I will here, however, only consider those experiences of something claimed to be personal, and discuss if they reveal the existence of what might be called a person.

As to the definition of a person, C.D. Broad has probably one of the best. He applies the name "person" to a substance if, and only if, it fulfils the following conditions.

10. Objectivity is also included in Stace's definition.

"(1) It must think, feel, will, etc.

- (2) Its various contemporary states must have that peculiar kind of unity which we express by saying that they "together make up a single total state of mind".
- (3) Its successive total states must have that peculiar kind of unity with each other which we express by saying that they are "so many different stages in the history of a single mind".
- (4) These two kinds of unity must be recognized by itself, and not only by some external observer (. . .) it must not only be in fact a mind, but must also know that it is a mind".¹¹

As regards the first of these conditions, it is clear that the being experienced by many mystics has certain feelings, in the first place love. 'The mystic feels loved by this being. St. Theresia wrote, for instance: the soul (. . .) is made one with God, Who, (. . .) has been pleased to reveal the love that He has for us by showing to certain persons the extent of that love, so that we may praise His greatness'.¹² This being is also often characterized as having feelings like blessedness and peace, and is sometimes felt to have some kind of will. John of the Cross wrote: "And the supernatural union comes about when the two wills—that of the soul and that of God—are confounded in one."¹³

It is, however, doubtful if this being is thinking in the ordinary human sense. The mystics agree that this experienced being is somehow beyond reason and does not conform to the common laws of logic and thinking. Stace for this reason mentions paradoxically as one of the characteristics of a mystical experience. So even if one assumes that this being has some kind of mental activity, this must be of such a peculiar kind that I don't think one ought to call it thinking.

I do not think that the conditions (2) to (4) on Broad's list are fulfilled either. As regards (2) and (3) they assert that there must exist various different states of the consciousness of a being, either contemporary or successive states, if it shall be justified to call this being a person.

But both the divine being experienced in the mind and in nature is uniform. The divine being is an "undifferentiated unity"¹⁴ and cannot be divided in different states. That would imply multiplicity. As regards the being experienced during an introverted experience, it has no meaning to use concepts of time like "contemporary" and "successive" about it since this kind of experience is somehow non-temporal. Meister Eckhart wrote: "And therefore, if the soul is to know God, it must know him above time and outside of space".¹⁵

11. Broad, *op. cit.*, p. 160.

12. Stace, *op. cit.*, p. 184.

13. *Ibid.*, p. 187.

14. Regarding the extroverted experience, one probably has to distinguish between the mystical element in it, being non-sensory and uniform, and that which belongs to the sense world and which of course is characterized by multiplicity. But that which is interpreted as God in the extroverted experience, is an "undifferentiated unity".

15. Stace, *The Teachings of the Mystics*, New York 1950, p. 253.

As far as condition (4) in Broad's definition is concerned, no experienced being can recognise itself as having the two kinds of unity described in (2) and (3), since it does not have them altogether as just shown.

If, however, one only considers the problem whether any experienced being knows itself as a being, many mystics have believed so. Meister Eckhart wrote: "God has perfect insight into himself and knows himself up and down, through and through, not by ideas, but of himself".¹⁶

The conclusion is therefore that the divine being some mystics experience, often has certain personal aspects, but it cannot be considered a person—in the sense Broad defines this concept.

The personal aspects of the Christian God is made somewhat complicated by the doctrine of the Trinity, which claims that the Deity consists of three interrelated persons.

Many Christian mystics do not mention the Trinity in connection with their experiences. But Meister Eckhart wrote: "In this way the soul enters the unity of the Holy Trinity, but it may become even more blessed by going further, to the barren Godhead, of which the Trinity is a revelation".¹⁷

Eckhart seems to maintain that the highest stage, where the soul is united with what he calls the Godhead, the three persons have disappeared, only an "undifferentiated unity", a "pure void" is left.

Stace identifies the mystical consciousness only with this highest stage, the Godhead of Eckhart. If it is accepted that the divine being of the mystics is experienced during this highest state only (which many will not), this being can never contain anything about the persons of the Trinity, because an "undifferentiated unity" cannot reveal the existence of three persons. If it did so, it was no longer undifferentiated.

Another reason why the mystical consciousness cannot reveal the existence of the persons of the Trinity is due to the fact that no being experienced during unio mystica can be a person according to Broad's definition of the term, as I have tried to show. But for the same reasons that it cannot be a person, it cannot be a group of interrelated persons either.

Some may of course doubt that Christian theologians would accept Broad's definition as valid also for the persons of the Trinity. But I think they at least implicitly have such a conception of these divine persons. For the Father and the Son I think this is clear, although one cannot be quite sure concerning the Holy Ghost. But I think it is likely that Broad's definition can be applied also in this case.

But even if the lower stages of Eckhart's and other mystics' experiences are defined as mystical, it is difficult to understand especially how the Son in the Trinity can reveal Himself during such an experience, although Meister Eckhart sometimes wrote about some of his experiences as "the birth of Christ in the soul".

Jesus Christ is a historical person with a physical appearance. But it cannot be his physical body which is revealed. That would be a vision, which never belongs to a mystical experience.

Then it could be argued that only some mental aspects of Christ are revealed.

16. *Ibid.*, p. 146

17. *Ibid.*, p. 156

But to be able to identify these mental aspects with Christ they must somehow refer to the historical Jesus, directly or indirectly. But such references must at least partly be of a sensory nature, and sensory thoughts and ideas do not belong to mystical experiences. A mystical experience cannot therefore give evidence of a contact with Christ's mind. Just a feeling of a holy, divine, and awe-inspiring being is not a sufficient reason to identify this being with Christ.

Ruysbroeck seems simply to identify Christ with that peculiar light (fotism) which is seen during many mystical experiences. He writes: "For in this darkness there shines and is born an incomprehensible Light, which is the Son of God."¹⁸

In another passage he says: "And from our proper ground, (. . .) there shines forth an eternal brightness, which is the birth of the Son."¹⁹

It seems unjustified to identify this light with Christ with nothing else to support such an identification. These passages seem to be one of many examples about how a mystic tends to interpret what he experiences in the terms of his own religion.

It is, however, understandable that certain aspects of the being might be related to the Holy Ghost, since the divine entity experienced is felt as holy and also has certain personal and mental aspects which might be interpreted as belonging to a ghost.

But the conclusion, as regards characteristic (2) in my definition of God, is that no being experienced during unio mystica is a person, as defined by Broad, or a whole of three interrelated persons as described by the doctrine of the Trinity.

Mystics generally maintain that the being revealed to them is felt as holy. This is an empirical attribute of the entity and it is also mentioned in Stace's definition of a mystical experience.²⁰ Mystics also universally agree that the being they experience is a loving entity.²¹ The characteristics (3) and (4) therefore often belong to the being experienced by mystics.

That God is the creator of the universe, can be understood in various ways. One might either assume that God created the universe long time ago, and that the universe from then has existed and developed according to its own laws, subject to more or less interference from God.

Mystical experiences cannot be taken to support such a view. That would imply that the mystic during his experience somehow could go back in time getting information about the act of creation in the past. Such a hypothesis seems too far-fetched.

But that God creates the world might be interpreted as meaning that God is "causing its existence every moment", i.e., that He is a necessary condition for the existence of the universe. He is constantly upholding it and one might therefore say that He is creating it every moment. John of the Cross held this opinion and wrote: "To understand, then, the nature of this union, it must be known that God dwells or is present substantially (*per essentiam*) in every soul, even in the soul of the greatest sinner. This kind of union between God and all His creatures is never lacking, since it is in and by this union that He sustains their being, and if it were ever lacking, these creatures would immediately cease to be and would fall back into nothingness".²²

18. *Id.*, p. 164

19. *Id.*, p. 167

20. See note 8

21. See quote mentioned in connection with note 12

22. *Id.*, p. 137

As in Eckhart's writings, "creatures" here stand from things as well as living beings.

Ruysbroeck has his own understanding of God as creator and writes: "And thereby (during union) the created image (of Ruysbroeck) is united above reason in a three-fold way with its Eternal Image, which is the origin of its being and its life, and this origin is preserved and possessed, essentially and eternally, through a simple seeing in an imageless void."²³

In another passage he says: "And, through the Eternal Birth all creatures have come forth in eternity, before they were created in time. So God has seen and known them in Himself, according to distinction, in living ideas, and in an otherness from Himself, but not as something other in all ways, for all that is in God is God. This eternal going out and this eternal life, which we have and are in God eternally, without ourselves, is the cause of our created being in time. And our created being abides in the Eternal Essence, and is one with it in its essential existence".²⁴

Ruysbroeck is thus explaining God as creator in Platonic terms. All things exist in God as Platonic ideas, and these ideas might become manifest and thus a thing is created in the world. According to the first quote, Ruysbroeck's "created image" (during unio mystica) can perceive the idea of himself, which is the origin of his being.

Plotinus explained how God was a creator by his so-called emanation-theory. He held that God, or the One, created everything in the way that God "emanated existence" in a process that metaphorically can be compared with how the sun emanates light. Directly emanated from God is the spirit (*nous*). Below the spirit is the soul (*psychê*), and furthest away from God is the material world, being the outer limit of God's emanation. That part of creation which is higher than the sensory, material world, Plotinus called the intelligible world. By a certain kind of introversion (meditation) person could be able to experience this intelligible world, and during unio mystica he could experience its highest stage, which is God.

As regards both John of the Cross, Ruysbroeck, and Plotinus, they all felt that their experiences revealed to them something about how the being they called God, was acting as creator, although they seem to have different conceptions about how this creation was actually done. It is, however, unclear how much of this alleged insight was empirically given and how much speculation and interpretation.

But even if everything about the creative process was empirically given during mystical union, the question arises: Are the empirical experiences of an entity being the creator of everything also *true*, i.e., is the creative process taking place in the way the experiences reveal it? Or are they only illusions produced by the mind, giving no insight about how the world has come into existence? I think there are no way to know this. If some mystic gets a revelation during mystical ecstasy about how the being he experiences is creating, it is well conceivable that this revelation is false, i.e., that the process of creation in the world is otherwise than how he experiences it to be.

The question, whether a being experienced in unio mystica is the creator of the world, is different from the problem whether this being is holy and loving or not. As

regards the last problem it is sufficient to show that these characteristics are empirically given as belonging to an entity experienced. Here one only has to find out if the being itself has certain properties, and not to get information about this being's relation to something else.

But regarding the first problem, it is not sufficient to show that the being has a particular characteristic, in this case to be experienced as the creator of the world. One must in addition show that this experienced relation between the being and the world also is true in the sense that the experience is a correct rendering of how creation actually takes place.

As far as I can see, no mystical experience can give a proof that the being experienced actually is the creator of the world. As was the case regarding the problem of objective reference, different solutions are possible, and there is no way to verify or falsify one of them. Consequently characteristic (5) expressing that the being experienced in union mystica is the creator of the universe, cannot be proved by mystical experience.

The mystics generally describe the being they experience as the supreme good. But in order to call something, X, the supreme good, it is necessary to know everything good, so that one can compare and in this way come to the conclusion that X is the supreme good of them. But since one does not know whether any Y exists or not, whose goodness is greater than that of X, it is not justified to call X the supreme good.

The only thing the mystic for this reason is justified in saying, is that he has never experienced anything equal in goodness to what he knows from union mystica. But whether an even higher goodness exists, he cannot know. Therefore characteristic (6) cannot be ascribed to any being experienced in mystical union.

Another question is if moral perfection can be ascribed to this being. The proposition: "X is morally perfect" (a), can be understood in various ways. One of them is: "X is morally perfect only if no attribute belongs to X which is morally imperfect" (i).

Most mystics would claim that as far as their experiences were concerned, no attribute belonging to the being they experienced was morally imperfect. If one further assumes that no experienced being has more attributes than these mystics realised, the being they experienced would be morally perfect in sense (i).

A few mystics have, however, claimed that what they experienced was somehow morally indifferent, "beyond good and evil". Therefore all mystics do not support the view that their experienced being is morally perfect in sense (i).

But (a) can also be interpreted in this way: "X is morally perfect only if all actions performed by X are morally perfect" (ii). Here the problem is which actions are performed by X, in our case the alleged experienced being of the mystics. Most Christian mystics would say that this being, which they identify with God, is constantly acting in the world, and that these acts are morally beyond reproach. But apart from the acts of the mystics directly inspired by their experiences, the experiences themselves cannot tell which actions in the world are performed by the being experienced, if one assumes that such actions are carried out. The experiences cannot for this reason tell performs more actions than those done by mystics directly inspired by union mystica,

which probably all Christians believe that it, which they call God, does.

The question whether any mystic's experienced being has the characteristic (7), will after what has been said depend on how one understands that a being is morally perfect. If (i) is used, most mystics would say that the being they experienced was morally perfect. But a minority would not do so. If (ii) is applied, one cannot know if this being is morally perfect or not, because there is no way to know its actions in the world apart from those of the mystics directly caused by their experiences.

The two questions whether God has been incarnated in the historical person Jesus Christ and whether He has addressed Himself to man through the Bible, are both questions involving sense experience. The mystical experiences cannot for this reason have any direct reference to Christ or the Bible, since they do not contain anything of a sensory nature.²⁵

It can, however, be argued that the message of the mystical experiences, when a mystic tries to put it into words, are similar or identical with the central message of Christ and the Bible so that for this reason there might be a connection between the being experienced in unio mystica, by Christian mystics called God, and Jesus and the Bible.

Some might say that love towards others is the core of Christ's and the Bible's message, and the mystical experiences are usually felt by the mystics to give an urge in that direction.

But the message that one shall love one's neighbour has also been preached by many philosophers and believers in non-Christian religions, some of these persons existing before both Jesus and the Bible. So that fact alone is no sufficient reason to assume any relationship between the historical Jesus and the Bible on the one hand and the being experienced by the mystics on the other. The mere fact that Jesus and the Bible and this being have one or more characteristics in common, do not prove the existence of any particular relationship between them.

Jesus himself has not said anything which could support a theory of any relationship between him and the being experienced in unio mystica. From the available sources there is no special reason to believe that Jesus was a mystic. In the Gospel of St. John there are certain mystical-sounding phrases, as when Jesus said: "I and the Father are one", and: "I am in the Father and the Father in me". But these phrases need not be interpreted as relating to a mystical experience. They only show that the author of the fourth gospel was acquainted with certain common phrases of the mystics of his time. But none of these sayings is found in the other gospels.

To sum up: Mystical experiences do not prove the incarnation of God in Christ (8), nor that God has addressed Himself to man through the Bible (9). This is mainly so because a proof would require that mystical experiences contained references to sensory data, which they cannot do, but also because there is no evidence of mystical experiences in the writings about Jesus, perhaps not even in the whole Bible, although certain passages might be interpreted as referring to mystical experiences.

Christians also maintain that their God is unique. Only one God exists. If the being experienced in that class of mystical experiences assumed to represent a know-

25. As already mentioned regarding the extrovertive experiences, the mystical element in them is of a non-sensory nature, and it is that which constitutes the mystical experience proper.

ledge of God, is identical with the Christian God, this being has to be the same in all the experiences in this class. It cannot be so that the being *X* reveals itself to the mystic *p* and the being *y* to the mystic *q* within the class just mentioned.

But my view is that there is no way to know if a being *X*, experienced by the mystic *p*, is identical with the being *y*, experienced by the mystic *q*, and that therefore one cannot know if the mystics experience one unique being, or a multitude of different beings. This is so within any class of mystical experiences one might choose. All one can say is that the descriptions given by *p* and *q* might indicate certain similarities between *x* and *y*. The reason is that mystics agree that their experiences are basically ineffable. This characteristic is also included in Stace's and others' definitions of a mystical experience. These experiences cannot be "caught in the nets of words", as Zen-Buddhists say. What is most important cannot be expressed. And since therefore vague approximations are the only sources available for the student in this field, he can never find out if any two experiences or the beings experienced in them are identical. He can only point out certain similarities in the descriptions. If there are many similarities in the descriptions made by, for instance *p* and *q*, he might suggest the hypothesis that the beings *x* and *y* are identical. But he cannot know if this hypothesis is true, and consequently he does not know if *p* and *q* have experienced the same being. But that must be the case if they both claim to have experienced the Christian God.

Since there is no way to know if any two being experienced during unio mystica are identical, mystical experiences of a divine being, by mystics called God, cannot prove that they really are a realisation of the one, unique, Christian God (10).

That God is omnipotent, one might define that He is capable of bringing about any event in the universe. Many mystics would say that their experiences convinced them that the being they realised and called God is omnipotent in so far as the existence of everything is concerned. If this being withdrew from the world, it would cease to exist. This, however, is not sufficient to call a being omnipotent. It must also be able to make everything happen between existing things. The fact that many mystics claim this being to be present in all things, does not imply that it also has power to do anything with them. And even if it had power to do everything it wanted, there would be no way to verify this fact, since one does not know which actions this being wants to do. Therefore mystical experiences do not give any proof for the omnipotence (11) of this experienced being.

There are various aspects of the mystical experiences indicating that the being experienced is felt as omniscient.

First there is the so-called "all-in-one"—experience, i.e., the alleged experience by many mystics that the whole universe, everything existing, can be perceived in one single thing. Blake thus saw "the world in a grain of sand", and Angelus Silesius wrote :

"Du sprichst : das Grosse kann nicht in dem Kleinen sein,
Den Himmel schleusst man nicht ins Erdentöpfchen ein,
Kommt, schau der Jungfrau Kind,
So siehst du in den Wiegen,
Den Himmel und die Erd' und
Hundert Welten liegen."

For a non-mystic it is hard to know how this strange idea shall be understood, but it clearly has some relevance to the problem of omniscience.

Since the mystic and the experienced being is united during unio mystica, it might be suggested that this divine being also is participating in this "all-in-one"-experience and thus is omniscient as well.

But the theory breaks down on the fact that it is impossible for the mystic to know if everything in the world is contained in an object. That would require that he knows everything that exists, i.e., that he already was omniscient, so that he can know if everything is in the object or not. But if he is not omniscient, there is always the possibility that objects unknown to him are absent, and consequently he cannot know if everything existing is in the object. And since it is fair to assume that no human being is omniscient, this "all-in-one"-experience cannot be proved to represent any omniscience either, and thus it cannot be the base for a theory that this experienced being is all-knowing.

Another theory providing this being with omniscience, might be grounded on the fact that this being during extrovertive experiences is experienced "in" all things. One could then assume that it also knows all things it is in. But such a theory is based on the assumption that this divine being not only *is*, but also has certain perceptive abilities, i. e., that it also can get knowledge about the things it is in. But I don't think it possible to know if this is the case or not. Therefore this view cannot be more than an unverified hypothesis.

In addition it is doubtful if the mystic from his extrovertive experiences can infer that this divine being is "in" everything that exists. He only experiences it in everything he perceives, but whether it also is "in" anything outside his field of perception he cannot know.

Another common view of mystics is the idea of the correspondence between microcosmos, or as the mystics see it, between the inner self of man and the universe. Such views were for instance well-known in medieval alchemy.

This theory could also be the possible base for a theory of omniscience. According to most Hindu philosophers the self, or *Atman*, is identical with *Brahman*, the world-soul that some call God although it to many seems to lack personal aspects. If you thus know your self, you also know the basic, divine essence of the universe. And since the self in unio mystica is united with the divine being it experiences, one might assume that this being also knows the basic structure of the universe.

Another question is if this being also would know everything in the sense world, the world of *Māyā* in Indian terminology, which does not belong to the basic structure of the universe.

But even if this being should have some knowledge of the sense world, one does not know if it is omniscient and knows the *whole* sense world for the same reason that the argument of omniscience from the "all-in-one"-experience had to be rejected. To know if this being is omniscient, the mystic must himself be so to be able to decide if this being is omniscient. And since the mystics cannot be supposed to have this ability, they cannot know if this being is omniscient either.

For these reasons it does not seem possible to prove that the being experienced is omniscient and that the characteristic (12) belongs to it.

Mystics agree, however, as stated, that the being experienced is basically unfathomable and inexpressible. Characteristic (13) can therefore be ascribed to this being.

My final conclusion based on all these discussions will be that mystical experiences do not prove the existence of God, when God is defined as I do here.

As we have seen, no mystical experience can prove that the being experienced is theistic or that it is a person (as defined by Broad), although it has certain personal aspects. But these aspects cannot be explained by the dogma of the Trinity. Mystical experiences cannot prove either that this experienced being is the creator of the world, that it is the supreme good (although it might be characterised as good), that it has been incarnated in the historical person Jesus Christ and has spoken to man through the Bible, or that it is omniscient. And finally the experienced being cannot be proved by these experiences to be unique in the sense that it is the same for all mystics within that group of experiences investigated here.

As I have tried to show, this is so regardless of the fact that some mystics have claimed that some of these characteristics have belonged to the being they experienced. In my view these claims are interpretations of their experiences which are not justified on the basis of the empirical content of the experiences.

It is, however, justified to describe this being as holy, loving, basically unfathomable to ordinary reason, and as possessing certain personal aspects.

If "moral perfection" is understood in the sense that "X is morally perfect only if no attribute belongs to X which is morally imperfect", then this being would be regarded as morally perfect by most mystics.

If, however, "moral perfection" is conceived as: "X is morally perfect only if all actions performed by X are morally perfect", then mystical experiences alone cannot decide whether any experienced being is morally perfect or not.

According to this, unto mystica could give an experience of a holy, loving, and basically irrational and unfathomable being, in some sense morally perfect and with certain personal aspects. Many experiences of such a being are also recorded. But such an experience would in no way prove the existence of the Christian God—as He has been defined here. Although all the characteristics of the being just mentioned also belong to the Christian God, they are not sufficient to make up the Christians' concept of God. Perhaps most important is the fact that it cannot be excluded that this being is just a product of the brain and have no objective existence independent of the mind.

But after having denied that mystical experiences give a proof for the existence of God, the question remains: Why have so many mystics claimed that their experiences actually are a realisation of their God?

There are several explanations to this. One is the influence of tradition and authority. When highly esteemed philosophers and saints of a particular religious tradition have interpreted their mystical experiences as a realisation of their God, later mystics tend to do the same when they have experiences which seem similar. This tendency is re-enforced by some of the subjective convictions these experiences might give, like the conviction that they are independent of the mind, as God is assumed to be etc.

Another explanation can be understood in analogy with sense perception. When we in the sense world see a thing with certain characteristics, we usually instinctively regard it as having other qualities, as well that will make it the thing we think it is. In the distance we might only see a shining object moving on the road, and all the same feel sure it is a car since cars are the only objects moving on roads with that speed. We then instinctively assume that this object also has other qualities, like being of metal, having windows, wheels, etc.

In the same way I think it often is with non-sensory perception. The mystic experiences something as having certain characteristics, and might instinctively regard it as having also other qualities that are not manifest to him at the moment, but that it seems likely to have.

If he then feels in contact with a being having certain qualities he ordinarily ascribes to God, he will instinctively also attribute other aspects of God to this being, and when he later tries to describe his experience, he says that it was a realisation of God.

This so-called empirical proof for the existence of God is perhaps the one of the many proofs, known from the history of philosophy which today seems most convincing. But in my view it cannot be regarded as valid any more than the other proofs recorded from the centuries past. A belief in the Christian God cannot rest on mystical experiences alone.

The Concept of Sarvodaya

Gandhi is said to have given us two new words which indicate his whole approach. They are *Satyagraha* and *Sarvodaya*. The word '*Satyagraha*' is certainly his own, coined as it was to express the nature of his non-violent movement in South Africa to get some justice done to his countrymen. It distinguished his movement from what was termed 'passive resistance'. But it cannot be strictly said so of the other word '*Sarvodaya*', which means the uplift or the welfare of all. We find the word to have been used by the Jain teacher Samantbhadra in a somewhat identical sense centuries ago, when he said with such a person in mind as was above attachment and hatred :

एवमिदमःपथः नित्यं सर्वदेवं लोकेष्विह सर्वत्र ।

(Your path is the only one that can end all troubles, which is for all times and which can lead to the uplift of all.)

When, however, Gandhi used this word to express the central ideas of Ruskin's *Unto This Last*, he did not know that the word had been used earlier. Ruskin's book does not differentiate between the so-called, 'high' and 'low', and accords equal human rights to all. This impressed Gandhi so greatly that he paraphrased it in a small booklet under the title of *Sarvodaya*.

But the word did not find currency during his lifetime except as the name of the Hindi monthly started in 1938 by the Gandhi Sewa Sangh as its organ under the joint editorship of Kaka Kalelkar and Dada Dharmadhikari. In its message to it, Gandhiji spoke of the objective of *Sarvodaya*. Thus the word came to denote the ideal social order of Gandhi. It was, however, Vinoba who gave the word its present wide currency.

After the death of Gandhi, his constructive work followers had assembled at Sevagram to discuss their role in the new situation after independence in March 1948, and they decided to have an organization of those who subscribed to the principles and ideas of Gandhi. The question then arose about the name of that organization.

¹ Vinoba : *Nagar Abhigyan*, p. 197.

There was a difference of opinion, and ultimately the suggestion of Vinoba, towards whom all eyes had turned as the spiritual successor of Gandhi, prevailed and the name of *Sarvodaya Samaj* was preferred to that of *Satyagraha Mandal*. Vinoba's argument was that the word *Satyagraha* had come to acquire a restricted meaning in the sense of non-violent resistance and it excluded constructive work. Its adoption under the circumstances would lead the people to expect resistance movement from them.² Later on, during his tours of 1948-49 in the various parts of the country, the main themes of his discourses were the general aspects of Sarvodaya so that the general public might come to understand and grasp its meaning, implications and significance. A Hindi monthly too of that name was started in 1949 under the joint editorship of Vinoba and Dada Dharmadhikari, and prior to the birth of the Hindi weekly *Bhoodan Yajna*, it was the chief vehicle of the propagation of the post-Gandhi Sarvodaya thought. Thus the term came to acquire the currency it has today.

Sarvodaya, which stands for the good or the welfare of all, rejects the utilitarian principle of the greatest good of the greatest number which was neither acceptable to Gandhi nor is it so to Vinoba. Gandhi wrote, "A votary of *ahimsa* cannot subscribe to the utilitarian formula . . . He will strive for the good of all and die in the attempt to realize the ideal. . . The greatest good of all inevitably includes the good of the greatest number, and therefore, he and the utilitarian will converge in many points in their career but there does come a time when they must part company, and even work in opposite direction."³ Vinoba's objections to it are that it attaches importance to quantity to the neglect of quality, and that into a society already torn into divisions, it adds to more of majority and minority.⁴ It is also asserted that the good of all is no chimera but a practical possibility. To Vinoba, one's own good, the good of others and the supreme good are all one. People may have varying opinions, but there can be no conflicting interests.⁵ This conviction is based on his view of the relationship between the individual and society.

According to him, the prevailing opinions on the question fall into three groups. One magnifies the individual, another magnifies the society and the third attempts to strike a balance between the two. He, however, does not agree with any of these schools because they are based on the presumption of duality between the individual and society. He thinks it is not possible to rigidly separate the two. They together constitute one whole and may be likened to a room which has been divided into two compartments by means of some slender and light partition. When the wind blows one way, one of them looks bigger, and when it blows the other way, it is otherwise. Their sizes are not fixed, they depend on the direction of the blowing wind. Similarly, in history the pendulum has sometimes been oscillating in favour of the individual and at other times in favour of the society. It has all been determined by the needs of the time and place.⁶

Both Gandhi and Vinoba emphasize the social aspect of man. The former laid

2. *Conference Proceedings (Hindi)*

3. Nirmal Kumar Bose : *Selections from Gandhi*, pp. 33-39.

4. *Vinoba Prarrachan*, 7.4.58.

5. 1959 *Vinoba Prarrachan*, p. 103; and *Harijan Sevak* of 17.4.49.

6. *Talks on the Gita*, chapter XVII.

greater stress on duties than on rights, and wrote, "I value individual freedom but you must not forget that man is essentially a social being. He has risen to his present status by learning to adjust his individualism to social progress. . . . Willing submission to social restraint for the sake of the wellbeing of the whole society, enriches both the individual and the society of which one is a member."⁷ In spite of the fact that the individual was the one supreme consideration with him,⁸ he, *albeit* indirectly, gave support to the organic view of society when he said, "The individual being pure, sacrifices himself for the family, the latter for the village, the village for the district, the district for the province, the province for the nation, the nation for all."⁹ In Vinoba there is slightly greater emphasis on society. Reference to social organism are direct and somewhat frequent, and he explicitly says that a man's own good lies in sacrificing everything for the society. The more he sacrifices for others, the better he serves his own good.¹⁰

It does not, however, mean that Vinoba fails to realize the importance of the individual. According to him, the worth of a society is judged by the quality of its individuals. It is like determining the quality of the milk by its butter-coefficient.¹¹ Moreover, he admits that some part of man's life is individual and some part is social ; and while the latter part is more extensive, the former is more intensive. The depth of the latter can never exceed that of the former. An individual can only introspect during his private moments, which are of great depth, derive strength and with its aid to serve the society.¹² This amounts to a plea for the sanctity of the individual sphere.

His conception of society as an organism also does not run counter to it. He gives it his own interpretation. In reply to the criticism that the analogy is fraught with danger in that it can be used for enslaving man, he once said, "I use this simile in a different sense. In the society of my conception, an individual will have full freedom. Like the organs of a body, the functions of individuals also vary. Only an eye can perform the function of an eye." And he further added, "No physical body would like to blind the eyes for it would injure the whole body."¹³ He also conceded the right of rebellion to an individual, provided it is felt as a duty. Thus his conception of society as an organism does not imply any unreasonable subordination of the individual to society, which is not to be identified with the state. His advocacy of decentralization is another safeguard against any tyranny of the state.

Thus there is no fundamental difference between Gandhi and Vinoba, and whatever difference of emphasis is there, it is due to particular circumstances which prevail today. During the lifetime of Gandhi the joint family system was alive enough to imbue its members with some social sense and to teach them to adjust themselves to

7. N. K. Bose : *op. cit.*, p. 190.

8. *Ibid.*, p. 27.

9. D. Mackenzie : *The White Umbrella*, p. 160.

10. *Bhoodini Yajna* of 9.9.55.

11. *Talks on the Gita*, chap. XXVII.

12. *Vinoba Pravachan* no. 54 of 1957.

13. A full description of the question and Vinoba's reply are found in Nirmala Deshpande : *Vinoba ke Sark*, pp. 156-58.

the needs of others, the old value had not been completely eroded and the glamour of western life had not cast that spell on us that it has today. As against it, in the post-war and post-independence period of today, things have greatly altered in this country resulting in stinking corruption, nepotism and lack of patriotism and of Swadeshi spirit. It is the lack of social sense born of excessive individualism which is the bane of our national life today, and it is this which Vinoba is anxious to correct.

A question that arises in connection with the concept of Sarvodaya is if it can at all be justified when we witness conflict all around, when struggle seems to be the law of evolution and when it appears that one man's meat is another man's poison. Vinoba does not deny the existence of conflicts. Only he says that they are not natural and inevitable. They are man-made. One reason for this conflict is our wrong way of life. In his own words, it is due to the absence of life lived as *vajna*.¹⁴ By this he means that if our way of life is such that we properly discharge our debts to the three institutions of body, society and the rest of the creation, there would not be any conflict at all. To put it differently, it is a problem of proper limits and right ordering of loyalties. In support of his views he writes,¹⁵ "The man whose life is lived as *vajna* belongs to everybody. In the same way, everyone feels that such a person belongs to him. He is dear and acceptable to the whole world. To everyone it appears that he is their life, their friend, their comrade."¹⁶ One thing highly responsible for the absence of such a life is the mammon worship and the rat race horn of it.

Another cause of conflict, according to Vinoba, is that we think on the mental plane. Our mind being a product of past history and old associations, it is a bundle of prejudices and predilections, and these prevent us from taking an objective view, from understanding the point of view of the other side. If we were to think on the 'supra-mental level', all conflicts would disappear.¹⁷ It may, however, be admitted here that the concept of Sarvodaya is certainly indefensible if we take a narrow grossly materialistic view of life. But it is not so if we take a spiritual view of man which Sarvodaya certainly does. A spirit of sacrifice is the very essence of it.

A third cause is the existence of wrong values which are both a cause as well as a product of the wrong structure of society. That is why to bring about a revolution, "a revaluation of all values", Vinoba and Gandhi favour a simultaneous attempt to bring about change both in the individual and the society.¹⁸

But a question may well be asked here. Is not the concept of 'all' too elusive and abstract? It is. To tide over this difficulty, there are two formulae which should be taken together. One is, in the language of Vinoba, 'service of an individual, but devotion to society',¹⁹ and the second is that we should begin with the last man. It is his welfare, or the *ant yodaya* as it has been called, that should be our first concern.²⁰

14. *Talks on the Gita* (Second Edition), p. 257.

15. *Ibid.*, chap. XVIII.

16. *Ibid.*, p. 256.

17. *Bhoodan Yajna* of 21.8.59.

18. Vinoba's Introduction to K. G. Mashruwala : *Gandhi and Marx deals with the Gandhian view as some length*.

19. *Vinoba ke Vichar*, Vol. I (1934 edition), p. 160.

20. *Proceedings of Rau Sarvodaya Sammelan* (Hindi).

The former would check us from taking any narrow or selfish view, while the latter provides us with a test for primacy. Gandhi once said in off-quoted sentences, "Recall the face of the poorest and the most helpless man whom you may have seen and ask yourself, if the step you contemplate is going to be of any use to him. Will he be able to gain anything by it? Will it restore him to a control over his own life and destiny? In other words, will it lead to *swaraj* or self-rule for the hungry and also spiritually starved millions of our countrymen? Then you will find your doubts and yourself melting away."²¹

Sarvodaya, which implies equality in every sphere of life, not mathematical equality but one based upon discernment, advocates a system of education which, while favourable to the integral development of an individual, would do away with the distinction of 'high' and 'low'. Its process is such as to labourize the intellectual and to intellectualize the labourer.²² The economic and political decentralization advocated by it would make an individual a greater master of himself and help in his better development. It stands for a planning which begins from below, and which considers the development of life to be the end and that of natural resources to be only a means.²³ It wants such transformation of the social structure through non-violent methods as to reflect appropriate values of a Sarvodaya society. A non-violent process of revolution permits mistakes to be made with least harm, if any, to individual and society.

But, as already pointed out, it is not only a change in the social structure that can lead to the welfare of all. The individual too has to be changed, and for that the Sarvodaya thinkers emphasize the various ethical principles like truth, non-violence, non-stealing, non-possession, etc. It is wantlessness on the part of the people that can provide the basic necessities to all so essential for their welfare. Today in the world there is a growing realization that a high standard of life has a limit and beyond that it is neither maintainable nor can it prove conducive to world peace.

However, within the confines of the general principles laid down, the Sarvodaya thinkers adopt a pragmatic attitude. They lay down no detailed prescription for all peoples and for all times. To rigidly insist on the particular application of any principle means intolerance and claiming infallibility. The Sarvodaya thinkers are totally opposed to such attitudes. *Theirs is the search for truth and not a claim to have attained it.* Principles rigidly applied can prove as dehumanizing as mechanization. Gandhi attempted to make man the centre of his thought and activities, and this explains his so-called inconsistencies. The same may be said of Vinoba who insists that we must try to see the truth on the other side.²⁴

21. I have not been able to trace the original source of this quotation, but it is often cited and is described on one of the entrances of Gandhi Samadhi.

22. The Zakir Husain Committee on *Nai Talm* says, "Socially considered the introduction of such practical productive work in education, to be participated in by all the children of the nation, will tend to break down the existing barriers of prejudice between manual and intellectual workers, harmful alike to both." Sri Dharendra Mazumdar, an important Sarvodaya thinker, has laid much stress on this quality of the *Nai Talm*. He calls it making 'major' of 'minor' and vice versa.

23. Vishwanath Tandon: *Sarvodaya after Gandhi*, pp. 125-27.

24. *Vinoba to Bhodan* of 18.6.1960.

Max Muller : India, Europe, and the Origin of Religion

Introduction

Probably more than any other nineteenth century European scholar interested in Indian spirituality, the Right Honourable Friedrich Max Müller is well-known and widely admired in India. During 1963 and 1964, while I was studying in Banaras, I frequently came across expressions of the high esteem with which Indian scholars have tended to view Max Müller.¹ Typical of such admiration is the description of him in the Publisher's Note to The Chowkhamba Sanskrit Studies reprint of *The Six Systems of Indian Philosophy* : "the most illustrious of the Orientalists from the West, Prof. Max Müller."

What does not seem to be as well-known in India is the Müller, while drawn to the East, was a complex person who was strongly influenced by a very "un-Indian" European intellectual climate. Indeed, his explanation of the origin and nature of religion shares much of the fundamental anti religious, antimetaphysical, positivistic cultural context of nineteenth century Europe. After a brief delineation of several aspects of Müller's relationship to Indian spirituality, we shall analyse this cultural context of nineteenth century Europe and shall then analyse Müller's specific explanation of the origin of religion.

Müller and India

Max Müller's reputation in India is certainly deserved if for no other reason than that he, more than any other European scholar, made Indian spirituality available to the West. His *Sacred Books of the East* represents a landmark in the Western study of

1. I would like to take this opportunity to express my gratitude to Dr. B. L. Atreya. While I was studying in Banaras, I used to visit Dr. Atreya at his home in the Lanka section of Varanasi. Although I was a young student and a complete stranger to him, Dr. Atreya extended to me a sense of warmth and kindness and a remarkable generosity of the spirit.

the history of religions and comparative religion. "The publication, in 1875, of the first of the great series of the Sacred Books of the East, under the editorship of Max Müller, made the Hindu scriptures available for the first time to the ordinary reader; and here, perhaps, is the proper place to pay homage to the great scholar who did so much not only to popularize Sanskrit learning, but to break down the barriers of prejudice and misconception between East and West."²

This renowned Sanskrit scholar felt that he had discovered in the *Rg Veda* the primordial form of religion. In his philological analysis, Müller attempted to understand an Indo-European religious form by tracing it back to its Aryan, Vedic "original" manifestation. In 1891, he claimed that "the most important discovery which has been made during the nineteenth century with respect to the ancient history of mankind . . . was this simple equation: Sanskrit *Dyaus-pitar*—Greek *Zeus pater*—Latin *Jupiter*—Old Norse *Tyr*." So important was this finding, according to Müller, that "Ancient history has become as completely changed by that one discovery as astronomy was by the Copernican heresy".³

Müller repeatedly expressed his high regard for Indian philosophy:

If I were to ask myself from what literature, we here in Europe, we who have been nurtured almost exclusively on the thoughts of Greeks and Romans, and of one Semitic race, the Jewish, may draw that corrective which is most wanted, in order to make our inner life more perfect, more comprehensive, more universal, in fact more truly human, a life, not for this life only, but a transfigured and eternal life again, I should point to India.⁴

He was especially fond of Vedānta, which he described as "a system in which human speculation seems to me to have reached its very acme." Müller compared Vedānta favourably with the most highly regarded Western philosophical systems:

It is surely astounding that such a system as the Vedānta should have been slowly elaborated by the indefatigable and intrepid thinkers of India thousands of years ago, a system that even now makes us feel giddy, as in mounting the last steps of the swaying spire of an ancient Gothic cathedral. None of our philosophers, not excepting Heraclitus, Plato, Kant, or Hegel, has ventured to erect such a spire, never frightened by storms or lightnings. Stone follows on stone regular succes-

2. H. G. Rawlinson, "India in European Literature and Thought," in *The Legacy of India*, edited by G. T. Garratt (London: Oxford University Press 1951), p. 76.

3. Max Müller, "The Lesson of Jupiter," *Anthropological Religion* (London: Longmans and Co., 1892), p. 72.

4. This passage is cited by Radhakrishnan, *Indian Philosophy*, vol. I (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1942), p. 55 and *Eastern Religions and Western Thought* (London: Oxford University Press, 1952), pp. 304-305.

In the Preface to *The Six Systems of Indian Philosophy* (London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1919), Müller wrote that "It was only in a country like India, with all its physical advantages and disadvantages, that such a rich development of philosophical thought as we can watch in the six systems of philosophy, could have taken place." A reprint of this work has been published in Varanasi as vol. XVI of *The Chowkhamba Sanskrit Studies*.

sion after once the first step has been made, after once it has been clearly seen that in the beginning there can have been but One, as there will be but One in the end, whether we call it Atman or Brahman.⁵

The Cultural Setting

Many Western scholars, who may know little of Indian spirituality, often associate Max Müller with the birth of the discipline of *Religionswissenschaft*. Many believe that the expression *Religionswissenschaft* was first used by Müller in 1867 in his *Chips from a German Workshop*. By using the term *Religionswissenschaft*, Müller wanted to emphasize that this new discipline would be freed from the philosophy of religion and especially from theology. This discipline would be descriptive, scientific, and objective; it would avoid the normative and subjective nature of previous studies of religions.

The German term *Religionswissenschaft* has not been given a generally acceptable English equivalent. Scholars in the field refer to the discipline by such titles as "the science of religions," "the history of religions," "comparative religion," the phenomenology (psychology, sociology, etc.) of religion," "the study of world religions."

It appears that the creation of *Religionswissenschaft* as an autonomous discipline was largely a product of the thought of the Enlightenment. Often the Enlightenment is characterized as rejecting in the light of scientific and intellectual progress. Certainly this is the strongest current in French Encyclopaedism: *homo religiosus* is the "slave of superstition," still imprisoned by the "yoke of religion." One recalls Diderot's image of the "Hydra of religion": Deism had cut off a dozen heads, but from the one head it had spared all the others would grow once again; all forms of religion must be completely rejected.

Ernst Cassirer has shown that this characterization of the Enlightenment is extremely misleading. It is true that the authority of revelation was undermined, but most thinkers accepted the deistic notion of reason and proclaimed a new form of religion. For many, "the fundamental objective is not the dissolution of religion but its 'transcendental' justification and foundation." In undermining the importance of revelation and appealing to "the inviolable, eternal laws of reason," the Enlightenment thinkers usually emphasized the notion of *religio naturalis*, a universal religious quality underlying all particular religious manifestations and known through reason.⁶

However, if the later scholars accepted this notion of *religio naturalis* and the sufficiency of reason in understanding religion, it should be noted that it was in terms of the normative judgments of reason that religious forms were characteristically ascribed to the earliest "prescientific" stages of cultural development. Indeed, when phenome-

5. *The Six Systems of Indian Philosophy*, p. 183. Müller did not offer such statements as the views of some detached and dispassionate scholar. On page 193, he writes that "Schopenhauer was the last man to write at random, or to allow himself to go into ecstasies over so-called mystic and inarticulate thought. And I am neither afraid nor ashamed to say that I share his enthusiasm for the Vedanta, and feel indebted to it for much that has been helpful to me in my passage through life."

6. Ernst Cassirer, *The Philosophy of the Enlightenment*, translated by Fritz C. A. Koelln and James P. Pettigrove (Boston: Beacon Press, 1961), pp. 134ff.

nologists of religion, such as Rudolf Otto, G. van der Leeuw, and Mircea Eliade, insist upon the complexity and the *uni generis* character of the religious, they are reacting against what they consider a "rationalistic bias" inherited from the Enlightenment.

If it is true that *Religionswissenschaft* grew out of the scientific and rational attitude of the Enlightenment, it is equally true that such a field could have begun only after being supplied with a body of empirical data: documents were submitted on primitive cultures; the field of Orientalism began to flourish; Indo-European philosophy and comparative linguistics were established.

We can now formulate the major problem which led to the birth of *Religionswissenschaft*. Since the scholar no longer had recourse to the norms of revelation and traditional religious authority, how was one to understand and evaluate this multitude of recently accumulated "religious data"? The direction the new discipline took in dealing with this problem can largely be seen in the cultural context of the period: "It is remarkable to note that the beginning of Comparative Religions took place during the middle of the nineteenth century at the very height of the materialistic and positivistic propaganda."⁷

Such a cultural context can be witnessed in Auguste Comte's *Cours de philosophie positive*, in which Comte formulated his theory of "the law of the three stages," with the theological as the "lowest" state of development. "This Positivism treats religion as a dated point of view, a primitive structure in the evolution of man."⁸ The positivist tended to regard religion in the modern world as "merely a survival from man's primitive past, and doomed to disappear in an era of science and general enlightenment."⁹

The positivistic and materialistic viewpoint was combined with a belief in evolutionism. In 1859 Darwin's *Origin of Species* appeared, and scholars began to look for other forms of evolution, including the evolution of religion. Characteristic of the thought of this age was Herbert Spencer's belief in a "unilinear evolution" and "progress by evolution."¹⁰ Evolution was seen as the gradual progression from what was simple and homogeneous into what was complex and heterogeneous. Significantly, Spencer believed that this entire process of "cosmic evolution" could be accounted for by the physicists' laws of matter and motion. His "progress by evolution" even came to be viewed as "something religiously profound, that here was a new cosmic conception based upon the operation of Natural Law."¹¹

It was during this period that the modern discipline of *Religionswissenschaft* had its beginnings. There were two major "groups" in its early stages: Max Müller and other philologists and Sir Edward B. Tylor and other ethnologists. *Essays in Compara-*

7. Mircea Eliade, *The Quest: History and Meaning in Religion* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1959), p. 40.

8. Jan de Vries, *The Study of Religion*, translated by Kees W. Bolle (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc., 1967), p. 63. In his later writings, Comte does introduce his new "Religion of Humanity," which seems to contrast sharply with his earlier "positive philosophy." It is Comte's positivism, not his "Religion of Humanity," which most influenced nineteenth century scholars.

9. Gerhard Lenski, *The Religious Factor* (New York: Anchor Books, 1963), p. 3.

10. In 1855 Spencer published his *Principles of Psychology* and two years later, in *Progress, Its Law and Cause*, he extended his evolutionary theory to encompass all aspects of the cosmos.

11. Homer W. Smith, *Man and His Gods* (New York: Grosset's Universal Library, 1957), pp. 354-56.

tive Mythology, which some consider the first important book in *Religionswissenschaft*, was published in 1856 by Müller. In 1871 Tylor published his monumental *Primitive Culture*, in which he tried to explain the origin and evolution of religion.

Mircea Eliade, in concentrating on the nineteenth century obsession with determining "origins" (of language, the Indo-Aryan races, culture, art, religion, etc.) offers an explanation for this "synchronicity" between a materialistic and positivistic attitude and the great interest in archaic and Oriental religions:

One could say that the anxious search for the origins of Life and Mind; the fascination in the "mysteries of Nature"; the urge to penetrate and decipher the inner structures of Matter—all these longings and drives denote a sort of nostalgia for the primordial, for the original, universal *matrix*. Matter, Substance, represents the *absolute origin*, the beginning of all things: Cosmos, Life, Mind Through science, man will come to know matter even more correctly and master it ever more completely. There will be no end to this progressive perfectibility. One can unravel from this enthusiastic confidence in science, scientific education, and industry a kind of religious, messianic optimism: man, at last, will be free, happy, rich, and powerful.

Optimism matched perfectly well with materialism, positivism, and the belief in an unlimited evolution.¹²

This then was the cultural context within which the autonomous, "scientific" study of religion began and flourished: the "positivistic" approach to the documents of religions; the attempt to arrive at the origin and first forms of religion; the search for the "laws of evolution" of religion; a tremendous enthusiasm and confidence in the unlimited possibilities that scientific progress in this field would yield.

Müller on the Origin of Religion

The first significant group in the "history of religions" was composed of philologists; through the scientific analysis of language, they believed it possible to comprehend the nature of religion. These philologists formulated "naturalistic" explanations of religion which maintained that the gods were no more than personified, such as the sun, the moon, and the rivers.

The leading proponent of "the nature-myth school" was Max Müller, for whom the "key" to deciphering the essence of religion was "comparative mythology," and this in turn could only be understood by a *method of philological analysis*. More specifically, the "key" for Müller was solar mythology. Other comparative philologists emphasized the storm-clouds (Kuhn), the wind (Schwartz), and the sky (Preller).¹³

12. Eliade, pp. 41-42.

13. For a detailed account of the formulation of Müller's view and his controversies with Andrew Lang, see M. Richard Dorson, "The Eclipse of Solar Mythology," in *Myth: A Symposium*, edited by Thomas A. Sebeok (Philadelphia: American Folklore Society, 1955), pp. 15-38.

Müller seems to endorse a traditional empiricist epistemological analysis: all human thought, language, and knowledge is derived from sense experience. Hence, the religious "intuition of the divine" or idea of "the Infinite" is based upon the sensations arising from the forces of external nature on the human beings. More specifically, Müller submitted that it was the "intangible" natural phenomena, such as the sun or the wind, which provided human beings with the idea of the infinite.

His thesis was that the infinite, once the idea had arisen, could only be thought of in metaphor and symbol, which could only be taken from what seemed majestic in the known world, such as the heavenly bodies, or rather their attributes. But these attributes then lost their original metaphorical sense and achieved autonomy by becoming personified as deities in their own right.¹⁴

Religion arose when what was originally only a name (*nomen*), metaphorically expressing the naturalistic forces, through the "illusion" of myth was given the status of a god (*nomen*).

Whenever any word, that was at first used metaphorically, is used without a clear conception of the steps that led from its original to its metaphorical meaning, there is danger of mythology; whenever those steps are forgotten and artificial steps put in their place, we have mythology, or, if I may say so, we have diseased language. . . .¹⁵

Thus the whole supernatural world arose from the limitations, ambiguity, and "illusion" of language;¹⁶ myth is described as a "pathological" condition, a "disease of language."¹⁷ It follows, according to Max Müller, "that the only way we can

14. E. E. Evans-Pritchard, *Theories of Primitive Religion* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1966), p. 21.

15. Max Müller, *Lectures on the Science of Language* (Second Series; New York: Scribner, Armstrong, and Co., 1873), pp. 375-76.

William A. Lessa and Evon Z. Vogt, *Reader in Comparative Religion: An Anthropological Approach*, edited by Lessa and Vogt (New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1958), p. 11, describe this birth of religion and its gods through a "disease of language" in the following terms: "... the forces of nature were transformed by man from abstract forces to personal agents, that is spirits. . . . Natural phenomena came to be compared to human acts, and expressions originally used for human acts came to be applied on natural objects. . . . After this had been done, spirits had to be invented to account for the acts attributed to them by their names, and so arose pantheons of gods. . . . The religion is really a fabric of errors. The supernatural world was composed of beings treated out of nothing."

16. Ernst Cassirer emphasizes the point that language, for Müller, is "inherently metaphorical," and it is the "inherent ambiguity," resulting from its inability to describe things unequivocally, that best explains the origin of myth and the birth of the gods. See *Language and Myth*, translated by Susanne K. Langer (New York: Dover Publications, Inc., 1946), pp. 3-4, 85-86; *An Essay on man* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966), pp. 407-110.

17. It is interesting to note the opposite approaches taken by Romanticism and "comparative mythology." Romanticism extolled mythology as grasping what is concrete and living, whereas language, "as faded mythology," only presents things in an abstract and formal manner. In *Language and Myth*, page 85, Cassirer points out that since "comparative mythology" in the second half of the nineteenth century "adopted the methodological principles of basing mythological ones seemed to them to be applied in their procedure."

discover the meaning of the religion of early man is by philological and etymological research, which restores to the names of gods and the stories told about them their original sense."¹⁸

For example, at first it seems that the Greek myth of Daphne makes little sense: Apollo, a solar deity, chases Daphne, who escapes his embraces when she is transformed by the Earth into a laurel tree. Müller resorts to philological analysis and submits that the Greek name for laurel can be traced back to the Sanskrit name for the dawn. Now the original meaning of the myth becomes comprehensible : the sun chasing away the dawn which finally disappears in the bosom of Mother Earth.

The above analysis suffices to reveal how strongly Max Müller was influenced by the cultural and intellectual setting of nineteenth century Europe. With other post-Enlightenment scholars, he shared a tremendous confidence in the capacity of a scientific and rational approach to uncover the nature of religion and of ultimate reality. With most other European scholars of that period, Müller displays a rationalistic attitude, marked by a sense of personal detachment, a concern for scientific objectivity, and a positivistic approach to the "religious facts." He assumes that a scientific approach, involving a scientific analysis of language, will allow him to comprehend the nature of the origin and development of religion. Unlike most contemporary scholars, who emphasize the mythic as an autonomous mode of consciousness, Müller formulates an explanation of myth which clearly rests upon a very narrowly-conceived rationalistic approach.

Along with Tylor and most of his other European contemporaries, Müller's rationalistic approach led him to a negative view of religion. Thus we observed that myth was explained as a "disease of language" and the religious supernatural world was a result of the limitation and "illusion" of language.

In his approach to religious data, Müller shared with other post-Enlightenment scholars an obsession for "origins" and primordial forms. It is interesting to note that Müller's concern with origins was not accompanied by the common nineteenth century formulation of a unilinear "progressive" evolutionary account of the development of religion.¹⁹

Perhaps the characteristic which Müller shared with his European colleagues and which most distinguishes his approach from contemporary *Religionswissenschaft*, certainly from contemporary phenomenology of religion, is his "reductionistic" explanation of religion. A common contemporary methodological assumption involves the "irreducibility" of the religious. We must recognize the unique and *sui generis* character of the religious. The spiritual must be understood on its own "plane of reference." As Rudolf Otto, Joachim Wach, G. van der Leeuw, Mircea Eliade, and others insist, "To try to grasp the essence of such a (religious) phenomenon by means of physiology, psychology, sociology, economics, linguistics, art or any other study is false ;

18. Evans-Pritchard, p. 22.

19. In his *Chips from a German Workshop* (New York : Scribners, 1869), vol. I, p. 48, Max Müller writes that "We shall learn that religions in their most ancient form, or in the minds of their authors, are generally free from many of the blemishes that attach to them in later times."

it misses the one unique and irreducible element in it—the element of the sacred.²⁰

Almost all nineteenth century explanations of religion tended to be strongly reductionistic. Müller's attempt to explain religion in terms of an analysis of language and his "naturistic" explanation of religion are illustrations of such a reductionism. This is not to deny the value of linguistic, economic, sociological, and other analysis of religion. Indeed, such explanations contribute much to our understanding of religion. What is insisted upon is that such analysis do not exhaust the meaning of the religious and do not grasp the uniquely and irreducibly spiritual dimension of certain experiences. The spiritual reveals a unique "intentionality" which at least partially transcends all linguistic, "naturistic," and other such explanations.

Transition

How do we reconcile the Max Müller who dismisses the mythic as a diseased language with the Max Müller who so admires the *Rg Veda* and the *Upanishads*, scriptures among the richest and most profound in mythic consciousness in the history of humanity? How do we reconcile the Max Müller who insists upon a detached, scientific, positivistic approach to the religious facts with the Max Müller who speaks so personally and passionately about Indian spirituality?

This contrast in orientations may be seen in Müller's "naturistic" explanation of religion and his high regard for Vedānta. This contrast may be expressed in light of the well-known asymmetrical relationship of one-sided dependence formulated by the Advaita Vedānta which Müller so praised. According to Vedānta, the world of *māyā*, which includes Müller's sense experiences of external nature, is in some way an illusory appearance of the spiritual reality. Brahman is the foundation of the world of *māyā*. The world is totally dependent for its existence on Brahman, which itself has independent reality.

Now Müller, in his explanation of religion, seems to have reversed this Vedāntic asymmetrical relationship. Our idea of the Infinite is in some way an illusory appearance of the world of sense experience. What is part of *māyā* for the Vedāntist now becomes the ontological and epistemological foundation of the world of spiritual creations. The religious world is totally dependent for its existence on our sensations of the world of natural phenomena, which itself has reality independent of the religious world.

One would expect such an empiricist epistemological analysis from David Hume, who would maintain that all knowledge is derived from sense experience and would be skeptical of all forms of Indian spirituality. But how does one reconcile such an empiricist account with Müller's high regard for Vedānta?

Perhaps the best explanation is simply that Max Müller was a complex person who lived in several "worlds" of conflicting orientations. Little of Müller's specific explanations are accepted today, but we recognize the lasting value of his opening

20. Mircea Eliade, *Patterns in Comparative Religion*, translated by Rosemary Sheed (New York, Meridian Books, 1949), p. xiii.

up to the West a universe of Eastern spirituality. And it seems to me that one may derive a certain hope from the contrasting tendencies in Max Müller. Here was a scholar so situated in the antimetaphysical and antireligious cultural context of his Europe and yet capable at times of transcending those limitations and reaching out to the universal.

What is perhaps most hopeful is that the contemporary West is far less sure of itself and far more open to experiencing other worlds of meaning than was Müller's post-Enlightenment Europe. The West is taking seriously the mythic and symbolic as autonomous modes of consciousness which cannot be reduced to logical or conceptual modes of cognition. Although Indians must be amused by the frequent descriptions in the West of Sigmund Freud as "the discoverer of the unconscious," it is true that the contemporary West now recognizes that the rational and conceptual does not exhaust the nature of the real. And because of the many demonic uses of reason and science in recent history, such as the work of Nazi scientists in World War II and U. S. scientists in Vietnam, few in the West would now share the earlier optimism that a rational scientific approach will find ultimate solutions to our problems and uncover the nature of reality.

What we find is that the contemporary human being in the West is gradually becoming less provincial and is beginning to identify himself/herself as a global being who is situated in a global universe of meaning. And in such a global orientation, Eastern spirituality will play a major role.

Can there be Meeting of Religions?

I am thankful to the executive of the Indian Philosophical Congress for electing me as a symposiast to speak my views on the topic : Can There Be Meeting of Religions ?

The reply to this question may be either in plain negative or plain affirmative and each reply may be defended and established with the help of sufficient reasons. But my apprehension is that religions (how much scientific they may be) are full of dogmas, rituals, local customs, habits, traditions, etc., and all these are based on beliefs and faiths and hence either negative or affirmative reply may not be defended and even if defended, the defence will be rather weak and unconvincing.

I have, therefore, taken up a *via media* position. My purpose here is to show that as each religion has got some unique and distinctive features, various religions, therefore, cannot meet, but on the other hand as all religions possess some common and essential traits or characteristics, the various religions do meet. I have tried to illustrate my views keeping before my mind some leading religions of the world, e.g. Hinduism, Buddhism, Jainism, Islam, Christianity, Taoism, etc.

First I propose to discuss the view that religions do not meet.

1. We are aware that Hinduism in general and Buddhism in particular believe that this *samsāra* is full of suffering, these religions, therefore, attach importance to the final release from this life and consequently the functions of these religions are not to attach too much value to the social activities and worldly life. In sharp contrast to this the Chinese religion and Japanese religion do not believe in the pessimistic outlook of life and therefore these religions do not think about *Mokṣa* from this world and instead these religions believe in the practical and material outlook of life. It is true that the Chinese modified Buddhism but Buddhism was modified by them to a great extent according to their culture and tradition. Buddhism was accepted by them only to the extent that it was practical and useful in their social intercourse. The transcendental outlook of Buddhism was ignored by the Chinese and if not ignored then at least it

1. Symposium Paper, Indian Philosophical Congress, Poona, 1970.

was harmonised with the materialism of the Taoism. The Christianity and Islam, the two great religions of the world, do not believe in the pessimistic outlook of life and these religions, therefore, do not accept the idea of *Mokṣa* or liberation from this suffering world. The Christians of Europe consider the German pessimists like Schopenhauer and Nietzsche and French Humanist Comte as atheists and perhaps even as mad philosophers. In the eyes of a true Christian these three great thinkers are the enemies of Christianity and indeed of any religion. Humanistic religion of Auguste Comte is aimed merely for the establishment of a social order. It is true that the Zoroastrianism assimilates the various evils, hardships etc., of this world but it says almost nothing concrete as to how men should get rid of sufferings, evils, hardships etc., of this world. This religion therefore is also opposed to Hinduism and Buddhism and perhaps to Islam and Christianity too. My purpose is illustrative and not merely exhaustive and therefore I pass on to other points of difference amongst the various religions. However even the single point of difference amongst the religions named above compels me to conclude that the religions cannot meet.

(2) The doctrine of rebirth strictly according to *Karmaphala* expounded in Hinduism, Buddhism and other Indian religions is another unique feature of these religions and not of other chief religions of the world. There are two values of this doctrine : (a) This doctrine constantly reminds us that we need not hanker after sensuous pleasure in this life but must hanker after blissful and everlasting happiness. As *Mīmāṃsā* philosophers point out that the impersonal principle *adṛṣṭa* takes stock of our actions, good and bad, and we are rewarded and punished accordingly, if not in this life then in the next life and so on. Similar idea finds a celebrated place in *Gītā*. (b) This doctrine lifts men to some spiritual world. Such a world has been accepted by Kant but it is unknown and unknowable. But as Kant holds that such a world cannot be known by us, it is as good as non-entity. But mystics have vision of such a world. The utility of doctrine of rebirth according to our *Karmaphala* is great, for it provides a sort of break to our going towards immoral paths and hence this doctrine gives a glimpse of the spiritual world. But as this doctrine is completely absent in great religions, like Christianity or Islam or in other religions, we cannot think of any break to our actions and we can freely move on immoral paths and consequently the spiritual world is not in our sight.

From this point of view also the religions cannot meet.

(3) Moral life, moral habits and moral customs in almost all religions in general and in Hinduism and Buddhism in particular are considered worthy only if they lead us to our goal of everlasting happiness not only in this world but in the world hereafter ; unfortunately, however, the Chinese and Japanese religions do not accept any world other than this world. It, therefore, follows that the moral and ethical laws and habits are worthy and useful only if they are helpful in our practical life. Chinese religion of Confucianism was accepted by the people of Japan. But Chinese and Japanese forms differ in many respects. The basis of Chinese Confucianism was the virtue of filial piety whereas the idea of loyalty to the Emperor became the central principle of Confucianism in Japan. From this point of view also the religions cannot meet.

(4) The Indian religions in general and Hinduism in particular think that a

man possesses infinite potentialities of the universal significance but Japanese think about the limited potentialities of man; man, is to be viewed only in terms of his relations to a limited human society. So man should dedicate himself only to his society; social good is the supreme good, which is to be promoted by him. Good is that which profits others in a social group. So, one should not be selfish. One should work disinterestedly for the good of the society. Self-sacrifice for something higher than human society is seldom found in the practical outlook of Japanese. But self-sacrifice for something higher than human society is the cardinal principle of any religion including Christianity and Islam.

It is, therefore, evident that there is enormous difference between the Taoism of China and the religions of the other countries and hence the different religions cannot be expected to meet.

(5) The Christianity and the Indian religions differ on the following points:

- (a) The Christianity does not make any distinction between the transcendental knowledge and the empirical knowledge. But the Indian religions do make distinctions between them.
- (b) There is fundamental metaphysical differences between the Indian religions and the Christianity in respect of true nature of individual soul. Hence *nirvya* (fourth) state in which pure consciousness is directly grasped will always remain beyond the sphere of Christianity.
- (c) To an Indian, the so-called spiritual values of the west are simply the values of mental life, which is a type of struggle between the opposite tendencies of the natural mind.
- (d) Spiritualism and transcendentalism are almost absent in Christianity. But these are not only present in Indian religions, but the life of a truly religious person is incomplete without them.

Could it, therefore, possible for the Indian religions and the Christianity to meet?

(6) The Indian religions accept the identification of an invisible soul with the infinite soul. But this is not accepted in the west. A western mind sudders at this very idea, thinking that this is equivalent to reducing his blessed existence to a state, which is as good as non-existence.

(7) Buddhism as practised in China is different from the Buddhism in Indian, and each Buddhism in turn differs from other religions, particularly from Hinduism, Christianity, Islam etc.

Chinese modified Buddhism in accordance to their culture, and tradition and hence the modified version of Buddhism in China is different from Indian Buddhism.

Indian Buddhism is generally a religio-philosophical teaching about the past and the future of man and it is free from worldly touch. The Chinese Buddhism, on the other hand, is influenced by their worldly trend of thought. Where as in Indian religion the problem of man's destiny after death occupies an important place, the worldly people of China do not worry about life after death. Death, in their opinion, is a necessary phenomenon of the world and there is no sense in spending time and energy

to solve the problem of life after death.

The Chinese Buddhism is different from the Indian Buddhism, because in the Chinese Buddhism, the transcendental outlook of Buddhism is harmonised with Naturalism of Taoism. Therefore the Chinese Buddhism is different from the Indian Buddhism and each one in turn is different from the other religions of the world, say Hinduism, Christianity, Islam etc., because the Buddhism either Indian or Chinese is a religion without God but Hinduism, Christianity, Islam, etc., are religions with full devotion of the devotees towards God.

Therefore, from this point of view also the religions cannot meet.

Cannot, therefore, religions meet ? The religions as considered above do not meet. But if they do not meet, the results will be suicidal. Why do they exist at all ? Perhaps they do not exist merely to solve some minor problems like rebirth, moral disciplines, *mokṣa*, social customs of various countries, human destiny etc. Perhaps they also do not exist to divide one country from other country or to divide one community from the other community. Nor do they exist to safeguard their own rituals, superstitions, etc.

If they exist, they exist as uniting bond between the people of various Nationalities. Surely, therefore, religions can meet. This, however, is a general point, and hence this may not satisfy this learned association as a meeting ground of religions. I shall, therefore, point out to some other essential points on which all religions meet.

1. Each religion points out that a man must seek real happiness and real bliss. But can he get real happiness and real bliss in the enjoyment of worldly objects ? Perhaps not ! The worldly objects give him only unhappiness and lead him to discord and conflict, which ultimately destroy the pivotal harmony of a human life and like a star gone astray he misses the orbit of his life and deviates from the path of truth, harmony and perfection. "Real happiness" and "real bliss" can be sought only with happy union of man with God or the Life Eternal. This union of human life with Life Eternal is the key of all religions. Man should place his whole being in the Great Life, should love the Great and should seek to unite with the Great. This is the key to enter into the maze of all religions and therefore all religions meet.

But even if we accept that all religions meet, because they all preach the union of human life with Life Eternal, the question that has to be clarified is, how is this union itself possible ? All religions say that this union is possible through moral and religious practices. It is true that the moral and the religious practices of different religions differ in accordance with the different ways of thinking in different countries. But the goal is the same—i.e., union of human mind with Life Eternal or Great Life. Therefore the different religions meet.

2. All religions also meet because each one places high value on humanism i.e., in the feeling of brotherhood of men. As illustrations I place below the views of the following religions :

- (a) The Vaidika religion of India, for example, believes that the individual human beings are the members of a large family of mankind. All are related by others by the bond of spontaneity and therefore all should work for the good of all. The social life should be sanctified by the feeling of oneness of

all.² Enjoyment with a spirit of sacrifice is the real form of enjoyment. There should always be a happy union between enjoyment and renunciation of selfish motives.³ The end to be obtained is the development of human excellence in the forms of *ahimsa*, *satya*, *tyāga*, *sāmyama*.

- (b) Buddhism too believes in the disinterested service for the welfare of all sentient beings. The concept of a Bodhisattva is the concept of a spirit soaked in the milk of compassion for suffering humanity. The Buddhist monks, famous for high moral ideals and ethical excellences, took great pains upon themselves in establishing a humanistic society.
- (c) Jainism too lays great emphasis on the establishment of monistic human society. The great vows of the sanyasis and the small vows of the family man are meant to arouse purity and humanitarian feelings without which man will never be able to attain progress, social or spiritual.

Indeed (a), (b), and (c) show that the systems of Indian religio-philosophy lay a great emphasis on the dignity of man and on the significance and value of moral and social life. Religious enquiry used to be undertaken in India not only to attain liberation but also to bring about the good of mankind as a whole.

- (d) The Islamic religion too seeks to inspire a man to reach a state of enlightened morality thereby transforming his behaviour and outlook upon the world. Commands of Prophet Mohammad are :

- (i) "Slay none, God has forbidden it except Justice requires it. Avoid false words, Woman and man who steal shall loose their hands. Intoxicants are satavis own device."
- (ii) "You should like for others What you like for your self."

(Hadith, Sayings of Muhammad)

- (e) Even the Chinese practical religion, like any Indian religion, teaches that the relations among family members used to provide the human basis for the moral excellences of the people. In the "Classic of filial piety" Confucius says that "The gentleman teaches filial piety in order that man may respect all those who are fathers in the world. He teaches brotherliness with younger brother, in order that man may respect all those who are elder brothers in the world. Those who love and respect their parents dare not show hatred and rudeness to others. Filial piety is the basis of virtue and the origin of culture. To do the right thing and walk according to the right morals thus leaving good names in posterity in order to glorify one's ancestors is the culmination of filial piety."
- Confucius says :

"Do not do to others what you do not want

2. Bhagavad Gita :- shall feel sorry with my fellow beings. And I shall be happy when they are happy. (sat loka-shukta-harsa-bhagya-m Atreya shuchati brinhyati.)

3. Trea tyaktva bhog-jitva, bhogamud 11.

Done to yourself—this is what the world means.”

(*Lin yu tang, My Country & my people*)

- (f) Christianity too lays great emphasis on the richness and morality of the Human mind, Christ was a man of this world and he was the reposer of all moral values. To awaken all the moral values in life is, therefore, the highest spiritual and moral creed of man. The goal of man is to unfold his own fine and noble personality in and through his various worldly relations. The West believes in the crucifixion of the flesh. If this expression has any moral significance, it means nothing but giving up of the selfish pursuit of gross and individual pleasures. In the opinion of the Christian religion, there is nothing else than perfection of humanity to which the highest value can be accorded. In the whole of creation, man stands out unique because he alone possesses the power to “look before and after and pine for what is not.” He is conscious of his ideals; he knows what he ought to be. He can, by elevating his nature morally and spiritually, become the meeting place of the earth and heaven. Hence, the necessity for man’s socio-moral and spiritual progress so as to enable him to live a full and wise-life.

If we go through religions of different countries, we shall be able to find in them all positive altruistic view on human life. “Perfect man in a perfect society is the motto of the religions of both the West and the East. To achieve this, it is necessary for man to dedicate his life to the principles of selfless service based on mutual love and mutual sympathy. “Live for others and not merely for yourself is the guiding principles of all religions.” A life of ‘renunciation of the selfish motive, service to others and love’, is a further life for man—this is what a human life ought to be. It is only in the process of man-making that all religions can meet. This is the universal force or law of operation of all true religions although the law may act differently in different circumstances producing inequality of effects in the forms of dogmas and religious rites. Each has a particular beauty of its own to be appreciated by the people of a particular type of mental make up; but there is really no standard by which the superiority of one religion over the others can be established.

Differences in religions may be real : because they show, how human genius can be manifested in multicolours for us : these differences, however, do not prevent us from establishing a harmony of all religions in the realm of Peace and Eternity of life.

The need of the hour is to work for the establishment of International Society but this can be done only when various religions meet. Hence the religious reformers, social workers must sit together to work out the basic principles of International Society. But the International Society is not created only if the principles for its formation have been worked out. Indeed to create an International Society the votaries of all religions must sort out the differences and essential agreements in religions and tell the people to give up the differences in religions for they lead to discords and conflicts, and the people must be told to hold on the essential agreements in religions, for only on the essential agreements in religions International Society could be formed or else the International Society is only a mirage in the land of sands.

Buddhism at the Edge of History

Throughout the long biological and cultural evolution of man, no change in the character and quality of human life has been more fundamental and far-reaching than the change that is now occurring. In a shift too volatile and unpredictable for any power structure to control or prevent, the direction of human living is being shifted away from established culture worlds with their distinctive linguistic and symbolic systems, over to a process of global interaction and communication that represents a new beginning for mankind. In this sense we are all living on the edge of history, not knowing if the human community will be able to struggle free from what the past has enshrined in its literature and incorporated in its institutions and traditions.

Patterns of culture now cracking and sinking in their foundations are monuments to a life style that was able to survive only as long as it could introject its own concepts and values so effectively into the experience of the rising generation that their lives were controlled by the sociological community in which they were reared. Under the conditions of cross-cultural interchange and mutual interdependence now prevailing, people everywhere are forced to look beyond the walls of their own cultural cocoon in order to interpret the meaning of the day's events. They intervene unwittingly as well as deliberately in one another's affairs, rubbing abrasively and throwing each other off balance from time to time in a process that "cures" everyone of the one-sidedness in which they were reared.

More and more individuals are discovering daily that they can no longer acquire the education and experience they need from the sociological community of their own time and place on the planet. Events drive them to understand what no previous people have ever understood, that they were born with capabilities for living a thousand different lives and under the condition of cultural encapsulation they are indeed and forced to live but one.

People are members of an amorphous global community into which, as Toynbee remarked a quarter century ago, "the whole habitable world has now been unified."

The new awareness people are now acquiring of one another in the commerce

carried on across hitherto almost impenetrable barriers of nation, race, social class, and ethnic tradition is depriving social institutions of their major anchorage in resisting change. Behind the headlines of catastrophe and conflict, this global awakening of people in interchange with one another is freeing them from the compulsive grip of the one-sided social systems of past and present. More and more fully as the weeks pass, they get the perspective of all the others, and these perspectives seep into the subliminal regions to become part of the apperceptive mass beneath conscious awareness. The unavoidable result is the expansion of each individual consciousness and the widening and deepening of community between individuals and peoples. This is the way men and women become more fully human. It is the process that has raised man from bestiality into civilization when it had never been done before. It is the process that expands indefinitely the valuing consciousness of each individual in community with others.

The fruit of this cross-cultural communication and interaction is seen in the new perspectives now emerging out of discussions of hunger, disease, pollution, overpopulation, and war, none of which can be solved by individual nations, or even civilizations acting independently of all the rest. It is also seen in the revolution of rising expectations and the growing realization that all major institutions, such as economic, educational, political, religious and all the rest, must be reshaped to fit the needs of the new day, providing conditions more favorable to the creative transformation of man.

This interchange is the meaning of the twentieth century. It is becoming the vital center of the world's life, opening up beyond any previous limit the values men and women can experience and the power of control they can exercise together over the conditions of their lives. It is bringing to dominance all over the earth a new interest in learning, a new concern for experiencing the perceptions of other people, lest in disregarding these perceptions their own lives are brought to ruin. It is spreading everywhere a new willingness to reconsider the assumptions and accumulated wisdom in the narrow parameters of which everyone up to now tended to live out their lives. Under the conditions presently existing and maturing everywhere on earth, the nation or civilization that cannot burst through its current assumptions, abstractions, social institutions and norms is doomed.¹

The secret that has lived behind our backs, that we are the most fully self-corrective creatures on earth, that *homo correctus* is a deeper truth than *homo faber* or *homo sapiens*, is being lifted to dominance in a community of learning that now envelops the globe. A new interest in militant probing of experience is forcing forward the fuller potentialities of mankind. Karl Popper indicates the significance of this change in his remark that his consciously critical attitude towards his own ideas "is the one really important difference between the method of Einstein and that of the amoeba."² Present conditions raise this difference to prominence, because individuals

1. Alfred North Whitehead, *Science and the Modern World* (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1925), p. 58.

2. Karl R. Popper, *Objective Knowledge: An Evolutionary Approach* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1972), p. 247.

come of age exposed to the new video technologies and other media, and with the entire planet in their eyes. They become more and more habituated to being thrown psychologically, biologically, and socially off balance from time to time by new perspectives originating in cultural backgrounds radically different from their own. They learn what must be learned if their balance is to be restored. In differing degrees, of course, because of genetic and cultural factors operating in their development, men and women become more and more capable of rethinking everything they have been taught to believe, of looking unflinchingly at the evidence that shows they have been wrong. New perspectives and forms of awareness emerge which prove more adequate and feel more appropriate in advancing beyond their problems.

These conditions of cultural revolution and the awakening and transformation of mankind are without parallel in history. Because they are felt daily and deeply by everyone on earth to an increasing extent, and yet have not become an integral part of the thinking of any discipline or nation or social class, they constitute a natural emergency that is dangerous beyond all imagining. They bring us to the edge of history and face us into a kaleidoscopic future for which our social habits and forms of understanding leave us alarmingly unprepared. Even to face such a radically different future, much less enjoy it, we need physicists who are busily exploring new sources of energy and biologists seeking new disclosures in deciphering and synthesizing the genetic code, but more than anything we need philosophers actively elaborating new options to penetrate the great cloud-bank of ancestral blindness that weighs upon us all. There are reasons for believing, moreover, that philosophers who can move freely within Buddhist perspectives may make the greatest contribution of all.

The New Focus on Novelty in the World's Life

Four million years ago, in places like Olduvai Gorge, the first beginnings were made in man's long and tortuous effort to survive. Ten thousand years ago, in the great estuaries and riverine regions of the major continents, the creature with the human future in his gene pool was discovering new techniques of agriculture and social organization with which to lift himself from bestiality into civilization. This was the first fundamental change after the initial evolving of the human animal.

Ten thousand years in the greenhouses of civilization, fashioned after the model of a cultural cocoon, have brought us to the third great transmutation. The windows in the greenhouses are being broken. The linguistic and behavioral incubators of thousands of relatively closed culture worlds are losing their insulation from one another as global changes sweep them together in an interdependent world. The banks of custom between which human life has been canalized are disappearing on every side in a global intermingling of feelings and perspectives which are robbing custom of its force. The stable norms and standards of ancestral tradition are slipping away from under us, forcing us to reshape our aims from mere stability, now impossible on any previous basis, to the enhancement of the qualities of the passing moment. As Whitehead had helped us to see, we move now from the good life, however conceived, to the better life we have unexplored capacities for enjoying.¹ In a post-Darwinian,

1. Alfred North Whitehead, *The Function of Reason* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1958), pp. 29-30.

post-Einsteinian, post-Whiteheadian age, this intuition among sane and informed people has been generalized to the universe at large. As Galileo said of the earth, we move. We live in a universe we may think of as a "creative advance into novelty."⁴ Like the universe, we are passing beyond ourselves, overcoming the gravitational pull of our cultural kindergartens.

Three conditions separate our life in the world from anything that has gone before. First, there is the literally shocking acceleration of change among people who have never learned to find their security amid dynamic process and innovation. Second, the colossal power of modern science and technology still awaits those forms of understanding and social control that will bring it into the service of a life more fully and deeply responsible and accountable for creation. Third, unreconciled cultures and ancestral traditions live in an unstable state of interpenetration and interdependence, with no way provided for anyone to withdraw from their occasional terrifying collisions.

The dislodgements of millions of men and women from old frames of reference, old security systems, and old patterns of orientation and devotion, are so varied and volatile that most people are kept busy coping with the specifics, with no time and energy available for winning an understanding of what is going on. Intellectuals labor in specialized areas that bear more than a little resemblance to the tiny units of research and development into which American scientists were divided during the building of the first atomic bomb during World War II; in the secret Manhattan Project, the purpose was to prevent anyone from knowing what they were being organized and directed to do together. Political leaders, moreover, are not free to emphasize their nation's dependence upon others for the basic necessities of life; especially in the most powerful nations, the illusion must be sustained that they are a people capable of going it alone, dependent upon no one but themselves. The result is an almost universal failure to take into account the most fundamental formative features now shaping the life of man.

The exponential pace at which knowledge grows out of millions of research centers on the planet is itself a force of apparently unlimited power in dislodging men and women from the perceptual anchorages and landscapes in which they were reared. All students of what is called "modernization" seem to agree that changes occurring simultaneously at millions of points in the world produce consequences which cannot be foreseen. The multiple effects operate far too swiftly to be controlled within the limits of any of the great culture worlds of the past. "The accelerating growth," Myrdal writes, "of scientific and technological knowledge becomes a force, speeding up and bending the course of history in a way that is largely outside our control . . . The effects on our societies of this force for change . . . are beyond our perception . . . The speeding up of history is clearly visible even if we do not perceive its direction."⁵

During the age of stone weapons and the wheel, man could foresee his future

4. Alfred North Whitehead, *Process and Reality* (New York: Macmillan & Co., 1929), pp. 339-340.

5. Gunnar Myrdal, *Asian Drama: An Inquiry Into the Poverty of Nations* (New York: The Twentieth Century Fund, 1968), Vol. I, pp. 702-703.

somewhat crudely. With the superindustrial age, man only knows that he will live more and more differently in the future. Possibilities multiply with each new discovery, each new social innovation and it would be a gesture of primitive magic to try to foretell just what will make the future different from the past. To believe that a new concept or perspective or technological innovation can be predicted is tantamount to saying that it can be invented and imagined before it has occurred to anyone. It is like arguing that Picasso should have been able to predict his next painting and even his next period, or that Gandhi at Ahmedabad could have predicted the touch-and-go endeavor, involving thousands of people, to change some of India's established ways. With all the testing and falsification of theory and practice, possibilities multiply, new perspectives emerge, and the backlog of unsolved problems tend to increase much faster than they can be solved. The furious pace at which the future arrives, indeed, is what Toffler's *Future Shock*, a best-seller of the early seventies, is all about.⁶ Indeterminate situations are forever presenting new possibilities for the adventure going on in mankind and the rest of nature. "The essence of life," as Whitehead contended, "is to be found in the frustrations of established order. . . . Life degenerates when enclosed within the deadening influence of complete conformity."⁷ No social class or nation can dominate history from this point on. We are caught up in a global interchange that has a momentum of its own.

Under the conditions of the closing decades of the twentieth century, which become more sharply defined with each passing year, nothing less than a transmutation of human "nature" is taking place, another in the age-old process of its evolution. What is new in the situation is not that social groups and nations widely separated from one another are communicating on an accelerating scale. Mankind did not wait for the jet age and satellites to engage in cross-cultural communication. What is different in a qualitative way is that men and women can no longer continue in the simple-minded, compulsive grip of the official culture, exchanging it upon occasion for some new revolutionary venture representing an equally narrow range of awareness. In global interchange of our unprecedented kind, the experience of each is awash with the experience of all the rest. Individuals living in the broken greenhouses open themselves and their own social organizations to inquiry "at new depths and over a wider range of affairs" than mankind could ever have imagined possible.⁸ As Peirce put it, "Unless we make ourselves hermits, we shall necessarily influence each other's opinions."⁹ New options for believing multiply; new forms of imaginative participation in society proliferate;¹⁰ and the unexamined life becomes not only not worth living but impossible. Slowly fitted in veins of human development, the human mind becomes each man's court of judicious opinion, probing ever widening ranges of memories and perceptions, driving the individual beyond the limited symbols of the past, and extend-

6. Alvin Toffler, *Future Shock* (New York: Bantam Books, 1971).

7. Alfred North Whitehead, *Modes of Thought* (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1928), p. 119.

8. Warren G. Bennis and Philip E. Slater, *The Temporary Society* (New York: Harper & Row, 1958), pp. 59-60.

9. Charles Sanders Peirce, "The Fixation of Belief," *Popular Science Monthly*, January 1878.

10. Marshall McLuhan, *Understanding Media: The Extensions of Man* (New York: New American Library, 1966), p. 311.

ing without limit the range of events to which a truly live creature is able to respond. Error and distortion tend to drop out of circulation, leaving the culture-bound mind of the past standing out as the very citadel of unreason. The cost of being culture-bound, along with its tightly ego-centered individual identity, has become prohibitive for the first time in history. "Without adventure civilization is in full decay. . . . The pure conservative is fighting against the essence of the universe."¹¹

Lured by the new cross-cultural interchange in the deep tacit dimensions of their experience,¹² and reared from childhood in a videoculture encompassing the globe, millions of men and women multiplying out of all proportion to increase in the population at large constitute a new human type. They constitute a new style and community of life emerging on the edge of history. The new human type is flexible and adaptable, capable of growing indefinitely beyond every cultural horizon. Unlike his earlier versions, he prefers the unpredictable future to the unalterable past, the innovations of feeling and free creations of mind over the doctrinal security systems that controlled behavior in the name of "Truth". This new human type is now building social organizations which are open, fluid, and quick to make the changes demanded under the transitory flow of unprecedented events. He knows in his skin and bones that the ingenuity and creativity that his predecessors committed so largely to the defense of established custom and convention, regardless of how obsolete they may have become, can be released in the creative transformation of every social institution influencing human affairs in a significant degree. He has sufficient confidence in creation to attempt to breed out of his gene pool whatever limitations his psychosomatic organism may harbor for the global interchange to which he and his fellows must now adapt. He has built into the interior climate of his life both the predisposition and the talent for rethinking from time to time everything considered in his early rearing to be true. And he lives with a sense of gratitude for the nurturing matrix of the cosmos and the fresh probing of the unseen members of the self-corrective community that encompasses his life.

All of this has been dramatized unwittingly in the manned space flights of Russia and the United States. The supreme aesthetic achievement of the twentieth century, and the act most significant, perhaps, for its unique global fallout, may prove to be the launching of the astronauts into outer space. There they were freed from the gravitational field of the earth, and they could see their planet floating like a beautiful agate in a sea of darkness, its blue oceans and grey contours of land becoming discernible every few hours in the rays of the sun. Everyone watching on television participated in this extraterrestrial perspective on the good earth, the wonder-inspiring biosphere of our common astronomical home. Slowly this new perspective from beyond the pull of gravitational systems may wash against the hard and compelling astigmatism of the culture-bound creature and free him for more flexible participation in the diverse experiences and multiform culture-worlds of fellow-creatures on the planet.

If man's first ventures into space function eventually in this symbolic way, they

11. Lucien Price, *Dialogues of Alfred North Whitehead* (Boston: Little Brown & Co., 1954), p. 163. Cf. Whitehead, *Adventures of Ideas* (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1933), pp. 354, 359.
12. Michael Polanyi, *The Tacit Dimension* (New York: Doubleday & Co. Inc., 1966).

will more fully justify their tremendous cost, for the new perspective from beyond the window of re-entry may be the experience that reassures most people regarding their power to encompass and transform all the hitherto unreconciled cultures of the past, luring them into feeling richer for being able to move openly in the total atmosphere of meanings and values with which the proprietary consciousness of the past furnished a multitude of invisible caves.

Such are some of the options with which the new human type faces the future. Such are some of the perspectives to which reason can appeal. Ten thousand years of self-justifying, self-regarding, Narcissistic culture worlds are drawing to a close. Interchange with other culture worlds can no longer be conducted through self-reinforcing "official" channels. The perimeter guards have vanished. No more delegates can be sent to the conference table with orders never to negotiate outside the pre-determined goals and purposes with which they were charged. All positions have become negotiable. Men and women must now mingle their talents and capabilities with people of radically different culture-worlds without claiming the right to pre-determine the outcome in advance. They must cure themselves of the pugnacity and passion with which they have sometimes propounded what they believe. They must bear children knowing that parents can no longer specify the attitudes and values their progeny will adopt. They must support educational institutions which can no longer introject into the young the beliefs and practices of the ancestral tradition. They must reduce their wants to levels consistent with the demands of the biosphere, the resources of the planet, and an equitable distribution of the world's available wealth. And they must do all these things without falling into despair when the outcome of their computerized planning brings them the future for which they are unprepared. They must do these things without yielding to the violence that precipitates the wars that tend inescapably to produce consequences contrary to the ends foreseen.

The new human type will do all these things because they must, but it is the thesis of the present essay that they can do these things only by appropriating some of the perspectives of Buddhism which now enters one of the most exciting moments of its career.

Buddhist Tendencies of the Twentieth Century

The impact of Buddhism upon the minds and emotions, language and arts, philosophies and religions of Asian people is a matter of record. It has been the most pervasive single influence in the entire cultural orbit of Asia. It began with a man who became consciously aware of the wonder of the passing moment, once it is released from ego-centered, culture-encapsulated drives through a discipline of meditation and analysis.¹¹ Buddhism teaches people to seek their security, their identity, and the meaning and value of their lives in these "cells" of experience, these unitary, simple and original centers of relation. Wherever they live and whatever they are doing, whether rich or poor, pigmented or white, people are alive primarily and ultimately in the

11. Nolan Pinoy Jacobson, *Buddhism: The Religion of Analysts* (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1970), Ch. 4.

memories, perception and anticipations of their feelings and experience. This changing and moving kaleidoscope of events perceived and remembered is the very world in which flowers bloom, birds sing, and people encounter one another. The change and novelty are everywhere with nothing left over. This is why Zen says that everything occurs "in a bottomless basket," or "in the field of bottomlessness." In this Buddhist view, all anthropomorphism in the sciences, philosophies, and religions of mankind is deprived of foundation and resolutely overcome. The world as experienced in all its diversity is no longer to be shaped in the image and under the dominion of man. No basis remains beyond experience thus felt and undergone from which the feelings, emotions, memories, and anticipations can be looked upon as inner or outer, subjective or objective. For any such basis would itself consist of similar feelings and experiences. The world in this sense is "bottomless" indeed; its enjoyment, however, presupposes a difficult discipline of self-correction.

Buddhism takes its stand with people who must struggle against control systems that reduce life to a narrow and distorted, self-justifying and self-deluding angle of awareness. It is one of the major cultural resources, therefore, now accessible to people who must fight against all the automatic mechanisms that rule the culture-bound creature. Until our own time, Buddhism has been more sophisticated than all other philosophies and religions in the knowledge that the canalization of human behavior into a fully acculturated person is chiefly carried out through the agency of signs and symbols, through what Wittgenstein called "the bewitchment of the intellect by language." Its distinctive perspectives and discipline of meditation bear creatively upon the individual of our time who must become more fully aware.

More persistently than any other strand of the human past, Buddhism has stressed the transitory character of life, the impermanence and dynamic movement of events. The Buddha is the man who awakened to the compulsive grip of self-centered goals and goods which dominate and control and exploit individuals to serve such ends. His name itself comes from the Sanskrit root *budh*, meaning to wake up, to become aware, and to know. The tradition that originates in this beginning twenty-five centuries ago is a major resource in the struggle against unseen, unconscious, compulsive drives that have dominated human development from prehistory until now. Buddhism is therefore an integral part of the adventure in human fulfilment which stands precariously balanced in our own day between the forces of renewal and destruction.

The long love affair of mankind with permanence sought in the corners of a changing world is now over, simply because conditions rising to dominance everywhere no longer permit people to turn their backs upon the central fact about their lives; namely, that *the vivid flow of felt quality across their nerve endings and through the sinews of their bodies is their ultimate source of security and renewal*. Conditions no longer support the style of life that turned away from this concreteness in favor of some unknown substratum assumed by almost all philosophers of Western Civilization to be the ultimate receptacle in which everything occurs, the transcendent reality around which everything revolves. "The whole history of Buddhist philosophy," Sicherbatsky observed, "can be described as a series of attempts to penetrate more deeply into this

original intuition of Buddha, what he himself believed to be his great discovery."¹⁴ The Belgian scholar whose writings were being read and published at Cambridge fifty years ago put it this way: "According to the Buddhists, no Self, that is, no unitary, permanent feeling or thinking entity, comes into the field of inquiry. We know only the body, which is visibly a composite, growing and decaying thing, and a number of phenomena, feelings, perceptions, wishes or wills, cognitions—in philosophic language, a number of states of consciousness. That these states of consciousness depend upon a Self, are the product of a Self or arise in a Self, is only a surmise, since there is no consciousness of a Self outside these states of consciousness. There are perceptions, but we do not know a perceiver."¹⁵ There is no thinker but "the Stream of Being . . . the life-continuum," which, as Shwe Zan Aung put it, is "the background on which thought-pictures are drawn. It is comparable to the current of a river when it flows calmly on, unhindered by any obstacle, unruled by any wind, untripped by any wave; . . . and when that current is opposed by any obstacle of thought from the world within or perturbed by tributary streams of the senses from the world without, then thoughts arise."¹⁶

In a widely read paper given in Tokyo in 1958, Harishorne presents what he calls "the Buddhist-Whiteheadian doctrine" arguing that the primary units of our successive experiences or "successive actualities" are the "momentary experiences" themselves. Harishorne praises Buddha for returning us to an honest empiricism in which "the concrete subjects are the momentary actualities."¹⁷ Murti formulates the position of the *Abhidhamma* as follows: "The Buddhist view . . . reduces change to a series of entities emerging and perishing; each entity however rises and perishes in entirety; it does not become another. Movement for the Buddhist is not the passage of an entity from one point to another; it is the emergence, at appropriate intervals, of a series of entities, like the individual pictures of a 'movie' show; it is a series of full-stops."¹⁸

Buddhist meditation and analysis is a process of heightening awareness of the momentariness of events, wherein all conditions are combined in a simultaneous correlation, as Govinda puts it; it is precisely because of this living juxtaposition and succession of the events in their momentariness that "the possibility of becoming free is conceivable . . . Life knows no absolute units but only centres of relation, continuous processes of unification, because reality cannot be broken up into bits; therefore each of its phases is related to the others, thus excluding the extremes of complete identity or non-identity."¹⁹

14. T. I. Sideritsky, "The Soul Theory of the Buddhists," *Bulletin of the Academy of Sciences*, U. S. S. R. (1919), pp. 824-825.

15. L. de la Vallée Poussin, *The Way to Nirvana* (Cambridge University Press, 1917), pp. 38-39.

16. Shwe Zan Aung, *Compendium of Philosophy* (London: Luzac & Co., Ltd., Pali Text Society, 1956 ed.), p. 11.

17. Charles Harishorne, "The Buddhist-Whiteheadian View of the Self and the Religious Tradition," International Congress for the History of Religions, 9th., Tokyo, 1958. *Proceedings* (Tokyo, 1960), pp. 298-302.

18. T. R. V. Murti, *The Central Philosophy of Buddhism* (London: George Allen & Unwin, Ltd., 1960), p. 75. Cf. pp. 121, 175, 177.

19. Lama Anagarika Govinda, *The Psychological Attitude of Early Buddhist Philosophy* (London: Rider & Co., 1961), pp. 56-57.

Many of the dominant features of life in the emerging world under discussion in this essay have played a central role in Buddhist faith and practice for more than two thousand years. The early Buddhist perspective becomes ever more plausible of a world created each moment by the free activity of an unlimited number of interdependent centers of relation (*pratītya-samutpāda/pañicca-samuppāda*). As Daisets Suzuki once put it, "Everything exists interdependently." Reality in its highest and deepest dimensions is a process of fleeting moments (*khanavada*), a world of dependent variables in a system of "conditioned genesis" or "dependent origination." Jayatilke preferred the former translation over the latter.

The Buddhist orientation has never induced in its members even the smallest desire for structures that would last forever, or for a substance on which men and women might utterly rely for permanence in a changing world. And there is diminishing room to exercise the inveterate wish of childhood to seek security in the form rather than in the quality of experience, and to smother all spontaneity as they mature, eventually posturing as an adult "complacently perched on cosy conceptual superstructures regarding the world," as a recent book out of Sri Lanka observes.²⁰

Wherever Buddhist teachings have become internalized and rendered habitual as a controlling style of life, reality is felt in each individual's experience as a process of events related organically in strands of interdependence, each experience synthesizing the events of the past into the novel and transitory events which constitute the reality in which flowers bloom and birds sing as indicated above. It is impossible to meditate upon this creative advance into novelty, this concrete experience of immersion in what early Buddhists called the "stream of existence," without an overwhelming sense of the limitations of any forms of understanding to comprehend this enrichment of quality that is the meaning and end of life, and without new resolve to struggle against every bias and limitation imposed by mental habits and cultural bias. Old bounds of egocentricity are left behind in the uncomprehended depth and richness of the continuing synthesizing of new life.

The world can be handled in different ways, according to an individual's acquired character and controlling orientation. For the first time in history conditions now rising to dominance appear to confirm the central elements in the Buddhist perspective regarding the enormous capacity for qualitative rupture that is impaired wherever intellectual experience and its material content are taken as the guide and directive for human life. As a Whiteheadian scholar puts it, "It is quality that is the ultimate reality; quality is energy and energy is quality to human experience; we must repudiate all belief and knowledge as ultimate sources of security and value."²¹

Buddhism is primarily inquiring, probing, penetrating, attending, awakening, becoming more and more fully self-corrective and aware. The stream of life in the

20. Bhikkhu Nananda, *Concept and Reality* (Kandy: Buddhist Publication Society, 1971), p. 75. Consider the following poem: "Men, aware along of what is told by names,/Take up their stands on what is expressed// If this, they have not rightly understood,/ They go their ways under the yoke of Death." *Ibid.*

21. Henry Nelson Wieman, *The Source of Human Good* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1946), p. 303, and his unpublished "Intellectual Autobiography" in Southern Illinois University Archives.

world at large expresses itself in the creative expanding of man's awareness. To those who seek their security and value in the form, rather than in the qualitative content of their experience, who seek their identity in the most dependable forms of knowledge, or social power, for example, or in something they have acquired, permitting their compulsive drives to smother awareness of life as a transient affair, even Nirvāṇa would turn out to be the world of tragic suffering that Buddhists call *saṃsāra*. This is what Nagarjuna taught eighteen centuries ago with a philosophical force comparable to the influence of Plato in the West.²² Compulsive attachments to determinate ideas and things prevent everyone from growing "the claws of wisdom" with which to emancipate themselves in a world whose qualitative multiplicity celebrates the "everlasting coming of novelty into being," as Whitehead said again and again.

The surprising congruence between Buddhism and Process Philosophies, surprising because the latter have emerged out of the intellectual atmosphere and historical conditions of the present day totally apart from any influence from Buddhist thought, is beginning to be noticed among Marxists of Eastern Europe. In the wake of the disintegration of the Judeo-Christian world view and the failure of all attempts to reinstate it in secular form, there is growing recognition that the old dualisms have become intellectually and socially sterile and that "Process Philosophy" is more effective in mobilizing the struggle against the alienation and hopelessness of the crisis of the capitalist era. Not even the power of the state can sustain the notion of inanimate, immutable, imperishable material substance in the matrix of a scientific materialism that emerged in the very center of nineteenth century bourgeois society where it fulfilled some function in the struggle against the thought forms of a pre-scientific age. Fiser, writing in Prague, argues that the model that fits the swift currents of our time is that of process without substratum. Becoming displaces being at the center of an evolving world. The ontologically real world is not a separate unit alongside either transcendent deity or matter. Reality is process defined as the becoming of experience identified in the analysis of that experience as entities that go to make up the actual world. This is a remarkable counterpart to Whitehead, who holds that each individual act of concrete self-enjoyment is an occasion of experience, and these are "the really real things which in their collective unity compose the evolving universe, ever plunging into the creative advance."²³ In the Buddhist perspective this means the nonbifurcated, nonbifurcating interdependent world in which nothing is independent or private and everything and everyone constitute the changing world of conditioned origination (*paṭicca-samuppāda*). Both Whitehead and Buddhism seek to direct attention to the changing present, rather than to some abstract notion of permanence, and to reinstate within the passing moment the qualities of joy and high expectation which are customarily so thoroughly cut away as to leave it poor in the qualities that make life unspeakably good. "Thus it is said, 'It is in the nature of things (*dhammasa*) that joy arises in a person who lacks remorse. A person who is joyful need not determine in his mind that delight should arise in him. It is of the nature of things that delight arises in a joyful person.'²⁴ Nirvana is "the

22. K. Venkata Ramanan, *Nagarjuna's Philosophy* (Tokyo: Charles E. Tuttle Co., 1966), p. 250.

23. Alfred North Whitehead, *Modes of Thought* (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1929), p. 206.

24. K. N. Jayantilleke, *Early Buddhist Theory of Knowledge* (London: George Allen & Unwin, Ltd., 1963), p. 418.

eternal joy" one realizes with the extinction of compulsive clinging.²⁵

According to this Marxist, dialectical materialism properly understood provides the view he has propounded without any assistance from Buddhism, though Buddhism, he says, comes closest in his explanation that transient and potentially free entities synthesize a world amid great suffering and risk. "There is no privileged being," Fiser writes; "all single units have an ontological reality in equal full measure. All are fully real, and there is nothing real besides them."²⁶ Many of Fiser's views find their explicit parallel in Whitehead's philosophy.

One may conclude from the large volume of writings usually called "Process Philosophy"—Bergson and Alexander in Europe, Peirce, James, Dewey, Whitehead and his many students in the United States—that the confluence of Buddhist and Whiteheadian perspectives is an entirely natural phenomenon growing amid conditions that probably bear some resemblance to the historical situation of the Buddha's day. Failure to take note of this confluence of such powerful strands of thought is probably best thought of as another illustration of cultural lag, as Hartshorne on many occasions has observed. For Buddhism and Whitehead alike, the main line of reality lies in no doctrine or concept of anything within or beyond the world, nor in any thought of abandoning anything within or beyond the world. The main line is the increasing flow of quality in the *now*. This is where we penetrate to what is most fundamental in the universe.²⁷ As Bergson had put it, "It is in the depths of our experience where we feel ourselves most intimately and fully alive."²⁸ It is the indefinite expansion of awareness that is the obvious nature and destiny of man, his distinguishing mark from other forms of life.²⁹ We must learn to pass our lives in the experience of fresh disclosure, yet not merely to "pass" our lives but to rejoice in the experience of fresh penetration into "the unknown, the unexperienced."³⁰ To those "philosophers of consciousness who were ready to suspect Whitehead of irrationalism, it was shocking to hear him remark that he looked forward to a future when what he called his "first love," symbolic logic, will become the foundation of our deepest penetration in examining pattern with the use of real variables.³¹ The habit of trying to incorporate the meaning of the universe in linguistic systems, Whitehead thought, must be looked upon as a habit associated with the childhood of the race. This is one of the major emphases in Whitehead and Buddhism are found together.

Purity of heart in the Buddhist perspective is a personal discipline that flushes and purifies these compulsive attachments that hamper the deep organic rhythm found

25. Ramanam, *op. cit.*, p. 51.

26. Zbynek Fiser, *The Questions of Being and Existence* (Praha: Svobodne Solvo, 1967; *The Consolation of Ontology* (Praha: Academic, 1967); and *Buddha* (Praha: Orbis, 1968).

27. Alfred North Whitehead, *Science and the Modern World* (New York: Macmillan Co., 1925), p. 92. Cf. *Religion in the Making* (Cleveland: World Publishing Co., 1926), p. 76, and *The Function of Reason* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1958), pp. 70-72.

28. Henri Bergson, *Creative Evolution*, trans. by A. Mitchell (New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1911), p. 199.

29. *Ibid.*, p. 195.

30. Whitehead, *Modes of Thought*, p. 87.

31. Library of Living Philosophers, Paul A. Schilpp (ed) *The Philosophy of Alfred North Whitehead* (New York: Tudor Publishing Co., 1941, 1951), p. 324.

in the concreteness of each individual's experience; it is the experience of being progressively opened to participate in feelings that interact and overlap in the mutually sustaining interdependence of the world; it is the capacity to will, to affirm, the non-clinging Middle Way in which all tendency to live for the relative and the fragmentary is brought to an end. Each "drop" or "cell" of our experience is an actual occasion achieving a new realization of itself as a center of experience constituted by its own becoming. This heightening of awareness, this turning of attention to the vivid feelings at the heart of creation draws its sense of potency any perpetual renewal from the live creature's experience of being constituted by its own becoming. This process is a continuing liberation from the grip of the past, an advancing into novelties; it is, in Whitehead's words, "the ultimate rhythm of the universe."

Conclusion

The cross-cultural interchange which is the meaning of the twentieth century is not the "perpetual perishing of the past" so much as the absorption of its positive potentialities into new and unexpected conditions favoring the more fully human life. It is enabling people of radically different ancestral backgrounds to acquire the forms of perception of other people, expanding in an unpredictable way the range of events to which they can respond. These conditions enable men and women to listen intently to all the voices of the past and present, to live across a broader spectrum of feelings and aspirations than any earlier epoch or century could imagine. Perspectives acquired in the rub of unreconciled cultures transform how they explicitly feel, what they can see, how large a segment they can understand, and the activities in which they wish to become involved. Stranger, perhaps, than anything else, the apparently insoluble social conflicts between races, classes, ethnic and national traditions of "the century of the world wars" are not solved through education, nor suppressed by coercion, so much as left behind as part of the cultural encapsulation that is now impossible anywhere on earth.

Depending upon the degree of their exposure and involvement, men and women are stretched across a threshold of feelings that overpower their cognitive ability to understand what is occurring or what will occur tomorrow. This sudden increase of novelty in the world's life places events beyond control by anything except interchange and communication too various to be harnessed and pressed into the service of conventional forms of understanding. Man's capacities for enjoyment, which have barely been explored, as Whitehead observed, are suddenly freed from these cloudbanks of ancestral blindness. For the first time in history conditions are present which encourage men and women to free themselves from linguistic, conceptual, and institutional compulsions and to establish their lives in organic bonds that no culture, no social class, no intellectual elite, and no nation ever has at its disposal. Men and women can now overcome that daily vulgarity and moral obtuseness in which they seek to grasp and possess forever a world that is alive to its microscopic depths. The consequent condition of their lives is suggested in a few lines where Whitehead endeavored to capture the dynamic nature of Peace. "It is a broadening of feeling due to the emergence of some deep metaphysical insight, unverbilized and yet momentous in its coordination

of values. Its first effect is the removal of the stress of acquisitive feeling arising from the 'soul's preoccupation with itself. Thus Peace carries with it a surpassing of personality . . . There is thus involved a grasp of infinitude, an appeal beyond boundaries. Its emotional effect is the subsidence of turbulence which inhibits. More accurately, it preserves the springs of energy . . . The experience of Peace is largely beyond the control of purpose. It comes as a gift . . . It enlarges the field of attention. Thus Peace is self-control at its widest,—at the width where the 'self' has been lost, and interest has been transferred to coordinations wider than personality . . . It is the barrier against narrowness. One of its fruits is that passion whose existence Hume denied, the love of mankind as such."³²

Under conditions now rising to dominance in the earth men and women increasingly are freely choosing repeatable relations with people far and near in whose company their largely unexplored memories and anticipations are encouraged to undergo whatever transformation may be required for the continuing enrichment of their experience. This new awakening to the novel fullness of concrete quality streaming across their nerve endings, and their repudiation of an indefinite postponement of life, make it possible for the first time for people to participate to the limit of their capacity, knowing that the enrichment of the qualities of the passing moment is the ultimate meaning and security of their lives. It thereby marks the turning point where oncoming generations may live to enhance awareness of the *now* and celebrate the wonder of being alive, accepting the obvious fact that life is a transient and risky affair of free creatures shaping their lives together.

It belongs to the maturity of those who labor to protect these new conditions of life in the twentieth century that they will fight to safeguard the new direction human history has now taken, with full knowledge that no cherished goal of theirs can be imposed upon the multiplicity of events, nor any specific outcome of their own devising be foreseen. Age-old plunder of the planet, and the rule of predatory individuals, races, classes, and nations are swept from dominance, along with the underlying ego-centered and culture-bound structures of the past ten thousand years.

32. Alfred North Whitehead, *Adventures of Ideas* (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1933), pp. 367-368.

The Law of Karma

Philosophy is the mirror of a country's mental and cultural progress. India has its culture rooted deep in the hoary past and its philosophy has a very ancient tradition. Tracing its origin from the sparkling wisdom of the Vedic Seers and undergoing various changes with the historical changes of the country it has retained certain characteristic features which make Indian Philosophy Indian. Whatever be the age and whatever be the idea, one of the important concepts of Indian Philosophy is the concept of the Law of Karma.

Any deed or any thought that causes an effect is called a Karma. The Law of Karma means the law of causation. Wherever there is a cause, there an effect must be produced. A seed is a cause for the tree, which is the effect. The tree produces seeds and becomes the cause for the seeds.

The Law of Karma is one of the fundamental doctrines of Indian philosophy. "As a man sows, so he reaps." This is the Law of Karma. If you do an evil action, you must suffer its consequences. If you do a good action you, must get happiness. There is no power on this earth which can stop the actions yielding their fruits. The Law of Karma is, therefore, inexorable.

Things do not happen in the universe by accident or chance in a disorderly manner. They happen in regular succession. They follow each other in a regular order. There is a regular order. There is a certain definite connection between what is being done now by you and what will happen in the future.

You are the master of your own fate. You are the architect of your own future. You are responsible for what you suffer. You are responsible for your present state. If you are unhappy, it has been your own making. Every action bears a fruit sooner or later. A virtuous action produces pleasure as its effects. An evil deed causes pain.

Whatever you sow by your actions come back to you. If you make others happy through service, charity and kind acts, you sow happiness like a seed and it will give you the fruit of happiness. If you make others unhappy through harsh words, insults, ill-treatment, cruel acts, oppression, etc., you sow unhappiness like a seed and it will

give you the fruits of pain, suffering, misery and unhappiness. This is the immutable Law of *Karma*.

Man is three-fold in his nature. He consists of feeling, knowing and willing. These three fashion his *Karma*. He knows objects like chairs, trees, etc. He feels joy and sorrow. He wills to do this and not to do that. Behind action there are desire and thought. A desire for an object arises in the mind. Then you think how to get it. Then you exert to possess it. Desire, thought and action always go together. They are the three threads as it were, that are twisted in the cord of *Karma*.

You sow an action and reap a habit. You sow a habit and reap a character. You sow a character and reap your destiny. Hence destiny is your own make up. You have built it. Cross the channel of Egoism. If start thinking that you are all-pervading immortal Brahman and Brahman you will become.

Thought moulds our character. If you entertain noble thoughts you will develop a noble character ; if you will entertain evil thoughts, you will develop a base character. Therefore, one should always cultivate noble thoughts.

We find differences in human beings. Some are long-lived and some short-lived, some rich and some poor, some handsome and some ugly etc. When the King Milinda asks Nāgasena as regards the differences in human beings, Nāgasena replies, "It is through a difference in their *Karma* that men are not all alike. All beings have *Karma* as their portion, they are heirs of their *Karma*, they have sprung from their *Karma* ; their *Karma* is their kinsman ; their *Karma* is their refuge ; *Karma* allots beings to meanness or greatness."

The doctrine of *Karma* merely asserts that actions are inevitably followed by their consequences. It is not the fate of the Hindus or the *Kismet* of the Muslims. The Sanskrit word for the play of cause and effect is customarily translated as "fate". A man's fate is simply a composite of things that happen to him. He may be played upon by constructive forces or by destructive ones, but whatever they have done to him is supposed to be his fate. The sudden death of a son in the prime youth, the premature death of a husband for a wife and all such calamities destroy the mental peace of man. Thinking thus, the Hindu says, "This is the result of my past *Karmas*." The Muslim says, "It is the decree of Allah." But Law of *Karma* is quite distinct from and even diametrically opposed to fate. The latter is destructive of all responsibility in man. It leaves no scope for human free will. But the doctrine of *Karma* leaves the individual with the maximum amount of freedom ; it makes the individual and the individual alone responsible for the whole of his career here.

Karma is of three kinds :

- (i) *Sañchita* (accumulated works),
- (ii) *Prārabdhā* (fructifying works), and
- (iii) *Kriyamāṇa* (current works).

Sañchita is all the accumulated *karmas* of the past ; *Prārabdhā* is that portion of the past *Karma* which is responsible for the present body. That portion of *Sañchita Karma* which influences human life in the present incarnation is called *prārabdhā*. It is ripe for reaping. It cannot be avoided or changed. It is only exhausted by being experienced. *Prārabdhā Karma* is that which has begun and is actually bearing fruit.

Kriyamānā is that *Karma* which is now being made for the future. It is also called *Āgāmī*.

In Vedāntic literature there is a beautiful analogy. The Bowman has already sent an arrow, it has left his hands. He cannot hold it back. He is about to shoot another arrow. The bundle of arrows on the quiver on his back is the *Sañchita*, the arrow he has shot is *Prārabhita* and the arrow which he is about to shoot is *Kriyamāṇa*.

The whole lot of *Sañchita Karma* is destroyed by attaining knowledge of Reality. *Kriyamān Karma* can be destroyed by expiatory rites and by removing the idea of agency through *विमिश्र माय* and *मायौपाय*. You have no *योग स्वतंत्र* but *कर्म स्वतंत्र*. The business is with action only and never with its fruits, says Lord Krishna in the *Gītā*. Every soul is like a husbandman who has got a plot of land. The nature of soil, the conditions of weather and all other factors are all predetermined. But the husbandman is quite at liberty to till the earth, manure it and get good crops or to allow it to remain as a waste land. What you are now at present is the result of what you thought and did in the past. What you shall be in the future will be the result of what you think and do now. Selfish *Karma* leads you to rebirth and that rebirth generates new *Karma*. Get rid of *Karma* if you wish to get rid of the miseries of rebirth. Selfless work will not bind you. They will purify your heart and head for the descent of the divine light and grace.

The shining sparks of the concept of Law of *Karma* are found in almost all systems of Indian Philosophy except the *Chārvāka*.

This Law of *Karma*, the law of the eternal moral order is called *Rta* in the Vedas. The ritualism of the *Rig Veda* has been taken to be the precursor of what in later times developed as the Law of *Karma*. The conception of *Rta*, which means literally the course or order of things, is taken by Meadonell in his "Vedic Mythology" to contain in it the germ of the Law of *Karma* or the unalterable law of producing effects. The theory of *Karma* came to exist in an age when man had found the disappointment rather than fruition of desires to be the order of the day and it was then employed to explain the failures that happened in spite of one's strenuous efforts and the due performance of scriptural injunctions as also for explaining the inequalities prevailing among men. The theory of *Karma* is a kind of rational explanation sought to be substituted in place of what used to be, and is still considered by many, as the mysterious working of a kind of divine dispensation, which cannot be peered into, much less understood.

The *Gītā* gives us the message of *Niskāma Karma*. The *Gītā* does not teach us abstention from action. Work is inevitable so long as we are alive in the world. No body can escape from it. Here abstention from activities means abstention from the attachment to the fruits of action. *Gītā's Niskāma Karma* is very much similar to Kant's duty for duty's sake. The *Gītā* does not ask to give up the common activities of everyday life but demands suppression of all selfish desires. The *Gītā* says that passion, anger and covetousness are the three ways to the hell and they are to be overcome by virtuous actions. The *Gītā*, instead of demanding the uprooting out of passions asks for purification and modification of them. At this point *Gītā* differs from the ethics of Kant. The *Gītā* emphasises the perfect purification of the Self-purity in thought, speech and action (*वागमे मनस बुद्ध्या वेदवैतिन्द्रियैरिति*).

According to the Jaina Philosophy the soul is inherently perfect. But there are hindrances in its way. Just as the sun shines forth to illuminate the entire world as soon as the atmosphere is cleared of cloud and fog, similarly, the soul attains omniscience and other perfections inherent in it as soon as the obstacles are removed. These obstacles are matter particles according to the Jainas. Owing to *Karma* it is associated with matter and thus becomes limited. The soul with its passion or *Karma* force is, therefore, regarded by the Jaina as the organizer of the body. Our past *Karma* determines the family in which we are born as well as the nature of the body—its colour, shape, longevity etc. The Jaina enumerates different *Karmas* like *गोत्र कर्म* (that determines the family), *आयु कर्म* (that determines the length of life), *ज्ञानावरणीय कर्म* (that clouds the knowledge), *दर्शनावरणीय कर्म* (that clouds faith), *मोहनीय कर्म* (that which produces delusion). So the *Karma* matter is the cause of bondage. Therefore, the Jaina says that liberation consists in the complete expulsion of matter from the Soul. The *Karmas* which are performed without any regard to fruits and in strict accordance with the rules of moral conduct and obedience of five great vows (e.g., *अहिंसा, सत्यम्, अस्तेयम्, ब्रह्मचर्यं, मपरिव्रज*) do not produce any fresh *Karma* and when all *Karmas* are being exhausted, the worldly existence of the soul comes to an end and consequently the soul leaves the body and becomes one with the liberated soul.

According to Buddha the Law of *Karma* is not imposed from outside but it is self-imposed. The Law of *Karma* accounts for moral justice. It explains the human differences. When the Law of *Karma* becomes the Supreme Law above God and man, how can we account for human endeavour? If everything is determined beforehand, what is the meaning of human effort? This problem creates difficulties in the realm of philosophy. Let us see how Buddha reconciles freedom with the Law of *Karma*. Buddha never takes Law of *Karma* as fate. According to him, the Law of *karma* is not a mechanical law but an organic Law. The past determines the present, yet but the future is in our hands and depends upon our present actions. Buddha also accepts the maxim, "As you sow, so you reap." The rotating wheel is a symbol of life which is determined by the law of *Karma*. Buddha does not believe in the existence of soul but believes in rebirth. According to him the soul is a continuous series of consciousness. The last stage of life which causes next life in a continuous manner includes all the fruits of the actions performed in life. Though the present life is the outcome of the previous life, yet it is new. 'Rebirth is painful', says Buddha and thus he says that he who follows the Buddhist eight-fold path will be freed from all kinds of miseries.

According to *Nyaya Vaisesika*, the law of *Karma* is a moral judge which accounts for human differences. A man laughs and weeps according to his actions performed in the past. As a bodily action produces bodily changes and mental thought produces mental changes, so moral action produces results in joy and suffering. A good action produces merit and evil demerit in the soul. The stock of merit and demerit is called *Adrishta* (अदृष्ट). The *Adrishta* is the cause of our joy and suffering.

Now the question arises how *Adrishta* causes joy and suffering? The principle of *Adrishta* is unconscious and hence it cannot distribute fruits and therefore there must be an intelligent being who guides and controls the *Adrishta*. A human being cannot control and guide it and so there must be a supreme power which is no other than God who controls it and dispenses fruits according to *Adrishta*. The German Philosopher, Kant, also says, "It is God who combines happiness with virtue and misery with

vice."

The Yoga system of *Patañjali* says that so long as *Avidyā* is not overcome, there will be life in *Samsāra*. The law of *Karma* is assumed as valid and our life, its character and length are all determined by it. Though we do not remember our past lives, we can infer particulars about them from the tendencies of the present and these tendencies will cease to exist on the disappearance of their cause, motive, substratum and object. The root cause is *Avidyā*.

The *Purva-Mīmāṃsā* calls this law of *Karma Apūrva* (अपूर्व). There is a necessary connection between the act and its result. *Apūrva* is the metaphysical link between the work and its result. The positive forces created by the act and leading to the attainment of the result is *Apūrva*.

Sāṅkhya says that individuality is due to *Karma* which is the product of *Avidyā*. The kind of the world into which we are born is just the return of the works to the doer. The individual organism is the working mechanism interded to produce that requital in the form of actions and its results of suffering and happiness. Moral life takes endless forms owing to the variety of demands of conditions of human life. This process goes on for ever until perfect knowledge is gained, which consumes the seed of *Karma* and makes rebirth impossible. To get rid of *Avidyā* is to be freed from the law of *Karma*. But so long as the individual is finite he is subject to law of *Karma*. Morality is a stepping stone and not a stopping place. All acts done in an expectation of reward yield their fruits in accordance with the law of *Karma*. It does not, however, follow that we move like marionettes pulled by the strings of our past *Karma*. But the fact is that the individual is responsible for his acts and God is only the assisting medium conserving the fruits of his deeds. God does not compel any one to do this or that. So long as his activities are determined by his impulses, he is not free. But man is not a mere sum total of his impulses. There is the Infinite in him.

Contemporary thinkers like R. N. Tagore, Gandhi and Radhakrishnan also believe in the law of *Karma*. Our most renowned and favourite poet and philosopher Tagore says that we should divest our work of selfishness and do *हित कर्म* which is similar to *सत् विद् भूत* of Lord Buddha. He says that if you do evil deeds, you will reap a harvest of pain. Mahatma Gandhi had also emphasized the law of *Karma* but his acceptance does not mean that man is completely determined. Man has been granted some freedom from God. The fruit of the action undoubtedly is determined by the action itself. The law of *Karma* implies that man is the architect of his own destiny. Radhakrishnan says that this life cannot be abstracted from past and future. He says that this law of *Karma* is continuous with the past and is creative of the future. The past has its effect on the present and the present is a stepping stone to future. If you do not cultivate right reasoning and moral activities, your future will be in dark.

The *Chārvāka* philosophy is the only exception which does not believe in the law of *Karma*. *Chārvāka* is a brilliant exponent of Egoistic Hedonism according to which "Eat, drink and be merry" is the ultimate principle of life. He rejects out right all the conceptions of heaven, hell, God, rebirth, law of *Karmas* etc. He says —

"आनेन जीवेत् सुखम् जीवेत् श्रेष्ठ इवायं विवेकः ।

मयीकृतस्य देहस्य पुनरावतारस्य भूताः ॥"

He vehemently attacks the *Karma* theory of Vedānta and other orthodox systems. He says that the scriptural verdict like "अहिंसा परमो धर्मः" is a word full of fury signifying nothing. But in *मनुस्मृति* it is advocated that, "वेदिकी हिंसा हिंसा न भवति,". The Charavaka throws cold 'water' upon the conceptions that are used in the Vedic Scriptures and says that they are nothing but the means adopted by the cunning *Brahmins* to fill granaries by befooling the ignorant and simple mass.

In conclusion, I must say that in spite of so many attacks made by the heterodox thinkers of the East and the West, the concepts of Indian philosophy like law of *Karma*, rebirth, liberation, etc., remain ever meaningful. In the present age we are in a state of transition where both the Indian and the Western ideals are fighting for supremacy and we do not know which to choose and where to stand. Even the best people of the country are being gradually intimately associated with the Western philosophy, literature, thought, culture and ideals. They do not know very much of their older ideals, nor are they in sympathy with them. If we try to hold fast to our old values and turn a deaf ear to the roaring rush of the West we are bound to be drowned and suffocated. We, in an age of reason, do not like to accept blindly the dogmas of Indian philosophy like the law of *Karma*, rebirth etc. But our aim should be to build an edifice of our own, high and secure enough to withstand the ravages of all inundations. Let the waters of the Western sea come and break themselves on the walls of our fortress with their foaming pillows; our only safety is thus to be with the sea and yet above it. To conclude, I must say that the law of *Karma* is the fundamental concept of our Indian culture and philosophy, which offers the eternal spiritual fountain of our sublime spiritual thoughts.

Reflections on the Medicine-Wheel

It is a great pleasure to be able to contribute this essay to a souvenir Volume in honour of Dr. B. L. Atreya. Anyone who has followed the articles published in DARSHANA INTERNATIONAL knows that this journal and its General Editor have consistently encouraged the violation of the artificial boundaries set up between various disciplines, and have provoked inquiry on the very borders of orthodox philosophical canon. The reflections to follow will, I hope, be an instance of the broadening of the philosophical perspective.

1

Each grouping of a people that may be said to have its own solidarity, that is, a sense of its own nature and destiny, has an appraisal of its own humanity which is embodied in a culture if this culture is reflective, or the product of reflection, then it is philosophical. In non-literate cultures, the ideals and patterns of life of a culture are embodied within its myths and its rituals. The "Medicine-Wheel" is the symbol of the story of the Plains Indian Peoples of North America—of the Cheyenne, the Crow and the Sioux Indians. This story involves an understanding of the universe together with ideals concerning a way of life based on that knowledge.¹ The story to which I shall refer as the "Medicine-Wheel" possesses, as we shall see, a well-defined regularity—and obeys the laws of a code of knowledge as well as a notion about being. In short, the story of the Medicine-Wheel defines the primary projection of the universe, a worldframe within which the Plains Indian Peoples may place the furniture of the universe and in terms of which they understand themselves as a people: it is an interpretation of life, of the nature and meaning of humankind, and of the significance of life. It

1. The material basis for this paper is to be found in a book written by an American Indian from the view-point of an American Indian and a member of the Plains Indian Peoples. References in the body of the text refer to Hyemeyohannes Storm, *Seven Arrows*, New York: Ballantine Books, 1972.

is in short what we would call a 'Philosophy of Life'.

My reasons for dealing with the story of the Medicine-Wheel in this essay are several. First of all, the organization of the story of the Medicine-Wheel is indicative of systematic reflection and deliberation on the part of the Plains Indian Peoples. As such it represents an indigenous 'American' philosophy which, to my mind, is a worthy alternative to existing 'American' philosophies. It is myopic in the worst degree for the professional philosophers to ignore the philosophies of the 'native' Americans—relegating their study to the anthropologists. Ballard, in his *Philosophy at the Crossroads*, has argued that philosophy in the West must explore the world of myth if it is to find a way out of sterile analysis and once again embark on the construction of a meaningful 'philosophy of life'.²

The return to myth might suggest the undertaking of a re-examination of the pre-philosophical myths of Ancient Greece, or of the use of mythological stories as heuristics in the philosophy of Plato, say. Yet it seems to me that the story of the Medicine-Wheel involves as grand a vision of the universe as the myths of ancient Greece do, and this vision connects up, in both form and doctrine, with aspects of Plato's philosophy—and thus the story of the Medicine-Wheel may be considered an analogue to what ancient Greek thought may have been like prior to the rise of the great systems. The Medicine-Wheel, then, is part of the literature of 'ancient' North America—with roots beyond memory and habit for most of us, but not beyond the reach of imaginative understanding and appreciation.

Like many other philosophies—old and new, East and West—the Medicine-Wheel is based on a tetradic—or Quaternary—metaphysical principle. Such systems are to be found among the pre-Socratic philosophers, in Plato and in Aristotle; in some forms of Buddhism and in Yoga; in the *I Ching*, in Jung, Blake and others. In North American philosophy, Robert Brumbaugh of Yale and Paul Weiss are two champions of tetradic instruments in systematic work.

In the recent philosophical literature in North America, we have seen the clash between the system of Charles Hartshorne who champions a triadic metaphysical instrument,³ and Paul Weiss, who champions a tetradic system.⁴ I shall attempt to show in what follows some of the reasons why this controversy is important and why it goes to the root of our philosophical quest. In the course of the analysis we shall see how the philosophy of the Medicine-Wheel differs from some of existing academic philosophy, and also its sharp differences with the code of knowledge and notion of being to be found in Western philosophy.

One final reason in support of this examination of the Medicine-Wheel is that the philosophy it symbolizes represents a form of reflection and also the achievement of substantive conclusions which I believe to be inescapable in the future of philosophy.

2. Edward G. Ballard, *Philosophy at the Crossroads*.

3. Charles Hartshorne, *Creative Synthesis and Philosophy Method*, La Salle: Open Court, 1970, p. 100, says, "There is also a deep truth in Peirce's contention that triads are incomparably more adequate than dyads and in a sense than tetrads, as intellectual instruments."

4. Paul Weiss, *Modes of Being*, Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, p. 16 says: "Being is diversely and exhaustively exhibited in four interlocked, irreducible modes."


II

"The Medicine-Wheel is the Universe," (p. 14). It is a 'mirror' in which everything in the universe is reflected, is shown to have a representative place and significance (pp. 4-5). The *Understanding* which it portrays is not arbitrary or relative, but absolute; it represents the truth of being beyond the power of space or time to modify or to change (p. 164). At the same time, the Medicine-Wheel does *not* represent a static, but a dynamic view of the universe. One cannot tie things down by an "arrangement" for things must flow or else die (p. 177). Things are different from each other, and have their own individual ways of being (p. 127). The world-view of the Medicine-Wheel thus combines into one two superficially antithetical philosophical premises: one is that rationalistic premise to the effect that what is real does not change, that truth is not relative; while the other is the view advanced by Nietzsche, for instance, to the effect that everything is relative to time, place, and character. The Medicine-Wheel unifies these divergent premises, by postulating that what is absolute, what is true, is precisely the relativity of things. "*Each tiny grain of sand is separate from the next, but they are all one thing within the whirlwind,*" (p. 21).

Let us examine this theme by considering first the general system of the Medicine-Wheel.

According to the Medicine-Wheel, there are four basic *directions* to the world, and three basic *dimensions*. This yields a vision of "Seven Arrows" or points in terms of which the universe is organized.

The 'first' teaching of the Medicine-Wheel is of the four directions (p. 6). The Universe and all that is within it may be organized in terms of the principle of taxonomy embodied within the doctrine of the four directions. These are the directions of North, South, East and West. The North is representative of Wisdom, its color is white and its symbolic animal is the Buffalo. The East represents the direction of Illumination, its color is yellow, and its symbolic animal is the Eagle. The South represents Innocence and trust, its color is green and its symbolic animal is the mouse. Finally, the West represents Introspection with black as its color and the bear as its symbolic animal (p. 6). The diagram below illustrates the above characterizations.



Let us consider these 'directions' further by reference to the nature of human beings. Each person, according to this philosophy, has as a posture a tendency towards one or another of these directions. This means that each person has the tendency to perceive things in terms of one or another of these states of consciousness (p. 6). A person whose orientation is symbolized by the North will pursue wisdom, but will be cold and without feeling (the South), tending to give the mind dominance. An "East"

person will have the capacity to see far and wide, but will be incapable of getting close of things, of touching them. One with a Southern orientation will tend to base life on immediate perception and touch, but will be incapable of giving unity to the things—ideas, facts, and objects—it collects throughout life, and will thus base life on feeling rather than thought or distance. And finally, one whose orientation is Westward, will be introspective and will, in most things, be so sceptical of motives as to be indecisive and impractical (pp. 56-57).

In addition to the four great directions, there are three dimensions to the world: the earth below, the sky above, and the realm of Spirit. Where the four great directions might be said to represent a 'horizontal' taxonomy of the universe, the three dimensions represent a 'vertical' orientation. If we multiply the dimensions by the directions, we arrive at a twelve-fold framework which represents the outer circumference of the Medicine-Wheel, and is symbolic of the twelve 'people' on the earth—two of which are the Indian peoples. On the other hand, the addition of the dimensions to the directions yields a sevenfold number of 'ways' of life: people may be (or, as we shall see, may choose to be) one of the four directions, or may choose to 'understand' the universe in terms of earth, sky or Spirit (p. 214). We may safely leave further consideration of this system until later. Now I wish to examine and comment upon the structure we have outlined above.

The sevenfold system outlined above is a mathematical conception based upon human beings as the 'measure' of things. The universe has four quarters, just as human beings have a four-square frame of directionality: forward (future?), backward (past?) left, and right. (That there is a scientific basis for this conception can be seen in the fact that we know there are four basic kinds of brain-wave patterns. At a different time I could show how these patterns correlate with the directions). Similarly, the universe has three dimensions, just as human beings have three bodily dimensions. Although each thing in the universe has its own nature, there are basic resemblances between things such that we can, in terms of this framework, outline their basic unity and togetherness. Each direction or direction of human beings is reduplicated in the universe. Were we beings with an other than upright posture, for instance, we may very well have forged a different vision of the arrangement of the universe. But given our basic posture and orientation, we organize the world and experience in terms of the metaphysical principle of the four directions and the three dimensions. In many ways, the philosophy of the Medicine-wheel, in its formal arrangements, may be considered a Pythagoreanism of North America.

Let us turn now to a consideration of the interpretation of human nature and human life which we find here.

One of the great teachings of the Medicine-Wheel is that all things in the universe are interdependent and unified—are, in short, harmonious. Of all the things in the universe, only human beings are *problems* to themselves (shades of Max Scheler) because they do not know of the universal harmony but must search it out (p. 5). The aim of life is to learn of this universal harmony and to grow in knowledge of it; to achieve what the Cheyenne Indians call "total understanding" (p. 7). Our basic aim as human beings must be to strive for the unity and equality of things (p. 222). Life is thus a dynamic, teleological process of growth towards unity.

Yet the achievement of 'total understanding' involves a struggle to answer the basic question—"Who am I?" (p. 345). Each person—or being—in the world has one basic quality in common with other people or things: their inevitable *aloneness* (p. 7). This is the cause of discord and strife—but also of growth. For it only as we overcome our aloneness that we can become 'total' beings.

Each individual person (restricting our discussion henceforth to the being of persons) has his or her own 'medicine', or "beginning-place", or basic orientation with-in the four directions. Each of us will initially perceive and understand things in terms of wisdom, innocence, introspection, or illumination. These define four of the 'ways' in which we may seek an understanding of ourselves and of the universe. If, however, we are to be more than 'partial' beings, we need to understand not only our own basic orientation (or dominant state of consciousness) but also the other three orientations as well (p. 7). That is, if one is an introspective person, one must seek to experience the ways of wisdom, illumination and innocence, in order to become total beings—to become "foursquare" persons. Thus, for instance, a person whose orientation is toward wisdom will tend to be cold, logical and distant; in order to become total, such a person would have to seek out and experience the ways of introspection and dreams (displacing logical thought by imagination and fantasy, for instance), experience the ways of illumination which involves the broadest possible view of things, and must experience the ways of immediacy and innocence. For it is only in terms of the four-fold unity that we can speak of a whole person (p. 24). Thus although one might begin life with only one power or one state of consciousness or another, our goal is to learn to unite the four powers into 'one' universe (p. 125).

The approach to the search for a unification of the four directions within us may be through physical things, through 'heavenly' things, or through the Spirit (p. 214). If we approach unification through physical things (through the Earth), we take an 'objective' attitude seeking to discover the resemblances between our individual 'powers' and the powers of things animate or inanimate. We may, on the other hand, pursue unification through 'heavenly' things—to understand what C. G. Jung would call the archetypal patterns of our earthly existence. This is a subjective approach to unity, but not personal and individual subjectivity, but collective, trans-personal subjectivity. And finally, the 'greatest and hardest' way is the unity of the Spirit, a unity which transcends yet includes all previous unities. There are thus seven 'ways' of life (p. 214). There are the four 'subjective' ways of wisdom, illumination, introspection, and innocence; and the three additional ways of Earth, Heaven, and Spirit. Diagrammatically:



It is extremely important to note that for the Plains Indian Peoples, even though a total person who has unified life is more praiseworthy than one who has not, and

even though the way of the Unity of Spirit is the grandest and hardest way, while the acceptance of individual 'ways' (wisdom, illumination, introspection, and innocence) are the easiest, yet all of these seven ways are on an *ontological parity*. Each one of us has a way appropriate to oneself (p. 126). We cannot dictate to others what we perceive as good, or we will become bad; and likewise, we cannot dictate to others what we perceive as bad, for this shows that we are already bad (p. 126). Finally, all things are *equal* on the Medicine-Wheel (p. 214). We thus have no ontological right to ascribe higher 'reality' to one way or another. Thus unlike other systems whose formal arrangement is similar to that of the Medicine-Wheel, but which would erect hierarchical systems whereby the seventh way (of the unity of Spirit) is placed at the valuational and metaphysical summit of things, the Medicine-Wheel people uphold in spirit and in word the principle of what Justus Buchler has called the doctrine of ontological parity,⁵ namely, that it is illegitimate to ascribe hierarchical or cardinal characteristics to some beings—or ways—and not to others. I shall take up this issue further in the next section.

III

One of the basic characteristics of 'Western' thinking is the tendency to conceive of the relationship between people and things either in terms of subordinate-superordinate dyadic arrangements, or in terms of unifying triads which unite two conflicting terms of a dyad into one. Both of these characteristic modes of thought are grounded in the desire to locate a single function or principle—a *first* principle—which may be said to support the entire architecture of the universe. Thus either one or another of the terms of a dyad is given ontological priority over the other—as being is "higher" than appearance; or the unifying 'third' is given ontological priority over the terms unified—as Hegel's Absolute takes ultimate priority over the terms it reconciles.

If one has followed the discussion so far, one will see that one of the central doctrines of the Medicine-Wheel is that each individual being is real and has its own way of being—the 'objects' of introspection, or illumination are no more or less real than the objects of sensation, for instance—and is simultaneously a part of a larger, but no more ontologically ultimate, whole—one will have grasped the fact that parity and not priority forms the metaphysical key principle in this philosophy. The result of such a doctrine is that this philosophy combines a respect for the integrity of individuals together with a 'correlativity' view of the relationship between these individual things. To my mind, this represents the summit of metaphysical wisdom.

The tendency to give priority to some modes of being and not to others is, I believe, a function of holding being to be dependent upon knowing. The tendency to ascribe ontological primacy to some things but not to other results from misconceiving one's own way of being and its correlative modes of knowing for the mode of knowing and being. In the philosophy of the Medicine-Wheel, the doctrine of the dependence of knowing upon being is clearly upheld. One's knowledge will depend on one's mode of being in the world; given the fact that there are many ways of being—even if we may categorize this multitude in terms of a four or sevenfold system—as there are things, then there is always an "other" mode of being to be known, and another

5. Justus Buchler, *Metaphysics of Natural Complexes*, New York: Columbia University Press, 1966, p. 154.

mode of knowing to be achieved. And if one respects the individual integrity of the modes of being and of knowing of individual beings, the one is never tempted to give ontological priority to some things and not to others.

I wish to consider this thesis in terms of two paths. First, I wish to consider the correlation between being and knowing by paying some attention to one of the 'stories' of the Medicine-Wheel. Following that, I shall consider the nature of being and knowing as evident in the life and growth of individual people.

Although in several respects there are differences between Plato's philosophy and that of the Medicine-Wheel, I wish to consider one central affinity: the relation between the myth of the cave and the doctrine of the line in Plato, and the correlative myth and doctrine in the story below.

Central to Plato's correlation of the 'cave' and the 'line' is a basic insight into the architecture of a 'philosophy of life'. For central to any philosophy of life is a conception of the universe—or at the very least of human life—as a dramatic, dynamic affair: the individual is dynamic, not static, subjective, not objective. Hence the myth of the cave is cast in a personal and dynamic form. On the other hand, it is a central characteristic of many philosophies of life whose central aim is to furnish individuals with guides through life, that they attempt to impersonalize and objectify individual drama into cosmic drama. For if it can be shown that one's individual dynamic is but an instance of the cosmic dynamic, then one's aloneness is overcome, and one feels at harmony with the universe. Thus Plato's doctrine of the line is a static, but correlative, representation on an impersonal level of the dynamics of the cave.

One of the stories of the Medicine-Wheel combines these two aspects of dynamic and static into one. It is dynamic in that the characters are alive and moving; whereas the fact that each character is simultaneously symbolic makes the story static and impersonal as well. The story to which I refer is about the 'Mouse'. It is impossible because of space limitations to reproduce the entire story here, but some central scenes together with commentary should be sufficient to grasp the point.

Once there was a Mouse...a Busy Mouse, Searching Everywhere.... He was Busy as all mice are....But once in a while he would hear an odd sound.... One day he asked a fellow mouse if he too had heard the sound.

"No, no I hear Nothing. I am Busy now. Talk to me Later." The little mouse asked yet another mouse about the sound, and this mouse replied, *"Are you foolish in your head? What sound?"* So the little mouse went about his business determined to forget the whole matter. But one day he decided to investigate the sound he kept on hearing. So he left the other mice to themselves. As it turned out, what the little mouse found was that he had heard the River. He was also able to see the Sacred Mountains beyond the River. After several adventures, he returned to the world of the mice, excited at the prospect of telling the other mice about his discovery. But instead he found disappointment. No one would listen to him. The fact that he returned without having been eaten by some other animal meant to his fellow mice that he was considered Poison by other animals—and so was poison to the mice too. So the vision of the Sacred Mountains burned within the little mouse, and one day he decided to explore further.

The story continues as the mouse explores the other three corners of his world, finally coming upon the Sacred Mountains themselves (pp. 68-85).

The Mouse is symbolic of the South, the direction of those who live in terms of immediate perception. That is where the mouse begins, and all the capitalized terms in the dialogue above refer to the characteristics of mice—busy, searching everywhere, regarding the unknown as 'nothing', leaving curiosity until 'later' and so forth. The little mouse is led to explore the world, and his explorations lead him to greater and greater understanding of the world. In his travels he meets with the Buffalo (Wisdom), the Bear (Introspection), and the Eagle (Illumination). In short, the little mouse grows by risking his life. He grows beyond his beginning place (in the South) and ended up encompassing all four directions.

All the stories of the Medicine-Wheel are cast in the form this story has. Each story is but a different way of indicating how individuals may grow, how they may come to understand. Each story is different, but they are all the same. Being "impersonal" the stories can be interpreted by each person in terms of his or her own dynamics.

Let us now cast a look at the nature of individual human life.

The Medicine-Wheel and its accompanying stories symbolize not only daily life, but life as a whole. Each individual must learn in his own way to unify the four directions. Groups of people are discriminable in terms of the tendency of some towards one way or another. And life as a whole has a four-fold aspect.

The life of each individual has four basic stages: birth, youth, maturity, and old-age. I shall consider here only the stage of youth.

In infancy, children exemplify mainly the characteristics of innocence and trust (the South). Initiation into membership into the group is preceded by what is known as the "Vision-Quest."

When the time for a Vision Quest approaches, a youth will select four people as 'spiritual' guides who will 'meditate at a distance' (p. 121) with the youth who then goes into the wilderness alone. Upon his return, the youth will recount his experiences—which will fall within or be interpretable in terms of the four directions, or combinations of them—to his spiritual guides who will then be also to indicate to the young person his 'beginning place' or basic mode of perception. Two events result from this interpretation of the vision quest. First, a new name is given to the youth. Let us say that a young person exemplifies the attributes of the mouse, as well as of introspection (West). In that case, the new name might be either Black Mouse, or Green Bear. The second event is the construction of a shield by the youth's guides. On this shield the main characteristics of the person are pictured in symbolic form. This shield is then carried wherever one goes, or left always outside one's dwelling-place so that at a glance anyone could know what that person was like (p. 9). All of one's basic tendencies towards this or that fault or virtue would be discoverable at a glance.


With this making of a shield and the giving of a new name, a person becomes a member of a group. But in terms of personal growth and fulfillment, the vision-quest marks only the beginning of the quest for unification and balancing of the four directions (p. 24).

In the vision-quest, we see, once again, the emphasis on individuality correlated with unity.

IV

It might be useful if some correlation could be established between the doctrines of the Medicine-Wheel and those of some other, preferably modern, thinker. C.G. Jung does mention the connection between his psychology and that of the 'Wheel' 'Such a correlation would perhaps extend the comparative usefulness of this study.

Very briefly, Jung holds that there are four basic functions of consciousness—thinking, feeling, sensation, and intuition. These are related as points on a cross :



Thinking and feeling are opposites, as are sensation and intuition. Jung holds that each person has one or another of these four functions as dominant, but he also holds that a complete person must learn to deal with the world in terms of the four functions.¹ Given this brief outline of Jung's views it is possible to see that his psychology has a basis like that of the Medicine-Wheel. We can correlate the two views if we realize that whereas Jung speaks of the functions of consciousness, the Medicine-Wheel speaks of states of consciousness. States of consciousness can be regarded as the result of the interplay of two functions or other. Thus in diagram form, we have :




If we characterize each section of the cross in terms of some basic nature, such as form or matter, part or whole, we will grasp the philosophical significance of this correlation.

6. C. J. Jung, *Analytical Psychology*, New York : Vantage, 1968, pp. 42-3.

7. *Ibid.*, p. 62.

Thus :



In terms of this diagram, we see that the following definitions can be arrived at :

I. NORTH : Wisdom—

- a. Thinking combined with intuition, or
- b. The FORM of the WHOLE : or Formal essence

II. EAST : Illumination—

- a. Intuition combined with feeling, or
- b. The MATTER of the WHOLE : or Material Essence

III. SOUTH : Immediacy—

- a. Sensation combined with feeling, or
- b. The PART of MATTER : or Material existent

IV. WEST : Introspection—

- a. Sensation combined with thinking, or
- b. The FORM of the PART : or Formal existent

Here in schematic form we find the ontology and epistemology of the Medicine-Wheel clarified by use of Jung's psychology. We could (have) made a correlation with any number of other thinkers : (1) with Plato's doctrine of the four stages of the line ; (2) with Aristotle's doctrine of the four causes ; (3) with the Scholastic doctrine of substance, form, matter, and being ; (4) and with Paul Weiss' four modes of being—actuality, existence, ideality, and God. Such elaborations remain a desideratum, but cannot be undertaken here.

To bring this paper to a close, I should like to comment further on the whole idea of a four-fold arrangement in philosophy.

We can distinguish, *inter alia*, four kinds of intellectual instruments : monadic, dyadic, triadic, and tetradic. C.S. Peirce argued* that of these four distinguishable tools, only the triad is sufficient for work in philosophy. As we have already mentioned, Hartshorne follows Peirce on this claim. But James K. Feibleman, also a student

8. C. S. Peirce, *The Collected Works*, Edited by C. Hartshorne and P. Weiss, Cambridge : Harvard University Press, 1929 ff. Volume I, cf. 1.292, 1.295, 1.363.

of Peirce, chose to develop a dyadic system;⁹ and Paul Weiss, whom we have already mentioned, has advanced a system in his *Modes of Being* arranged in terms of four irreducible realities. I think Weiss is on the right track, and I would like to adduce some circumstantial evidence in favour of tetrads before stating several yet to be developed reasons why I hold tetrads preferable to dyads or triads.

From the psychological point of view, Jung argues that the triadic model is a peculiarity of Christianity—and particularly of a Christianity which is aggressive and rationalistic in its philosophy.¹⁰ He suggests that Freud was dogmatic and authoritarian both as a person and as a thinker because of his use of a triadic instrument. He argues, on the other hand, that the tetradic model he uses may be true only of his own psyche.¹¹ I would suggest that tetradic instruments, which can be shown to involve a logic of inclusive disjunction, are conducive to the view that one's system may be true of the real without being the whole truth.

From the sociological point of view, we know that American culture is dominated by the three-number complex, and subsidiarily influenced by the two-number complex.¹²

And, finally, from socio-historical evidence we know that the European thought-patterns are dominated by the three-number pattern.¹³

A philosophical defence could be given along the following lines. (1) The tetrad helps us to avoid the principle of ontological priority for it rejects super-ordinate-subordinate dyads and unifying triads as adequate instruments; (2) the tetrad thus inhibits the tendency to reduce the modes of being and of knowledge to one form; (3) the tetrad introduces a fourth dimension (such as time) which overcomes the static timelessness of dyads and triads; (4) the tetrad unifies and at the same time discriminates. Thus we do not have to choose between unification (monism) and discrimination (atomism); (5) tetradic thinking is peculiar to genuinely pluralistic philosophies.

V

In American philosophy, only a few thinkers have utilized tetradic instruments—Weiss is one, and Robert S. Brumbaugh is another.¹⁴ But even these advocates have been too intellectualistic. We need to find a tetradic system which is not exclusively intellectualistic at the same time as it is reflective—and we need to articulate the philosophical principles of such a system so that we may understand and use it. In this paper I am suggesting that the philosophy of the Medicine-Wheel is a tetradic system in need of exploration and elaboration.

9. Cf. Huntington Cairns, Editor, *The Two-Story World*, New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1966, p. 9.

10. Jung, *Op. Cit.*, p. 414.

11. *Ibid.*, p. 141.

12. Cf. Alan Dundes, "The Number three in American Culture," in Dundes, Ed., *Every Man His Fox*, Englewood-Cliffs: Prentice-Hall 1968.

13. Georges Dumezil, *L'Idéologie tripartite des Indo-Européens*, Brussels: Collections Latomus, 31, 1958.

14. Robert S. Brumbaugh, "Preface to Cosmogony," *Review of Metaphysics*, VII, 1953, 53-63,

If we are to develop a philosophy which respects the things that are for what they are, while at the same time insisting on their inevitable unity with all other things—a philosophy, that is, which establishes unity-amidst-difference as a fundamental principle—we could do worse than develop the philosophy of the Medicine-Wheel. North America needs to discover that some of the people they conquered and have subjugated for over four-hundred years, elaborated a philosophy which surpasses in scope and in power many of the philosophies presented as alternatives in our own day.

Is there an Alternative to War?

There are several non-physical traits that differentiate Man from other animals. Some are obscure, others are well known and understood. For instance; it's axiomatic he surpasses other species in intelligence, reasoning power, and curiosity. Unfortunately, these and other factors have only made Man predominate but not superior to his fellow creatures. Man does not indicate superiority when he lays waste to his habitat and maniacally threatens the extinction of his own kind as well as all others.

If we carefully compare some of Man's attributes with those of his "cousin", the chimpanzee, we find they are similar and differ only in degree. The monkey has primitive forms of communication, tools, music, territorial conflict, medicine, and even doctors. The little "mimic" also eats meat while munching on a side dish of salad like leaves. These, and other examples among lower creatures, seem to indicate that, far from being unique and isolated from nature, Man shares traits which exist, to a lesser degree, in other animals. Either they were handed to him through a evolutionary process up the ocellon of life or they developed independently. In any case, through Man, they have expanded and developed into the human, social, and political institutions of his culture.

Now, if one were to ask which of these traits is the most important in Man, I'm afraid we must conclude it's his innate aggressive instinct. In fact, it's so much a part of his being that it permeates nearly all his actions and dealings with his fellows and with nature itself. It has made him the dominant species by equipping him with an instinct to survive; to subdue his enemies; and, coupled with curiosity, it has been the impetus behind discovery and the investigation of the unknown.

On the other hand, this same aggressive instinct has also helped make him the most corrupt, vicious, depraved creature that ever existed on the earth; a cannibalistic fiend who wantonly butchers his own kind on the battlefield while slyly consuming the spectators drawn to their own sacrifice with false promises of truth, justice, equality, and freedom made through perverse systems of morality, politics, and economics.

Even these systems had legitimate origins in an unremembered past. Their

functions were to help protect and provide for the band, and their incipient vestiges remain in the social structure of other primates today. It may be as developing Man conquered his old enemies of beast and hunger, his primitive instincts and drives remained strong ; so strong that he substituted conflict with himself to satisfy the urge of aggressiveness now fed by the thralls of greed and power. Concomitantly, Man in his conflicts with other men began to consider his antagonists as subhuman ; so the force that once gave impetus to practical forms of defence and survival degenerated into the insatiable monster of war. Through the eons of struggle in Man's past, war has kept pace with human progress till today it is a sophisticated leviathan that dares to break the tethers of a weakened civilization which tries to control it.

What are some of the reasons for modern war ? The first is a moral one. We might say it takes at least two nations with inflexible viewpoints to create a war. Now, if one of them would be more reasonable and willing to compromise, war could be avoided. This assumption is probably correct in some cases ; but, knowing human nature as it is, it is also entirely possible that one nation is clearly an aggressor and the other must defend itself. Second, there are emotional and chauvinistic reasons for war. Many people are patriotic, believe propaganda, and are willing and eager to fight for their country, right or wrong. Third, we shall consider the political reasons for war. The politics of war is allied with economic and geographic considerations that usually are not justifiable. Many times the common man understands this and suggests that the political leaders who want war should fight it out among themselves. A very good point. Fourth, war is profitable. It feeds the military-industrial complex while it boosts the economy. Fifth, military leaders press for war because they have been trained for it. A war enhances their prestige and increases the size of their establishment. Lastly, Man's evil drives and aggressive instincts specialize him to fight. Many men actually enjoy war. To them it is the high point of a restricted, mundane life ; and, those that survive combat feel individually superior, physically and spiritually, to those who were killed or didn't participate. Another fact we must consider is there are naturally cruel and vicious people who like to kill. War legitimizes their savage lust.

Attempts have been made to discover the Achilles heel of the war syndrome. It's been suggested women organized against war and refuse to let their men participate. Or, scientists and technicians must stop fabricating weapons ; and that, too, would have the desired effect. But, as the foregoing indicates, we are dealing with the results of a violent force that is part of our very nature and with a reality of life, intertwined with politics and economics, that cannot easily be changed or stopped. There are more ramifications to the problem of war than a cursory analysis would indicate or a few sage opinions will effect. *Many sophisticated institutions of man have been invented to prevent war and failed ; while religion has grappled with the problem for millenia without success.* The ancient Chinese had a workable scheme, for a while. The two armies would face each other ready for combat ; then the opposing generals sat down and between them decided the contest by playing a game of chess. Among the savages of New Guinea, they settle a dispute by throwing spears at one another until blood is drawn by only one man being killed or wounded. Interesting, but I'm afraid that small pinprick wouldn't satiate modern, *civilized man's appetite for killing.*

Unfortunately, even if war could be prevented, it would not mean the end to

violence against individuals in society. Crimes and car accidents alone in America take more lives in one year than were taken in all the years of its involvement in the Viet Nam War. Perhaps, a more realistic approach to armed conflict would be to control or modify it instead of attempting an abrupt and absolute eradication. Man not only must abolish war, he also needs an exciting alternative to it; a challenging adventure to take its place—one full of competition without the threat of annihilation and, mass destruction. Since mankind is fascinated with the accomplishments, the machines, the tactics, and the danger associated with military action; our substitute for war must perpetuate these rules to legitimize "the game". The alternatives in civilian life which might suffice (police work, fire fighting, space exploration, etc.) are too fragmented and don't involve enough people to satisfy the requirement as a substitute for war. We need something on a large scale involving more people, both those in the field and those back home.

What I propose is a *conflict of construction* instead of destruction. Imagine there has been a failure at the peace table to resolve a dispute between two countries. One of them decides to attack the other or invade the territory in question without warning. The first phase of the operation is conducted along the lines of standard warfare using conventional armaments. This allows the opposing forces and the people of the countries involved to dissipate their initial inflated hate, anger, and frustration, which could hardly be contained at this point anyway. After the catharsis of actual battle, the emotions and unreasonable attitudes that sparked the fighting can be channeled into a pattern of less dangerous Chauvinism while the necessary lines of communication are repaired. You see, the attacking forces will rout the defenders or the defenders will counter attack. In any case, a particular war zone or battle area, which can be delineated by recognizable geographic locations, will become apparent. Once this general area of conflict has been established and the opposing forces are arranged in a static relationship, we must, at this critical point, prevent further military action as both sides catch their breath before the next engagement.

Now we move on to phase two. According to a pre-war consensus, both sides must withdraw combat troops from the front line area and replace them with construction battalions numerically equal to the number of fighting troops replaced. The transition will be made under the watchful eyes of neutral umpires that have, by then, arrived at the scene of conflict. The fighting troops must pull all the way back to a line that would indicate the limit of the war area or to the point of attack departure. The new situation, then, is a contained theater of war where the armed combatants are separated from each other by a respectable distance while their own unarmed men create a psychological buffer between the new lines of defence and the enemy.

Phase three begins with the unarmed construction battalions from each side contiguously situated, with their machines, in the middle of the former combat zone. No one is allowed to carry weapons but guards are posted to preclude sabotage. The mission of the "builders" is to work back to their own defence line filling in trenches, replacing bridges, homes, etc. and generally improve the topography by planting or clearing land as the case may be. These men are supplied with materials and supported by the services in the rear as if they were conducting a military operation. All this is supervised by the umpires who by now have been augmented by a U.N. type peace force that patrols between the antagonists. Another key issue is that all peace

negotiations between high ranking officials must be carried out right on the centreline, while the troops on the defence lines are progressively disarmed and moved further back until only a nominal force is left.

To recapitulate : The rationale of the overall plan is to prevent a resumption of the original conflict by separating, disarming and keeping troops constructively busy ; getting more people involved, especially outsiders ; and putting important negotiators (including political leaders) on the "firing line". In reality, this scheme is not a true alternative to war but is an optional method of warfare agreed to beforehand by the key potentials. There is nothing in it that would force the combatants to follow through. It does, however, importantly *allow a change of mind or an excuse to pull back*, and *still save face*, after commitment. It then prevents further action by sublimating martial violence to a more positive level of construction. Also, Olympic type competition and contests of methods and machines between the now subdued opponents could be introduced at the end of phase three to stimulate war activities and help release tensions.

- This discussion has not included air and sea war or all out nuclear war because the first two are considered a subsidiary part of land warfare, either arising from it or, conversely, leading to it. The other, nuclear war, is in a class by itself but is still based on the success or failure to control conventional war or to resolve conflicts by other means.

I doubt if Man truly wants to stop war. If he did, the resources are already available through the U.N., which, from lack of practice, sports a poor record of conflict control. There is no sense even thinking of using its full potential. That is, simply annihilating the attacking force or all forces involved in the fighting. This, I am sure, would be a strong intimidating factor to divert, not placate, Man's aggressive urge and press him to seek solutions other than war. Earlier, I used the term "game" as a synonym for war. I didn't mean it facetiously at all. So many times the altercations between nations, lead by their megalomaniacal heads of state, remind one of testy children squabbling over toys in a sandbox.

In answer to the question "Is there an alternative to war ?", I think the answer is yes ! It is (as this essay indicates) peace, not the "practical devices" of men, but peace that begins in the hearts of individual men working together. Only this "aggressive" mobilization of peace, combined with good will and guided by restraint, will bring about defeat for the battlefield.

Catholicism in the U.S.A.

Is the Catholic religion facing a crisis in the United States? On college campuses throughout the country students are being accused of irreligion. Do college students today really shun religion as passe?

A survey conducted in Seattle, Washington, in Blessed Sacrament Parish and among seniors at Seattle University, a Catholic College, came up with some results that may aid in answering this question.

The survey was conducted in Blessed Sacrament Parish because of the large number of college students who live in the area. The survey covered a wide variety of subjects, but we shall limit the discussion to findings in three areas: Cultic behaviour, Ethical orthodoxy, and Doctrinal orthodoxy. We shall further limit the population to Catholic seniors attending SU, a Catholic University, and Catholic seniors attending the UW, a public University.

By cultic behaviour is meant acts in the area of the ceremonial practice of religion. The items selected to measure cultic behaviour were:

- (1) How often do you attend Mass?
- (2) How often do you receive communion? and,
- (3) How often do you go to Confession?

Ethical orthodoxy refers to conformity with the stand of the Church in matters of social morality. The Church has established laws and teachings on how a person is to react to certain problems facing him today. These problems, as discussed in this survey, included birth control, marriage with non-Catholics, and premarital sex. The Church through the years has established a firm stand against these three things, but as of late, there has been unrest within the Church as to whether the stand of the Church is justified. Ethical orthodoxy in this survey was measured by the extent of agreement with these five statements: (1) God will provide no matter how many children I have; (2) I think that a Catholic should marry only another Catholic; (3) I believe that it is morally permissible to spend tax money in support of the spread of birth control information or

artificial devices : (4) It is really wrong for an engaged couple to have sexual intercourse if they plan to marry : and (5) I would be entirely willing to use contraceptive methods other than rhythm and abstinence after I have had as many children as I can afford to raise.

Doctrinal orthodoxy is the stand and teachings of the Church in matters of faith. Doctrinal orthodoxy was measured by the extent of agreement with the following four statements : (1) God's existence can be proven, (2) God really doesn't care how He is worshipped as long as He is worshipped, (3) God will punish the unrepentant mortal sinner through all eternity, and (4) Jesus directly handed over the leadership of His Church to Peter and the Popes.

The Statements measuring doctrinal orthodoxy were split into two levels, Level A and Level B. It is important in interpreting the results to understand the levels. Level A consists of statements that are either classical and remembered from catechism, or vague but none the less classical in that they are in the form most frequently repeated by people. Of the above questions those numbered 1 and 4 are categorized in Level A. Level B restates the same truths in words that are not classical, or in words that are not vague. Of the listed statements those numbered 2 and 3 are Level B. It is important to know these levels because the person surveyed is more likely to agree with a level A question because of the familiarity of the classical form.

Cultic Behaviour

Cultic behaviour dealt with the measurement of religiosity of students by means of observing the external practice of religion. Three questions were asked :

- (1) How often do you attend mass ? (2) How often do you receive Communion ? (3) and, How often do you go to confession ? The responses were broken down into two categories : regularly or infrequently. The breakdown was as follow.

TABLE I
Regularity of Cultic Behaviour

<i>regularly</i>		<i>infrequently</i>
<i>UW</i>		
Mass	78%	22%
Communion	65%	33%
Confession	81%	19%
<i>SU</i>		
Mass	85%	15%
Communion	70%	30%
Confession	84%	16%

NOTE : The term regularly for Mass means weekly or oftener ; for Communion regularity means a few times a month or oftener ; and for confession it means a few times a year

or oftener.

The results of the cultic behaviour section showed strong indication that the religious practice of ceremonies in large majorities of college students is still, shall we say, going strong. If students are being accused of irreligion it can not be drawn from these results.

Ethical Orthodoxy

Ethical orthodoxy of the Catholic Church is heard about almost everywhere there is a discussion on contemporary affairs of the nation or the world. The main topics argued over in informal or formal discussions were worded into questions for this "Project Catholic" survey. The topics cover the areas: God providing for children; whether Catholics should marry only other Catholic persons; the morality of birth control methods financed by government spending; if engaged persons are morally right in having sexual intercourse before marriage; and if it is right to use contraceptive measures other than rhythm patterns or abstinence after one has had as many children as he can afford.

Today in our world birth control, population explosion, maximum family number, and 'free love' are among the most frequently discussed questions from politicians to 'Cocktail Party Senators'. Everybody talks about the new morality and the ones suspected of condoning it the most strongly are college students or those of college age. The questions of this survey covering this area may answer a few of our questions as to how people feel towards this new morality.

Ethical orthodoxy was measured by the extent of agreement with the following five statements:

- (1) God will provide no matter how many children I have;
- (2) I think that Catholics should marry only another Catholic;
- (3) I think it is morally permissible to spend tax money in support of the spread of birth control information or artificial devices (argument with this statement is defined as heterodoxy);
- (4) It is really wrong from an engaged couple to have sexual intercourse if they plan to get married;
- (5) I would be entirely willing to use contraceptive methods other than rhythm and abstinence after I have had as many children as I can afford to raise (agreement with this statement is defined as heterodoxy).

Before giving the results of the investigation into ethical orthodoxy there must be an explanation of the breakdown of the computed data. The answers to the questions were categorized into Hi and Lo. Hi is interpreted as meaning an answer which agreed with the stand of the Catholic church. Lo is to be interpreted as meaning an answer which is contrary to the stand of the Church on the matter involved.

In yes or no terms the ethically orthodox responses to the above questions; (1) yes, (2) yes, (3) no, (4) yes, and (5) no. The breakdown here showed a high proportion of

ethically heterodox responses. The breakdown was as follows :

TABLE II
Ethical Orthodoxy

<i>UW seniors</i>			<i>SU seniors</i>	
1.	hi	14%	12%	
	lo	86%	88%	
2.	hi	8%	20%	
	lo	92%	80%	
3.	hi	8%	22%	
	lo	92%	78%	
4.	hi	33%	57%	
	lo	67%	43%	
5.	hi	8%	31%	
	lo	92%	69%	

The average response for the Catholic senior, from the Catholic University, as opposed to the Catholic senior, from the secular university, was : SU seniors 28% hi and 72% lo ; UW seniors 14% hi and 86% lo. As is noticed, the Catholic University rate of hi rated response is double that of the secular university.

Doctrinal Orthodoxy

Doctrinal orthodoxy is the stand of the Church in matters of faith. It was measured by the extent of agreement with the following four statements :

- (1) God's existence can be proven.
- (2) God really doesn't care how He is worshipped as long as He is worshipped.
- (3) God will punish the unrepentant mortal sinner throughout all eternity, and,
- (4) Jesus directly handed over the leadership of His Church to Peter and the Popes.

These questions have been subsequently divided into two levels. The first level, called Level A, consists of statements that are either classical and remembered from catechism, or vague but nonetheless classical in that they are in the form most frequently repeated by people. The second level, level B, restates the same questions either in words that are not classical, or in words that are not vague. Questions 1) and 4) were in Level A ; questions 2) and 3) were on Level B.

The breakdown of the results was into two categories, hi and lo. Hi was, as in ethical orthodoxy, an answer which agreed with the stand of the Church, and lo being an answer which was contrary to the stand of the Church.

The breakdown was computed as :

TABLE III
Doctrinal Orthodoxy

UW seniors		SU seniors
1.	hi 31%	63%
	lo 69%	37%
2.	hi 20%	28%
	lo 80%	72%
3.	hi 34%	52%
	lo 66%	48%
4.	hi 42%	67%
	lo 58%	33%

Discussion

The freshman results on this particular section of the survey show that seniors in college, whether Catholic or secular, have liberalized their thought on doctrinal orthodoxy (the secular students tend to be more liberalized at a rate of 25% hi response to 38% hi).

Why have ideas become so liberalized in these students? The key to the situation may lie in question (3) God will punish the unrepentant mortal sinner throughout all eternity. In this lies the foundation for fear, the fear of pain or punishment that will never end. No person wishes to be punished throughout eternity so a rationalization is formed to feel safe from this. A person becomes afraid of never seeing God or 'forever burning in the fires of hell'. Of course, as disagreement grows in this teaching disagreement grows in other teachings, this disagreement with other teachings is used as a rationalization for disagreement with the first teaching. A much sounder foundation is laid to disagree with one teaching if a person disagrees with more than one.

Today especially man is afraid of pain. In this country modern advances in the medical field have kept pain at a minimum. A person in this country today, with all the conveniences and material well being, has a difficult time facing a problem that would punish him throughout eternity. The easiest way around this would be to deny there is such a thing. And the easiest way to rationalize disagreement with this teaching would be to disagree with most of the teachings.

Also as science grows and more things are made known, spiritual things become more vague and more abstract from the normal way of thinking. In this country the idea seems to be there is a solution to every problem; if there is no solution in absolute material means then there tends to be a denial that the problem really does exist. In the college students' quest for knowledge the spiritual knowledge of Divine Revelation has seemed to drop out of sight, everything is material. Everybody tends to want to operate in a field where material wealth can be made.

Taken from a religious point of view, a rationalization can be formed on the key

doctrinal point that God will punish the unrepentant mortal sinner for all eternity. There can be found a seeming contradiction in the teachings of the Church on this particular question. The Church teaches God is all powerful, all good, and all merciful. The abstraction can be centered around the phrase, 'God is all merciful'. The meaning of the words all merciful, might mean that God would forgive everybody no matter what they did. This is the universal heresy so common among the students studied here.

Also involved is the Lutheran dictum that, faith alone shall provide salvation. This idea has been taken from Paul. (The Epistle of James, which teaches that faith without works is dead, was called by Luther a "straw epistle.") But, in Matthew, Chapter 7, verse 21, Christ says, "It is not everyone who keeps saying to me 'Lord, Lord, who will enter the kingdom of Heaven, but the man who actually does my Heavenly Father's will.'" Thus the Catholic Universalist, then, implicitly denies the infallibility of the New Testament.

Perhaps then it is better to say that most rationalisations and disagreements have been drawn on the basis of fear of external punishment, rather than on the basis of a well thought-out position.

Conclusively the results of the section on doctrinal orthodoxy have shown disagreement with the Church's teachings in matters of faith.

What are some other factors which may account for the heterodoxy here encountered? One may be in that technological advances have made world problems close to the individual thousands of miles away from the actual place where the problem is taking place. Not so many years ago only politicians or sociologists were involved in the problems of birth control. Today, through instantaneous communications, most everybody is involved in the basis of birth control.

To mention only instant communications would be to mention only a "needle in a haystack". Among other is television. Television, in its own right, has revolutionized society. Through television we receive enjoyment and, perhaps more important, we witness the world and her problems before our eyes. We can see over-population and starvation as it happens; it is no longer miles away, but in our own homes.

Technological advances, of many sorts, have shortened our work week which means more leisure time. What do we do with this new leisure time? Often, we spend it in the pursuit of pleasure. That may lead to disagreement with the Church. A person who has so much time to spare has to choose things attractive but forbidden activities to fill this time. Sexual irregularities may be one of his choices. He may then change his faith to fit his behaviour.

Technological advancements may have caused disagreement with the Church. At least from these results we can draw the conclusion that college students are irreligious in terms of ethical orthodoxy.

Why is it that these students, who refused to accept the ethical and doctrinal orthodoxy of the Church: were very regular in their practice of religious ceremony?

Throughout the centuries man has had ceremony. Man has a ceremony for marriage, birth, death graduation, New Years, inaugurating leaders to positions, birthday commemorations, receiving privileges, and religious events; in short, man seems to need ceremonies. One of the reasons for the strong practice of the attendance to and

in religious ceremony among those surveyed is this need for ceremony.

Another important factor in the students' regularity in cultic behaviour may be the search for status. Status in this sense is not used to mean the status acquired with a new car or an important job, status here means the feeling of others toward you. Many people attend Church because they do not want people to start talking about them. Many people are acquainted with the type of person who makes a big scene about giving money to the Church (Christ mentions such people in His parables) when the rest of the week he is out swindling anybody and everybody.

Behaviour patterns long since ingrained in the mind of the person is possibly another reason for continuance in the practice of cultic behaviour. This can be understood in that people who have always gone to Mass, Communion and Confession regularly in early life, either through their own initiative or outside pressure are more likely to continue in later life to attend these regularly. If these people do decide to discontinue the practice of cultic behaviour it would most probably be a gradual change and not a radical turn of events. This behaviour can also be classified as habit. Anyone of us knows how hard it is to break a habit.

Most people find Mass, Communion and Confession an uplifting experience. By uplifting is meant a relief of inner tension and strife. One who has experienced going to confession knows how an individual can get a feeling of innocence and happiness because he feels he is no longer carrying the weight of his wrong doings. A modern phrase that is most suited for the definition of this feeling one gets from practising cultic behaviour is: "getting it off my chest".

One of the most probable causes for the continued practice of cultic behaviour is social pressure. The individual is under constant fire from peers to conform to the group behaviour patterns. One of the behaviour patterns of most groups is a religion and religious ceremony. One can easily see that one of the reasons for the continuance of religious practice, going to Mass, Communion and Confession, in this case, may be due to social pressure.

Another reason is a guilt feeling or guilt complex. An individual who has been through the socialization process will find it hard to rebel against these habits without a feeling of guilt. Related to guilt is shame. You may have often heard someone say, "If my parents knew what I was doing now they'd die". Of course, one may also truly believe he is doing something wrong by not going to Mass, Communion or Confession. These people do not necessarily agree with everything the Church says but they feel they have an obligation to worship God. These cultic behaviours are consistent with a wide range of doctrinal and ethical belief.

These are some of the reasons the cultic behaviour patterns are still being practiced even though one hears often that "God is dead" or there is no need for religion anymore.

Final Conclusion

In review: Catholic college students at both a leading Catholic and a leading secular University still practice cultic behaviour or take part in the religious ceremonies of the Church but they disagree with the Church in matters of ethical or doctrinal orthodoxy. We have speculated on why this may be so.

Possibly the Church is facing a crisis, possibly it is not. Possibly the college student is irreligious, possibly he is very religious, but in a different way than the Church thinks he should be.

The conclusion which is drawn in this article is not that the college student is irreligious but rather he is heterodox. Catholicism is possibly about to capitulate to the New Liberalism.

Dr. B.L. Atreya : Philosopher and Friend

Dr. B.L. Atreya is five years younger than I, which, added to our personal interests and relationships, makes me feel like his elder brother. He, no doubt, was the more learned and wiser, but I met him in Hawaii in 1947 on his first venture beyond the borders of India, and had the pleasant opportunity with my wife, Dorothy, of helping him learn to walk in another cultural milieu.

Dr. Atreya had flown from Varanasi to Hawaii, which, I believe, only a short stop in Hong Kong. He was to deliver lectures at the University of Hawaii. Dot and I, too, had recently come from the mainland States. (Hawaii was not yet a state, but a "territory" with a Governor appointed by the President of the U.S.A., and an elected representative in Congress). I had been invited to the University of Hawaii for a year as a visiting professor of philosophy to teach the courses of Charles A. Moore, who was spending a sabbatical year in India.

The University was overflowing with students but lacking in teachers and space. Honolulu was short of living quarters, except for abandoned military barracks. They were surplus because of the ending of World War II or, as is said in Hawaii, the War was *pau*. Several of these barracks had been moved to a field near the University campus, and Dr. Atreya and we had been lodged in two of these.

We called on him and learned that one of his problems was the satisfaction of his vegetarianism; indeed, the finding of any food at all in early morning. Dot invited him to have breakfast in our apartment, and soon other meals as well. We enjoyed and profited by our conversation around the table.

Our mutual friendliness was facilitated because we had earlier contacts with persons from India, most extensively with Dr. B.P. Hivali who had been my classmate at Harvard, where we later worked together for our doctorates in philosophy. For years after his return home we maintained correspondence.

Dr. Atreya and we seemed to have from the start a mutual trust and ease in conversation. While we were teaching him our ways of eating, he was attempting to instruct us in Sanskrit. I can still recall his enthusiasm for what he termed a most

logical and at once highly rational yet poetic language.

We were both impressed by the keenness of his observation, his quick mind, ready wit, and ingenuity. One day on a swim at a remote beach, our astute scholar adapted my too-large swim shorts by a twist of his sacred thread. And we were amused occasionally by his comments on the social patterns he noted in this new world. Visiting a student party, for instance, he commented on the meager exercise evident in American dance forms.

The evening came when Dr. Atreya was to deliver a general lecture in the University's largest hall. It was crowded with students and teachers. Dr. Atreya began speaking at eight. By nine he was looking occasionally at his watch. Soon questions began coming from the floor, and Dr. Atreya continued to talk, with watch in hand. About ten-thirty he suddenly stopped, studied his time-piece, then remarked that his watch had stopped !

Although no person there had ever sat that long listening to a lecturer, no one had left the room. They were enthralled by the manner and content of Dr. Atreya's words, especially by the novelty (to them) and seeming supernaturalism of much they were hearing. They continued discussing and arguing as they left the hall ; indeed, for days and months. Perhaps many will have passed on to their children their interest in this introduction to Indian religion and philosophy. Such ideas and accounts as levitation—"he floated the window out," as Dr. Atreya put it ; self-control, even of bodily functions such as breathing and heartbeat ; burial alive for long periods. Yoga, intense concentration, mysticism, asceticism, Hindu philosophies—all this was so foreign to the experience, thinking, life of American youth that it so captured their consciousness as to make them oblivious to the passage of time, even to the hardness of their chairs.

Near the time when Dr. Atreya was to fly on to the mainland U.S.A. he was invited by the Rotary Club of Waikiki to speak at a noon luncheon. He did well ; the Rotarians liked him. One of them, a prominent businessman who owned the largest cleaning and laundrying company in Hawaii, asked where Dr. Atreya was going after leaving Honolulu, and when I told him California and across the States, he asked whether Dr. Atreya would like to have his clothes cleaned and pressed before leaving. I assured him he would. So we came back to the University campus, got all the clothes he had used on his trip and took them to the laundry. The next day these were returned nicely cleaned and pressed and exchanged for the remainder of his travel wardrobe. Dr. Atreya was amazed that all was done so nicely, quickly, and as a gesture of friendship by a "money-grabbing American businessman."

My wife and I owe a debt of gratitude to Dr. Atreya for helping to prepare us for later extensive visits throughout India. From 1954 for some four years we were most of the time living and working in a dozen Asian countries forming local units of the World Brotherhood programme founded in 1950 at an international conference in UNESCO House, Paris. Of some 60 chapters 26 were in India from Mysore to Kashmir, including, of course, Varanasi (formerly known here as Benares). Unfortunately Dr. Atreya was away at the time of our visits, but we learned much about him through mutual friends and professional associates.

These World Brotherhood (in some countries *Fraternit Mondial*) units were composed of such prominent persons as educators, religious and political leaders, and other "Opinion makers". Designed to improve intergroup relations, they sought representatives, both men and women, of the various ethnic, caste, occupational, and other elements of the communities, a number of whom we were introduced to through the good offices of our philosopher-associate of earlier times. Eventually we had the cooperation of Mr. Nehru and his two sisters. Dr. Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan was a chief adviser; Professor Jal Daruvalla of Bombay succeeded us as Director for the Asia-Pacific area; and in Madras Professor Mahadevan, another noted philosopher, was among our organizing group. At Varanasi, although Dr. Atreya was elsewhere at a conference of philosophers, he had arranged for Swami Aghananda to advise us during our first visit.

These years in Asia, including several months in India, also inspired Dorothy to write and edit three volumes contributing to the burgeoning interest throughout the world in things Asian—*The Mentor Book of Modern Asian Literature*, *Voices of Modern Asia*, and a biography of India's award-winning novelist, *Bhabani Bhattacharya*.

We are grateful for this opportunity to share in the *Souvenir Volume International* in honour of Dr. Atreya, who has contributed so much to our personal lives and to increasing understanding among peoples of many cultures.

We approached him with difficulties without the least fear of being jected at and received immense guidance for pursuing our studies in a wider perspective.

Pandit's kindness was never stinted. For those who like me opted philosophy for their post-graduate studies it was virtually converted into a boon. Pandit's residential quarters were frequently visited by us far personal as well as for collective guidance. Those who showed deeper interest in his subjects found his personal library thrown open to them. They could borrow any number of books from it. If Pandit felt that more books were needed by his students, he would personally go to the University library, get those books issued in his name and hand over to them. For students like me, who were aspiring but financially worse off, this proved to be nothing short of Divine providence.

After my M.A., I was further taken into confidence by Pandit. I was treated as a member of his family. Although I worked for my D.Litt. under the direct guidance of the late Dr. S.K. Mahtta, another student Professor of Philosophy, Pandit nevertheless would discuss my subject for several hours at a stretch. Some times we would take meals together and go out for a walk. This gave me an opportunity to observe him closely. Pandit observed a certain discipline in his daily life. Invariably an early riser, he would go out for a morning walk in all seasons. Even at a fairly advanced age he would try to brace his physique up by running. He used to take plain meals with enough of milk and curds and would devote whatever time he could spare either to reading or writing. It appeared as if he was modelling his personality in conformity with the requirements of *Jidnyogya*.

It was precisely at this time, that is after 1932 onwards, that Pandit got interested in psychology. He gave me several books on this disputed science to read. To be frank, they never appealed to my mind. Pandit, however, invited me to attend several sances. I did so and participated in them out of curiosity. Regarding their outcome they left me as sceptical as ever. When subsequently I discussed certain matters with Pandit in the same direction saying that every science in its infancy had to meet with such rebuffs. I knew that he was not dogmatic. He merely evinced a spirit of inquiry in the teeth of direct opposition—another rare quality which a *Jidnyogya* alone could manifest.

Pandit was humility incarnate. This endeared him to his students perhaps more than his scholarship. He was quick to appreciate merit in others although they were his juniors. When he was preparing the press copy of his *Philosophy of Yogadharma*, I happened to glance at its appendices which reproduced certain extracts from the original text. While going through them cursorily, I found that there was something wrong about them. I brought this to the notice of Pandit. He immediately consulted the original and verified the truth of my suggestions. Taken aback, he made me read the whole again in his presence. I did so and pointed out similar mistakes. On verification they were found to be correct. Pandit was all praise for me thinking that I had some mysterious power to detect errors without consulting the original. I then explained to him my trick which lay in reading the Sanskrit stanzas in accordance with their musical rhythm. The flaws were easy to detect if the rhythm was in any way interrupted. But in spite of my explanation of which he

as thoroughly convinced, he would never approve the final proofs until he was sure that I had gone through them.

Once in course of our talk Pandity casually observed that he would very much like to follow in the footsteps of the great Indian missionaries such as Swami Ramakrishna and Swami Vivekananda and would like to propagate the Vedanta Philosophy far and wide. As a philosophical writer and Birta scholar, it seems he has done much to fulfil this fond aspiration of his. The world, nevertheless, has much changed since the times of Swami Ramakrishna. Instead of admiring philosophy, it has found ways and means to become impervious to it. Under these circumstances, Pandity's work deserves to be gauged by the spirit which worked behind it rather than by its actual impact it could make on the global mind. What can be definitely said is that the spirit with which Pandity wrote and worked had been true and authentic to the core in the sense in which Heidegger would have us use the word 'authentic'. His entire personality is verily the embodiment of it. It has become more and more glorious and consummate as it has attained maturity. May God bless Pandity with a long and happy life to show through his personal example at least the immeasurable wealth and bliss of spiritual life.

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The Rational and the Non-Rational

The problem of rational and non-rational has at times been confused with that of the relation between philosophy and religion. In such contexts the term 'philosophy' is used for some kind of rational inquiry into a particular branch of study. Thus, when we use expressions like philosophy of science, philosophy of history, philosophy of art etc., we mean by these usages some rational, objective and analytical study of the respective disciplines. Religion, on the other hand, is taken to be superhuman, supra-rational, sometimes even infra-rational, and divine, which have very little to do with reason. It is supposed to be based on faith or belief in some kind of reality, subjective or objective. But such generalizations could be more true in the Western context. In India we have a more healthy harmony between philosophy and religion. In a sense the whole of Indian philosophy could be said to be philosophy of religion; In fact we have never separated the two, although the two are clearly distinguished. *Darśana* (philosophy) here is that by which we are able to see (the Reality) and *dharma* (religion) that which holds us fast. The former seems to be taking the Real to be the object of our pursuit whereas the latter takes the same to be the ground. The Vedāntic tradition takes the *Brahman* or the *Ātman* to be the end as well as the ground for human pursuit. The Western tradition has tried, at times, to synthesise between philosophy and religion but the synthesis has never been satisfactory because of either the rational or the theological overplus.

The present attempt to ponder over the problem of rational and non-rational may be called an essay in philosophy of religion. It was Hegel who had given currency to the phrase 'philosophy of religion' and this later on gave a new dimension to the study of religion in the philosophy departments of the Universities all over. Consequently, a rational and objective study of religion was taken up severally and became popular in due course. In the present essay the problem of philosophy of religion as approached by two representative thinkers of the West—John Caird and Rudolf Otto—has been studied in order to clarify the two seminal concepts, i.e., the rational and the non-rational. The two thinkers selected herein represent polar approaches to

the problem, the one emphasizing the rational and the other the non-rational.

Before we land directly in the philosophical geography of Germany, it would be more appropriate to have a look on the situation in our own surroundings. Here, in India, the debate between the two positions takes the form of the controversy between *tarka* (reason) and *śruti* (revelation or scripture). Revelation is supposed to be of superhuman origin. In other worldly matters the verdict of the scripture is final (*atīndriya viṣayeṣu śabdameva pramāṇam*). Here reason plays only a secondary role. It is used like a duster to clean the ground, but never to destroy the ground. When it comes to secular region, it is reason that reigns supreme. Śaṅkara has very emphatically told that even if hundred scriptures declare with one voice that the fire is cool and without-light we can't accept the verdict (*na hi śrutiśatamapi śitogniraprakāśo veti bruvatpramāṇyamupaitīti* see his *Gr̥ha-Bhāṣya*, XVIII. 66 ; also *Bṛhadāraṇyaka-Bhāṣya*, II, 1.20).

The role of reason in a system or *saṃpradāya* (tradition) may said to be threefold. The first task of reason could be explanatory. If we take up Śaṅkara, for example, he takes up the help of reason to present an agreeable solution of certain problems. His commentary on the first aphorism of the *Brahma-Sūtras* is revealing in this respect. Reason could also be of the form of internal criticism. The second task of reason would be the defensive one. To take up Advaitic school again, if the Buddhist logicians attack the tenets of the system, the Advaitin will have to make use of the sharper tools of reason. Sometimes the methodology (war-techniques, in a sense) of the opponent is adopted for one's defence. Once the defensive function is over, reason is employed to take the offensive as well. The enemy could be the internal one or an external system. Śaṅkara had to use his logical tools against the Vedic Sāṃkhya (who were treated as *pradhāna mallas*) as well as the non-Vedic Buddhists and established the philosophy of Advaita firm in the soil of India. But Śaṅkara would all the time be conscious of the limits of logic or reason. For, according to him, nothing could be finally decided by reason, as there will always be the possibility of some stronger reason being evolved and consequently controverting the earlier stand, as is found in the case of scientific discoveries (*tarkāpratishṭhānāt, Brahma-sūtra-bhāṣya*, II. 1. 11). In the end Śaṅkara would like to say good-bye to the tools of reason and retire with his *Bhāja-Govindam*.

Buddha, on the other hand, being a critic of the traditional learning, would not give much importance to words or revelation, though his followers, on their part, have accorded almost the same sanctity to *Buddha-vaṇana*. But the Buddha himself did not like that his words be accepted without rational analysis. He has boldly told the monks not to accept the words of the Master because of sheer regard for him ; they should rather examine them before acceptance, as gold is taken to be pure only after being put to fire, cut into pieces and tried on a touch-stone :

*tūpacchedācca nikaṣāt suvarṇamiva paṇḍitāṃ,
parikṣya bhīksavo grāhyam madvaco na tu gaṇavāt.*

—*Tattva-Saṃgraha*, K. 3588

Like Buddhism, Jainism too gives prominent place to reason. The *Uttarādhyaṇa* (27) recommends that *dharma* should be reviewed by the intellect and the reality should be

analysed by it (*pannāye samīkṣhīe dhammam tatta tatta vigicchīam*). When we come to Nyāya system, we find here that reason has been given maximum importance, although the loyalty towards scripture has not been withdrawn. The Vedic philosophers found Nyāya to be extremely useful for the defense of their system, therefore they developed the logic of Nyāya philosophy much better. The Nyāya-system and other schools, particularly the Advaita Vedānta, function together like bush-and-lion (*śara-simha-nyāya*); reason defends the scripture and other orthodox doctrines as the bush protects the lion from external dangers. On the other hand, the bush provides help to the lion to make the offensive as well. Similarly, the orthodox schools use Nyāya-logic to attack the opponents.

As mentioned earlier, the Western tradition has not been able to present a harmony between reason and revelation. In theology the use of the tenets of reason is limited one. Theologians make their best efforts to nurture their religious doctrines under infra-red light of reason and the moment there is a switch-over to higher voltage, the danger of immediate disaster. Theologians feel that by keeping themselves away from the broad day-light or the current philosophical investigations they will be able to spare their God from lethal weapons. They would not question their principal hypotheses and try to explain away the objections labelled against the dogmas. But this will not force the non-theologians to forget about the God (or spare Him) sitting in some theological mansion. If the concept of God is analysed by a student of philosophy, the results will equally apply to all the concepts of God, irrespective of that of a theologian or of a non-theologian.

The first notable shock to the traditional theological approach to the religious concepts like those of God and others came from a non-rationalist. It was David Hume who denied the popular notion of causality if one adopts the empiricistic line of approach. With the denial of causality are demolished the long-standing concepts of soul on the subjective side and that of God on the objective side. And when Immanuel Kant showed the limits of our conceptual thinking in his *Critique of Pure Reason* and also in *Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone* we kept our lips tight for long and religious mind was further intimidated. Of course, Kant himself had found out a way out and had made some room for God, freedom and immortality on non-rational (moral) grounds in his *Critique of Practical Reason*.

The real problem that concerns us here with regard to the concepts of rational and non-rational arises in the Hegelian identification of Reason (thought) and Reality. For Hegel and his followers the Real can be known through reason alone, reason being the most competent means of such knowledge. Being a follower of Hegel, John Caird takes up this position while writing one of the first books on philosophy of religion. In his *An Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion* (1880) Caird has shown that it is thought, and nothing else, that can fruitfully scrutinise the tenets of religion. In the first three chapters of this book he considers three main objections to the scientific or objective treatment of religion. First, there are thinkers like Herbert Spencer who regard human knowledge to be relative and inadequate means of knowing the Absolute. Next, the intuitionists hold that religious knowledge is of immediate and intuitive character, hence reason cannot apprehend it. Lastly, the advocates of scriptural authority hold that religious knowledge is of revelatory nature and revelation, being sourced

in God, is beyond rational approach. Against the first contention John Caird maintains that to hold that human knowledge is relative and yet to claim to know the existence of God are irreconcilable. Logically, the relativity of human knowledge must imply the unknowability, therefore non-existence, of the Absolute. Moreover, we cannot worship the unknowable. We adore the known or the knowable, but not the unknowable. To say that there is some higher reason within us that comprehends the Absolute would not help us to get out of the riddle. In the very first round of argumentation, one would say that we cannot make a distinction between the higher and the lower reason in one and the same person adequately. But, next, even if we believe in some kind of higher reason, Caird would say that it is reason nonetheless. As regards the second objection against the objective study of religion Caird would say that religious knowledge cannot remain purely immediate and intuitive forever, though this fundamental characteristic of religion cannot be denied. He admits that there are certain moments of trance or divine communication, but after few moments of such states one comes back to ordinary level of consciousness and resumes his/her normal behaviour. That experience too does not remain purely personal and private. It comes out in the form of spoken or written language or music or art etc. And at this stage the role of reason is important. The certitude required for religious experience, as different from non-religious experiences, is provided by reason. Reason also clears off superstitions and dogmas from the body of intuition so that the religious structure based on such intuitions may be accepted in the cultured society. As regards the third objection, Caird maintains that reason is not opposed to revelation. In fact the authoritative character of revelation is determined by reason itself. When there is some doubt as regards the revelatory or the secular character of any text the final verdict is given by reason. Reason also acts as an umpire to decide the issues between reason and faith or between one religious text and another. To say that revelation is above reason would simply mean that the contents of religion are amenable to a higher reason ; but this would lead to the difficulties noted earlier. Thus Caird answers all the three objections and concludes that there is absolutely nothing that cannot be scrutinised by reason. Faith as well as revelation are implicitly rational for him.

After considering these objections Caird now proceeds to justify the supremacy of thought and we may here note that all the justifications are purely Hegelian. Since, according to Caird, thought itself is infinite and absolute, and there cannot be two absolutes, thought and reality are identical. The infinite character of thought is proved rather negatively, viz., the finitude implies the infinite. The moment we think of the boundaries of the finite, thought goes beyond itself. Thought, thus, is ever self-transcending. The finite strives to become the infinite because it *is* infinite. If the end of religion is to know and realise the Real, it is thought that would help it in this pursuit. In religion, thus, we go deeper and deeper into the nature of Reality in a cyclical manner whereas in morality and other social sciences the progress is linear. To restate the same in the words of Śaṅkara, even though the *Brahman* and the *Ātman* are essentially identical, and our study into the nature of this reality is not going to make any ontological difference, the enquiry into the nature of *Brahman* does make at least epistemological difference, namely, it removes our misunderstanding regarding the nature of the Real. Hence the desirability and the necessity of such analysis.

The approach of Rudolf Otto to the problems of religion may be regarded as fundamentally opposed to the idealistic and rationalistic ones. In his *The Idea of the Holy* (*Das Heilige*, 1917) Otto tries to compensate one-sided approach to religious problems. He wants to do justice to the non-rational aspect of religion. In his attempt to do justice to the non-rational he sometimes goes to the extent where he is charged for doing injustice to the rational. No doubt there is an overtone of the non-rational in him but he has not overlooked the rational, as the very sub-title of his book states that the work is 'an inquiry into the non-rational factor in the idea of the divine and its relation to the rational'. According to the author, the rational and the non-rational are blended together like warp and woof of the fabric. Otto notes that in the Christian idea of the Cross the rational is enfolded with the non-rational, the revealed commingled with the unrevealed. But if we ask him which of the two threads of the fabric is more important, Otto would unhesitatingly state that it is the non-rational that carries more importance. In the Sacred or the Holy there is definitely an overplus of the non-rational.¹

By 'non-rational' Otto does not mean the irrational or the infra-rational, though he sometimes seems to be making use of these terms in such senses occasionally. In the present context the irrational would be that state of mind where the tools of reason have not yet been applied. It is always possible that this state might prove to be a meaningless absurdity once we apply reason to it. This state is akin to the animal world where reason has not yet sprouted. It is below reason or prior to reason. On the rational plane things are understood to be analysing facts of experience and these facts might turn out to be true or false after examination. This is our ordinary level of behaviour. But Rudolf Otto, and a host of other similar thinkers, including Śaṅkara and Bradley, would feel that there is a still higher state than this one where logical instruments, if applied, become defunct (*yato vāco nivartante aprāpya manasā saha* or the happy suicide of thought). Otto would call this state the non-rational, Śaṅkara would call it the state of *śukṣmadanubhūti* and Bradley would take it to be the 'sentient-experience'. Otto claims that everybody has got some such type of experience and has boldly forbidden those persons to read further this book of his who deny such experiences: "Whoever cannot do this, whoever knows no such moments in his experience, is requested to read no further. . ." (*The Idea of the Holy*, p. 22). The non-rational points to a sphere that cannot be conceptualised, but that hidden, inaccessible domain that can be immediately experienced and not analysed.

Though the author of the *Idea of the Holy* admits the inseparability of the rational and the non-rational, he finds it possible to distinguish between the two (thus he would subscribe to the Vaiśeṣika category of *samavāya*). He takes out, so to say, the rational and the moral elements from the body of the Holy and gives a new name to the remainder. The Holy minus rationality and morality is the *numinous* for Otto. The term is a novel usage or coinage of Otto himself which he constructs after the Latin *numen*, as ominous from *omen*.

After delineating the numinous from the rational Otto distinguishes several

1. For more detailed information on this subject, please see, Dubey, S.P., *Rudolf Otto and Hinduism*, Bharatiya Vidya Prakashan, Varanasi, 1969.

elements in the numinous as well, although he has taken it to be different from reason. The Kantian spirit in Otto forces him to categorise the numinous, so to say. On the subjective side of the numinous experience Otto finds a creature-feeling as against the *mysterium tremendum*, on the objective side. When the human individual comes face to face with the divine (the Holy or God), he feels himself to be insignificant and humbled. The person becomes conscious of his creaturehood, as in the case of Abraham who felt himself to be dust and ashes in the presence of the divine (*Gen. xviii, 27*). The eleventh chapter of the *Bhagavadgītā* also depicts a similar situation which is of great religious import. Here Arjuna becomes aware of his creaturehood in the presence of the Lord (Kṛiṣṇa) in his universal form (*Viśva-rūpa*). This feeling makes us conscious of the difference between the Creator and the creature which is important for theistic religions. The feeling preserves as well as elevates the sanctity of the distinction between the two. We may note here that in such feeling the epistemological distinction between the knower, the known and the knowledge remains traceable and the highest level under such experience would be that type of relation which is found in I-thou relation. But the idealistic systems, when talking about non-rational experience or the *nirvikalpaka anubhūti*, would not allow such distinctions. For them the immediate experience would be the state of *tripuṭi laya* where all the distinctions between the knower, known and knowledge are dissolved.

Coming again to the numinous, which has been elaborated by Otto by using the words *mysterium tremendum*, we find about five elements that have been treated by him as ideograms and not ideas. To take up the adjective first, we find that the term '*tremendum*' comes from tremor (fear) reflecting the terrible or the dreadful nature of the deity (which is abundant in Jewish religion). Yahweh is terrible like Rudra of the Vedic age or Durgā of the Śākta theism. The *tremendum*, according to Otto, has three constituents, (i) awefulness (*āscarya*), (ii) overpoweringness (*majestas*), and (iii) energy (or urgency). The substantive *mysterium*, for Otto, is more universal and is universally found in all the mystic experiences. It is one of the most common properties of the great religions of the world. The analysis of *mysterium*, on its part, reveals that it consists of two elements. The first element is the 'Wholly Other' (*anyadeva*) where the subject feels that the divine has very little in common with the human (but not completely wholly-other, for, in that case it would not be possible to talk about the divine). In India the dualistic Vedānta of Śrī Maḍḍhva comes close to this distinction. The other element in the *mysterium* is *fascinans* (fascination). The subject here is charmed by the beauty and grace of the divine. God is not merely dreadful (Rudra); He is also fascinating (Śivam and Sundaram), unlike demons who are never attractive. Otto finds the Mother Goddess (Durgā) in Bengal to be the ideal combination of the dreadful and the fascinating.

What is uniquely distinct in Otto is his emphasis on the non-rational while using the instrument of reason in appropriate manner. The Kant in him categorises the numinous. But the 'moments' of the numinous are not concepts; as mentioned earlier, they are ideograms. Like the myths of Plato the ideograms are illustrative and symbolic substitutes for concepts. Otto would talk of the non-rational in rational manners, thus maintaining the spirit of philosophy of religion. Otto firmly believes that in the Holy there is a healthy combination of the rational and the non-rational. According to him

religion should be judged to be superior or inferior by the degree in which it combines the two. Thus he provides a criterion for judging the relative positions of different religions of the world. As in the case of mathematics, where real numbers combine the rational as well as the irrational, for religion both these aspects are real constituents.

Thus we find two different kinds of overtones in the approaches of two representative thinkers of philosophy of religion. John Caird retains his Hegelian flavour when he holds that religious consciousness is dominantly rational, although the intuitive or the non-rational is never negated in his philosophy. Rudolf Otto, on the other hand, gives primacy to the non-rational. In him the Kantian spirit is conscious all the time and tries to categorise the numinous, but the numinous itself, as the basic non-rational core of the Holy, is Otto's own formulation. This formulation of Otto has given a new dimension to the study of philosophy of religion, which was earlier neglected because of the rise of rationalism in Europe.

But the very fact that the two thinkers, noted above, give almost exclusive importance to one or the other aspects, i.e., the rational and the non-rational, it is circularly proved that both the aspects are important and necessary. None of the two aspects can be ignored by a student of philosophy of religion. They are like form and content and supplement each other.

Future of Man

The future of Man is rooted in the conscious utilization of his self-knowledge and self-experience which is invariably rooted in human aspiration for personal perfection. Future is in essence a sort of heightening or enlivening of the force of consciousness in the individual—the manifest being. The future of man and his select species on this basis is not only hopeful but meaningful and purposeful and the future civilization is nevertheless a collective aspiration for total realisation, perfection and fulfilment. There are two significant theories indicated in order to explain the authentic character of man. That man as a homosapien is viewed as the ruler of his species. He is the finished product in the long chain of evolutionary history. He is also interpreted as the last link of his organic process. Secondly, man is a conscious medium, an evolutionary ideal and an integral whole, etc., are some of the most important explanations and interpretations. From the point of view of the first theory the future of man is limited, confined and well-defined. But from the point of view of the other interpretation, man has an endless destiny. He is a blend of humanity and divinity and above all his future is bright. There is no surprise, if we say that one day he may be the model of perfection and his future is a relentless and an endless process of being and becoming.

Whether the future of Man is related to his past or to his present or to both his past and present is a matter of consideration for us at the moment. When we say Past it means the origin of Man, his evolution and making, disposition and when we say present it signifies the meaning of man, his essence, structure and organisation, quality and character. The Future of Man is however governed by his necessity and destiny. When we say necessity we mean his natural impulses, unconscious motivations and conscious aspiration and so on. When we speak of his destiny we keep in our mind many things as his moral ideal, his spiritual faith and his union with God etc. Apart from these considerations, human limitations and conditions shape the Future of Man as much as his effort and organisation which lead to condition his being during the course of his existence. These conditions and limitations are natural imperfections

associated with his nature as the remnants of his past life. In the traditional Sankhya, they are called as *karma-pudgala*. These particles of matter are so sticky that they hold the soul-substance fast to the material or the earthly good. But the earthly good is not the aim of Man any way. His aim is something more than this. Freedom from all earthly achievements and worldly good is, in fact, the necessity involved in all human processes and progress. In this way, the Future of Man is governed by two things: one is signified by the elimination or cessation of all earthly limitations and conditions and the other is the natural effort of Man to overcome them steadily and consciously. The most important problem which faces us as regards the Future of Man is whether there is any co-relation between human aspiration and the eternal becoming? Whether the ultimate aim of Man is one with his final purpose? Whether the human ideal is in bonds of likeness with the ultimate destiny of Man or not, etc., are some of the basic problems which bother us much on and often when we begin to reflect upon the Future of Man. If there is a complete harmony between the human ideal and the final purpose, then again arises a contradiction in the whole process of thinking. Can the material or the mental be one with the meaningful or the purposeful? If not, there must be an eternal contradiction between the Individual and the Universal. The process of becoming involves a direction which leads us to the real Being which is the source of all becoming. Thus both things are needed: one the push and the other the pull. In fact there is not much difference between the two for the being and the becoming are one and the same aspects of one Reality. The Future of Man is thus governed by his differentiation as much as by his limitation. Man is manifesting the new levels of Consciousness in the natural process of his becoming is not only a fact but a reality well-known to both the scientists and the philosophers. Is this becoming of man final or is it only a means to attain the higher manifestation? etc., requires a careful analysis at the moment. We have seen although that the organic evolution which is based upon energy or force is a necessity; it cannot however be a sufficient explanation or an answer for the basic human aspiration which is ever trying to meet and integrate itself with the higher and ever higher categories of Evolution—may be material or non-material, organic or non-organic, moral or spiritual. In this way, the future of man is largely governed by his differentiation. This differentiation involves a progress over the past. Destiny as the future necessity is manifesting itself through Man is no doubt a hard fact. Man, the homo-sapien—the king of creation, is impelled by Destiny as much as and even much more than his necessity involved in the primeval existence. Each individual is evolving new phases of Consciousness which is directly proportional to the degree and quality of his conscious aspiration. For this reason, each individual has had to work out his own plan for the future. This planning for future is the law of life. It makes a lot of difference if this plan of future does not concur with the common plan of Nature. All human effort is a waste if there is no harmony between the individual aspiration and the workings of Nature. So Sri Aurobindo has very well pointed out that human aspiration and the divine manifestation are always in bonds of closeness and likeness. They are not separate entities or realities.

The Future of Man is his Destiny. The Destiny as future necessity, as the divine foreordainment, as an out-come of actuality and possibility and as a predetermined

course of events, etc., are some of the common basic approaches discussed in the academic philosophy of the East and the West. Plato's Cosmology explained reality as purposeful and well-ordered. It is a teleological world-view. The whole world is directed towards an ethical goal. The final causes are the real, the material or the physical causes are mere co-operative. Man's purpose and ideals are not however rooted in the mechanical Universe. Man is not a mere mirror of facts in Lotze. His ethical and religious interests are not however rooted in the material Universe. Man's purpose and ideals are far beyond the boundaries of the physical world. The self-determining principle of Unity in Man is no other than his soul. The Unity of Consciousness is the sole quality in Man. Man can comprehend the Reality in one sweep of his vision which is however rooted in his wisdom. Man cannot be a mere mechanical robot. It is his act of faith which makes him confident about his future. In this sense, Lotze's Logic and metaphysics are rooted in his Ethics. The source of Mechanics lies in Metaphysics was the main theme of the Leibnizean system. There is no physical kingdom without the spiritual kingdom; there is no human reason without the Divine Reason and there is no human soul without the Soul or Spirit of God. The purpose of man is the purpose of God. Therefore, to be one with Him is the destiny of man. The absolute Idealism of Josiah Royce which presents a dynamic conception of the human mind and the absolute being gives a new turn to the optimistic view of Man and his future destiny. Pain and suffering do exist in Sri Aurobindo but they are far outweighed by the inner peace and tranquillity. For this reason, there is the delight of self-existence or *Ananda* in every form of being. Man is no exception to this general rule of human evolution. Henri Bergson finds Mechanism and Finalism as untenable theories to explain the reality of the Universe. Creation cannot be an origination out of the total void. There must be some inner force to guide Creation towards some end or direction which is not known to Man ordinarily.

The future of Civilisation lies in the future of Man. Ordinarily, the future of Man is not the immortal man but the *siddhapurusha*. Immortality is the deathless state of being, whereas the *siddhapurusha* is the abiding character of Man. The everlasting status of his being i.e., *siddhapurusha* establishes a kinship with all and realises their oneness i.e., *sarvatmabhava*. The cultivation of inner life is directly related to the revelation of the eternal in us. For this reason, man has to undergo an inner discipline in life which is no other than the doctrine of human destiny. In this way, the Future of Man and the destiny of his race depend on the direction of Life. Self-conscious aspiration i.e., *abhi-anubhuti* constitutes the perfection of Man and the sole supreme ideal before Man is the spiritual ideal. Man is meant to shape his Future for the higher and ever higher goals. The uniqueness of Man is gifted with a moral ferment. On the basis of this moral ferment his aspiration is growing from time to time, nay from occasion to occasion. *Moksha* is not a mere liberation. In fact it implies the destiny of human soul and the Future of Man. *Gnana* is the spiritual destiny of Man as much as *moksha*. *Gnana* includes *moksha* in Indian philosophy.

The problem of human destiny is as old as the hymns of the Rîg-Veda, the philosophy of the Upanishads and the religion of the Epics. The Vedic Aryans loved Life so much that they showed no great interest in the Future of the Soul. The joys of

Heaven to them were the joys of the Earth, perfected and heightened. They believed in the spiritual form of the soul which ascends to live in the abode of Gods. For them Death was the gateway to new Life. The Vedic Aryans thus lived a life of the Spirit which covered both the earthly and the heavenly aspects of existence. The Brahmanas of the Upanishads distinguished the path of the *pitr* from the path of the *Devas*. Rebirth is not *jara-marana*, death and despair, but a fresh blessing to be welcomed and not escaped. According to them, a pious man is born in the next world with his entire body i.e., *sarva-tanu*. In the Vedic Hymns, the sinner is reduced to nothingness, while the pious man attains immortality. In the texts of the Upanishads, we discover that both the sinner and the pious are born again to reap the results of their past actions. Rewards or punishments are however ascribed to the actions in Future life. Thither gifts do not reach the farther shores. Thus, the doctrine of the last or the final things seems to be more clear in the Upanishadic accounts than in the Hymns of the Rig-Veda. In the Satapatha-Brahmana, we find the earliest conception of birth. In the later Upanishads also we discover certain conceptions of Future life which are the real advances over the Vedic and the Brahmaical theories. Those who aspire for real knowledge, i.e., *gnana* and rightly perform their duties are born to attain the immortality and such of those who prefer to live in the world of ignorance or *agnana* and neglect their duties are born again and again only to degenerate and decay. That the idea of rebirth is more conspicuous in the Upanishads can be noted in the replies of Yojnavalkya to Jemka in Brihadaranyaka. Thus, the Future life of man is very well discussed in the Upanishads which is more hopeful and purposeful than his present life or existence. In the Epic philosophy of Mahabharatha, immortality is an eternal happiness in Heaven which is beyond all sufferings of hunger or thirst, death or old age. The highest goal of Man is no less than his union with God. It is this highest state of happiness that is commonly called as *Ananda*. Sometimes, the stars are considered as the shining images of the departed souls of the sages and saints. With the introduction of hell and heaven the conception of human destiny and eschatology are being revolutionised to a very great extent in the Epic philosophy of Mahabharatha. The theism of the Bhagvat-Geeta discusses the five principles of human destiny which tend to revolutionise the whole philosophy of life. *Karte*, *karana*, *cesta*, *dalvya*, and *adhishtana*, characterise the five aspects of Man which speak of his nature, effort and goal. *Dalvya* is fate, the cosmic principle working in-and-through Nature. Fate is a popular conception both in the East and the West accepted by all. It is the hand of fate that rocks the cradle of life. The conception of fate is so generic that it tends to revolutionise the whole philosophy of life. *Dalvya* or fate involves a teleological principle, a purpose which is divine in itself. *Adhishtana* is considered as the nucleus of work, a seat of human effort and a *swadharna*. *Swadharna* is one's own work which is different from *swabhava* i.e., one's own nature. Man has many aims and ambitions in life. In order to fulfil them he is engaged in a variety of ways, putting in extra effort. His immediate goals are different from his final ends. According to the Geeta, the ends are in its means. The problem of ends and means is so significantly discussed in both the philosophies of the East and the West that a clear-cut conclusion has not yet been reached so far. The western philosophers and thinkers introduce the principle of causation and emphasise more and more upon the causality of objects and events

whereas the Easterns over-emphasise the ends or purposes. Primary causes and final ends or purposes are not at all incompatibles in the theism of the Bhagvad-Geeta. There is no dualism between them. For this reason, our ancients have pointed out that the path of Gods i.e., the *devayana* is not different from the path of fathers' i.e., the *pitravana*. In this way, an infinite destiny of Man was projected as a supreme ideal by our ancients. The supreme goal or ideal was called *Paramgatin* which is beyond all forms of *niyatma-karma*. The supreme goal before man, according to the Brahmanas of the Upanishads, is *brahmaloka*. *Brahmaloka* is symbolic of the infinite destiny in which Man seeks or aspires for the life of Spirit. If we make a careful study of our ancient literatures we discover an optimistic view of human destiny which inspires Man to evolve ever-new levels of human consciousness. The Vedic Aryans considered death as the gateway to new life. The cycle of birth and rebirth has been interpreted in a new way so as to evolve a hopeful view of Man's future. The Brahmanas of the Upanishads exclaimed and said that pious alone attain immortality. This emphasis on piety and purity led to human reform in the age of the Upanishads. The Vedic thinkers considered *gnana* or the perfect knowledge as the supreme end of life. *Gnana* is absolute and all-inclusive reality in the Vedas. The theistic Geeta co-relates *Atman* with *Paramatman* and tends to integrate the former with the latter. *Atman* is viewed as the *pratibimban* or reflection of *Paramatman*. This conception gave a new turn for Man's Future which is not only higher and nobler but divine. Thus the highest goal of Man in the Geeta is no other than God. Apart from these, the Epic philosophy of Mahabharatha has advanced a new theory of Man's Future. The supreme goal before man is Man himself. To know Man is to know everything around him. Apart from this, the Mahabharatha gave a new meaning to the supreme goal of Man through its generic ideal *param-gatin*. The traditional Sankhya blends both the Past and the Future of Man in its Ideal of human perfection and destiny. The Future of Man is governed by Man himself. The emphasis on the individual perfection and God-realisation has been equally realised by the Sankhya thinkers. *Siddhapurusha* is the ideal of human perfection in the Sankhya Yoga. The individual realisation is not however isolated from the realisation of other objects. The *atma-niti* or life-view is well harmonised and blended with the *lokadristi* or world-view.

The problem of human destiny is a persistent problem of philosophy. Human destiny can be interpreted as real or objective and as unreal or subjective. The objective considerations about the Future of Man are always hopeful and imperative. They do not vary. On the other hand, the subjective factors which condition the outlook of Man do vary from time to time and may even from occasion to occasion. The Future of Man seems to be hopeful sometimes and hopeless at some other times. This Future appears at times as glorious, expectant, smooth and happy but on some other occasions, the same future may appear as inglorious, diffident, dark and deadly. Optimism is a philosophy of life which is full of hope and confidence. Man sees his future bright and he feels that success is sure for him. Pessimism, on the other hand, is a philosophy of life which is filled with despair. A pessimistic man feels that his future destiny is at once dark and bleak. All these attitudes to life are born out of one's own understanding about the future prospects which are necessarily based upon one's own intrinsic capacities or potentialities. In order to avoid such contradictions in one's own life some

philosophers of human destiny have prescribed a middle path of knowing the future. This is popularly called as meliorism in philosophy. Thus there are, in all, three approaches to understand the nature of human destiny. The optimistic view of life is one extreme affirmation and the pessimistic view of life indicates the other extreme viewpoint of negation. The Philosophers of moderation have always been trying to approximate the above two contradictory approaches by projecting a third view of life which is agreeable to one and all. This view is meliorism. The Meliorism works out a new theory to understand human life and its destiny. Meliorism infuses a new confidence in the affairs of men.

Our survey of the ancient philosophies of India will however give us a clue to understand the real significance of the Future of Man. Man's goal is far beyond the world in *Ithahas* and *Puranas*, Man's Future ever recedes from him to remain in the transcendental region. Man is not satisfied with the richness and the vastness of this world. These are not viewed as ends in themselves. In fact all these are the means to some other ends which are beyond the ordinary limitations of the earthly existence. According to the *Ithahas* and *Puranas*, Man's goal is not *manasika*, it is *daiyika* in its scope. In the *Epics*, Man's goal is far beyond the worldly existence, i.e., *vyavaharika*. Ordinary earthly existence will not attract or absorb the real attention of Man. Man has been seeking for an ideal which—is not found in this world. The *Mahakavyas* also insist upon the worthlessness of the worldly life. They envisage a higher life of morality and spirituality. *Moksha* or liberation formed the summbonum of Man's life. Kalidasa, the classical poet of the ancient India has given a new turn to the idea of human destiny in his interpretation of the Cosmic Beauty. *Sringara* formed the main basis of human aspiration in Kalidasa. Beauty was the main ideal before all great poets of the world throughout. *Manu-dharmashastra* stressed more upon *rijnana*. It belloved in the wisdom of Gods more than the wisdom of Man. The *Geeta* projected a new destiny of Man. *Tyago* is Man's *Yogno* in the *Geeta*. A life of devotion and dedication formed the sole reality with the teachings of the *Geetha*. The ideal of Man lies in his final aloofness i.e., *kaivalya* in the *Sankhya*. Cessation of all pain and suffering is a necessary pre-requisite for all pervading consciousness, says the *Sankhya-Muni*, *Kapila*. The ideal of human destiny is beyond all mental modifications in *Yoga*. This is popularly interpreted as the *cittavritti-nirodha-marga*. The future of Man is symbolic of *nyeshinta* in the *Nyana* philosophy. The real ideal of Man is beyond pain and suffering. Pain and suffering limit the progress of Man in this world. The destiny of Man has gone beyond the levels of phenomenal consciousness i.e., *daiyavibhuti* in the *Vaisesika* philosophy. In *purva-Minamsa*, the ideal of human perfection centres round the Vedic Commandments i.e., the *daiyarekka*. In the *Advaita Vedanta* of *Sankara*, the Future of Man is deeply rooted in the life of immortality i.e., *parama-jiva* *Ahm-Brahmasmi*. All these studies indicate the gradual evolution of the teleological talents in Man.

The East-West philosophies of Evolution have had their own effective roles to play in shaping the Future of Man. The Organic Theory of Evolution of Charles Darwin emphasises upon the Evolution of modified species; generation after generation they are selected to survive and reproduce the more useful characters. This is an optimistic

faith in human survival projected by almost all the later descendants of Charles Darwin's Organic theory. This however created a new faith and confidence in the Future of Man. The Cosmic theory of evolution of Herbert Spencer, which emphasised upon a theory that the species differentiate themselves from homogenous forms further gave a new hope for Man in the Organic world. The Emergent theory of Evolution is however an improved form of explanation about the nature of Evolution and progress of Man. The traditional theory of Emergent Evolution believed in the gradual evolution of mind and consciousness out of the less complex forms or organisations. The more improved forms arise out of the less improved species and the complexity of organisation give rise to the more specialised category of consciousness, etc., forms the basis of the theory. This theory has added a new dimension to the general view of human destiny. The Integral theory of Emergent evolution slightly differs from the Traditional theory in that the former emphasises upon the inward processes of transformation rather than improving upon the outward habits or characters of the species. The theory of Creative Evolution emphasises upon the basic concept of *elan vital*. The *Elan vital* is a connecting link between the various generations of the species of Creation, says Henri Bergson, the author of the Creative Evolution. Bergson however contributed a novel idea to the Theory of Evolution by conceiving the multilinear series in the process. This rendered a new optimism to the life of Man on Earth. Hegel's Metaphysical theory of evolution says that the same Absolute Spirit manifests through every object of Creation. All species are but the products of the divine Spirit. This turn in the general or historical theory of evolution has however caused a lag in the usual organic concepts and the linear progress of Mankind. The Sankhya theory advances a mechanical interpretation of evolution. The *Purusha* and the *Prakrit* actively join together and evolve the world of objects which invariably include the species of Man. The ideal of Human Destiny remains static in the Sankhya in a way that it gave no scope to teleology in its theory. On the other hand, the Advaita Vedanta of Sankara, which injects the generic ideal of teleology in its conscious guidance has indeed revolutionised the course of evolution of Man to a greater degree of perfection. All these philosophies of evolution, the organic and the inorganic, the creative and the non-creative, the mechanical and the non-mechanical, have thus contributed largely to the general theory of Human Destiny. The Evolution and Human Destiny are two sides of the same coin in the Space-Time Reality. The Span of Consciousness Theory as enunciated earlier indicates that pressure of Spirit on Matter and the influence of Conscious forces upon the unconscious have largely contributed to the glorification of body from age to age and even from generation to generation. On this basis, the ardent exponents of the theory believe in the divinisation of Man. The subtle forces acting upon the prime matter is a long-drawn conclusion of the Sankhya and the Vedanta. Day by day Man is evolving new levels of his Consciousness and making new additions to his physicality by way of perfection has been proved not only by the philosophers of Destiny but also by the scientists of this century who have made great contributions to the ideal of human perfection in their specific attempts or researches. The contributions of the scientists to the welfare of Man are in fact imperceptible from the point of view of Evolution and Progress because their contributions are only constitutive elements to this main line of Thought. All contributory factors are necessarily the pre-requisite truths. They cannot however

be treated as the secondary or tertiary characteristics or attributes. The nature of Future Man is both glorious and rich. Glorious in the sense that it is an improvement over his Past from all angles of evolutionary index. It is rich in the sense that the deeper potentialities hitherto undiscovered in the nature of Man will be brought to the surface level of Consciousness by a new process of enlightenment and realisation. New avenues of thinking, new ways of living will be discovered on the basis of his future needs. Apart from this, the new ideals to suit these new aspirations will be projected by the Future Man of Destiny. The negative or the destructive role of Science and Technology will soon be replaced by the positive or the constructive role of Religion and Philosophy. Man is bound to follow the memorable lesson of human history that the future of Man lies in his race itself. He need not search for new values and ideals outside the realm of his being. Man is the miniature cosmos. He is bound to destroy himself as he is bound to create himself. The fall of man is due to the fall of his ideals and not due to the degeneration of his race, culture of civilisation. Man is man-made and not God-made in this sense.

Rabindranath's ideas on Evolution and Human Destiny are Upanishadic in their origin. The finite ever-seeking for the Infinite, the sins of the self and the world melting away in the divine realisation and the final perfection of man realisable in the ultimate union, etc., are all common to both. The human destiny initially appears to be bleak and dark. But suddenly a ray of new hope predominates over the settled grief and thus Man becomes optimistic about his destiny. It is the same ray of light that runs through everything of this world and sustains the life of all creatures. 'Hidden in the heart of things, Thou art nourishing seeds into sprouts, buds into blossoms and ripening flowers into fruitfulness'. The perfection of Man is concerned with the passage of time in Tagore. The infinitude of the passage of Time is closely associated with the magnitude of Man's Perfection. The centuries follow each other in perfecting a small wild flower, says the poet. Such centuries are numberless as the Time is endless. So every querulous man of this world must scramble for his chances to share the great benefits of the passage of Time. It is high time to spend our lives in vain ways and unfruitful pursuits. According to Tagore, each man is endowed with endless opportunities to improve himself in a variety of ways. The all-merciful and the all-compassionate God sets His mercy and compassion to flow in the annals of Time endlessly. As time is eternal, so God's mercy must also be eternal and endless. 'At the end of the day I hasten in fear lest Thy gate be shut; but I find that yet there is time.' For this reason, there is every possibility of Man improving his destiny from time to time and perfecting himself from age to age. God is so compassionate towards Man that He gives him His Grace in exchange of sorrow. 'When I bring it to Thee as my offering, Thou rewardest me with Thy grace'. Thus God's infinite Mercy, His endless Compassion and eternal Grace, etc., unconditionally favour Man in shaping his destiny.

The course of Evolution in the opinion of the poet has changed in two ways: The struggle for existence and the survival of the fittest have had their own influence on the Organic life of Man in the past. But with the emergence of the socio-cultural influences the ever-growing benefits of One-world-Order and with the physical emancipation of Man's life from the horrors of disease and death, the emphasis of Evolution is more on the supraphysical characters of man's personality. Secondly, the Evolution

of Man has made rapid strides in its long course through the passage of time when compared to the other species of Creation. As a result, the human species could transcend its boundaries of physical integrity in much less than its time-limit. Subsequently, the Creative ideals of Human Unity, Self-fulfilment and Community co-operation became one with the conscious existence of Man. This is all due to his character differentiation and linear evolution. There has been a rapid shift from body to mind from sensual to non-sensual as if there is a new turn in the life-process itself. In poet's own words, 'when the course of Evolution advanced to the stage of Man its character changed, it shifted its emphasis from the Body to the Mind'.

Tagore visualises an emergence of the supreme man whose major qualities are yet to be unravelled by the process of Human Understanding. This is marvellously expressed by the poet through the well-known example of the marriage party. The marriage party is continually gathering, its members are waiting for ages, in the distance; one hears the music of the bridegroom's march. The coming of the supreme man is partly due to his ineffable spirit of perfection and partly due to the descent of the gnostic consciousness in the being of Man. So, man is doubly rewarded. He need not be frightened by the deep waters of the unintelligible. So he is neither confined by conditions nor limited by restrictions. He is, in fact, a free being who lives in his own glory.

Tagore is hopeful of a new turn in the domain of man's life. The one-sided emphasis of Natural Selection on the special functions of the species was highly deplored by Tagore. On the other hand, the spirit of life in Man is fast trying to disengage itself from the professionalism of specialisation in its pursuit of the wholeness of perfection. This perfection implies the strength of the 'surplus' in Man which tends to transcend the physical limits. The evolution of Man is not however different from the evolution of Consciousness which dissolves all bonds of individual separatedness. The relationship of Man to wholeness or entireness is not the relationship of a part to its whole. The wholeness and the realizedness go hand-in-hand in Human Evolution. Thus, the realizedness and the relatedness are the main attributes of the entireness or wholeness.

According to Radhakrishnan the ideal of man is to make himself profoundly human. The perfection of man is based upon self-conscious aspiration i.e., *abhi-anubhuti*. The supreme ideal before man is the spiritual ideal and the sole object of man is to become a whole man. This whole man is interpreted and discussed differently at different places. For instance, the expressions like 'complete' man, the 'ideal' man and the 'divine' man signify the same meaning. Radhakrishnan most emphatically exclaims and says that self-discovery, self-knowledge and self-fulfilment is man's destiny. Man is meant to shape his destiny for higher and higher goals. The uniqueness of man is that, he is gifted with a moral ferment. On the basis of this moral ferment, his aspiration is growing from time to time, and may from occasion to occasion. *Dharma* is again a goal of man, a sole principle of human perfection and a whole reality. *Dharma* thus assumes a new status in Radhakrishnan. There are many common elements in Tagore and Radhakrishnan. Firstly, the highest ideal of man is the spiritual ideal which is to be obtained through cultivation of inner life; secondly, the negation of the reality of the world and the total renunciation of its cares is untenable to a man of the spiritual religion and lastly, an attitude of human sympathy towards all sentient

beings is common to both Tagore and Radhakrishnan.

We have seen that *dharma* is interlinked with *moksa* in Radhakrishnan's *darśana*. *Moksa* is not mere liberation but it implies the destiny of the human soul. The soul of Man finds its fulfilment through Self-knowledge and through the Nature of Society. Self-realisation, self-discovery and self-transformation are the three important processes in the life of the individual which help him in carving his destiny. The destiny of the human soul is to realise its oneness with the Supreme. The conscious union of Man with God lies in the creative voluntary identification. The *summum-bonum* or the ultimate destiny lies in the realisation of the four-ends of human life. The pursuit of wealth and happiness is not an illegitimate human aspiration provided they are gained through the ways of righteousness. The spiritual freedom of man i.e., *moksa* is mainly based upon *dharma*. Each of the states of *Purusartha* requires an ethical discipline. The purpose of life is to emerge from limitation and imperfection of ignorance to fullness and wisdom of knowledge. Radhakrishnan stresses that the Liberation or Spiritual realisation cannot be achieved by an ethical action. This is because *moksa* or liberation belongs to a higher order of *Purusartha*s; it is altogether a new dimension of reality and experience. *Ghana* is the spiritual destiny of Man. *Karma* cannot lead to *moksa*. A seeker of the Spirit is no doubt the seeker of self or soul may not realise the Infinite beyond the moral life. The moralistic individualism is based upon imperfect outlook which is the seat of all ego, says the author of the optimistic destiny of man. As rules of murder, theft and the like do not worry the civilized man, so the spiritual man is not concerned with the conventional rules of morality. The destiny of man includes the future of man but the future of man may not include his destiny. Destiny implies the ultimate future which is ever receding from us. Future may mean the immediate future. The flow of events and happenings cannot constitute the future much less the destiny of man. Pre-determined course of events mean causation both in the East as well as in the West. The ethical ideal is individual perfection. The moral ideal implies a social realisation or perfection. On the other hand, the spiritual ideal is an over-all perfection, realisation and fulfilment. The future of man is never pre-determined. It is a relentless flow of consciousness through actions and events. The origin of Man and the meaning of Man cannot however be isolated from the future of Man in one specific sense. That the flow of the stream of consciousness of the Divine is a relentless process. There is no such thing as the past, the present and the future. It is the All-Consciousness that pervades the universe and even transcends it for purposes of ever new creation. It is the Idea which is the source of every action from the point of view of Evolution of Creation. For this reason, Leibnitz exclaimed and said that the 'source of mechanics lies in metaphysics'. Man is predetermined in the sense that he is governed by the laws of causation. Man is bound to be born again and again only to disappear once and again. This is the pessimistic view of human destiny. On the other hand, Man is also a mission of consciousness on Earth. He knows not his future. His future is a conscious emergence. It is a definite purpose. At each moment man is a 'new' man. He is breathing the air of the Hour of God as a member of the New Race. Teleology is a definite improvement over mechanism, as much as Aschactology is a marked improvement over Teleology. The reality of the Universe is neither governed by Mechanism nor Finalism, Teleology or Aschactology. Universe is

the expression of the Divine, so it is the Progression in consciousness which automatically implies the progression in the workings of the Divine or Cosmic consciousness. Thus, the problem of Human Destiny and the Individual is the problem of the cosmic Destiny and the World.

The reality of the Universe is neither governed by Mechanism nor Finalism, Teleology or Aeschaetology. Universe is the expression of the Divine; so, it is not predestined. Progression in consciousness automatically implies the progression in the working of the Divine or Cosmic consciousness. Thus, the problem of Human Destiny and the Individual is the problem of the cosmic Destiny and the World. Neither the past tendencies nor the ever-new forms of expression are correct. The one theory is put forth by the physicist and the other theory is advanced by a teleologist like Leibnitz. The creative impulse that is striving to express itself along the divergent paths for the purposes of inner harmony and tranquillity in Prof. S. Radhakrishnan is nearer to Bergson in the sense that the latter believes in the creative *elan* in Man which tends to express the Reality in him in its advance to the ever-higher forms or levels of Creation. As Bergson contends that the Creation cannot be an origination based on the total void so also Radhakrishnan believes in the basic reality of man and says that there is the divine in man which impels him to move towards the ever-new forms. The world-view which is projected by the Existentialists tends to take an inner existential leap to faith in its intense feeling of the inner despair and helplessness. A belief that the Infinite will help to quench the love of the Infinite ingrained in Man is widely prevalent among the Existentialists. This kind of faith which is born out of despair becomes a necessity with man. The postulation of God as born out of the frustrations of Man and the real faith is the faith born out of despair. Thus, there is a co-relation between the ethical tensions and the human destiny. On the other hand, there is no such element of despair in Radhakrishnan. A voluntary effort based on self-expression, the realisation of the Infinite in finite, the fulfilment of the spirit in man through *niti* and *niyam*, etc., form the main contents of Radhakrishnan's idealistic hypothesis. The individual effort and struggle on one hand and the element of gift or grace on the other through both aspiration and realisation form the most fundamental idealistic doctrines of Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan. The destiny of man is thus governed by his will and impelled by the universal spirit, which is ever-guiding him in his aspirations from above. All through, we have seen that the goal of Man is no other than the ideal of Human Perfection. The greatness of Man is indicated through his manifold self-consciousness, which is the secret of Evolution. 'The greatest fact in the story of Man on Earth is not his material achievements, the Empires he has built and broken but the growth of his soul from age to age in its search for truth and goodness', says Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan.

According to the Gītā, Man grows into the divine life. He undergoes a process called self-enlargement through his relentless aspiration. Radhakrishnan believes with the Gītā that the Divine dwells in the inmost being of Man. Man's light is inextinguishable as long as he is required to choose the good and realise it by his conscious effort. The whole theme of the Gītā runs along the idea that Man, the subject, should gain mastery over Man, the object. Subject symbolises the aspiration while the object indicates determinism from without. To over-come all such limitation and determini-

ation the Gītā gives us human discipline, *yoga-saṣṭra* along with a higher metaphysics, *Brahma-vidyā*. The Real Destiny of Man lies in the unity of the life of spirit. This unity is the unity of wisdom, love and action. The *siddhāpuruṣa* is one who always breeds *brahmabhava*. Liberation is not the freedom of the soul from the bondage of the body but it is the transfiguration of the whole man. On similar lines, Rādhakrishnan proceeds towards the optimistic human goals and reconciles the Sāṅkhya theory with the Yogic practices. He points out towards the growing level of Human Evolution like all other great thinkers of the world. He proclaims along the others that humanity can rise above its present limitations. The tide of Evolution is pushing forward towards the ever-new levels of human progress, says the philosopher of the optimistic human destiny. The problem of human destiny is an age-old problem in philosophy. When we say the destiny of man, we mean his ultimate destiny. This ultimate destiny is no other than the union of man with God. The differentiation of the individual itself is an assertion of his future destiny. Man is born into this world with a special mission. The *nisus* of this special mission is destiny. Destiny is never determined. It is always elevating, ennobling and fulfilling. Man is born again and again into this world because of his imperfect future destiny. In the future, there is nothing like higher than man. It is man himself who outgrows into his future destiny. For this reason, the real excellence lies with the present man. His future ideal devoid of his present aspiration is a *tabula rasa*. So, it is the conscious awakening in man which determines the future course of events. Man is the forerunner of his future and not vice-versa. The one interpretation is that it is the future ideal which elevates man to a higher level or degree of consciousness and perfection. The other explanation is that it is the evolving consciousness in a way which impels him to grow into the future which otherwise would have been remained unknown and inglorious. The ethical theory ascribes rewards and punishments to persons who are committed to good and bad actions in life. Such of those who perform good actions here and now are bound to reap good results in their future life to come is an age-old belief. But such of those who are convincingly and consciously wedded to good here and now in this world are bound to reap its benefits in this very life itself is a much greater truth in the light of the Integral philosophy. It is a fact that the "thither gifts do not reach the farther shores" in this particular context. Present life is the trust of the future life and not vice-versa. Immortality is perfection in life. Immortality is the highest level of Man's conscious existence. *Ekagra* and *sthithapragna* cannot constitute Immortality. On the other hand, the live state of the *asampragñātha-samadhi* indicates an entry into Immortality. *Nirāṇa* or *nibbāna* is the well-known ideal of Buddhism. *Nirvāṇa* is a state of eternal happiness which is beyond all sufferings of hunger, thirst, death or disease. Thus the future life of man is more hopeful and purposeful than his present existence. *Ananda* is the highest goal of happiness. It is ultimately the *Ishta* which is concerned directly in the process. Hence evolution is a conscious impulse. It is never a blind process or working. All these indicate that the destiny of man is at once hopeful and purposeful. It is a conscious reality and not a mechanical process.

The theism of the Bhagavad-Gītā teaches *gnāna* as the basis of the spiritual intuition which is the sole ideal of perfection before Man. *Gnāna* is both a goal i.e. *mokṣa* and a method to attain it, i.e., *yoga*. *Mokṣa* is unity with God and *yoga* is

self-perfection. This union of *atman* with *Paramatman* is expressed in a variety of ways *Brahmishthiti*, *naishkarnya*, *nistraigunya*, *brahma-bhava*, *kaivalya* and *mukti*, etc., are most commonly discussed in the Gita. Thus the state of perfection is beyond all fruits of righteousness. The *siddhi* or *para-siddhi* are identical with *param-gathan* or the supreme goal. The Gita however believes in the infinite destiny of Man which is beyond *niyatam-karma*. It calls for a fuller flowering of the divine in human nature. For action is only a condition and not a destiny. The theism of the Gita, discusses the five principles of human destiny as stated earlier : *kartr*, *karana*, *cesta*, *daiva* and *adhisthana*. The last two need some explanation ; *daiva* or fate is a cosmic principle working in and through nature and *adhisthana* is the nucleus of work, a seat of human effort. All these indicate that mere work is not a sufficient cause to explain the future life of Man. Equally important is his eschatology which invariably includes a telological principle which is working from above. Thus, *brahma-vidya* and *yoga-sastra* are equally stressed in the theism of the Bhagavad-Gita. The Advaita Vadam of Sankara discusses that each individual is a potential seeker of knowledge i. e., *Gananasakti*. Even after the destruction of physical bodies there remains something in us which not only survives death but determines our future. The accumulation of the past is an indication of the Future in Sankara's Advaita religion. The pious man always marks a rise to heaven whereas an impious man sinks into the darkness of ignorance. That the moral quality of Man's past life shapes his future destiny is not only true of the Vedanta but also of the Gita. The *devayana* and the *pitrayana* are the two paths which are commonly discussed in the Chandogya Upanishad. The one leads to the wisdom of the *brahmaloka* and the other to the actions of the *pitryaloka*. The soul is altogether different from the body which always seeks or aspires for the life of the Spirit. This is the optimistic view of Human Destiny wherein freedom is guaranteed to the soul of the individual. If we study the eschatology or the doctrine of Human Destiny of Radhakrishnan against this background of Indian thought, we tend to realise the greatness of his synthetic thought which unites all trends and fuses all ideologies relating to the doctrine of final things and the life after death. He agrees with all great thinkers of the world who proclaimed a new lease of life to Man. Yagnavalkya and Gargeyi, Sankara and Ramanuja, Madhava and Vallabha, etc., are all equally important to our tradition as Kant and Hegel, Bergson and Bradley, Goethe and Nietzsche, etc., are significant to the West. Prof. Radhakrishnan combines in himself all trends of the optimistic human destiny in some or other way. He is one with the Vedic Aryans when he says that death is the gateway to new life. He is nearer to the Brahmanas of the early Upanishads when he says that the pious attain immortality and he is again one with the later Upanishadic thinkers in his emphasis on *gnana*. Radhakrishnan believes in *tyaga* and *tapasya* which are the common theistic beliefs of the Gita. His faith in Man's highest goal however brings him nearer to the epic philosophy of the Mahabharata. That the past of Man has its own role in shaping the future man is common to both Sankara and Radhakrishnan. Prof. Radhakrishnan's optimism, activism and purposivism can be interpreted well in terms of meliorism. His belief in the spiritual meditation i. e., *dhyana*, is based upon *iksana* i. e., direct apprehension. His idea of the intuitional consciousness i. e., *anudhara* is different from *adhyasa* or practical experience. Thus Prof. Radhakrishnan

visualises an optimistic view of life based on the future necessity which is the real outcome of the actuality in man. The Human destiny is not a mere divine foreordainment, not is it based upon an unalterable course of events. On the other hand, the future of Man is inevitably governed by Man himself. It is his intuitional consciousness i.e., *anubhava*, which works through the world of objects and ends in the ideal of human perfection. This does not however mean that Sarvepalli is unmindful of the divine grace or *anugraha*. His philosophy of the spirit is a golden mean between *anubhava* and *anugraha*. His conception of *siddhaparvasha* is not final because the aspiration of Man is never ending. It ever evolves new levels of Consciousness and ever issues new ideals and goals towards which the Man of Destiny advances with new hope and faith. This process proclaims a new race of Mankind in Sri Aurobindo but in Radhakrishnan it assumes a new meaning as it entails a life-view and a world-view i.e., *atmanirrit* and *lokadristi*.

The Unified Theory of Man or the total concept of his being has indeed revolutionised the philosophy of human destiny in recent years. The concept of whole man has contributed largely to the overall growth of the East-West Understanding of man. The evolutionary mode of thinking, the unified comprehension of truth and the positive approach to reality, etc., have all served as the catalytic agents in the noble cause of the Oneness of Humanity. In the background of this Evolutionary theory, Man has carved out for himself a new course for the pursuit of his life-ideals and goals. Instead of resigning himself to the will of God he has learnt to participate in the creative process of development. This participation of Man in his own making is called fulfilment. The fulfilment of Man is the improvement of his destiny. For this reason, destiny is defined as a natural necessity by some philosophers. The discovery of one's own potentialities, the harnessing and mobilising of one's own energies and giving direction to one's own inner impulses and volitions, etc., is all that is needed for the new understanding of Progress. Progress is not again a mechanical advancement of ideals and beliefs. It is more or less an evolution of the inner states of Man. The growth of consciousness and the evolution of self-hood characterise the progress of Humanity. This Progress of Humanity is no other than the Evolution of Destiny. Thus Destiny implies both a positive necessity and a natural teleology. The Unified Theory of Man, the evolutionary ideals of development and the new understanding of Progress etc. have all contributed to the East-West Understanding of Man. The East-West Understanding has become a human imperative in this age of Creative humanism and the World-Integration. The East is not the East and the West is not the West in a literal sense. The East-West ideals have come closer to unite the race of Mankind into one Common Humanity on some vital or intrinsic principles of Universal Brotherhood and common Fraternity. Man has become an active participant in the great drama of Humanity. As a result of this participation, personal realisation and an inborn aspiration have all given place to common good, social perfection and collective realisation. The progressive evolution of new knowledge and the rapid growth of new ideals in the modern age, have further contributed to the new trends of Human Destiny. Human Destiny is not a static ideal or the final end of human perfection which cannot however be changed or

transformed. On the other hand, the real Destiny of Man is with Man himself. The ever-changing demands, the ever-evolving aspirations and the ever-new goals and ideals condition the course of Evolution to such an extent that in the creative process of development Man is bound to change the normal path of his natural becoming both on the organic and the inorganic levels. This is called as the new turn in the course of Evolution and a new phase in the ideal of Human Perfection.

The conception of Evolution from the unilateral dimension to the multi-linear creative process has caused a new change in the Concept of Man and also in the basic ideals of his Perfection and ultimate Destiny. The human nature which is evolving ever-new levels of Consciousness from time to time is fast contributing to the general progress of Mankind. Man is thus, out-growing his natural limitations every time. This interiorisation of human psyche is directly related to the involution of the Psychological apparatus in view of the Organic theory of Evolution. Even the so-called physical or the physiological apparatus is always seen in a process of becoming. From the extremely simple mechanism, it is growing endlessly into the extremely complex organism. This is the prime characterisation of Man. The evolutionary becoming in Man is as much powerful and sometimes it is apparently more powerful than its counter-part at the other level, i.e., the involutory being. The process of individuation is equally significant as the process of psychicisation, particularly in the case of human species of Creation. For this reason alone that Man is endowed with the individual and the collective roles or thresholds of 'selection', 'rejection' and 'reflection'. There is an inborn tendency in him to grow in to the higher and higher levels of conscious life. This is commonly called as the ascent of psyche. The ascension of human psyche into the higher levels of supra-human existence is a natural process of becoming which cannot however be overlooked at any cost. If this intrinsic quality of Man is properly understood in the context of the East-West objectives, much of the misunderstandings between the Races and Nations may be wiped off or subordinated to the greater ideals of Human Unity.

The Future of Man is interpreted differently by different philosophers. The Finalists and the Purposivists have more faith in the Future of Man in terms of their teleological considerations. That man's goals and ideals are far beyond this world and that his life is filled with some purpose which is not a mere mechanical design but it is based upon the creative will of the divine Architect, Who out of His own free Will and Pleasure, has created this world etc., are some of the basic doctrines commonly advocated by the Finalists and the Purposivists. Man is thus created for a set purpose in this world. This purpose is both immediate and the ultimate. The immediate purpose of Man is to out-grow his material limitations born out of his primeval ignorance and his ultimate purpose tends to signify his infinite potentialities, which integrate his finite being with the final Reality. The Determinist or the Mechanist will adopt a different attitude towards the Future of Man and the Problem of Human Destiny, The Mechanist affirming his full faith in the Mechanical Laws of Evolution rejects the finality of Man on the ground that Man's becoming is only physical or mechanical. If Man's becoming was not mechanical there would have been an unnatural deviation between him and the Cosmos. Those rules and laws which govern the Cosmic Evolution must necessarily govern the Evolution of Man. But the mechanical laws are not

final. They have their well defined imperfections. Mechanical laws contribute to the general orderliness of the universe. But they cannot generate the natural harmony which is needed for growth and perfection. On the other hand, the laws of telology, exiology, humanity and spirituality are infinite in their action and application. Man is partly governed by the mechanistic perfections but mostly he is inspired by the ever-evolving and ever-emanating aspirations. An aspiration is an endless process of being and becoming. It is the inner quest of the individual for himself-and-by-himself. It is on this basis, the future of man is successfully evaluated, visualised, and planned. The extent of knowledge, the frontiers of life and the scope of ideals have had to change with the future evolution of man. The future evolution of man, does not lie in his organic manifestations and orientations. It is solely rooted in the conscious and the super-conscious perfections. It is the nissus of spirituality, that is, bound to pierce through the diverse human inclinations. As a result of this, man is bound to become the only hope of man and the conscious realisation of the knowledge of integral perfection is bound to become to sole reality and necessity with human desire and destiny alike.

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Revelation in Religion

I

Preliminary

Most critics of religion seem to maintain that there is a logical absurdity in the claim made by believers to their experience or knowledge of God through personal intercourse with Him. But such a denial of the reality of the knowledge of God is not merely underrating our own capacity; it is, in fact, also taking a very degrading view of the object of our reverence. It is to deny the power of self-revelation to God and with it the power of influence which the self-revealing character of God brings. No knowledge can be claimed to be complete. Howsoever much a man is convinced that he knows God, the true nature of God is not completely revealed to him. "The infinite must for ever remain incomprehensible to the finite; but this is not because it is in itself unintelligible; it is because of the limitation of our power to understand."¹ It is, in fact, in the unencompassable mystery of God's nature that one finds a great source of one's reverence for Him. The instinctive longing for God in our heart is itself a pointer to its satisfaction and a proof of the reality of the knowledge of God. The instinct would have hardly ever survived had it not been in close touch with reality.

Religion is basically the knowledge of God. As for science the basic assumption is the possibility of knowledge of the physical world, so also for religion the basic assumption is the possibility of the knowledge of God and both may be admitted as perfectly justified by the fruitfulness of the results obtained, though there is every possibility that our knowledge which apparently seems to be real may not be actually so, for it is relative to the knower who claims it. But if it is possible to reject scepticism in the sphere of science, there is no reason why we ought not also reject it in the sphere of religion. A multitude of the sanest and the best of mankind have claimed to

¹ William Temple, *Nature, Man and God*, p. 304.

know God and they have ascribed to this knowledge all that is best and most valuable in their lives. "If, therefore, the knowledge of God is increasingly fruitful in power and joy and goodness, we need no other proof of its reality."²

II

Meaning and Definition of Revelation

It will not be out of place to mention here at the very outset, that revelation, the concept to which religion appeals, is a not so simple as it seems. Therefore, no account of it, howsoever critical and penetrating it may be, can be regarded as satisfactory without understanding its real meaning. Men are widely divided over what is revealed and over what form the revelation of it takes. On the first question there is a group of believers who have held that revelation is of propositions while others maintained that revelation is of God himself. Similarly, on the second question there seems to be a sharp division of opinions among believers who have held that revelation is in the form of persons and 'saving events' such as the life of Christ and the history of Israel and those who have held that revelation is in the form of authoritative pronouncements. Further, men are divided also on the issue whether or not revelation ceases at some particular time in history or it still continues. Thus, it is possible that the varying interpretations of the concept of revelation may create some sort of confusion and so it is obligatory on our part to penetrate into its real meaning and vindicate a proper definition of it.

Revelation can be taken to be an apprehension of truth which rests more or less on the activity of God. The world owes its origin and not only its existence, to the will of God. "Thou hast created all things, and because of the will they were, and they were created."³ But God moulds and guides all things in the world which express His nature in different forms. God's action in guiding the course of the world process is not constant in a mechanical sense. Rather, its constancy is due to His infinite adjustability to present conditions which are themselves due to God's action. Divine action is not dead action of an immanent principle but living action of a transcendent Person. Divine action produces uniformities in the world in the interest of man. But apparent uniformities that appear in the world process may be due to an elaborately designed balance of infinite adjustment. It is, in fact, true that the uniform process of the world is the direct revelation of God for those whose minds are alert to its significance. Like beauty, revelation exists objectively but is subjectively conditioned. Revelation is given through events to minds enlightened to receive it. The term revelation, therefore, should be used with a special reference to those occasions. There is event and apprehension of event and in the coincidence of these revelation exists. William Temple rightly tell us, "He guides the process : He guides the mind of men ; the interaction of the process and the minds which are alike guided by Him is the essence of revelation."⁴

God's special activity is not to be found in what baffles the intelligence but in

² J. Hastings, *Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics*, Vol. x. p. 745. T. and T. Clark, New York 1923.

³ *Revelation*, iv. 14

⁴ William Temple, *op. cit.* p. 312.

power active for such purposes. When power and mercy are combined, there is God manifest, where righteousness or love in God's character is revealed, where there is great success or victory we see God in action, we acknowledge God signally self-revealed.

The essence of revelation, therefore, is the intercourse of mind and event and not surely the communication of any doctrine distilled from that intercourse. Revelation suggests the full actuality of the relationship between soul and God. It can briefly be defined as consisting in the presupposition of both the existence of a living and loving God able and willing for self-disclosure and of an intelligent and alert mind capable to receive and to make use of it.

III

Revelation and Authority

Revelation and authority are both parts of the process whereby one claims one comes into contact with God and enjoys communion with Him. If God is personal and His relation with man is of a kind akin to that which holds between two individuals or persons then God also may be supposed to reveal Himself to man in the same fashion. Religious experience bears testimony to this disclosure on the part of God to man. Those who seek God and suffer from an acute yearning for their communion with God receive His grace in revelation. God's self-disclosure is designated as revelation. Revelation is something which the individual encounters as a result of the grace of God conferred on him. Revelation is, therefore, a personal experience of God but authority is no less important than revelation. One's knowledge of God at least in the beginning of religious experience cannot be immediate and direct. One has to fall back upon the testimony of the experience of others following the same track of religious experience. One has, therefore, to be trained and disciplined in a particular way dictated by the nature of the object of knowledge one seeks by the testimony of those who have undergone similar experiences. This is what we call authority. The individual depends upon the authority of others which leads him to strive after one's personal experience. But personal experience is something individual and before it is authenticated and declared true and valid it has to learn a great deal from the experience of the collective life of the community. This is authority. Hence, it follows, that God reveals Himself to man both through authority and through revelation. The former is the revelation to the individual, the latter is the means of the knowledge of Him through the race. Both partake of and testify to the same experience. In both God reveals Himself. Hence, there is no radical contrast between them.

There is no scope for any radical contrast between revelation and authority because they refer only to the processes which are called in for the knowledge of God. Authority and experience seem to be radically opposite to each other because whereas in the individual the former plays its role prior to the latter, in the community, group or the race experience commands the supreme importance. It is antecedent to authority. Thus, it is manifest that whether one gets into contact with God through revelation or through authority God is personal, because we can think of self-disclosure on the part of God and not on the part of the Absolute. But many philosophers look at experience by taking it as an intellectual puzzle. There are many dimensions of human

personality and of the spiritual life of man which mere intellectual analysis and understanding of the problems of the ultimate reality is unable to unfold. That is why a philosophical understanding which must be all-comprehensive cannot endorse any conception of ultimate reality other than that of Personal God. Lord Balfour tells us, "When I speak of God, I mean something other than an Identity wherein all differences vanish, or a Unity which includes but does transcend the differences which it somehow holds in solution. I mean a God whom men can love, a God to whom men can pray, who takes sides, who has purposes and preferences, whose attributes, however conceived, leave unimpaired the possibility of a personal relation between Himself and those whom He has created."³

It follows, therefore, that no one can do justice to the uniqueness of the personal encounter in religious experience between God and man who does not acknowledge that the dialogue between them is of completely personal nature. The disclosure is the expression not of God's glory or power but rather of His grace. What is of crucial importance in this respect of which we must take account is that man by this intercourse with God shares His attributes the most important and significant of which is God's holiness. It must be admitted that God's entrance into the heart of man must transform the latter's being and this is possible certainly by making him as perfect or as holy as God Himself is, as the Bible says, "You are to be perfect, as your heavenly Father is perfect."⁴

IV

Revelation : Whether in the form of Propositions or of God Himself

One of the most pertinent questions that arrests our attention in dealing with the concept of revelation relates to the form of revelation. It has generally been believed the greater part of Christian history that revelation consisted in clear cut truth-statements. According to Canon Lilley, "the kind of knowledge which Revelation gave consisted in exact, clear-cut truth-statements. The fact that the actual revelation of Scriptures had very seldom anything approaching this character was for tradition something of a scandal, difficult to be explained away. For us the difficulty does not exist. The scandal becomes the clearest witness to what we should expect in man's attempt to translate the knowledge he had received through God's immediate action upon his rapt and expectant soul."⁵ Thus, in Christianity it is believed that the particular revelation of God is to be sought in the Bible and, so also in Islam the sacred writings are regarded as divine utterances and therefore, believers are asked to accept and obey them without question. But here one may ask if the Bible itself is to be reckoned as revelation or a record of revelation? Whether revelation is in the book itself or in the events which the book records? Plainly speaking, it could not be in the book unless it first took place in 'saving events' such as the life of Christ and the history of Israel. But according to the traditional doctrine of Christianity the book itself is revelation than that it contains the record of it.

If revelation, as our definition suggests, is an intercourse between the soul and

3. Lord Balfour, *Theism and Humanism*, p. 21.

4. *Matthew*, v. 48.

5. Canon Lilley, *Religion and Revelation*, pp. 144-5.

God then all other revelations apart from what God has revealed, is subordinate to this and to a great extent included within it. The precise divine utterances of Isaiah or Jeremiah are not in themselves revelation for others. The essence of revelation does not consist in promulgation of some moral code to be accepted and obeyed without understanding their real significance. Rather, it consists in the participation of the seeker in the spiritual reality. It is touching and tasting of the object of our reverence. William Temple very rightly observes that, "What is offered to man's apprehension in any specific Revelation is not truth concerning God but the living God Himself."⁸ What is actually revealed is God Himself and the purpose for which He works. When St. Paul taught that 'the promise was primary and the law secondary'⁹ he was perfectly right in the light of the teaching of the *Old Testament* he represented the deepest truth which has hardly any parallel.

God's reality and character are made known through His special activity in the universe setting aside the normal course of the world process. In the third chapter of the book of *Exodus* we read how Moses had the living relationship with God, "The Lord revealed himself through a flame that rose up from the midst of a bush : it seemed that the bush was a light, yet did not burn. "Here is a great sight", said Moses, "I must go up and see more of it, a bush that does not waste by burning." But now, as he saw him coming up to look closer, the Lord called to him from the midst of the bush, Moses Moses ; and when he answered, I am here at thy command, he was told, Do not come nearer ; rather take the shoes from thy feet, thou art standing on holy ground."¹⁰

Moses's communion with God reminds of the *visvarūpa* of Lord Kṛṣṇa in the *Bhagavadgītā*. In the *Bhagavadgītā* Lord Kṛṣṇa appears to be Brahman in personal form, in the beginning as the charioteer to the warrior Arjuna and by answering his questions resolves his doubts by revealing to him the way of devotion. But the *Gītā* goes beyond and we read that Kṛṣṇa reveals himself to Arjuna in a multi-form transfiguration and the astonished and frightened Arjuna declares the supreme mystery that Lord Kṛṣṇa is the true God.¹¹

V

Types of Revelation

Since religious movement advances at a very unequal rate and never affects every class of society equally we are met with two types of revelation—a general revelation and a special revelation as has always been distinguished by traditional theologians. In the former sense the order of Nature is a revelation. Starting from the given nature of the universe we can rise to the idea of God for it unfolds a meaning which has its ultimate source in God. Special revelation, on the other hand, is regarded as consisting in the living any sympathetic relationship with God. Just as we cannot know a person without a direct communion of sympathetic intercourse with him, so also, in the absence of direct communion with God, revelation in the special sense of the term is not possible. In a special sense revelation is a more direct working of God for the apprehension

8. William Temple, *op. cit.* p. 322.

9. *Galatians*, iii, 15-24.

10. *Exodus*, iii, 2-5.

11. *Gītā*, xi, 37 ff.

of truth. But here one is confronted with a difficulty as to how one can distinguish between an act of specific revelation on the part of God from that of general revelation. Special revelation has an authoritative character, God's self-disclosure claims authority. But what is its test? Modern mind is not in the least prepared to accept a doctrine as revealed simply because it is taught by Church or is contained in religious literatures. According to older theological notions the doctrines were communicated to prophets and high ranking individuals. But such an idea can no longer be defended in our day since it is an offspring of an era when the human mind was hardly penetrable and the movement of religious thought was little understood. Galloway is right when he tells us that "Direct revelation can only be asserted of a religious experience; the doctrine is a derivative, and sometimes an imperfect, statement of what the experience means."¹²

Thus the distinguishing mark of special revelation is certainly a personal and inward spiritual experience. And to the question as to how one can decide such spiritual experience as special revelation which is more than a private feeling, we can have no better answer than that it is testified by the fruitfulness of the result obtained. It signifies new and fruitful apprehensions of divine truth on the part of man. If one seeks God, God also in turn helps and directs in the fulfilment of one's spiritual destiny.

Special revelation is not a collective experience; rather, it is an experience of a few people who are qualified and trained in the media of divine influence. Just as a mountain peak first catches the light of the rising sun so also prophets and high-ranking individuals first receive the revealing light of God and then they reflect it to the society. The term *special revelation*, therefore, may fitly be applied to those illuminating experiences of great souls who have given to man the sense and meaning of true religion.

VI

Revelation and Response

Many theologians are prone to think that revelation is an act of God's grace; it is God's gift and no credit therefore should be ascribed to man in the act of revelation since "no human creature was to have any ground of boasting, in the presence of God."¹³ But if revelation, as we have admitted in the beginning, consists in the loving and living relationship between soul and God and if again no communication between soul and God is possible in the absence of either, then, in no case, man's place in the completed act of revelation as we shall presently see be ignored.

It is true that if revelation ever occurs, it ultimately depends upon the sweet will of God. It belongs to Him alone to make His Being known to us when and how He wishes. If He elects a nation or a generation or a race or a particular individual to reveal Himself more fully than others, we are not to question it for it belongs to Lord's own management of His household. But, at the same time, it is no wise to construe that man has no part to play in the act of revelation.

¹² George Galloway, *The Philosophy of Religion*, p. 521.

¹³ *Calvinism*, I, 29.

Though, it is for God to reveal the light yet there must be some one to open his eyes to recognise it. Unless there is some one to recognise and accept which is revealed, as revealed, revelation has no meaning whatsoever. Thus, it is true, that in all revelations God takes the initiative but this also is true that the fullness of revelation cannot be admitted as depending upon the will of God alone. Though the giving is important but no less significant is the act of receiving John Baillie has very rightly observed: "To take the human analogy, do all my efforts to make myself plain amount to a real self-disclosure, if none succeeds in grasping what is in my mind? Surely not, we must therefore say that the receiving is as necessary to a completed act of revelation as the giving. It is only so far as the action of God in history is understood as God means it to be understood that revelation has place at all."¹⁴ Thus for the effectiveness and full actuality of revelation man also has his part to play "in seeking after it, in preparing himself for it, in welcoming it, in yielding himself to it."¹⁵

It must always be borne in mind that every revelation of character necessarily demands a special training and discipline of mind on the part of those to whom revelation is given. It was certainly not for lack of efforts but for lack of that requisite training and discipline of the mind that "When God shewed us His wisdom, the world, with all its wisdom, could not find its way to God."¹⁶ Nor was a reward of some spiritual effort on the part of Israel that the Lord specially revealed Himself to it. The Lord has spoken "to our fathers in many ways and by many means"¹⁷ as He thought proper but also "as they could listen to easily."¹⁸ Once when some of the disciples of Christ came to him and asked, "Why does though speak to them in parables?"¹⁹ he answered resolving all their doubts that, "it is granted to you to understand the secret of God's kingdom but not to these others."²⁰ So, "if I talk to them in parables, it is because though they have eyes, they cannot see, and though they have ears they cannot hear or understand."²¹ The history of Israel records as to how much at one time in the days of Amos the people of Israel were in need of divine justice and on another occasion in the days of Hosea they needed divine love and the Lord bestowed each revelation at its appropriate time. But here it must not be forgotten that what was revealed to Amos, Hosea was not able to grasp and similarly what was revealed to Hosea, Amos could not understand.

Thus, there is strong reason in logic to believe that though revelation primarily depends upon the will of God, yet its full actuality cannot be properly conceived without taking into account the efforts and appreciation on the part of man. Howsoever much one may argue, the fact remains that revelation is an interplay between God and man.

¹⁴ John Baillie, *The Idea of Revelation in Recent Thought*, p. 64.

¹⁵ James Hastings, *Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics*, vol. x, p. 747.

¹⁶ *I Corinthians* i. 21.

¹⁷ *Hebrews* i. 1.

¹⁸ *Mark*, iv. 33.

¹⁹ *Matthew*, xiii. 10.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, xiii. 11.

²¹ *Ibid.*, xiii. 13.

VII

Has Revelation Ceased with Jesus of History?

It has commonly been held by all sections of Christianity that man cannot apprehend God directly since all is mediated through the historic figure of Jesus. Nobody has ever seen or can see the infinite God, but He is revealed to man in 'the son'. Hence revelation, it is argued, ceased with Jesus of history. Emil Brunner tells us that, "The unique and unrepeatable character of revelation constitute the essence of Christianity. A final event can only happen once."²² And similarly Karl Barth remarks: "God has revealed himself to man in Jesus Christ. What do we know from any other source of God . . . Absolutely nothing."²³ Thus, by attaching revelation exclusively to the person of Jesus, men have often denied all other channels of revelation. But such a contention is open to the charge of involving a static conception of revelation and is therefore untenable.

Christianity, it is true, loses its vitality if the Person of its founder is forgotten but this also cannot be ruled out that the end of religion is precisely the vision of God. Hence the idea that revelation ceases with the historic figure of Jesus must be done away with. God's self-disclosure cannot be regarded as limited to Jesus alone. God always looks down from heaven at the race of man to find such soul that reflects but if all have missed the mark and rebelled against Him the fault certainly belongs to them, as the Bible declares: "blessing they lack not that look to him."²⁴ and He "leaves none but the rebels to find their abode in the wilderness."²⁵ In the Fourth Gospel we read that God has always been operative in all creation from the very beginning. He is always revealing Himself to mankind. He is active in the present as in the past and it is His present activity that paves the way for our experience of Him. However much one may argue, the fact remains that many have reached the experience of God in other ways than through contact with the Jesus of history. St. Paul wanderings in Sinai and we have St. Augustine to remind us "That which today is called Christian religion existed among the ancients and has never ceased from the origin of antiquity the true religion which already existed beforehand."²⁶ Thus to know God does not mean to "know Christ according to the flesh", says Spinoza for God's "wisdom has manifested itself in all things . . . and most of all in Jesus Christ."²⁷

If God has spoken to our fathers in old days there is no reason to doubt why He will not speak to us today. God's promise still holds good as the prophet declares: "The promise has been proclaimed to us, just as it was to them."²⁸ But what we have to be afraid of is that we must not fall into unbelief in God. Actions, however

22. Emil Brunner, *The Mediator*, I.T. (1934), pp. 25 ff.

23. Karl Barth, *The Knowledge of God* (1957-38), p. 43.

24. *Psalms*, xxxiii, 11.

25. *Psalms*, xxxiii, 7.

26. St. Augustine, *Retraites*, I, xlii, 3.

27. Quoted in Nathaniel Macklem's *Religion*, p. 94.

28. *Hebrews*, ix, 2.

august they may be, become fruitless and unprofitable to us without faith in Him. God cannot make his presence known to a lifeless observer. Thus deep rooted faith and unshakable belief in God are the prerequisites for the attainment of communion with God. Jesus's personal experience of God and the dignity of high priesthood are certainly rewards of his deep-rooted faith in God. We are, therefore, asked to cultivate faith in infinite God for it is only then that the birth of God in the soul is possible and for this there is no need of 'the mediator'.

Moreover, if there exists no contrast, as there can be none, between God's will and wisdom, then there is more ground in reason than not to believe, that what God has done in the past He still must do. Hence the Jesus of history cannot be regarded as God's last word to us.

VIII

Concluding Remarks

It might have been apparent by this time that the sense of a divine presence irradiating the soul of the seeker after truth is one of the most obvious things of experience, the truth of which does not stand in need of any proof. And, if even now the critics of religion demand logical proof to support the contention that we make, they surely fail, and for me, they do fail to recognise that the heart has its own reason of which the head knows nothing and, consequently, fall into the error of supposing that proof is the only criterion of truth-claim. Howsoever much one may argue with the critics of religion that there is a logical absurdity in the claim made by the believers the experienced of God, the fact remains that religion is of value only because of the felt reality of the presence of God and if it has survived the deadliest missiles of destructive criticism, it is only because the soul to whom God has bestowed 'His all' cries with a loud voice, saying, "This whole world is full of God."²⁹ Let therefore, proof be the idol for men of reason alone before whom they may torture themselves as much as they like; it has no relevance, whatever, for men of faith. Are we not unostentatiously warned in religious literatures against the undue pride of the intellect? I think, readers will agree, that as the self-exhibiting character of Nature or Nature as we know tempts the mind to exclude from its universe the super-sensuous Being of God, so the self-revealing character of God tempts the soul to exclude from its universe the inferior being of Nature. No one, says, Dante.

Who looks upon that light can turn
To other object, willingly, his view.³⁰

29. B. Angela of Foligno, *The Book of Divine Consolation*, II. G. Steegmann's trans.

30. *Paradise*, XXXIII, pp. 103-104 (trans. Temple Classics).

Tantra Sadhana

Tantra Sadhana is a physico-psycho-spiritual process. It seeks to weave yoga into every details of human life. It is an inner yoga of progression from the human into the divine. It is an esoteric process of mystic transformation and spiritual sublimation. It brings an integrated development of human personality. It is an integral yoga of progress and perfection. In other forms of spiritual discipline, a man is not allowed to enjoy the mundane existence; the world is a forbidden fruit. A man is required to lead an ascetic life. A man who is in the midst of the world cannot be a yogin; whereas Tantra Sadhana takes the world to be the manifestation of Divine Principle. Tantra Sadhana is a synthesis. It combines in it yoga and *bhoga* (enjoyment). It promises to award to the Sadhaka not merely liberation but also enjoyment, not merely beauty (niraya) but also progress (*abhyudaya*).

Tantra Sadhana is based on the cardinal principle that the Absolute is to be realised in and through the human body. Man is an epitome of the cosmos. There is no real distinction between man and God. Every microcosm is an hybernation macrocosm. Every man is a dormant divine. Human body is the abode of *Param Siva* of which the universe is a manifestation in space and time. Sadhana awakens his own dormant divinity (Kundalini) with the clear conviction that the truth that is realised within, is the truth that pervades the whole universe.

According to Tantra the Absolute Reality is the state of neutrality produced through the union of *Siva* and *Sakti*. However, neither *Siva* by himself nor *Sakti* by herself is the absolute reality. *Siva* and *Sakti* are eternally one and indivisible. The union of *Siva* and *Sakti* produces divine bliss and liberation in the state of neutrality and under different conditions, same becomes the noumenal cause of the physical existence. However, when *Sakti* (Kundalini) rises to *Siva* in the process of mystic inversion, their esoteric unification brings infinite bliss and absolute peace.

Tantra has been greatly scandalised due to the use of *Panaemakara Sadhanā*. Tantra is based on scientific principles. It is an intentional science. It is a positive determination to overcome the strongest desires for sensuous enjoyment. For a person having

strong desires for physical enjoyment Tantra prescribes the Sādhana of crude M's as it does not encourage suppression and repression of unfulfilled desires. Normally, man is dominated by animal desires of hunger (Ahāra), sleep (Nidrā), fear (Bhaya) and sex (Maithuna). The dominance of such crude desires of material enjoyment differs from man to man. When such desires are dominant, man runs after sensuous enjoyments.

Resistance on the part of such persons is an uphill task. Spiritual Sādhana and higher values do not attract the parched up soul. An elevated soul can abstain from material enjoyment and lead spiritual life. However, Tantra does not abhor material enjoyment. Suppression and repression of unfulfilled desires lead to immorality and degeneration.

Pañcamakāra Sādhana is directed to get control over the material desires. The use of the crude Pañcamakāra according to prescribed esoteric disciplines, leads to detachment and inner purification. This will give the Sādhana inner strength of moral control over his baser instincts. In Pañcamakāra Sādhana wine is used for the release of the senses from their engrossment in their outer objects. The surface consciousness of mind which is exposed to the shocks and attachments, is temporarily suspended and the deeper, the expansive and the subliminal spheres of consciousness are opened. It enables the Sādhana to get control over the inner recesses and work for the sublimation and purification of being. In Tantra Sādhana wine is used for the purification of mind (citta).¹ Wine is not to be drunk in the manner of animal drinking. It leads to degradation.² The Supreme Lord is invoked, worshipped and the dedication is sanctified by the prescribed esoteric mantra. Sādhana identifies his whole being and consciousness with the Deities and mantra in course of Sāva Sādhana before the use of wine. One who does not know the science of Tantra Sādhana, has no right to perform this Sādhana. To hell he goes who dares to infringe these conditions and seeks to enjoy wine and women.³ He is sinner and libertine. Drinking of wine that is not sanctified is as reprehensible as rape.

The real meaning of wine in Tantra is not liquor. In mystic sense the word *Madya* (wine) means the hormones secreted from the pineal gland. This Pineal nector vitalises the different glands and gives divine bliss. The pineal gland from which nectar flows, is thousand-petalled. When the kundalini is awakened and made conscious, she rises upwards and drinks the pineal nectar. The nectar which flows from the lotus in the supreme ether alone is the real wine. What is drunk otherwise is only liquor. According to Agama Sāstra wine is the somadhara or lunar ambrosia which drops from the Sahasrāra.

Māmsa Sādhana does not mean the eating of meat. The real meaning of the

1 मदिरा ब्राह्मण : प्रोक्ताः चित्तशोधन साधनाः ।

तासामपि समाच्छदम पूजाकर्तुं समाचरेत् ॥४१॥

Kuṭāravana Tantra p. 191.

2. Ibid., p. 196.

3 बरतस्तुतं पिबेद्वल्यं वलादकारेण भेषुनम् ।

स्वप्नियेण हतं मातं रोषं नरकं वजेत् ॥६६॥

Ibid., p. 197.

Māmsa Sadhana is to overcome the dualism of 'I' and 'Thou' by yoga. It means to rid consciousness from the fetters of *Maya* with the help of divine knowledge. Consciousness so freed is merged with the supreme godhead. This is the esoteric meaning of *Māmsa Sadhana*.¹ The word *Ma* means tongue. The *Mamsa Sadhāna* means control over speech. It also means the dedication of all actions to Lord '*Mam*'.²

Matsya Sadhana means the control of breath through *Pranayama*. The eating of fish means the controlling of breath. The other meaning of the *Matsya Sadhāna* is the controlling of the senses. With the help of *Pranayama* the senses are brought under the control of this mind and yoked to the self. This is the meaning of *Matsya Sadhana*.³

Mudrā does not mean parched rice. *Mudra Sadhana* means detachment from the evils that keep the soul in bondage. To cut off all connections with evil is called *Mudra Sadhana*.

Maithuna of *Pañca makār Sadhāna* has been greatly scandalised and grossly misunderstood. *Tantra* is based on scientific principles. It does not ignore the biological and psychological aspects of the human personality. However, crude *Maithuna Sadhana* (copulation with women) is allowed in *Tantra* for conquering the sex-instinct. One can conquer sex with gradual practice of restraint and sublimation. But the real meaning of *Maithuna Sadhana* is the copulation of *Siva* with *Sakti*. The woman to be waited upon is none other than the inner divine power which is lying asleep in the ordinary animal-man and is awake in the *Kaul*. This *Kundalini Sakti* is to be awakened, served and attended to.

The *Kulārṇava Tantra* says, "The divine nectar of spiritual bliss that ensues on the meeting of this Divine Pair, Supreme *Sakti* (*Kundalini*) and the Supreme Self (*Siva*), the Lord that waits alone, that is real *Maithuna*, the final *Ma*. Anything else is only copulation." According to *Tantra Sūtra* and *Yāmala* the union of *Siva* and *Sakti* is the true yoga and the joy which arises out of it is known as supreme bliss.⁴

Desire is an enemy but it can be made an ally. *Tantra* does not believe in the suffering and torture of the body and mind. The physical body of man is the only medium through which one can attain salvation. The physical body is an expression of the supreme self. The manifest universe has been created by Bliss. In the copulation of man and woman the same Bliss is experienced in a lesser intensity. If it is done with a spiritual motivation and under esoteric discipline, the physical function is quickened and divinised. This is called *Vīrabhava*. It has been described as 'the profocused pagani instinct to glorify the generative impulse with religious ritual'.⁵

Pañcamakāra Sadhana is a psycho-spiritual process to transform the mental

being into a divine being. It is scientific, positive, esoteric and mystic the Sadhana of inner progression. The whole principle of the Pancamakara depends upon idealism and intuition. 'A wife is kissed with one feeling, a daughter's face with another'. Tantra does not sanction immoral satisfaction of sexual desires in the way it does normal eating and drinking and so forth; it demands that man should unite with Siva-Sakti in worldly enjoyment as a step towards the supreme enjoyment. In doing so he must follow the Dharma prescribed by Siva.

The bondage of the self is due to Samskara. It has got five-fold manifestations: Avidya (ignorance), Asmita (egoism) Raga (attraction), Dvesa (repulsion) and Abhinivasa (willingness to live). All actions result from Samskara. It is the root cause of all modifications of Citta. Mental modifications cease with the cessation of Samskara. The self becomes liberated and remains ever in its divine purity and eternal freedom. Reason cannot establish its supremacy over will and volition. According to Tantra conscious life of reason and volition is only the surface level of a wider and more expansive psychic life of man. The subconscious and the causal mind are not infra-conscious at all but are rather an expansion of cosmic consciousness and rooted to whole consciousness. Human consciousness is undivided, unlimited and whole. The real life of reason and will is rooted to whole consciousness. Cosmic consciousness is the source, substratum and goal of all mental processes.

Paśvācāra Sadhana

The Pasvacara Sadhana is meant for the regulation of moral conduct and mental concentration. It is a psycho-physical process of inner development. Pasvacara Sadhana addresses Siva as Pasupati. Pasupati stands for the supreme godhead which liberates man from the bondage of animality.

Virācāra Sadhana

Viracara Sadhana is a psycho-spiritual process of inner transformation. It is an aggressive form of spirituality. This cult has been so named because the Sadhakas of this school perform Sadhana with a dead human body in the posture of Virasama to overcome the Eight Fetters (Pasas) and Six Enemies (Ripus). The Viracara Sadhaka addresses Siva as Viresvara. This Sadhana is done for the unification of the Kundalini with Parama Siva. Detailed esoteric disciplines and rituals have been laid down for this Sadhana. The Sadhaka has to obscure the esoteric principles both in letter and spirit. This is the most secret part of 'Tantric mysticism'. Arthur Avalon says, "By the union of Vira and Sakti, who is a form (akara) of the Devi, direct union is had with the latter who being pleased grants all that is desired of Her. Then is thus what is technically called Pratayaksa of Devata whereas in Kumari-puja and in Sava-Sadhana the Devi speaks through the mouth of a virgin or the corpse respectively. Vira communicates with Siva and Sakti in Avadhutaloka."¹⁰ During Sava Sadhana the incantation of Mantra infuses life-force in the corpse as a result of which it seemingly becomes

10. *Sakti and Sakta*, p. 623.

alive but is actually the life-force of the Sadhaka himself. On seeing this if the Sadhaka becomes nervous and falls within the *Cakra*, he meets with his own death and if he falls outside the *Cakra* he becomes permanently mad. But if he holds his own and succeeds in this Sadhana, he attains salvation.

Divyācāra

Divyācāra is a purely spiritual process. It is subtle, sublime and the highest form of mysticism. The realization of the identity of self and God which is known as *Sivadvaita* is the purpose behind Divyācāra. The body is the temple of God. Jīva is Sadasiva. Let him give up his ignorance is the offering which is thrown away and meditate with the idealism "I am He." The idealism of I am He is not a mental contemplation or discursive reasoning. The incantation of mantra is associated with other disciplines. As an insect becomes a bee by the force of meditation so becomes man God by dint of spiritual trance (*Samādhi*). The whole system of Tantra Sadhana is based on this principle. The mystic unification of jīva with Siva cuts as under the key-knot (*Hydaya-granthi*) that rivets all involvements in the many strands of nature. All doubts are shown and all actions dwindle away. When a man attains this state of spiritual blessedness, all spiritual disciplines are no more incumbent. For him there is no Yama and Niyama Sadhana. He does not need any mental concentration and Prāṇayāma.

There are several states of being. There are many gradations of consciousness in the life of a yogi. Divyācāra is the highest form of spirituality. Divyabhava is the supreme state of consciousness. It is called *Sahajavastha*, in which mystic oneness with Param Siva is attained spontaneously. The Sadhaka becomes Siddha. He becomes God. He always remains in the state of Eternal Bliss. He is beyond the body-mind consciousness. He becomes totally unimpeded in his impulses, thoughts and behaviour. Such a soul is beyond moral and social imperatives. He does no wrong. He is always merged in Siva-consciousness; when engaged in action he is really inactive.

Tantra Sadhana is a very difficult process. Success in Tantra Sadhana brings salvation, a mistake misfortune. Madhusudan Kaul says, "But no rose is without thorns. Good and evil run side by side. There is nothing which has unmixed good or unmixed evil in it. The rosy path of the Tantric is set with thorns here and there. It is therefore the foremost duty of the Sadhaka to avoid the thorns and adhere to the rosy path, but if he falls into the trap of the low spirits of nature, who, by trying to cause mischief, put obstacles in his way and thereby retard his progress in the attainment of his desired object. It is only the potency of the mantras that brings about the subjugation of these supersensuous beings."¹² The path to salvation is as sharp as the edge of a razor. The *Katha Upaniṣad* says, "Arise, awake, and learn by approaching the excellent ones. The wise ones describe that path to be as impassable as a

razor's edge, which, when sharpened, is difficult to tread on.¹⁴ The Infinite in man is like the oil in the river-bed, or fire in the two pieces of wood.¹⁵ To get oil from Sesamum seeds we have to crush them, churn the curds before we can have butter, dig the ground for water and rub the sticks hard for fire. This is Sadhana. Till man attains Samadhi, he has risks and dangers on the path.

Tantra Sadhana goes into every detail of life. It weaves yoga into the day-to-day life. It gives meaning and mystic interpretation to a man's activities by making them all means for the effectuation and transformation of the inner consciousness of progression from the human into the divine.

14 उत्तिष्ठत जायत प्राप्य ब्रह्मनिबोधत

धूरस्य घारा निक्षिप्ता दुग्धया दुग्धं पयस्तत्कनयो वदन्ति

Kath Up. I. iii, 14.

15. *Svetāśvatara Upaniṣad*, 3-15.

Saivism in Assam

A retrospective analysis of the cultural history of Assam enables us to fathom the antiquities of its religious philosophy. Monistic Saivism, as a branch of religious thought can claim its origin in Assam. In fact, the Kashmiri Saivism has its parental home in Kāmarūpa. The ancient literature including that of Tantra and other documents of Assamese literature have proved the antiquity and the authenticity of it, "The traceable history of the fourth school—We learn from the following quotation in T. A. Comm. that it had its origin in Kāmarūpa (Assam) and that its founder was the great sage, Mīna alias Macchanda Vibhu—

"Bhāiravyā Bhāiravāt prāptam yogam
vyāpya tataḥ prīya
Tataśśāstān siddhena Minākhyena varānāne
Kāmarūpa mahāpūthe Macchandena Mahātmanā."

T. A. Comm, I, 24

The commentator has cleared the point that Macchanda was the founder of the fourth school by describing him as "Turyanatha" in the introduction to that *śloka* of the 1st Aṅkika of the *Tantrāloka* in which the author offers his salutation to him (Macchanda Vibhu)" (Abhinavagupta : *An Historical and Philosophical Study* By K. C. Pandey. p. 82.)

According to Dr. B. K. Barua, Saivism as a popular form of religion has been prevalent in Assam from a very long period among the aboriginals and the Aryanised people (A Cultural History of Assam. Vol. I : By Dr. B. K. Barua p. 143). It has been stated in the '*Kālika Purāṇa*' that the number of places associated with Siva worship in Assam is greater than the places of Viṣṇu and Devī worship. The sacred places of Siva worship are fifteen in number whereas those of Devī and Viṣṇu are five and four respectively. Rai Bahadur Ganavirum Barua in his '*Assam Buranjī*' (the History of Assam, 1900) observes that the Siva worship was first introduced by Jalpeswarn, a

king of Jalpaiguri which was formerly a part of Kāmarūpa. (pp. 39, 45, 46). The '*Kālika Purāṇa*' further claims that prior to the arrival of king Naraka, who probably introduced the cult of the mother goddess in Kāmarūpa, Siva was accepted as the supreme deity of the State. (8 a. Chap. xxxviii, v. 96). Dr. B. K. Kakati opines that Saivism in some crude form was the popular creed of the aboriginal Kiratas. The Grant of Vanamala (v. 5), the Kamauli Grant (v. 20), also bear witnesses of the antiquity of the Assamese Saivism.

Saivism of Kāmarūpa had a series of sub-cults. The 'Prasastis' on Siva have made it clear that Siva was invoked by various names. The Siva was invoked as Parameśvara, Išvara, Maheśvara, Mahavaraha, Adideva, Śambhu, Śaṅkara, Prajādhinatha, Rudra, Hatakasolin, Hara, Kameśvara, Kitava, Ardha-Yuvastisvara, Pasupati, Gauripati, and Somanatha. Siva was conceived as the prime deity (Adideva) and the supreme god (Parama Mahesvara) whose feet were worshipped even by other deities. In the 'Prasasti' of the Bargaon Grant, Siva is described as the supreme self who "becomes many through his multifarious attributes due to omnipresence, and thus shines in the world." (Grant of Vanamala. v. 1).

Siva was also invoked in the *linga* form. Images of Siva are found in Assam and Arunachal in various forms. The most common form of the images is lingam. The 'Yogini Tantra' asserts that the lingam of Siva in Kāmarūpa exceeds even a million (Chap. xi. v. 36).

The philosophical significance of Kāmarūpa Saivism is that it is monistic and has a very close affinity with Tantra thought. Siva is admitted as the sole reality, as the one without a second. He is absolute consciousness and is also *svatautrya*. Siva is omniscient, the one embracer of the universe. He is all-pervading. Knowledge is possible only for his existence. It is his will force. His own inherent power known as 'Shakti' is responsible for the creation of the whole world. He is the subject. He is also the object,—for the world which is apparently distinct from Siva, is not actually so in real state. The world is an external representation of the same reality. The world with its soul and object is an appearance of the ultimate reality, of the supreme self known as 'Parama Siva'. *Shakti* is self-consciousness. By *Shakti* Siva manifests himself as many. Thus Siva and *Shakti* are inseparable. Siva is both immanent and transcendent. *Shakti* is his immanent aspect. Transcendentally he is the background, the substratum of the whole universe. The individual self is not limitation absolute consciousness. It is pure consciousness and is identical with Siva. It is in fact the supreme reality in the garb of self-limitation. So empirically, though there are many selves, transcendentally there is only one and that is Siva. It is a mode of the Divine manifestation of Siva. Siva is the Divine energy in its static aspect. *Shakti* preserves and sustains the universe. Kāmarūpi Saivism admits creation as a conditional reality. Siva is also Rudra. He stands for the ultimate dissolution of the universe. At the time of dissolution, *Shakti* absorbs the whole world into herself and merges herself into the infinite Siva.

On its ethical ground, Siva is cognised as the emblem of all virtues. He is benign, auspicious and easily propitiated. He forgives all transgressions of the sinners. He is the most democratic deity among all the Hindu deities.

I have stated above that Siva worship is popular among both the Aryans and

the aboriginals. Hence the remarks—

- (1) "In the fastness of hills and mountains, in dense forests, we still come across wild savages in India, the primitive children of the soil, who were driven from their homes by the onrush of the Aryan conquerors. Among these wild tribes up till now no evidence of the worship of Siva or Kālī has been found. They still adhere to their primitive religious faith of Animism and worship stocks and stones."
- (2) "One may search from the foot of the Himalayas up to the Cape Comorin in vain to find even the slightest trace of any Tantric form of worship, or of Siva or Kālī among these wild aboriginal people"—of D. N. Bose and H. Halder Tantras.

Their Philosophy and Occult : (By D. N. Bose and Hiralai Halder, pp. 76, 77). are untrue in so far as Saivism in Assam is concerned. To put it in the words of Dr. Maheswar Neog: "From the vamsavalis we also get an account of the worship of Siva, both according to Hindu scriptures as well as with tribal rites. When starting on a military expedition against the Ahoms, Naranarayana performed such propitiatory rites to the deity as are prescribed in the Hindu books. But Siva, it is said, appeared before him in a dream and rebuked him severely for giving up his own tribal mode of worship. The king thereupon made arrangements for the performance of such rites by his Kachari soldiers on the banks of the river, Sonkos." (*Sankardera and his times* : By Dr. M. Neog, p. 80).

In Brahmaputra valley, the Bodo tribes invoke Siva as "Batho, Bathau, brai or Bathau Siv-ral". In Meghalaya, a few groups of Jaintiya tribes even now worship Siva as the Supreme deity. Certain very peculiar rituals are observed by the Bodos, Jaintiyas and also by the Aryan devotees in the Umananda temple of Gauhati. Gait observes in his 'Animistic tribes of Bengal',—"The religion of the Mech, like that of the Dhimal, is still in an early stage of transition from Animism to Hinduism. They describe themselves as Hindus of the Saiva sect, and worship Siva under the name of Batho, his consort Kālī as Bali Khungri." (*Census of India*, I, i, p. 414).

Apart from its religious significance, Saivism in Kāmarūpa has an immense contribution to the growth of its lucid folk literature. Researches on this particular field might throw enough light on the hitherto neglected but glorious past history of Kāmarūpa.

The Death of God

When we analyse the concept of death we find that the word 'death' is meaningful in the context of with respect to the material or physical entities. In no case is the word 'death' can be meaningful as regards spiritual entity. The concept of God almost in all ages and in all religions is conceived as spiritual entity. Therefore, the assertion ; God is dead ; is not worth considering at least in the sense in which God is considered to be a spiritual entity.

The primitive people have presented the anthropomorphic conception of God in which God used to participate in the daily affairs of man. God is made in the image and likeness of man. Thus, God, in primitive religion, was materially conceived. As Xenophanes says, "600 years before Christ, men imagined Gods to be born, and to have raiment and voice and body, like themselves Even so the gods of the Ethiopians are swarthy and flat-nosed, and the gods of the Thracians are fair-haired and blue-eyed Even so Homer and Hesiod attributed to the gods all that is a shame and reproach among men-theft, adultery, deceit and other lawless acts"¹ Now, if this is the conception of God, God can be considered as dead or God can be killed because primitive people conceive God as a means to fulfil their ends. But this concept of God disappears in the history of religion particularly after the development of Theistic, Deistic or, Pantheistic religion.

God is immune from both birth and death both by birth and death. A spiritual God cannot be corrupted, since He possesses no matter. He cannot be disintegrated, since He has no substantial parts. He cannot lose his individual unity, since He is self-subsisting. He cannot lose His internal energy, since He contains within Himself all the sources of His energies. This means that God cannot die. Once he exists, he cannot disappear. Hence, He will necessarily exist for ever and He will endure without end. Bhagavadgita also supports this contention. This shows that one who takes birth, faces death. Here death is a necessary consequence of birth. But God is eternal and so the question of death of God is superfluous and unwarranted.

1. Will Durant, *The Ascent of Man, The Measure of Philosophy*, p. 379.

na jāyate mriyate va kadācin²
 nā'yaṁ bhūtvā bhaviṣ va na bhūyaḥ
 ajo nityaḥ śāśvato yaṁ purāṇo
 na hanyate hanpamāne śarīre

II, 20

naī'naṁ chīdanti śāstrāṇi³
 naī'naṁ dābati pāvakaḥ
 na caī'naṁ kledayanty āpo
 na śoṣayati mārutaḥ

Gītā II 23

In Christianity, the concept of death is often equated with the idea of resurrection as in Hinduism with the idea of rebirth. This means that if one dies, he resurrects into another life or takes rebirth. Thus, the Christian religion reveals that the news of this death is the expectation of new birth, the coming into being of a humanity whose nature has been briefly glimpsed in Christ. That is why, Christians up till now believe that Christ is not dead but that he is alive. He will appear on the scene very soon. In Hindu religion there are many evidences of taking birth again and again which cannot be disproved by any scientific or logical reasoning. This means that when we say that Christ is dead, it means that the physical body of Christ is dead and not Christ as God is dead. In Hindu religion such types of misunderstanding do not occur. The *Bhagavadgītā* clearly maintains that soul being immortal never dies. It simply takes or another life just as a man discards worn-out clothes and takes other new ones. Similarly, there is a lurking hope of resurrection of Christ in the mind of every Christian these days. Thus, the concept of death cannot be equated with God who is unthinkable, immutable, eternal, omnipresent, immovable, constant and everlasting.⁴

vācārhaḥ jīrṇāṇi yathā vihāya
 navāni grhṇāti naro² parāṇi
 lathā śarīrāṇi vihāya jīrṇāṇy
 anyāni samyācī navāni dehi³

II, 22

Again, death is regarded as an event in one's life, that is, if some one dies, it becomes an event in his life. Now, it can be said that God is not dead, for the death of God is not an event for God. It can be explained in another way also. Death is not an experience. As for example, I die in spectator's eyes and in no case I experience my own death. Now, if I am unable to experience my own death, how can I experience the death of God. This again can be explained in another way. Death is the end of all experiences and one cannot experience the end of experiences. But man is still experiencing God whether he be a Hindu or a Muslim or a Christian. This clearly reveals that God is not dead.⁴

The concept of death can be explained in terms of a personal God and an impersonal God also. The word 'death' is meaningful in the case of a personal God, i.e.,

2. *Bhagavadgītā*, II, 20.

3. *Bhagavadgītā*, II, 23.

4. *Bhagavadgītā*, II, 22.

Christ, Mohammad, Kṛṣṇa, etc.. But in the case of impersonal God, it is useless or meaningless to express one's whim that God is dead. According to Sāṃkhya the Absolute or Brahman is indescribable. If the Absolute or Brahman is indescribable, how can it be said that an impersonal God is dead? This is so because to say that an impersonal God or Brahman is dead is to describe in words. Likewise, Bradley says that every analysis leads to falsification. This means that Reality cannot be analysed or described in words. The absolute Reality or Brahman is a whole. The Whole cannot be divided into parts. But if we assume that the Absolute or Brahman is dead, it is possible only when It can be described. But Sāṃkhya and Bradley have already discarded this possibility, hence the Absolute or Brahman or an impersonal God cannot be said to be a dead entity.

But when we describe God as a personal being, it can be regarded as dead. Only in this sense do Christians believe that God has died in Jesus Christ and that this death of God is both a historical and a cosmic event which cannot be reversed by a subsequent religious or cosmic movement. Nietzsche says, "We have killed him, you and I. We, all of us, are his murderers... God is dead! God remains dead! And we have killed him! . . ."⁵ Now, when Christians say that God has died in Christ or when Nietzsche says that; 'we have killed God', this means that man wants to become like God. Again, he wants to be free, responsible and creative without the weakening effects of guilt and remorse. Nietzsche also means by saying that when we have killed God, we can hope for the coming up of a new humanity free from fear and disappointment.

But this contention of Nietzsche never proves that Christ as God is dead. The physical body of Christ is dead or in other words, the material substance of Christ has disappeared but Christ as God or the spirituality in Christ remains alive for ever. Thus, in proclaiming the death of God, Nietzsche was merely pointing to a cultural and historical fact. So, God is not dead also because in the Christian world, values are grounded in the Christian understanding of human life and these values are always found in relation to God. God, being the author of human life and of the cosmos, is the centre of all valuations of man's existence on earth. But if God is not alive or God is dead in the hearts and minds of men, then their value commitments remain meaningless and as such no longer any foundation. Frazier says, "The realisation of the loss of the deity means madness, an existence shattering anxiety, but also, perhaps, the possibility of a new innocence, a fresh beginning."⁶

This shows that whether God is personal or impersonal, it cannot be said that God is dead. God as a person connotes some qualities which are inherent in Him. And when we say that Christ or Kṛṣṇa is God, it means that there are some inherent qualities in Christ or Kṛṣṇa. Now, the physical body of Christ or Kṛṣṇa is no more but their inherent qualities such as incarnation of God in Christ or Avatara of God as Kṛṣṇa never die. These inherent qualities are immortal. Thus, it becomes clear from the above deliberation that Christ as God will remain alive for ever.

Commenting on Nietzsche's idea that the new race of Superman would take over the mastery of the world, Heidegger says that Nietzsche in his prophetic zeal almost

5. Lines taken from Paul Roubiczek, *Existentialism, For and Against*, p. 40.

6. Allie M. Frazier, *Issues in Religion*, p. 359.

sidetracks and dodges a very important and central issue namely, that of the ontology of being. He never tries to face the question as to how man, or for that matter the Superman, would replace God. Therefore, Heidegger says that the centre of man's vision must not be the Superman as the new ruler of the world, but being as such, 'If Nietzsche's solution is accepted, God will not actually be displaced. God will assume merely a new name and become the supreme custodian of new values. Therefore, Heidegger says that God must not be thought of as being. It is wrong to develop the ontology of God. Man has created the concept of God, therefore, he could any day kill God.

Now, if we analyse the assertion of Heidegger regarding the concept of God, we will find that Heidegger does not succeed in eliminating God as such. His assertion—'man created the concept of God'—is able to reveal only this that man can kill any day the concept of God. But, in no case, his assertion reveals that man can kill any day God as such. What I mean to say is that a man is free to believe or disbelieve in the concept of God. Now, if a man does not believe in God, the concept of God will naturally be useless for him. Therefore, I think that even Heidegger has failed to explain the death of God.

Again, Heidegger feels that God makes man completely subordinate to Him. Here, I have to say that Heidegger has completely forgotten the concept which is presented by A.N. Whitehead. Whitehead, of course, in a way, rejects the traditional concept of God but in explaining the universe he admits God as a feeling-centre or a choosing-centre. This aspect of God is, according to him, the *primordial aspect of God*. But the feeling-centre is also the enjoying centre. This enjoyment constitutes God, and as a result of this God also is growing. Thus, God becomes the aspect of creativity. This aspect of God is the *consequent aspect of God*. When man realises this, he comes to see that God is not only the Creator of the world but also its *constant Companion*. This shows that if God is conceived in this way, there is no sense in asserting that God makes man completely subordinate to Him. This also reveals that such a growing God will never die.

Sartre also proclaims, "In a world where 'God is dead' men must invent God by the religious illusion whereby they seek to worship him, or by the titanism whereby they seek to become God. Thus man's passion is the universe of Christ's, for man loses himself as man in order that God may be born. But the idea of God is contradictory and we lose ourselves in vain; man is a useless passion."² Now, this assertion of Sartre can be explained in this way:

When Sartre says that God is dead, it means that God has no existence of His own. This means that man is nothing else but what he makes of himself. This again it means that every kind of concept, including the concept of God, appears much later than man's existence. Now, if God's concept is a creation of man, that too man becomes conscious of his existence, and if man himself is responsible for all his projects and ways of existence, then obviously God is not needed and as such God is dead.

Again, it can be said that the chief ground of Sartre's atheism is his belief in human freedom. Sartre is not prepared to sacrifice the basic existential freedom of man at any cost. If God is conceived as the ultimate creator of the universe, then it means that man has been created in accordance with a pre-conceived form or idea in God's

mind. But, in that case, man becomes fully determined. Sartre, on the other hand, is not prepared to accept that man is fully determined. In fact, Sartre says that man's freedom is basic and it permeates man's existence. Freedom, in Sartre's opinion means freedom of choice, freedom to take decision in complete awareness of one's responsibilities. That shows that in view of this basic freedom of man atheism has to be accepted as a natural corollary.

Now, Sartre's position can be clarified in this way by saying that there is a sharp difference between the assertion of God's non-existence and the assertion of the death of God. This means that Sartre, being an atheist, can say only this that God does not exist. But the moment he says that God is dead, his assertion leads to contradiction. Sartre has said somewhere that we have killed God, hence God is dead. But it can be said here that if he is not ready to accept the existence of God, how can he believe in the death of God? For the concept of God is related to some existential objects and in no case with non-existential objects.

Again, there is a scope for the existence of God. This can be established by analysing Sartre's notion of freedom itself. Sartre asserts that man is basically free. By this he means that the ultimate choice of every action or decision lies on man himself. Sartre has also emphasised the importance of man's subjectivity. It is said that man, in his subjectivity, weighs the alternatives and finally decides on his projects. If this is so, it means that there is no limitation set around the free choice of human subjectivity. It is quite possible, therefore, for a particular individual, to develop the religious sense and faith in God. To begin with, he may not have any awareness of God but it is a matter of his free choice to let his subjectivity grow in a manner in which he wants it to grow. It is quite possible that a particular individual may come to develop a religion of his own and thereby a conception of God. Sartre cannot deny this because such a denial would amount to an infringement on the freedom of an individual. Thus, in spite of Sartre's atheistic attitude, God somehow comes to stay.

The Concept of Spirituality

In this paper, I shall engage myself to examine the concept 'Spirituality'. The few of the queries that come up are ; what do we mean when we talk of 'spirituality' ? Of what it is constituted ? And what kind of goals are aimed at by it ?

To be precise, the direction of search here is not with the ontological status as to the functional process that takes place within man which is weighed against the concept of 'spirituality'. To quote Prof. Marneffe, 'true spirituality is the property of an action or its cause, when the action is exercised or the cause subsists, without intrinsic dependence on matter.'¹

1

The Term Spirituality

It is referred to in many senses. Thus ;

- (a). Many take it to be a continuous devotion to impersonal, lofty and higher ideals or some may identify it with religious life, with many attitudes and opinions. Contrasts and contradictions are natural here.
- (b). Being obscure and hair splitting by its very nature, a reference to spirituality generally is regarded as taboo. Or at the most it is understood merely as an emotional or aesthetic development.
- (c). But in fact, the Hindu word '*Adhyatmika*' comes closer when it suggests that spirituality leads oneself to higher and higher goals of human life. It is a unique exercise of meta-physical search of self-transcendence given to a man. It is the essence of man, a law of his being. It should not be confused as non-secular from secular. In fact, it is very much a secular

1. *The Spirituality of the Human Soul* - J. De, Marneffe S. J.; *The Philosophical Quarterly Oct.*, 58 p. 241.

human experience, "only it does not look beyond itself for meaning or validity."² To Prof. Datta,³ "it is the inner dialectic which makes one constantly strive for fuller and purer views of truth, corrects the sources of self-deception. It is the inner evolution."

Three things can be clarified from the above process.

- (1) Spirituality is non-empirical and autonomous in nature. No particular empirical phenomenon entails it as a logical necessity. It does not stand or fall with the empirical phenomenon that evidences it.
- (2) In spite of its empirical contexts, it is somehow discovered *a priori*. It is not revealed in its entirety all at once. It lives and grows in time.
- (3) The method of discovering the *a priori* in the empirical is referred to as intuition. No doubt, privacy is as much a problem in the knowledge of spiritual transcendence as it is with regards to the data of sense perception.

It's Nature

Looking further, it is admitted that qualitative analysis is one of the aspects of human experience. A mere quantitative measurement does not and cannot exhaust man's experience comprehensively. Again the quantification by itself has no personal relation. This knowledge of spirituality is discovered in the qualitative sphere of man, the basic plan which grows from within the man.

Thus Yājñavalkya⁴ was right when he said that 'everything is dear for the sake of one's own self.' It is this nature which makes for valuation in one's life. It's avowed aim is the enhancement and enrichment of human life. Thus in spite of man's possessing physical, mental and moral riches, he has a constant sensu of inadequacy. Now if this is not mechanical and does not originate from material life, then it "must be sought for in the depth of the human personality."⁵

It is only as a particular human being that one is individual; but so far as the call of spirituality in man is concerned, one strives for participation in this universal process. A further understanding of human nature in this regard is worthwhile.

Human Nature

While discussing this, it is indisputable to state that so far as his psycho-physical instincts are concerned, man is on a par with other creatures of the universe. He seeks security and survival, sustenance and growth with an equal craving. But still he invariably differs from the animal in the fact that all his above activity is subordinated to a higher 'end' viz., to continuously satisfy the epistemological inadequacy of his ontological being. There is a native urge in him to give meaning and value to his fleeting and discrete experiences of life. Dr. P. T. Raju rightly says that "change below man is non-purposive; purposive change which is a result of rational reflexion, is peculiar to man."⁶

2. An Idealist view of life-Radhakrishnan p. 72, Bombay' 71

3. Philosophical Perspectives - 'A selection of Essays' D. M. Datta-p. 74-75.

4. Brhadaranyaka - Dialogue (II.IV 1-14).

5. Eternal Values for a Changing Society'- Swami Ranganathanand, Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan p. 541.

6. The Concepts of Man - P. T. Raju-George Allen & Unwin, 1960 p. 336.

This rules out the mere mechanical interpretation of human nature. His inner call not only decries and rejects conventions by other conventions, rules and ideals, but it also means to live beyond their guidance, control or aspiration. The Upanishadic statement substantiates this very much when it says that "true knowledge makes one free."⁷ Thus to be informed of the details of knowledge is not enough, one also has to be continuously transformed into its higher form.

In other words, amidst the changing processes of life, unity and stability are also to be found. Man pursues in his best the values of Truth, Goodness and Beauty, and it is this alone that gives significance to the human life. Of course, these ends are sought under conditions of time and in the changing events of the world and so its final point of complete attainment cannot be deciphered at a given time. It is a continuous process.

To be short, spirituality is elevation in the sense of self-conquest. Here the struggles and conflicts are inevitable phenomena. The lower (animal) drives of man, strong as they are may lead him astray. But this clearly cannot be the end of man's life.

Thus no immanent factor can exhaust man's self-transcendent nature. Metaphorically Sankara's negative approach viz., *Neti, Neti* can be very well cited here. This is no way means to reject man's material existence. It is very much there with him but only as a means to an end. He cannot be reduced to that level; he is superior to the fleeting physical world. It is this that testifies a 'higher' sphere of reality without which most of the facts of human life would remain unexplained.⁸

Spirituality Differentiated from Morality

The pertinent problem which arises here from the above consideration is whether spirituality at all differs from moral system! If morality also means striving for an ideal then is it not identical with spirituality? But the fact is that the moral system is characterised by human limitation. The constitution of man as finite is taken for granted and what it expects is disciplined unity. But the pursuit of spirituality is opposite. It is an attempt "to circumvent or minimize the limitation of what underlies the efforts of man."⁹

In fact, it is spirituality which reveals the deeper side of man. One may function with one's limitation, conditioned by what one knows oneself, but this need not necessarily reject the greater and unknown positive potentialities of self. In reality ethics derives its value from spirituality. Prof. Raju rightly maintains "If no spirituality, then the ethical standard would be just a tolerant self interest."¹⁰

But as it is well aware, ethics is not exhausted to this end. The spiritual process has much to contribute here. Thus although spirituality is said to rest with the individual ultimately, this state of being is to be one and agreeable within and without too. The indication of self-transcendence by spirituality is meant to herald such a possibility, provided one continuously attempts to transcend one's "Narrower, purely biological and

7. *Sā Vidyā Yā Vimuktaye*-A noted maṇḍan.

8. *The meaning and significance of Spirituality in Europe and India*; Philosophy east and west, summer' 61-p 107.

9. *A Modern Intro to Ethics* - Edn. by Milton K. Munit, Hinnons p. 302.

10. *Concept of Man* - P. T. Raju p. 302.

momentary self, spatially, temperally, enviromentally, circumstantially, yet even hereditary.¹¹ To put in other way it is "to look deeper then this conventionalism, the spirituality in man demands self-surrender and non-egoity."¹²

To analyse further, this self-transcendent character of spirituality points to go above the frontiers of morality. It is a drive towards minimizing the limitations of fact and value. As referred to above, this is a qualitative experience, of which we cannot have an exact quantitative verification. Thus, though man is engaged in a moral struggle constantly, the basis of it in fact, is the urge of self-transcendence that sets one in action. Man continues to struggle to realize ethical values. The realized ethical values become spiritual-fact due to self transcendent nature of Man.

Is Spirituality Supernatural ?

Is the concept of Spirituality to be understood as something supernatural ? Even if one thinks so, the very fact of the embodiment of man with down to earth elements requires it to be natural. If spirituality is supernatural, it cannot be embodied. But with the relative significance of the degrees of hierarchy, it can be shown to be connected in relation of matter, life and mind. As life transcends matter ; spirituality transcends mind too.

Is it because we cannot explain the spiritual process in physical terms, it is to be termed supernatural ? But that way we cannot do so clearly in the case of life and mind too. So there is no justification in calling spirituality supernatural. A help of certain method does not make one wholly capable to distinguish the natural from the supernatural.

Thus because one comes across ideal experience in one's life, it need not necessarily be justified by a 'supernatural' standard. To agree with Prof. Raju, "to be an ideal is not necessarily to be unattainable and unreal or non-natural. Only we have to broaden our concept of the natural."¹³ No doubt one has to struggle hard and his inwardness has to be pushed to its deepest limits.

II

Now the second query is : What are the constituent factors to be found in human nature that go to make the process of spirituality as it is ? Before an attempt at analysis is made, it has to be admitted that this process, being too personal and subjective, a strict scientific study of objective kind is not possible. A philosophical interpretation will best suit the method.

There are two levels at which the spiritual process is found to be operating in man. It can be pointed as below :

- (a) Outer Level : Here it is reflected in the activities of will and the intellect, emotions and imaginations of man. Its range, to be short, is equal to the categories of mind.
- (b) Inner Level : The ceaseless intuitive dissatisfaction with logical categories suggests to greater limitless ground within man. The goal of this sponta-

11. A. R. Wadia - *Essays In Philosophy* - Bangalore 1954 p. 289.

12. *Concept of Man* - P. T. Raju p. 367.

13. *Concept of Man* - P. T. Raju p. 370.

neous activity suggests to shake off the narrow individuality and to merge with whole Reality as such.

In short, the factors of spiritual process to be accounted here must take note of the spiritual activity of man within.

- (a) spatio-temporal situation, and
- (b) above it too.

In the light of the above, the factors of the concept 'spirituality' can be accounted as below :

1. *It is not a static concept*

Thus stagnancy is a denial of the nature of man. Of course, as other creatures, he needs moments of peace, rest and recreation. But unlike them, this is only a refur-bushing period for further spiritual process of self-transcendence.

2. *'Change' is an inseparable phenomenon*

It is a universal fact and so it is with spirituality too. To account for change all round us, change has to be presupposed.

3. *It is both dynamic and Intelligent*

Mere change is not self-sufficing and self-explanatory. It is only the blind power of nature. Creativity is a fact with man and is a progressive approximation to greater goals.

4. *It has a free causality*

The self is a free being. All activities that ensue from it are not freely originated themselves, but are result from the basic freedom of the self. The very process of self-transcendence implies that it is unrestricted and unhindered by all not self forces. Even amidst the bondage of various kinds, the impulse of freedom can emanate from it alone.

5. *It points to go beyond change*

It is accepted that change does not stand by itself. The self-transcending process is within the being, which is the substratum of change. It has neither thisness nor thatness; nothing can be fixed of it in thought. It is supersensuous and does not belong to Nature, or to the know the visible universe. At this deepest level of self-transcendence, the self is not suppressed or negated but ennobled and elevated to a life which is in unison with the life of the whole.

6. *It is a continuous activity*

As life is basically dynamic, the Spiritual process is continuous with it. Spirituality lives and grows in time, the whole of it is not found at any one part of time and cannot be concentrated into one part. It is a single stream of conscious life.

Thus grasped so far, let us proceed to examine the nature of the end that the spiritual process helps to bring about.

III

It is noted above that man is unique in his self-transcending spiritual nature. To respond to this essential assertion means to be firm against all degenerative and negative worldly and non-spiritual influences.

This in no way means to imply to devalue the relation between man and matter and man and society. They are very much real and contribute much to the welfare of man. Still these are relative and subservient to man. Being so, they have to be tuned to the self-transcending nature of man. In fact, the true worth of spirituality in its purest and fullest form is achieved in this inner life of man which are reflected in all external relations.

To substantiate this, we see that at the macrocosmic level the unity of matter, life, mind, reason and spirit is not given as a fact, but it is a fact at the microcosmic level of men. Human life is a quest for unity. At the lower level it may be an adaptation to physical environment, but at the higher level he has an appeal to the demands of spiritual unity.

Thus, when we talk of the goal or end of spirituality, what we mean by this goal? To be true to the fact, the spiritual process itself is the goal of all other goals. Man with his physical, mental and cultural equipments is constantly in quest of Ultimate Reality. It is a case with man individually as well as socially. Thus one type of goal refers to, by the activities of cognition, conation and affection—towards External things. As noted in section II, here the status of spirituality rests totally on the status of the mind. This context can be very well compared to the western approach of spirituality. What is sought is the perfection in the fields mentioned above. Man's limitations in these spheres can be overcome through advancement in science and in related secular fields.

Whereas the above western approach to the concept of spirituality may not dissolve the particular, the other method of the eastern approach is to eliminate each distinction. The indication is that the greater demand in man is that of the Unconditioned and this Infinite. It is freedom which is beyond the limitations of body, life and mind and surpasses all relativity and finiteness.

It is already clarified in section I, that the spiritual process is not to be weighed in relation with secular and non-secular distinctions. The sphere of secular values and moral life involve as much struggle of opposite and the dialectical tendencies of the mind as in the non-secular sphere. And the self-transcending nature of man is helpful in both.

In fact, there is no chasm or hiatus in the continuous spiritual activity of man. *The secular and non-secular spheres are divided only on the surface; in substance they are inseparable.*

Access to Greater Reality

No doubt this is a hypothetical position to go forward but its acceptability is warranted only in such a system wherein facts are coordinated. The higher demand visualised has to be materialised, as it has a cosmic significance. Here again, the Hindu concept of Dharma,¹⁴ to think and act that way which sustains from the absolute stand point would well

14. Dharmaḥ Dharma Ityāḥ Dharma Dhārayate Praja-Karmaparve-Mahabharat.

clarify the end of the concept of spirituality. This is to admit that due to spatio-temporal and cultural relativity, the end of man's spiritual process is conditioned by the prevailing philosophic presuppositions of man and the universe at a given time. To help solve this predicament a continuous and constructive criticism would go a long way in expediting the working of the spiritual process in man. To quote Prof. Ramanathan.¹⁵ It is to meet the demands of reason and vindicate the validity of the higher values of life by showing that these are significant from the cosmic standpoint.

The fact is that the spiritual process as much applies to the end as to the process for the realization of the end. There may be a period of long dissatisfaction, before the self transcending freedom dawns in man. Till that time there is a ceaseless reformation, reconstruction and revaluation spirituality is an open activity.

Sin and Avidya in Christianity and Vedānta

The concepts of Sin and *Avidyā* are not only fundamental to Christianity and Vedānta but are also considered to constitute the line of demarcation between them to an extent and in a manner that any possibility of rapprochement between them is ruled out at the very start. The doctrine of Original Sin and the inherent purity and perfection of the human soul which are taken to be the distinctive features of Christianity and Vedānta, have doubtless been expressed in a language that is the source of confusion and a good deal of analysis has to be made to clear up misunderstandings and errors of judgment that have arisen from our failure to reflect upon the principal ideas embedded in them. It is useful for the sake of clarity first to state the common notion about Sin and *Avidyā* that still prevails in theological thinking.

It is still commonly held that man in Christianity is inherently a sinner, that sin is inextricably bound up with human nature, and that consequently, not by one's own exercise of free will but instead by grace or by the aid of an external mediator like Jesus can one hope to be delivered from its weight. The hereditary character of sin is an additional point to be taken into consideration. Sin is not so much a matter of the individual's own act as something he inherits from his ancestors its roots being traced back to the first man, Adam, who incurred sin by an act of the disobedience of God's commands and from whom it passed on to all subsequent generations of mankind. It is common thus to lay stress on its theological rather than on its psychological dimension. Sin is understandable only in relation to God as it is taken to stem from the defiance of God's will. The inherent corruption of human nature is only the direct result of such a notion of sin characteristic of Christianity. Calvin and Luther have made much of the doctrine of Original Sin and of the inherent corruption of human nature because of which a pessimistic interpretation is put on Christianity. The doctrine of Original sin, further, has contributed to social determinism in as much as it is impossible to escape from the effects the social environment exercises on the individual who is ordinarily subject to the social influences which express themselves in misdirecting human impulses and passions. It is just here that the ques-

tion of herd instinct and the social instinct and of the group mind comes up for critical consideration as regards their bearings on the deterministic and pessimistic character of the Christian doctrine of Sin.

It is perhaps needless to lay stress on the point that even though the sense of sin and guilt in the members of a community is an index of their high moral standard, obsession with it engenders a morbid and pessimistic mentality and defeats its very purpose. Christianity has developed through centuries and it is a matter of established truth that its obsession with sin and guilt became part of the normal Christian belief only after St. Augustine. The doctrine of Original Sin is taken to be so intrinsic to Christianity that almost every sentence that is uttered in the Christian Prayer, contains the word 'sin'. 'I believe in God who forgives sins through Jesus Christ', is the text often on the lips of the Christian devotee whose obsession with sin can by no means be doubted. The above text may thus be taken to be a concise summary of the Christian faith.

On the other hand, *Avidyā* or cognitive confusion is the key concept of Vedānta. The orientation to moral and spiritual problems is from the self of man whose knowledge alone ensures perfect peace, integrity and freedom. *Avidyā* is lack of discriminative wisdom which consists in a clear cognition of the difference of the self from the not-self, of the subject from the object and consequently of things which have only instrumental and perishable value from the self of man or from God or Brahman looked upon as supreme and absolute values. The context in which *avidyā* is interpreted and expounded and related to all human problems is psychological rather than theological. In Christian orthodoxy, the meaning of sin is supposed to be intelligible mainly in a theological framework for it consists in the defiance of God's will or commands. The exclusively personal context in which sin is understood is taken to distinguish it from the Hindu concept of *avidyā* which is primarily a psychological rather than a theological concept. It should not, however, be understood that Hindu thought excludes altogether the theological bearings of the question. There are theistic systems in Hindu thought as well in which sin is taken to be the defiance of God's will. The point of basic interest in Hindu thought, however, is that even theological thinking has its starting point in and its inseparable connection with issues which are psychological. The two questions, the theological and the psychological, cannot be separated. If man defies God's will, he must be understood to have defected from the norm of conduct which is in consonance with His nature. The initial point, therefore, from which consideration of sin has to be pondered over, is human nature itself first and foremost and not in God as in Christian orthodoxy. Whether God is considered ontologically as being identical with or different from the individual self, the fact which can by no means be disputed is that man as he ordinarily leads his life, does not take care to reflect upon himself and makes it part and parcel of his conviction that he is different from the not-self and that is why he falls a victim to Sin. Sin in Hinduism is fundamentally an impersonal concept in so far as it is taken to spring from cognitive confusion and the consequent identification of the lower with the higher self. In the *Gītā*, to the question why man, even though reluctantly, commits sin, the Lord says in reply that desire, *Kāma*, and anger *Krodha* are behind it which in their turn are born of *rajas*. Now, desire and anger are concomitants of cognitive confusion or *avidyā* or

nescience. Just because one does not know how the self is distinct from the not-self, one falls a victim to sin which results from desire and anger, *kāma* and *krodha*. The implication is that the source of sin is more fundamental and ultimate than a mere defiance of the command of God as in Christianity. Why does the self, the *jīva* defy the will of God? The reply is that if the self does not possess discriminative wisdom and fails to know its true nature as distinct from the not-self, it inevitably disobeys God's will. *Avidyā* may thus be taken to be a concept wider in connotation and meaning than Sin. It is impersonal-personal whereas Sin is personal only. *Avidyā* is primarily a psychological concept while Sin is a theological concept.

Closer reflection reveals that the two concepts are not as radically different as they are commonly taken to be. *Avidyā*, nescience in Hinduism is not intrinsic to the self. The myth of the fall tells us clearly that man is not inherently infected with Sin. The narrative in the Bible depicting the original purity and perfection of the soul does not radically differ from the *Vedāntic* account of the self telling us that it is ever free and ever liberated. Sin enters into the self from outside and is therefore extrinsic to it as *avidyā* is in respect of the *ātman*. Sin cannot also be said to be intrinsic to the self in the sense that it is essential to it. To speak in terms of *Vedānta*, it does not constitute its nature or *svarūpa*. One cannot hold in the same breath both that a property or an attribute constitutes the essence or nature of something and also that the object can exist even though its nature has been dissipated or obliterated. Nor is there any need felt to eliminate it from the object. Viewed in this perspective both *avidyā* and sin do not appear intrinsic to the self or the *ātman* and it is conceivable that prior to affection by them the self or the *Ātman* is pure. If sin can be overcome and the self rendered immune from it and there is always the awareness that it is something one has to be delivered from, then, it is not intrinsic to it in the sense that it enters into the very constitution of it. The *Vedāntic* and the Christian views need not therefore be placed in watertight compartments as has been the fashion so far. Original Sin is original in the sense that *avidyā* is beginningless or *anādi*. Neither in *Vedānta* nor in Christianity can *avidyā* or Sin be looked upon as congenital.

The Christians start with sin but only to demonstrate that sin is not intrinsic to the self. I do not think it is a correct understanding of Christianity to impute to it the view that while it starts with the original sin it can think of a sinless state in the end. What after all is the meaning of the Christian doctrine of the creation of man in the image of God? That man is essentially sinless and divine but that because of his freedom and wrong choice in exercising it he commits sin is the most commonplace Christian view. Christians first emphasize the grandeur and dignity and purity of the self and then the misery and sin attending his disobedience of God. The difference between man's original state and what happened after fall is a commonplace theme in Christian theology and it was not earlier than St. Augustine that this distinction was interpreted to mean that man is inherently a sinner and that original sin constitutes the very essence of man. To say, again, that man is fallen is to presuppose a state of original purity from which he has fallen and this the Christian no less than the Hindu is interested to bring to the central focus of theological discussion. First, the dignity and grandeur and then the misery and depravity of man. First the order, then the disorder. There can be no disorder if there is not already the order. Sin, *avidyā* is not the utter

absence of the good but the corruption of the good.

The very term 'sin' designates a prior state of the soul, defection from which results in what we call sin. The Hebrew word for 'sin' is *het*, *hattat* whose Greek equivalent is *hamartia* which means 'to miss the mark'. It means thus the failure to attain a goal or end and this is due obviously to the fact that the self has fallen from its original state of sinlessness. There should be no obstacle to understanding sin also in the sense of intellectual error. It is at the same time both an error in judgment and also the failure to achieve a goal. The word 'sin' can thus be so interpreted as not to conflict with the goodness and grace of God. Of course, much confusion has arisen from making use of the phrase itself which is misleading indeed.

The doctrine of the fall of man and of original sin is claimed by many modern Christian writers to be only psychologically true in which case it conveys a meaning which is not sharply different from the Vedāntic notion. "...in every soul that shall be saved is a godly will that never assented unto sin." "It is high understanding to see and know that God dwelleth in our soul, and a higher understanding to see and know that our soul, which is made, dwelleth in God's substance." "Our soul is made Trinity, like the unmade blissful Trinity, and in the making owed to the Maker. This sight was full sweet and marvellous to behold." (W. R. Inge, *Mysticism in Religion*, p. 163) Gerald Vann says that although the narrative of the 'first chapters of the *Genesis* is psychologically true, ... to regard it as literal history is just puerile." It is interesting to note that the thirteenth-century theologian St. Thomas Aquinas made a distinction between the words *person* and *nature* and taught that Original sin which affects all men is not defect in them in their literal history is just puerile." It is interesting to note that the thirteenth century theologian St. Thomas Aquinas made a distinction between the words *Person* and *nature* and taught that Original Sin which affects all men is not a defect in them in their character as *persons* but in their *natures*. By *person* he meant the impenetrable, incommunicable, self-identity of men, the essential, mysterious, private self of man, the 'I'. In this character of his, man is sinless. But man has what is called a human nature which he shares in common with other men, his pride, self-consciousness, his ego, which makes him isolated and estranged from the rest of the world and from his fellow men. In this he is alienated from himself, from God and from the world and fellow men. Thus it is clear that even according to St. Thomas Aquinas man is not inherently a sinner (*Summa Theologica*, Blackfriars, 1964, Vol. XXVI, English translation, Appendices by T. C. O'Brien quoted in E. L. Mascall, *The Christian Universe*, p. 104) Sin is a voluntary activity; it is the necessary corollary of the freedom and self-consciousness of man and does not therefore prove the innate depravity of man. Man can never be aware of sin if he is not inherently good. Even in choosing the evil course of action man can never be aware of sin if he is not inherently good. This is the paradox of human nature that he commits sin even when he knows what virtue or the right course of action is and this is what freedom of will exactly implies. Duryodhana of the *Mahābhārata* knows what *dharma* and *adharma* are and yet he practises the latter by abandoning the former. Ideally, man is good though actually he is bad. This is exactly what *avidyā* too connotes. *Avidyā* and sin bring out thus the paradoxical character of man, his sinlessness and sinfulness co-existing in him. Sin is nothing if it is not voluntary. There is no sin in the stone and plants. Even St. Augus-

line said that 'Sin' is so much voluntary evil that it is not sin at all unless it is voluntary." (Quoted in Dr. Frederic Greeves, *The Meaning of Sin*, p. 32, Epworth Press, 1956, Also, Leslie D. Weatherhead, *The Christian Agnostic*, p. 185). But if there is no such thing as unconscious sin, if that is to say, all sins are voluntary and arise from the consciousness of the antithesis of both the good and the bad, the right and the wrong, the innate divinity and sinlessness of the human soul cannot be disputed. William Temple said: "We agree that there is no guilt attaching to the individual in respect of original sin. . . In our view the doctrine of a universal tendency to evil in man is not bound up with the historical truth of any story of fall." (*Doctrine in the Church of England*, pp. 64, 69, S. P. C. K., London, 1938, Leslie D. Weatherhead, *The Christian Agnostic*, p. 187).

II. Original Sin not the doctrine of Early Church

When we look at the doctrine of Original Sin in an historical perspective, we find that the early Christian Church had no clear-cut, well-defined, systematic doctrine of Original Sin which must be another strong ground for the conclusion that it did not form part of the essential Christian teachings. Jesus himself rarely talks about sin. In the opinion of Dr. Greeves, 'As far as Synoptic gospels inform us, our Lord used the noun only on six occasions and the verb on three occasions, allowing for parallel accounts, St. Paul used the words for sin ninety-one times.' (*The Meaning of Sin*, p. 102, quoted in *The Christian Agnostic*, p. 196). St. Paul's obsession with sin which is obvious from his using the word ninety-one times is doubtless a matter of later innovation on Jesus' original teachings. We have also to take into consideration the times in which Paul lived and lectured to the people of Rome which must have impressed him with the magnitude and hideousness of the brutality and wickedness and the moral bankruptcy of the people. The old Testament does not seem to have a well-defined, clear, unambiguous, cast-iron formulation of the doctrine of original sin. It is no doubt true that the third chapter of *Genesis* informs us that all men sinned 'in Adam' which later gave the impression that sin passed from Adam to his generation and that Adam was the original sinner. But this does not, in fact, lend any support to Original Sin. The word 'Adam' is the symbol of unregenerate humanity. Sin passed from Adam not by way of heredity but by setting a bad example. In St. Paul's Epistles even though we meet with his doctrine of the subjection of the whole human race to sin, Adam is never held responsible for it. It is nowhere suggested that men inevitably sin because Adam sinned in the very beginning from whom all men have inherited a deprived nature. It is to the social dimension of sin, of bad examples spreading the contagion that St. Paul calls attention. *Avidyā* too has, this social dimension. Sin, before its articulation and transformation into the doctrine of Original Sin was taken by the early Church to be more of the nature of privation than of deprivation, a fall from the supernatural status, divinity and sinlessness and light. There is always strong emphasis laid on free will and moral responsibility. It was since the time of Augustine that we have any record and evidence of the formulation of the doctrine of Original Sin in contrast to that of Pelagius who insisted on the freedom and uncorrupted nature of man. For St. Paul sin is only of the nature of a spiritual disease which can be overcome by the right use of freedom. St. Augustine overlooks this side of St. Paul's teachings and enlarges

upon the presence of the impulse to sin. Without entering into a detailed historical account of the fortunes and vicissitudes of the doctrine of original sin as doctored by St. Augustine in later Church history, we may say that it provoked much opposition and protest both in the Eastern and the Western Churches which goes to prove that it cannot be regarded as having been endorsed by Christianity. And from this the conclusion to which we seem inescapably driven is that the doctrine of the sinless divinity remains unaffected in Christianity and the contrast of the Vedāntic doctrine of the innate divinity and splendour of the Ātman is not as sharp as it is so common among the Hindu thinkers to emphasize.

III. Fundamental Points of Contact between Christianity and Vedānta

It is our main object to moderate and mitigate the tension between Christianity and Vedānta so far as the doctrines of Sin and *Avidyā* are concerned. From the brief treatment of the problem of sin and of the meaning and content of it the following conclusions regarding their mutual relations inevitably follow on closer reflection on both concepts. In the first place, it has to be taken into consideration that Vedānta and Christianity start with the assumption that man is inherently divine and sinless which is obvious from the Christian thesis that man was created in the the image of God. On the other hand, all schools of Vedānta categorically approve of the purity and perfection of the Ātman. A careful study of the Christian doctrine of this issue in an historical perspective does not seem to countenance the doctrine of original sin which seeped into the Christian faith not earlier than St. Augustine.

Secondly, *avidyā* in the manner it is handled and discussed in Vedāntic literature and articulated and formulated in Advaita, maintains the position that it is something whose reality and existence cannot be questioned. Even though on occasions, Śaṅkara says there is no existence of *avidyā* independently of the mind, (*nahyastayavidyā manasatirikṭā, Yiraka Chudāmaṇi*, 171) there is an doubt that some reality is accorded to it in Vedāntic writings. It is something *yakkṣit* whose reality and existence seem to be unquestionable. It is a fact that man is found infected with *avidyā*. It is no doubt true that ultimately one can overcome it and that it is not essential to the Ātman; nevertheless the fact remains that human life as it is ordinarily lived, (*avidyāyān antare vartamānā, svayam dhīrā paṇḍitammanyamānā*) gives unmistakable evidence of its domination over it and one cannot easily get rid of its spell even though its delusive nature and the manner and the extent of its corrupting power and function are not quite unknown to man. It calls attention, therefore, to the paradoxical character of man, of human nature, of knowledge tainted with the perversion of will and of the failure on the part of man for the proper orientation of the will. Thirdly, *avidyā* is not simply an intellectual concept suggesting mere want of knowledge or cognitive confusion. It is more than mere error of judgment which is an essential constituent in the complex concept of *avidyā*. Even Sin in Christianity is not utterly innocent of error of judgment. The sin of the first man does point to error of judgment and this leads us to infer that there is between the two concepts no such yawning gulf as can-determination to live in accordance with it thus yielding oneself to what we call the unregenerate life. *Avidyā* is not mere want of knowledge; it is in addition, the will to

elect a course of action contrary to that which is known to be good. One knows what is good and what is bad and yet there is the vicious tendency to do what is forbidden as being harmful. The first man had the knowledge of both the good and the evil and yet he gave way to the latter by rejecting the former. The idea embedded in this doctrine of Sin is not quite alien to the advaita concept of *avidyā*. "Extremely impenetrable, elusive, inscrutable indeed is this *Māyā*, so that all men even though reminded that they are in truth the Supreme Reality do not apprehend them to be such and take even the aggregate of the body and the senses which are preceived like the jars and so on to be not self, to be the self and to be the souls of another even though not said not to be such". (*Kaṣha Upaniṣad* III. 12, *Śaṅkara's bhāṣya*) which certainly echoes God's commands issued to Adam asking him not to eat of the forbidden fruit. Sin and *avidyā* agree in telling us that man is a victim to perverted vision because of his inability to see anything in clear light. Sin need not therefore be taken to be exclusively a moral concept devoid of cognitive confusion. Such errors exercise their power only on the minds of such thinkers as take a truncated and compartmentalised view of mind's functions. Fourthly, both Vedānta and Christianity are equally emphatic that there is no wrong thinking that is not accompanied by wrong living and that all our actual thinking has become pervert as Śaṅkara in the very beginning of his *adhyāsa-bhāṣya* makes clear. The social dimension of Sin and *avidyā* in the sense that almost all men are affected by them is common to both Christianity and Vedānta. There are stanzas in the *Gītā* also which bring into clear relief this nature of *avidyā*. In both Christianity and Vedānta sin and *avidyā* have been looked upon as insurmountable hindrances to the proper understanding of man which results in the alienation of man from himself, from the Cosmic Mind and from the community. Sin and *Avidyā* thus, result in what is now-a-days known to be alienation and it should thus be regarded as a moral rather than as a social or political or economic concept. Inner division, disintegration, the impotence of will, identification of the soul with the flesh, putting one's self above everything are too well-known manifestations of Sin and *Avidyā* to mislead us into thinking that they are radically different from each other in their connotation and meaning. Extracts from the writings of Śaṅkara can be endlessly multiplied in order to tell us after the Christian fashion that the delusion and distress and the physical suffering in which the whole human race has, inextricably plunged itself, as if embarking in the shoreless ocean of the world with leaky ships is the outcome of all one's divine powers and potentialities having been wrecked, crippled and impaired by the sway of *avidyā*. Nor can the Vedāntin in subscribing to the reality of *avidyā* by which all mankind has been affected claim that he keeps his doctrine of the absolute divinity of self antiseptically immune from any attack on it so that we may say the Vedāntic and the Christian views of man are utterly distinct from each other. To say as the Christian says that man is a sinner is not to make an assertion uncompromisingly different from the parallel Vedāntic conten-

१ अहो प्रतिगंभीरा दुःखमाह्वया विचित्रा चेवं माया, यदयं सर्वो जगुः :

परमावृतः परमावृतस्तद्वोदध्यैवं बोध्यमानोऽहं परमावृति न गृह्णाति,

अनात्मनं देहेन्द्रियादिसंघातमात्मनो दृश्यमस्मानि घटादिवदालेखेनाहममुष्य पुन इत्यनुच्यामानोरपि गृह्णाति नूनं यदयं मायया भोमुह्यमानः सर्वो लोक लोको बन्धमीति ।

tion that *avidyā* is congenital, *naisargika* as Śaṅkara frankly admits. Both views are statements in different terms and phrases of the same fact of spiritual experience.

There are differences however. The creation of the soul as understood by Christianity is in itself an element of imperfection and does not seem to confer that stately dignity and splendour and glory and status on man which is the most direct consequence of the Hindu view that it is eternal. Creation and immortality do not seem to cohere with each other. Personal immortality alone on which Christianity so emphatically insists can be immortality in the most logical and true sense of the term. The doctrine of the creation of the soul, however, is an obstacle to the realization of the Christian hope. There is also the attempt on the part of the Christian theologians to explain the whole phenomenon of sin dualistically as if sin were due to some objective force coördinate and equal in power with the soul. In Vedānta *avidyā* is understood as something arising from man's own cognitive confusion. The emphasis is on the subjective conditions rather than on objective circumstances and the whole outlook seems to be more optimistic than in Christianity. Yet the points of agreement are more powerful and numerous than those which divide Hinduism from Christianity.